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  1 
Prologue 
[E]very tradition, including Buddhism, is a flowing 
together of currents […] . There is no pure substratum, no 
static and independent core called ‘Buddhism’ – in the 
founder’s day or in later generations. What we have come 
to call ‘Buddhism’ was always becoming, being made and 
remade over and over again in contact and exchange, as 
it was carried along in the flow of things. (Tweed 2011: 
23)  
In a Pāli Vinaya narrative introducing the first pārājika precept a conversation is 
rendered wherein a Buddhist bhikkhu (Skt. bhikṣu, ‘ascetic’)1 inquires the Buddha for the 
reasons why the virtuous ascetic conduct or Brahma-life (brahmacariyā)2 lasted long 
under some of the 24 Buddhas of the previous kalpas, and why it was short lived among 
others. From the Buddha’s answer it becomes clear that one of the key factors for 
ensuring the presence of Brahma-life is the Pātimokkhasutta, for without it, disciples 
are like “various flowers, loose on a flat piece of wood, not tied together by a thread, 
[and] are scattered about, whirled about and destroyed by the wind.”3 On hearing the 
Buddha’s reply the bhikkhu, being apprehensive for a long continuation of the Brahma-
 
                                                     
1 With reference to the early Indian Buddhist context, I use the term ‘ascetic’ in a broad sense, this is, as 
referring to any individual possibly understood by the ‘samaṇa-brāhmaṇa’ compound (Skt. śramaṇa-brāhmaṇa). 
On the samaṇa-brāhmaṇa compound, see Appendix ‘Labeling the Ascetic other’ p. 152 ff. I will thus use the term 
‘ascetic’ simply in opposition to ‘householder,’ irrespective of the varying degrees of practiced austerity 
(tapas) between the various samaṇa-brāhmaṇa communities or within one and the same community. 
2 On the social context and various meanings of the term brahmacariyā, see Gombrich 2009: 202-3. See also 
Horner 2004 (1940) BD I: liv-lvi for her insightful reflections on her difficulty to translate this term in the Pāli 
Vinaya. 
The Padabhājaniya (old word commentary) to saṃghādisesa VIII equates ‘brahmacariyā’ with monkhood 
(bhikkhubhāva), śramaṇa-dharma (samaṇadhamma), morality (sīla) and austerity (tapas). Cf. Vin III: 163-4; BD I 
282. 
3 Vin III 8: “seyyathāpi Sāriputta nānāpupphāni phalake nikkhittāni suttena asaṃgahitāni tāni vāto vikirati vidhamati 
viddhaṃseti” (trsl. I.B. Horner BD I 16). 
 2 
life, presses the Buddha to proclaim the Pātimokkhasutta without delay, but the Buddha 
tells him to be patient, since, he explains:  
The teacher does not make known […] the course of training [sikkhāpadaṃ] for 
disciples, or appoint the Pāṭimokkha until some conditions causing the cankers 
appear here in the Order.4 (trsl. I.B. Horner BD I 18) 
According to this tradition recorded in the Suttavibhaṅga (‘Explanation of the Rules’), 
the Pātimokkhasutta is not a body of precepts conceived and imparted at the outset of 
the saṅgha to guide its members on the path to liberation, but it is the outcome of 
having had to practically meet specific unfavourable conditions that, if left unregulated, 
might have led to the deterioration of the virtuous conduct of Buddhist bhikkhus and 
consequently also of the saṅgha as a whole. This brief tradition further also provides an 
explanation for the presence of introductory stories to each precept in the Pāli Vinaya 
in which the monk-editors went through obvious great efforts to record the supposed 
events that led to the formulation of these precepts. 
Without taking prior notice of the specific content of the precepts or of their 
introductory stories, one could correctly presume that some precepts and narrative 
elements came into being due to the various relationships existent between the early 
Buddhist community and the other ascetic communities present at that time. Surely, 
the interaction and confrontation of the Buddhist saṅgha with contemporary ascetic 
communities might repeatedly have effected ‘unfavourable conditions’ that led to the 
formulation of various precepts of the Pātimokkhasutta. But even when leaving the 
‘unfavourable conditions’ aside, already the mere presence of other but similarly 
organized ascetic communities most certainly resulted in actual dynamic forces 
triggering and directing the development of the Buddhist ascetic organization. 
Certain contemporary ascetic communities, such as the Jain (nigaṇṭha, Skt. 
Nirgrantha) and ājīvika communities, were already well-established at the very 
beginning of the Buddhist saṅgha. The fact that Buddhists shared their claims on leading 
a samaṇa (Skt. śramaṇa) lifestyle and on offering an effective path to liberation, must 
have pressurized the Buddhist community to adopt a number of their practices that 
were already widely recognized by contemporary ascetics and lay-followers alike to be 
effective means to lead a virtuous samaṇa lifestyle. At the same time, during the course 
of development of the Buddhist monastic saṅgha, the customs of these contemporary 
ascetics might also have functioned as negative reference points against which Buddhist 
bhikkhus felt the need to differentiate themselves. In other words, it is only reasonable 
to assume that the various relations existent between the Buddhist saṅgha and other 
 
                                                     
4 Vin III 9: “na tāva Sāriputta satthā sāvakānaṃ sikkhāpadaṃ paññāpeti uddisati pātimokkhaṃ yāva na idh’ ekacce 
āsavaṭṭhāniyā dhammā saṃghe pātubhavanti.” 
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contemporary ascetic communities regularly acted as a dynamic force that stirred the 
Buddhist community to endorse regulations to, on the one hand, be in conformity with 
certain well-established ascetic customs and on the other hand, to (re)define their 
community as a clearly separate order. Any study aimed at understanding the history of 
the early Buddhist ascetic tradition must therefore necessarily try to reconstruct the 
nature of the interaction of the Buddhist saṅgha with contemporary ascetic movements, 
and consider the questions how this interaction influenced the development of their 
organization, or also, how these ascetic others were perceived and dealt with and how it 
affected their self-perception and definition. Framing this PhD are precisely these 
research questions.  
Departing from this truism that the development of the early Buddhist ascetic 
community evolved in intense dialogue with its wider Indian contexts, I question how 
and how much of this dialogue can still be traced in an important Buddhist monastic 
text, i.e. the Pāli Vinaya of the Theravāda school.5 The treatment of these research 
questions will be dealt with in the following way. In section I, ‘Scholarly Frameworks, 
Past and Present,’ I first discuss how the very question of dialogue relates to today’s 
larger contemporary scholarly language. In section II, ‘A Brief Typology of Contact 
Opportunities’ I turn to examine the occasions when and the places where early 
Buddhist bhikkhus could come into contact with their ascetic others, and ask how this 
affected their on-going boundary and identity negotiation. In section III, I examine 
processes of othering in the Pāli Vinaya, and in the final section, section IV, I show how 
the early Buddhist ascetic community evolved in close symbiosis with its wider Indian 
ascetic landscape by means of a philological excursion of the term titthiya, being the Pāli 
Vinaya’s most frequently employed term to refer to the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s ascetic 
other.  
To study which elements within the Pāli Vinaya are products of and best understood 
within these dialogical contexts of the early Buddhist tradition, is to admit that the 
development of the early Buddhist ascetic saṅgha should not be understood as a simple, 
coherent, internal or linear development, but as a dynamic, changing and dialectic 
process wherein the contemporary ascetic communities did not play a marginal but a 
central role. It is my personal conviction that a critical reading of the Pāli Vinaya is 
bound to be unsuccessful, or at least incomplete, if the dynamic and dialectic force of 
the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s ascetic others, is not fully taken into consideration. For, as 
it has recently been underscored again in a theoretical reflection on the current state of 
affairs of Religious Studies, the formative stages of any religious system is always 
characterized by the 
 
                                                     
5 On the question “how Theravāda is Theravāda,” see Skilling:  2012. 
 4 
amalgamation of elements from different traditions. This process is the general 
rule; purification and homogenisation are secondary phenomena.6  
In full agreement with this observation, my study aims in addition to identifying 
those elements within the Pāli Vinaya that developed in response to the various existing 
inter-religious contacts,  to dismantle strategies reflected within and of the Pāli Vinaya 
that enabled the early Buddhist ascetic community to, in a most basic sense, become a 
community and to be recognized as such. Or, to put it differently, this research also 
investigates the dynamic processes that enabled the early Buddhist monastic 
community to be both qualified as a community and, to use an anachronistic term, as 
‘Buddhist.’ This double quest translates itself into various research specific questions, 
such as how did early Buddhists define themselves and their contemporary ascetic 
others? What terms did they adopt to refer to these ascetic others and what do these 
terms reveal about the manner in which early Buddhists perceived and defined 
themselves vis-à-vis those very others? Which precepts address the problem of 
‘conversion’ or ‘otherness’ and are there different treatments for different ‘others’? To 
the narratological level of the Pāli Vinaya the question is put forward how the Pāli 
Vinaya refers to these ascetic others and what it establishes with these very references. 
Also, we ask which narrative structures or strategies are developed to help to create, as 
it were, a ‘Buddhist’ tradition? 
At this point, one may already justly remark that it is counterintuitive to hope to find in 
the Pāli Vinaya faithful reflections of the impact of other ascetic traditions on the 
development of the early Indian Buddhist monastic organisation since the Pāli Vinaya, 
as it is generally well realized, being compiled within and for the Theravāda tradition is 
a highly normative and prescriptive source that moreover evolved during a long period 
of time before it was written down in the first century BCE. Yet, how tricky our current 
task may appear in this light, it is nevertheless highly important to try to circumvent 
this problem by developing effective methodological readings of the Pāli Vinaya 
wherein the role and impact of these ‘others’ can be brought fully to the foreground. 
Otherwise the risk exist that when consulting the Pāli Vinaya, one elapses in the 
academic loophole of merely being ‘paraphrasing the texts,’ offering nothing more than 
a ‘weak continuation of the tradition itself,’7 or also, that one presents the monastic 
tradition the Pāli Vinaya reflects as a static unity that simply was and continued to be 
there for some time, ignoring the constant negotiating of the early Buddhist monastic 
community with itself and its ascetic surroundings in order to create its very tradition. 
 
                                                     
6 Krech 2012: 19. 
7 For this risk of remaining at a descriptive level when researching any religious tradition and for thus just 
being echoing the voice of the tradition itself, see Jensen 2008  and Smith 2001. 
  5 
I hope that the following pages achieve to offer an effective and much needed move 
away from the traditional stories concerning the development of the Buddhist monastic 
precepts and structures wherein (the authority of) the Buddha is having the central 
role, to the boundaries of the early Buddhist ascetic community where ‘Buddhist’ 
identity was continuously being negotiated, just as the possibility of incorporating new, 
or differing and alternative ascetic ideas and practices. By concentrating on the dynamic 
and dialectic force of the ascetic others, I hope to successfully move the spotlight from the 
centre of the early Buddhist community to its boundaries where the ‘flowing together of 
currents’ can be seen, or where, in short, the dynamics of “the making off” can still be best 
appreciated. 
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  9 
Scholarly Frameworks, Past and Present 
[U]nderstanding something implicitly involves the 
prejudices of one’s own ‘historical situatedness’; one 
simply cannot avoid having an agenda or a perspective 
upon things by virtue of one’s cultural and historical 
particularity. (King 2008 (1999): 95)1 
 
All scholars produce a scientific discourse inasmuch as they are directed by it. Scholars 
both simultaneously belong to a scholarly tradition as well as they actively (but 
therefore not necessarily consciously and purposefully) create that tradition. 
Consequently, “[i]t does not matter whether one generation applauds the previous 
generation or hisses it – in either event, it carries the previous generation within 
itself.”2 
Research is conducted within the scholarly language one has been taught in, and one 
may either be inspired or limited by it, but one is certainly being directed by it. By 
“scholarly language” I mean the received scientific discourse of an academic generation 
with its dominant and framing research paradigms, wherein scholarly questions are 
raised, discussed, pursued or abandoned for other questions. Shaping to a great extent 
the research content and applied methodologies of a particular scientific discourse are 
the various specific academic disciplines, institutionally supported, and artificially 
separated from one another in terms of required specialization, treated subjects and 
 
                                                     
1 Richard King formulated this lucid observation in his critical discussion on the question whether the act of 
‘Orientalism’ is not inevitably present to a lesser or higher degree in any study of Indian religious and 
philosophical material. For this observation he was inspired by the German philosopher Gadamer. Cf. King 
2008 (1999): 95. For a discussion on the act of orientalism, see the second section of this chapter.  
2 José Ortega y Gasset quoted in Charles Hallisey 1995: 31. See also Richard DAVIS 1999 (1998): 214- 223 for a 
similar observation on the difficulty to escape the patterns of traditional scholarly narratives, here, in regards 
to the traditional scholarly account on South Indian Jainism and Śaivism. 
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generally also in terms of distinct physical centres.3 Characterizing this scholarly 
language is the fact that it tends to change gradually, with changes becoming 
perceptible only in retrospect, after a (few successive) generation(s) of academics. 
Notable exceptions to this tendency of slow change should be expected in the event of 
historical axial moments that urgently require and effect new theoretical approaches, 
such as World War II or the 1968 cultural revolutions.4 Our concept of scholarly 
language agrees thus with Jacques Derrida’s notion of langue, namely inasmuch as we 
speak in a language the language is also speaking us.5 
As scholars, it is essential to develop an awareness concerning this fact that one is 
simultaneously speaking in and being spoken by a particular scholarly language, and 
this for two reasons. First, it effectively underscores the plain but important 
observation that our products of knowledge are relative. Being the outcome of a 
particular dialogue between one’s scholarly language, one’s research questions and one’s 
object of inquiry, any ‘fact’ presented as knowledge will by its very nature be relative.6 
Second, if a particular scholarly language is to change, if the structuring frame for our 
research material is to become more appropriate and meaningful to discuss a particular 
subject, then it needs to, so to speak, become aware both of itself, and of its framing 
relationship to its object of study. In other words, if scholarly language is to become 
more adequate one needs to develop an awareness of, in King’s words, “one’s own 
‘historical situatedness’.” The purpose of the following chapters is precisely this: to 
analyse the “historical situatedness” of this Dialogues with(in) the Pāli Vinaya. I try to 
answer, as far as possible, how this PhD relates with today’s larger contemporary 
scholarly framework. The questions of the dynamics and dialectics of the Pāli Vinaya’s 
ascetic others are framed, directed and inspired by, what I would like to term, the modern 
scholarly discourse on anti-essentialism. In broad terms, the anti-essentialist discourse 
may be conceived as the discursive thought rejecting the humanist idea that a subject is 
defined by an inherently present, unique and essential characteristic. Our discussion of 
this anti-essentialist discourse and its historical development will bring us to an analysis 
of the paradigm-shifting period of the 1970s (Part II). As this paradigm-shifting period of 
the 1970s should be understood in its – albeit mostly negative – relation to the late 
 
                                                     
3 For a brief and insightful discussion of the history of the modern university with its main division of the “two 
cultures” (‘sciences’ and ‘humanities’) and its subdivisions into various disciplines, see Wallerstein 2004: 1-22. 
4 It is, for instance, no coincidence that we speak of “Post World War II scholarship,” since the hangover of the 
Second World War and the subsequent period of decolonization required an urgent rethinking and 
restructuring of  the  academic disciplines, both with regards to their methods and subjects of knowledge. See 
further part II: Anti-Essentialist Framework of Dialogues with(in) the Pāli Vinaya. 
5 See “Force et signification,” in Derrida 1967: 9-49.   
6 Cp. Jonathan Smith’s lucid statement “I work very hard at persuading my college students that facts become 
data only for purposes of argumentation.” McCutcheon 2008:1 (quoting Smith 2002: 9). 
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nineteenth century, early twentieth century scholarly language, I start with an analysis 
of the dominant research paradigms of that period. This is, I begin with an examination 
of the questions and methodologies directing the then on-going scholarship on the Jain 
and Buddhist ascetic traditions, and ask which particular ‘Jainism’ and ‘Buddhism’ came 
thus to be constructed. 
Part I: Originating Origins. The Late Nineteenth, Early 
Twentieth Century Scholarly Framework  
The ‘Jainism’ and ‘Buddhism’ of late nineteenth century and early twentieth century 
European scholars, were a Jainism and a Buddhism informed by historicism, scientism, 
and by what modern scholars have referred to as some long-standing Protestant 
presuppositions regarding the importance of scriptures.7 The research questions and 
methods directing their particular construction of Jainism and Buddhism were modelled 
after those of the recently established disciplines of Science of Religion and Science of 
Language, and inspired by the language of evolutionary Theories which reached a high 
in the 1860s with Charles Darwin’s publication On the Origin of Species. A theme 
connecting all academic disciplines of that time is the set of interrelated questions of 
origins and development.  
While considering that within contemporary academia the assessment of the history 
of a religious field - as Jain and Buddhist studies are - is being researched both by 
historians (of religion), and by those scholars directly engaged in the field, it is not 
surprising to find many research papers discussing the dominant paradigms of late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century scholarship on Jainism and Buddhism.8 Some 
 
                                                     
7 For a good general academic introduction into Jainism, see Dundas 2002² (1992). For Indian Buddhism see 
Gombrich 2009 & Williams (et al) 2012. 
8 Many various groups of scholars are directly engaged in the fields of Buddhist and Jain studies: Indologists, 
Buddhologists, Jainologists, anthropologists, sociologists, Sinologists, Japanologists, philologists etc. 
It may be noted that 1807 is traditionally considered to be the birthdate of Jain Studies (cf. Schubring 1935: 1) 
as Jains were for the first time mentioned in a scholarly publication on India. It concerns the publications of 
Colin Mackenzie’s (1754-1821) and Sir Henry Thomas Colebrooke’s (1765-1837) accounts of India and its 
inhabitants in the journal Asiatic Researches 9. Both Mackenzie, who became the first Surveyor General of India 
in 1815 and Colebrooke, who was the director of the Royal Asiatic Society, resided for many years in India and 
became pioneers in the collection of documents and manuscripts for the Oriental study of India’s heritage. 
Flügel notes that the emic and etic use of ‘Jains’ as a term of (self-) designation became current from 1807 
onwards, due to Colebrooke’s article ‘Observations on the Sect of Jains.’ Flügel 2005: 4. Cf. Coolebrooke 1807.   
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outstanding papers outlining these paradigms in either general historical terms, or by 
means of specific case studies are Judith Snodgrass 2007’s “Defining Modern Buddhism: 
Mr. and Mrs. Rhys Davids and the Pāli Text Society,” Charles Hallisey 1995’s “Roads 
Taken and Not Taken in the Study of Theravāda Buddhism,” Mitch Numark’s “The 
Scottish ‘Discovery’ of Jainism in Nineteenth-Century Bombay” (2013), and John Cort 
1990’s “Models of and for the Study of the Jains.” Philip Almond’s 1988 The British 
Discovery of Buddhism is still today a most informative monograph discussing the many 
cultural and ideological frames shaping the British discussions (or better, creations) and 
multiple evaluations of ‘Buddhism’ during the Victorian period.9  
In the presence of this scholarship I have chosen to elucidate the research paradigms 
by especially focussing on those scholars whose work may be considered as being 
paradigmatic examples of the then current approach to the early Jain and Buddhist 
ascetic traditions. Being a critical reflection of our inherited mould for understanding 
the early Jain and Buddhist ascetic traditions, the following pages should by no means 
be understood as a rejection of this late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
scholarship. On the contrary, much of the research presented in this PhD is highly 
indebted to the many valuable contributions of that time. It may therefore be stressed 
that the main concern of our analysis is not a (re-)evaluation of the research results of 
that time; rather, the main objective is to point out the dominant research paradigms 
that directed the very research questions and methodologies of that time (= Part I) to, in 
a second instance, question how these affected our current understanding of and 
approach to the early Jain and Buddhist ascetic traditions (= Part II). The value of this 
discussion lies in the facts that it will not only enable us to better understand our own 
‘historical situatedness,’ but also that it effectively underscores the importance of an 
on-going methodological reflection that, ideally speaking, would be in dialogue with 
one’s scholarly heritage, one’s own contemporary scholarly language, and one’s object 
of study.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
On the history of the study of the Jain tradition, see Winternitz 1920: 289-356. Discussing the canon of the 
Jains, Winternitz reviews the western study of the Jain texts from its inception onwards up to 1920. Three 
articles of the late Kendall Folkert (and edited by John Cort) discuss with great lucidity the history of Jain 
studies, its generative context, initial research questions and patterns and some of its lasting consequences. 
Folkert 1993 (1989; 1980-1984; 1975-1980). See also Flügel 2005 ‘The Invention of Jainism: A Short History of 
Jaina Studies’ and Cort 1990 where many more references treating the history of Jain studies may be found. 
9 As starting date of the Victorian period the year 1837 is generally given, being the year that Victoria became 
a queen, and as closing date the year 1901, being the year of Queen Victoria’s death. Other conventional data 
are 1830-1900. 
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Historicism 
Late nineteenth, early twentieth century scholarly language was one predominantly 
concerned with the interrelated questions of origins and development. These questions 
were informed by a then newly felt need for history which was caused by an in those 
days prevailing belief in historicism, or in the idea that all contemporary things could be 
accounted for in terms of their past, or in terms of their specific historical development.  
Any cursory reading of late nineteenth century and early twentieth century 
European accounts on ‘Jainism’ or ‘Buddhism’ shows the scholars’ deep engagement 
with questions pertaining to the historical origins of these religious traditions. It 
underlay, for instance, Hermann Jacobi’s very concern with the historicity of the 
twenty-third and twenty-fourth Jain tīrthaṅkara Parśvānath and Mahāvīra (cf. below), 
and Rhys Davids’ efforts to construct his historical biography of the Buddha.10 As John 
Cort noted, in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century “ ‘Origin and 
development of something became almost a cliche,’ ” for at that time an “[i]nterest in 
history naturally led to an interest in origins and beginnings.”11 The then fairly newly 
established discipline of Science of Religion (“Religionswissenschaft”) was first and 
foremost a History of Religion.12  
The strong interest in and need for history in nineteenth century Europe was a tail 
end of the rapid social and cultural changes effected by the then on-going 
industrialization processes. These changes awoke an awareness of the cultural and 
historical contingency of one’s own present situation that, as Krech noted, arose an 
interest in history, but not in history as a sole reservoir of facts, but as a means to 
understand the contemporary society. The need was felt for a history that could answer 
 
                                                     
10 Cf. Rhys Davids, 1878, Buddhism: being a Sketch of the Life and Teachings of Gautama, the Buddha. London: Society 
for Promoting Christian Knowledge. He constructed his biography by means of a critical comparison of the 
various Buddhist canonical texts he had at his disposal. In his construction he shows a positive appreciation 
for the Pāli canon – considering it to be the oldest and hence most authoritative version, and a general 
negative appreciation for all the ‘supernatural’ elements surrounding the Buddha’s life, explaining them away 
as  common features of ‘hero-worship’ of common people. Cf. Davids 1878: 17. 
11 Cf. Cort 1990: 50 & 51. Cort (p.50) quotes here from Mircea Eliade, 1969. The Quest. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
12 The discipline ‘Science of Religion’ originated within the configuration of the modern university in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. For a socio-cultural historical analysis of the rise of the ‘science of 
religion’ with its initial stress on ‘origin and development,’ see Krech (2000). See also Kippenberg’s (2002) 
monograph discussing the rise of the historical concept of religion against the nineteenth century background 
of modernization Discovering Religious History in the Modern Age, being a translation of his 1997 volume Die 
Entdeckung der Religionsgeschichte, Religionswissenschaft und Moderne. On the discipline’s aim and methodology, 
see further in this chapter. 
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the why of the present being as it is and not being something else.13 This particular 
interest in history wherein “the present had to be contextualized with regard to the 
past” resulted in historicism.14 A historicism that, it should be realized, “permeated 
almost all nineteenth-century scholarship in Europe and North America.”15 
Science of Religion and Science of Language 
How was the question of history in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe 
approached? More specifically, how did European scholars of that time go about in 
writing the history of the Indian religious traditions? To further our critical 
understanding of both our inherited mould for Jain and Buddhist studies and our 
awareness concerning our own ‘historical situatedness’ as scholars, we need to have a 
knowledge not only of the nineteenth century Jainism and Buddhism, but also of the 
manner in which that particular Jainism and Buddhism was constructed. This is, if 
nineteenth century scholars wrote a history of early Buddhism, we need to take note 
not only of that particular history, but also of the manner in which they wrote that 
history. Which questions directed them? Why did these questions direct them, and not a 
different set of questions? From what sources did they draw their information, and what 
informed their source selection? Which methodologies underlay their research? Even if 
we know a priori that our answers to such questions are bound to be partial and do 
injustice to the complexity of the diverse realities that informed the scholars’ writing, 
they are nevertheless worthy of our reflection. For, such reflections effectively remind 
us, as mentioned, both of the inescapability of framing paradigms and of the relativity 
or dialogical aspect of knowledge production.  
The manner how late nineteenth century European scholars wrote their history of 
‘Jainism’ and ‘Buddhism’ was informed by the overall aim of that recently established 
discipline Science of Religion (read History of Religion). The discipline’s aim was to 
discover the ‘origin’ of religion, to find both that one principle underlying all religions, 
and the ‘laws’ causing religions to change, or better, develop into their present stage or 
manifestation, or, alternatively, causing religions to stop or freeze in their 
development.16 This Science of Religion’s general aim of identifying the dynamic origin 
 
                                                     
13 Cf. Krech 2000, esp. 245-50 and 261-65.  
14 Krech 2000: 261. 
15 Hallisey 1995: 36. 
16 Animism and ancestor worship have been alternatively postulated as lying at the genesis of religion. Cf. 
Krech 2000: 245-50. 
Some nineteenth century Victorian scholars evaluated Buddhism as a religion that had  in its development 
stopped “one stage” short of (becoming) Christianity. Cp. Almond 1988: 132-138. 
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and growth of religion also motivated the late nineteenth century historical writings on 
‘Jainism’ and ‘Buddhism.’ This may be exemplified with the work of Rhys Davids. In his 
introduction to The Hibbert Lectures, which full title significantly reads Lectures on the 
Origin and Growth of Religion, as Illustrated by Some Points in the History of Indian Buddhism, he 
notes:  
[T]he task allotted to us is … to discuss those points in the history of Buddhism 
which appear likely to throw light on the origin and growth of religious belief. This 
means, as I understand it, the origin and growth of religion outside, as well as inside, 
the circle of the Buddhist beliefs themselves. What we have to do is, in a word, to 
apply a particular method, the comparative method, to the study of the facts 
revealed to us by the history of Buddhism. (Davids 1906 (1881): 1, emphasis mine) 
Subscribing to the discipline’s aim of throwing “light on the origin and growth of 
religious belief,” he sets out using the “comparative method.” The comparative method 
was adopted from the equally relatively new discipline Science of Language and 
introduced into the discipline Science of Religion by Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900), 
one of the discipline’s progenitors.17 The comparative method not only served the 
general purpose of tracing that common foundation of all religions and their 
development, but also helped nineteenth century European scholars to better 
understand the history of their own religion, ‘Christianity.’ Rhys Davids in a lecture 
entitled “What has Buddhism derived from Christianity,” which was posthumously 
published in 1923 by his wife and Pāli scholar Mrs. Rhys Davids, observes with a distinct 
enthusiastic tinge how: 
[Buddhism is] a religion whose development runs entirely parallel with that of 
Christianity, every episode, every line of whose history seems almost as if it might 
be created for the very purpose of throwing the clearest light on the most difficult 
and disputed questions of the origin of the European [i.e. Christianity] faith. 
(Davids 1920-3: 51-52) 
 
                                                     
17 For Friedrich Max Müller, who among Sanskritist is best remembered for his edition of the Ṛgveda, and as 
editor of the famous series “Sacred Books of the East,” the “comparative method” was primordial in the 
scientific study of religion. With reference to Goethe’s paradox “He who knows one language knows none,” he 
similarly asserted that for the study of religion “He who knows one [religion], knows none.” (Müller 1882² [1873]: 
12-13). Considering that he was the first professor of Comparative Philology at Oxford University in 1868, we 
should not be surprised that he modeled his methodological approaches and departing premises for the 
scientific study of religion on the ones of Science of Language. Because of the use of the comparative method 
“Science of Religion” was in its early days also known as (and today better remembered under the name of) 
“Comparative Religion.” Today the discipline is known as “Religious studies.” 
See for Max Müller’s view on and questions for Science of Religion  “Philologist Out of Season. F. Max Müller 
on the Classification of Language and Religion,” in Masuzawa 2005: 207-256.  
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It is also telling that Rhys Davids’ 1878 publication Buddhism was published by the 
‘Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.’ Comparing ‘Buddhism’ and ‘Christianity’ 
meant charting their alleged similarities and differences. And as Davids’ quote above 
makes apparent, the noted similarities between the two were considered – at the very 
least – remarkable. In general terms, the knowledge produced on Buddhism was put at 
the disposal of the newly established discipline ‘Science of Religion’ and its overarching 
aim of charting the origin and development of religion. 
For us today it is apparent, in retrospect, that the noted similarities between 
‘Buddhism’ and ‘Christianity’ were not so much a mere reflection of ‘objective facts,’ but 
more the result of nineteenth century scholars drawing Buddhism within their given 
conceptual framework and language, this being their deep-rooted Christian theological 
worldview. To nineteenth century European scholars the similarities were, however, 
discovered ‘facts’ that could be accounted for in historical terms. Friedrich Max Müller 
saw two possible explanations for the similarities between Buddhism and Christianity: 
“Either, one of these two religions borrowed from the other, or the similarities between 
them must be traced back to that common foundation which underlies all religions.”18 
Müller and Rhys Davids, among others, adhered to the latter explanation, while still 
others adhered to the first. Irrespective of the nineteenth century scholars’ reasons for 
adhering to either one of these two possibilities,19 the two proposed possibilities are in 
themselves reflective of the argumentative patterns reigning the nineteenth century 
scientific discourse on religion. Discussing similarities and differences in terms of 
“borrowing” and “originality,” while searching for origins, may be viewed as 
characteristic of nineteenth century scientific discourse on religion. The scientific 
discourse of that time was one dominated with a general search for origins; with the 
questions of originality or of who copied who. As we shall see, underlying this search for 
origins is “the historiographical assumption of the purity of the historically prior” (cf. 
below).20 But first, let us illustrate how this scientific discourse with its stress on origins 
directed the then on-going research on the early Jain ascetic tradition by means of 
Hermann Jacobi’s (1850-1937) argumentation on the independent origins and authentic 
status of the Jain community. 
 
                                                     
18 Müller cited in Almond 1988: 126. 
19 Similarities were by some seen to be the result of the influence of Nestorian Christians on Buddhism. For a 
detailed elaboration of this and other views, see Almond 1988: 126-9. 
20 Almond 1988: 96. This normative qualification of the “historically prior” is a correlative of an inherited 
Christian monogenetic worldview. For an examination of how the Christian monogenetic worldview affected 
the understanding of “new worlds,” see Smith 2004 (1985) and Smith 2004 (2001). 
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Interlude. Nineteenth Century Scholarly Language Exemplified  
Jacobi and his Search for Origin and Originality in Jain and Buddhist Precepts 
Jacobi’s argumentation on the independent origins and authentic status of the Jain 
community, is generally considered to be a first axial moment in nineteenth century 
European scholarship on Jainism. It is well-known that before Hermann Jacobi’s 1884 
historic argumentation, western Indological discourse conceived the early Jain 
community to be the oldest schismatic offshoot of the Buddhist tradition.21 Jacobi had 
already tried to counter this pro-schismatic argument in 1880 in his article ‘On 
Mahāvīra and his Predecessors,’ by arguing for the historicity of Pārśva, this is, the Jain 
teacher or tīrthaṅkara prior to Mahāvīra, and thus arguing also for dating the historical 
start of the Jain community as anterior to the one of the Buddhist community. Key to 
his argumentation was his identification of cātu-yāma-saṃvara-saṃvuto (‘controlled by 
the fourfold restraint’),22 being a description given of nigaṇṭhas in the Pāli Sāmaññaphala 
Sutta (DN I 58:29), with the ‘Fourfold Restraint’ of Pārśva’s teachings in Jain texts.23 
Though this identification, together with other circumstantial evidence,24 would ensure 
 
                                                     
21 This view was held e.g. by Auguste Barthe (1834-1916), Christian Lassen (1800-1876) and Albrecht Weber 
(1825-1901). Cf. Wiley 2004, Historical Dictionary of Jainism: s.v. Jacobi, Hermann. Note, however, that not all 
information listed is accurate. 
22 Other translations given for the technical description cātu-yāma-saṃvara-saṃvuto (Skt. cātur-yāma-saṃvara-
saṃvṛta) are ‘being protected by the four kinds of restraints or rules’ (cf. Watanabe 2002); ‘retenu par le frein 
de quatre abstentions réunies’ (Burnouf as quoted in Jacobi 1880:160); or ‘bound by a fourfold restraint’ (Thus 
Have I heard, Walshe 1987: 97). 
For a critical discussion on the Buddhist interpretation of this Jain technical term, see Watanabe 2002 and 
Huang 2008. See also Jaini 2001 (1979): 15-19 where he points to the possibility that cātu-yāma-saṃvara may not 
be referring to the four vows of Pārśva, but to ‘the four modalities (mind, body, speech, and the senses) through 
which evil could be expressed.’ Cf. Jaini 2001 (1979): 18. On this possibility see also Dundas 2002² (1992): 32. 
Further see Bronkhorst 2000: 515-517 who points out that ‘early Buddhists were aware of the exact meaning of 
the four restraints of the followers of Pārśva.’ If the definition given in Buddhist texts does not agree with the 
one in Jain texts then this should be understood, according to Bronkhorst, as a Buddhist punning. Bronkhorst 
2000: 517 & 515. 
23 Jacobi 1880: 160-1. Pārśva would have stipulated a Fourfold Restraint (caujjāma) for his ascetic followers 
whereas Mahāvīra  would have stipulated five restraints, i.e. his five Great Vows (mahavvaya). For the specifics  
of Pārśva’s Fourfold Restraint and Mahāvīra’s five Great Vows, see Dundas 2002² (1992): 30-1. 
24 It is not easy to trace back the arguments that lead to the current widespread and unquestioned scholarly 
acceptance of the historicity of Pārśva. It seems to be one of those arguments that gained weight by force of 
repetition. This correspondence of the description of the fourfold restraint of nigaṇṭhas in Buddhist texts with 
the caujjāma (caturyāma) of Pārśva in Jain texts seems to be one of the few decisive arguments that lead to 
accept Pārśva’s historicity. Other circumstantial evidence corroborating Pārśva’s historicity is the fact that a 
description of his teachings is found in the ‘Sayings of the Seers’ (IBh 31). Another generally accepted fact 
regarding the history of the early Jain community that is based on rather meagre evidence, is the conception 
of Mahāvīra having renounced within Pārśva’s ascetic lineage. The evidence conventionally drawn upon in 
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a widespread scholarly acceptance of Pārśva’s historicity in later scholarly circles, it did 
not suffice to persuade the then on-going academic discussion on the origins of the Jain 
community. As we will see, the turning point would have to wait until 1884 with his 
introduction to his translation of the first book of the Āyāraṅga Sutta and the Kappa 
Sutta, wherein he goes to great length to substantiate his earlier argument.25  
The reasons why some scholars of that time26 viewed the Jains as Buddhist sectarians 
were the many real - and apparent - similarities the two traditions shared; the too much 
Buddha-like biography of the Jain teacher Mahāvīra; and the fact that the Jain Prākrit 
texts were viewed to be not as old as the Buddhist texts.27 Additional reasons were the 
resemblances between early Jains and Buddhists regarding their epithets for their 
teachers; their supposed worship of “mortal men” (i.e. the Buddha and Mahāvῑra); stress 
on non-violence and conception of the world history into “those enormous periods of 
time which bewilder and awe even the most imaginative fancy,”28 were conventionally 
drawn upon in support of the pro-schismatic argument of the Jain community. Also the 
similarities between the principal vows and precepts of the two communities were 
quoted as corroborating evidence for the sectarian origin of the Jain community. With 
this argumentation in view, Albrecht Weber (1825-1901) showed the correspondences 
between the five great vows of the Jains (pañca-mahāvratas) and the five precepts or 
virtues of the Buddhists, and Ernst Windisch (1844-1918) drew attention to the similar 
content of the Jain vows and the dasasīlas or the Ten Precepts for the Buddhist novice.29  
Establishing the independent origination of the Jain tradition, Jacobi refuted these 
common pro-schismatic arguments one by one. And though each one of his refutations 
could lead to stimulating discussions, for the present purpose I will focus on his 
negation of the pro-schismatic argument that early Buddhists and Jains shared basic 
vows and precepts.30 For the manner in which Jacobi – successfully - negated this 
argument, may be considered as a paradigmatic example of how studies would frame 
their discussion of the early Jain and Buddhist ascetic organization. This is, in terms of 
true origin and originality, authenticity and authority, borrowing and adaptation. For 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
support of this statement, is the fact that the Āyāraṃga Sutta mentions that Mahāvīra’s parents were 
followers of Pārśva. Cf. Dundas 2002² (1992): 30.  
25 Cf. Jaina Sūtras. Part I: The Âcârâṅga Sūtra, The Kalpa Sūtra, Hermann Jacobi (tr.), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 
Publishers Private Ltd (Sacred Books of the East vol. 22), 1989 [1884]. 
26 See note 21. 
27 See Folkert 1993 (1989): 97. 
28 Jacobi 1884, op. cit.:  xxi.  
29 Ibid.: xxii – xxiii. 
The ten precepts, or the ‘ten rules of training’ (dasa sikkhāpada)’ for the novice (sāmaṇera) are in the Pāli 
Vinaya recorded at Mahāvagga I.56.1 (Vin I 83-4; BD IV 105-6). 
30 See Jacobi 1884: xff.  
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his refutation of this pro-schismatic argument we turn to his translation activities of the 
Āyāraṅga Sutta (Skt. Ācāraṅga Sutta), the oldest extant - and until then unknown – Jain 
Śvetāmbara text on ascetic conduct.31  
During his translation work on the Āyāraṅga Sutta, Jacobi became familiar with the 
Dharmasūtra of Baudhāyana, a law book containing various prescriptions for the 
brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsin,32 as its translation by George Bühler became published in 1882 in 
Max Müller’s famous Sacred Books of the East series.33 This fact is important. For, with 
this translation of Baudhāyana’s Dharmasūtra made available for the first time, new 
insights were gained both into the ascetic organization of the ascetic members of the 
ancient Indian brāhmaṇa community, and into the age of this brāhmaṇa ascetic 
institution that, without entering into details, was considered to be older than the 
historical start of both the Buddhist and Jain ascetic communities.34  
Jacobi soon observed that there where the vows or precepts of the Jain ascetic agreed 
with those of the Buddhist bhikkhu, they also agreed with those of the brahmaṇa 
saṃnyāsin. For example, the general correspondence between the main mahāvratas of 
the Jains and the precepts of the Buddhists, was also found in the five principle vows of 
the brahmaṇa saṃnyāsin. Regarding this fact Jacobi made the following observation and 
though brief, both its formulation and underlying reasoning could be considered 
paradigmatic, as I will soon elaborate upon, for studies on the origins of the Jain 
community: 
neither the Buddhists nor the Gainas have in this regard any claim to originality, 
[as]… both have only adopted the five vows of the Brahmanic ascetics (samnyāsin).  
And after having enumerated the respective five vows of the brahmaṇa ascetics, he 
continues: 
Our foregoing inquiry suggests where we have to look for the original of the 
monastic orders of the Gainas and Buddhists. The Brahmanic ascetic was their 
model, from which they borrowed many important practices and institutions of 
ascetic life. (Jacobi 1884: xxiii - xxiv) 
 
                                                     
31 Jacobi completed the editing and translation of the Āyāraṅga Sutta in respectively 1882 and 1884. For a 
discussion of this Sutta, see p. 58 ff. 
32 On the semantic history of the term saṃnyāsa, see Olivelle 1981. 
33 The Sacred Laws of the Âryas. Part II: Vâsishtha and Baudhâyana, George Bühler (tr.), Oxford: Oxford University 
Press (Sacred Books of the East vol. 14), 1882. 
34 The Dharmasūtra of Baudhyāyana was then generally considered to date between 500-200 BCE. In a recent 
re-evaluation of the relative chronology and absolute dates of the Dharmasūtras, Patrick Olivelle came to a 
“much narrower time span for the composition of the three earlier documents [i.e. the Dharmasūtra of 
Āpastamba, Gautama, and Baudhyāyana], from the beginning of the third to the middle of the second 
centuries BCE.” Cf. Olivelle 2009 (1999): xxxiv, see also p. xxv ff. 
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The facts that the Jain ascetics (and also Buddhists for that matter) have in common 
with the brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins not only their major vows but also various other precepts, 
was considered by Jacobi to be conclusive evidence to counter the then current pro-
schismatic assertion on the basis that both traditions shared some precepts. For, he 
argued, why would Jains copy the Buddhists when they had in the institution of the 
brahmaṇa saṃnyāsin a “model of higher antiquity and authority”? The Jain ascetics 
indubitably would have followed in their articulation of vows and precepts this model of 
the brahmaṇa saṃnyāsin, rather than “the less respected and second-hand model of their 
rivals, the Buddhists.” In fact, “the life of Gaina monks is but an imitation of the life of 
the Brahmanic ascetics.”35 
The pattern of Jacobi’s argumentation may be clear. In order to establish the 
independent origination of the Jain tradition he, among other things, compared the 
precepts of the three known and documented wandering traditions of early north India, 
the brāhmaṇa, Jain and Buddhist. Taking the brāhmaṇa tradition to be the most ancient 
and (hence?) most authoritative model, he understood all similarities as an indication of 
Jains and Buddhists to be following the authoritative brāhmaṇa model. And it is this type 
of reasoning and argumentation that became formative for the way subsequent 
comparative studies dealt with identical praxes of the three wandering traditions. 
Corresponding practices were found to reflect the common ascetic substratum, which 
was naturally dictated by the brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins, from which they developed and as 
such did not constitute the real ‘original’ or ‘genuine’ elements of the ascetic traditions. 
Indeed, the scholarly opinion developed that only when the corresponding practices 
were removed, only then the unique characteristics and realizations of each wandering 
tradition would come to the foreground, an opinion that, it may be noted, is still to some 
extend adhered to today. With the brāhmaṇa tradition determining this common ascetic 
substratum, Jains and Buddhists in their agreement with it, became commonly 
portrayed to be merely copying the brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins and to be, at least in this 
respect, ‘unoriginal.’ This double tendency to view both the Jain and Buddhist ascetic 
precepts in relation to the ones of the brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins, and to interpret their 
correspondences in terms of ‘adoption’, ‘borrowing’ or ‘imitation’ versus ‘original,’ has 
had pernicious effects for the conception of the Jain and thus also the Buddhist tradition 
as a movement “in and for itself.” 
Jacobi was well aware that central to his argumentation was the supposed older date of 
the brāhmaṇa Dharmasūtras, and thus also of the brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsin institution, to the 
rise of the Jain and Buddhist tradition. Realizing that George Bühler’s dating of the 
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Dharmasūtras was still very speculative,36 Jacobi does briefly venture to consider the 
reverse scenario: what if the Dharmasūtras were not older or at least as old as the rise of 
the Jain and Buddhist tradition? Would it mean that the common precepts are a result 
of the brāhmaṇa ascetics copying the Buddhists? Jacobi dismisses the possibility 
altogether and his reasoning is worthy to be quoted here as, again, it is a beautiful 
paradigmatic example of how the relationship between the three wandering institutions 
came to be conceived: 
Even in that case, which is not a probable one, those lawgivers [of the 
Dharmasūtras] are not likely to have largely borrowed from the Buddhists whom 
the Brahmans at that time must have despised as false pretenders of a recent 
origin. They would certainly not have regarded laws as sacred which were 
evidently appropriated from heretics. On the other hand, the Buddhist had no 
reason not to borrow from the Brahmans, because they greatly respected the 
latter for the sake of their intellectual and moral superiority. (Jacobi 1884: xxx) 
It is truly remarkable how quickly the possibility is rejected. In the light of the fact 
that not only the Buddhist sources developed over a long period of time and present 
true chronological labyrinths to the philological historian (cf. below) but also the 
brāhmaṇa texts such as the Dharmasūtras, the possibility should at least be considered 
that if one similarity is the result of Buddhists copying brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins at one time 
and place, that another might be the outcome of brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins copying the 
Buddhists at a different time and/or place, if at all, indeed, similarities necessarily need 
to point to the fact that one is consciously copying or imitating the other. And what 
about religious flexibility, or the possibility of multiple sources of identity? How about 
the possibility of a brāhmaṇa Buddhist or Buddhist brāhmaṇa, or Jain Buddhist? How 
strict were the boundaries between the various traditions, or also, how well were they 
defined? The questions are complex, bring more confusion than clarity, but are 
legitimate and urgent. For example, if the tradition recorded in the Pāli Vinaya 
regarding admission to the Buddhist ascetic saṅgha may be trusted, the procedure to 
become a Buddhist bhikkhu (i.e. an ascetic disciple of the Buddha), at least in the initial 
formative stages of the saṅgha, constituted not much more than one expressing the wish 
to become a disciple, and the Buddha granting the wish with the standard formula ‘ehi 
bhikkhu,’ this is ‘come here bhikkhu.’37 This admission does not seem to demand a clear or 
rigid abandonment of a previous (religious) identity. Considering in addition the simple 
fact that prior to becoming a disciple of the Buddha one was not a Buddhist bhikkhu, the 
 
                                                     
36 See n. 34. 
37 The ordination formula of ‘ehi bhikkhu’ is seen used for the first time in the Pāli Vinaya at MV I 6.32 (Vin I 11; 
BD IV 18). For a discussion of the various formulation procedures, see Horner BD IV xff. 
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feasibility of carrying a double (or multiple sources of) identity seems very actual, if at 
all identity negotiation was indeed carried along the lines (of our analytical categories) 
‘Buddhist,’ ‘Jain’ and ‘brāhmaṇa.’38 Temporarily suspending the treatment of these 
questions, the main issues that need to be underscored here are the facts that in the 
nineteenth century European discussions on the origins of the Jain ascetic organization, 
the brāhmaṇical ascetic institution came by some scholars to be viewed as the example 
for both the Jain and Buddhist systems, and the direction of influence as unilateral. For, 
irrespective of the truth value of Jacobi’s claim in the last quoted passage that early 
Buddhists attributed ‘intellectual and moral superiority’ to their brāhmaṇa other, this 
much has become clear: nineteenth century scholars, such as Jacobi, certainly did. The 
ascetic institution of the brāhmaṇas was viewed and presented as ‘the model’ par 
excellence. To assemble the terms from the brief passages of Jacobi quoted above, the 
brahmanical ascetic institution was in relation to those of the early Jains and Buddhists 
seen as: the ‘original’ one, the one endowed with ‘originality’, a ‘model of higher 
antiquity and authority,’  and of an ‘intellectual and moral superiority.’ Again, when 
considering the chronological heterogeneity of also the Brahmanical texts, the 
confidence with which this view was presented and accepted could not solely have 
rested on the supposed elder date of the Dharmasūtras as a whole.39 Part of the certitude 
must instead have lied in the fact that early European scholars most probably (and 
perhaps unquestioningly) accepted the Brahmins’ own claim of superiority, this is, their 
ideological division of society into four different groups or vaṇṇa (Skt. varṇa), and 
viewing themselves to be occupying the highest vaṇṇa.   
To conclude this discussion, it may be made explicit how the questions and pattern of 
Jacobi’s argumentation are reflective of the dominant scholarly language of his time. 
Already his very questions concerning the historical origins of the Jain tradition, of the 
historicity of the Jain tīrthaṅkaras Pārśva and Mahāvīra, and of the origin of the common 
Jain and Buddhist precepts, are reflective of the late nineteenth century general 
concern with the questions of origins and history. It is very significant how Jacobi went 
into great trouble to find the ‘real source’ or origin for the precepts the Jain community 
shared with Buddhists. For in the end, the fact that the brāhmāṇa saṃnyāsin came to be 
presented and accepted as the authoritative source of these Jain precepts, does - 
regardless whether it is actually correct or not -  not per se need to abolish the 
possibility that Jains were Buddhist sectarians. Jacobi might very well have convinced 
his audience of the fundamental difference between Jains and Buddhists by showing 
how adherence to the same precepts was by each community believed to have 
 
                                                     
38 Cf. Part II Dialogue. 
39 Note how recent scholarship does not consider the Dharmasūtras, among which the one of Baudhyāyana, to 
be as old as was then commonly thought. See n. 34.  
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fundamentally different soteriological consequences40 - even though, indeed, they still 
lead to the same soteriological goal of mokṣa. Conversely, he might have argued that 
Jains sharing Buddhist precepts did not have to signify anything particular, but that it is 
just an indication of the simple fact that similarly organized ascetic communities who 
both claim and are recognized to be ascetic communities can only be expected to share 
fundamental vows and precepts. Instead, as we have amply seen, Jacobi searched and 
found an origin for these Jain precepts different than the Buddhist one. 
Further, Jacobi’s pattern of argumentation may be considered as representing one of 
the dominant moulds that developed during his time to understand the early Jain and 
Buddhist traditions. This mould being, once again, the view that the brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsin 
presented the oldest and most authoritative model, and all agreement found with the 
Jain and Buddhist mendicant would be seen as further confirming this fact. In addition, 
there would be a general tendency to positively appreciate the brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsin in so 
far it represented the ‘original’ ascetic institution, and to negatively appreciate the 
Jain’s and Buddhist’s ones for being merely ‘imitating’ or, in the words of Jacobi, to be 
‘false pretenders of a recent origin.’ As we will see in the upcoming discussion of the so-
called Protestant paradigm, in addition to this model where Jains and Buddhist came to 
be considered as mere ‘imitators’ of the original and authoritative brāhmaṇa institution, 
another model developed wherein the historical beginnings of the Jain and Buddhist 
traditions came to be articulated in terms of “heterodoxy” and “orthodoxy.” This is, 
another mould developed wherein the beginnings of the Jain and Buddhist traditions 
came to be conceived as a “heterodox reaction” against the “orthodox” (and corrupted) 
brāhmaṇa priests. 
Evolutionary Theories 
Returning to our general description of the dominant research paradigms of the late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century scholarly language, we may briefly note 
how also evolutionary theories left a mark on the manner how ‘the origin and 
development’ of a religion came to be conceived. Evolutionary theories, reaching a high 
point in the 1860s with Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, offered the concept of 
evolution as a workable model for tracing ‘phases,’ ‘stages’, and ‘laws’ of the ‘origin and 
growth of religion.’41 As noted by Jeffrey Franklin the nineteenth century British 
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construction of Buddhism clearly drew inspiration from the evolutionary model, when 
it “emphasized the parallels between scientific law … and the Dharma, often translated 
as “Law,” or between natural causality and causal necessity of karma, or between the 
evolution of species and the progressive evolution that many Westerners assumed 
occurred between lives in the cycle of reincarnation.”42 To return to Rhys Davids’ 
Buddhism, also his construction of Buddhism was scientific and rational. This was not 
only in line with this general on-going evolutionary theory inspired scientism, but also 
with his personal inclination for the Enlightenment ideals. This latter can briefly be 
illustrated with his choice to translate ‘bodhi’ with ‘Enlightenment’, and his preference 
for stressing the human aspect, and not the divine aspect of the Buddha by consistently 
referring to the Buddha not with the term ‘Buddha’ but with his family name ‘Gotama.’43   
 
Protestant Paradigm  
The Protestant paradigm or trope is customarily referred to by present-day scholars to 
explicate the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century European scholars’ 
preference for reifying ‘Jainism’ and ‘Buddhism’ from the religions’ so-called canonical 
texts; their subsequent devaluation or simple disregard of the Buddhism and Jainism 
represented in later (non-canonical) texts, in archaeological material, and in 
contemporary praxes. It is further commonly alluded to, to explain the scholars’ 
penchant for a scientific, rational presentation of Jainism and Buddhism at the cost of 
neglecting or suppressing the tradition’s magical elements; and their insistence to view 
the rise of the Jain and Buddhist traditions as heterodox reform movements against the 
orthodox brāhmaṇical supremacy. Regarding the latter, the narrative of Mahāvīra and 
the Buddha as having been reformers, protesting against the corrupt brāhmaṇa priesthood 
and their oppressive caste system, is a particular well-known narrative as it became a 
frequently used mould to explicate the rise of Buddhism and Jainism in both popular 
and scholarly introductory works. It is therefore interesting to note how this particular 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Compare also Foucault who in the introduction to his discourse analysis in Archéologie du savoir notes how the 
discipline of history in ‘its classical form’ (i.e. before 1970) “ suppose…que l’histoire elle-même peut être 
articulée en grandes unités – stades ou phases – qui détiennent en elles-mêmes leur principe de cohésion. », 
and how in the classical methodology for the discipline of history « on avait été habitué à chercher des 
origines, à remonter indéfiniment la ligne des antécédences, à reconstituer des traditions, à suivre des courbes 
évolutives…  .” Foucault 1969: 18 & 22. 
42 Franklin 2005: 943. 
43 See Snodgrass 2007; 192-3. Rhys Davids’ choice to present a rational, scientific Buddhism was his way to 
respond to the ongoing crisis of faith in Victorian England. 
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narrative, irrespective of its historical accuracy, was one supposedly effected by so-
called Protestant sentiments against the Catholic institution.44 
The following pages mainly focus on how longstanding Protestant ideas concerning 
the importance of scripture would have informed the source selection and evaluation of  
the then current scholarship on Jainism and Buddhism. It begins with a discussion of the 
scholars’ tendency to localize ‘real’ Jainism and ‘real’ Buddhism in the religions’ 
canonical texts, and proceeds to illustrate the various consequences of this nineteenth 
century positivistic textual attitude on the manner how scholars would approach, 
select, describe and appreciate the various sources for describing Jainism and Buddhism. 
The discussion concludes with noting some reservations of this so-called Protestant 
paradigm. 
Localization of “Real” Jainism and “Real” Buddhism in Canonical Texts 
The question of unveiling the origins of the Jain and Buddhist traditions translated 
itself in the task of revealing and describing their essence. This meant studying the Jain 
and Buddhist canonical texts. Having a positivistic textual attitude, the nineteenth 
century European scholars located the essence of the Jain and Buddhist tradition in texts, 
but not in just any text. They located it in those texts only that were considered 
‘authoritative,’ these being ancient ‘canonical’ texts written in the ‘original’ languages. 45  
According to some present-day reviewers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century knowledge production,46 this positivistic textual attitude was informed by some 
longstanding western Protestant presuppositions regarding scripture as the ultimate 
source of authority for matters of faith and practice, regardless whether the scholars 
themselves were Protestant or not.47  Be as it may, it was generally believed that the 
ancient Jain and Buddhist canonical texts could reveal the essence of the Jain and 
Buddhist tradition if read adequately. I write “could reveal” for ‘Jainism’ and ‘Buddhism’ 
was not considered to be simply coinciding with the canonical texts. Though containing 
the essence of the Jain and Buddhist tradition, canonical texts were not seen, however, 
to be just corresponding with or to be simply mirroring that essence. ‘Jainism’ and 
 
                                                     
44 For more details, see Almond 1988: 70-74. See also further ‘Reservations of the Protestant Paradigm’ where I 
point out how this narrative wherein Jainism and Buddhism are presented as reform movements is not the sole 
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45 My choice to put the word ‘canonical’ in this discussion between single quotation marks is to avoid creating 
the idea that our given concept of canon as a closed, authoritative, body of texts would agree or would find a 
strong resonance with the manner how early Buddhists and Jains approached their ‘texts,’ or also pre-colonial 
Buddhists and Jains for this matter. On this subject, see Collins 1990, “On the Very Idea of the Pali Canon.” 
JPTS, 89-126. 
46 See e.g. Cort 1990 and Folkert 1993 (1980-1984; 1975-1980). 
47 Cf. p. 32. 
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‘Buddhism’ had to be distilled from these texts and this could be achieved by means of 
specific methodological readings. The Jain and Buddhist canonical texts had to be read 
in such a fashion that the authentic could be separated from the false, the older from 
the later, the rational from the irrational, the factual from the mythical. In short, they 
had to be read in a manner that would uncover the hidden essence of the Jain and 
Buddhist tradition.  
The optimistic conviction of nineteenth century European scholars that in such 
readings one was merely ‘revealing’ the essence and not, at least to some extent, 
constructing it with one’s very frames, paradigms and questions, is typical for that time. 
For instance, returning to Rhys Davids’ foreword to his Hibbert Lectures where he was 
explaining his goal “to throw light on the origin and growth of religious belief,”  we can 
also read how he hopes to achieve his goal. He writes: “What we have to do is … to apply 
a particular method, the comparative method, to the study of the facts revealed to us by 
the history of Buddhism.”48 Davids writes “the facts revealed” as if ‘facts’ were just ‘out 
there’ but hidden (in the canonical texts), as if they were clear, self-evident, and well-
defined objects of knowledge that only needed to be, so to speak, unveiled or discovered 
by the scholar to start meaning. For the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century academic it was common to simply view ‘facts’ or , to go back to the topic of our 
current discussion, ‘essences’ to be ‘out there’, only, they needed the apt scholar to 
reveal them and voice their silent meaning.49  
 
The European scholars’ preference for the Jain and Buddhist canonical texts above 
the later vernacular texts was shared with other nineteenth century orientalists. 
Missionaries, for instance, though mostly known for their work on contemporary 
languages, their description of the manners and customs of local people and their 
religious expressions, have nevertheless also devoted a great deal of time searching for, 
translating and/or paraphrasing the ancient sacred texts of the religions of the people 
they encountered. That missionaries, compared to their contemporary nineteenth 
century European scholars, gave more serious attention to the various popular religious 
manifestations, was due to their specific agenda, this is, conversion. Still, just as the 
nineteenth century European scholars, missionaries too considered the ancient sacred 
texts as the authoritative source of information on a religious tradition. Having the view 
that a religion could only be truly grasped by means of its sacred texts, missionaries 
dedicated themselves to the study of canonical texts of the various ‘religions’ they came 
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“le document était toujours traité comme le langage d’une voix maintenant réduite au silence, - sa trace 
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across. It is not accidental that the very first English translation of a Jain canonical text 
was carried out by a missionary.  
The first English translation of a Jain sūtra available to European scholars was from 
the Bombay-based Scottish Protestant missionary, John Stevenson (1798-1858). John 
Stevenson’s 1848 Kalpa Sutra and Nava Tatva: Two Works Illustrative of the Jain Religion and 
Philosophy provided the European ‘arm-chair’ scholars for the first time a published 
translation of two Jain sūtras from which they could study and reify Jainism.50 
Nineteenth century missionaries such as John Stevenson in India or Spence Hardy in 
Ceylon (cf. below) attached great importance to the ancient sacred texts of the religions 
of those they sought to proselytize. They actively searched for, collected, and examined 
manuscripts enclosing the religions’ sacred words. Encouraging their activities, was a 
strong conviction that through the study of authoritative sacred texts they could truly 
penetrate the religions to, in a second instance, successfully unearth them. A beautifully 
clear expression of this double conviction can be found in the foreword to Eastern 
Monachism, published in 1850 and written by the Wesleyan missionary Spence Hardy.51  
In the month of September, 1825, I landed in the beautiful island of Ceylon as a 
Wesleyan Missionary, and one of the first duties to which I addressed myself was, 
to acquire a knowledge of the language of the people among whom I was 
appointed to minister. After reading the New Testament in Singhalese, I began the 
study of the native books, that I might ascertain, from authentic source, the character of 
the religion [i.e. ‘Buddhism’] I was trying to displace. (Hardy 1860 (1850): vii, own 
emphasis) 
Calling ‘the native books’ an ‘authentic source,’ Hardy shows his great liking for the written 
word. However, these so-called native books he utilized to describe the Ceylonese 
Buddhist monastic system were not, as we might expect, those books considered to be 
canonical, but were ‘only’ books written in “the more modern languages.” Subscribing 
to the view of his times, he recognizes this, so to speak, shortcoming - for his time, that 
 
                                                     
50 Cf. Numark 2013: 20. Numark (2013) ’s article offers an excellent historical discussion of nineteenth century 
Bombay based Scottish missionaries and their ‘discovery,’ or better encounter and subsequent reification and 
study of Jainism, and their conceptual proselytization method to spread the Gospel in India. 
51 Eastern Monachism was a four-hundred-page-plus-monograph describing the Ceylonese Buddhist monastic 
system, which Hardy quickly succeeded with a second – and as voluminous – monograph A Manual of Budhism, 
in its Modern Development in 1853. Though both volumes have for their many and explicit Buddhist unfriendly 
remarks, in the words of Hallisey, “received if not continuing criticism then what is thought to be a well-
deserved neglect,” they nevertheless exerted at their time of publication a considerable influence as they 
“offered a first systematic account of Theravada Buddhist beliefs and practices and so provided a framework 
to structure the fragmentary knowledge collected to that date.” Quotes from Hallisey 1990:39 and Snodgrass 
2007: 187-8. 
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is - and values the superiority of descriptions based on ‘original’ canonical sources. So 
we can read a little further in his forward: 
[T]hey who study the original canon may be regarded as actually entering the land, and 
winning here and there a portion of territory more or less extensive, and by the 
whole the region will be gained ; when the initiatory labours I am now pursuing 
will be forgotten, as they will have been succeeded by more authoritative 
investigations. (Hardy 1860 (1850): viii, own emphasis) 
Hardy, just as his contemporaries, valued canonical texts as superior to the later and 
more modern or contemporaneous texts.52 Hardy and other missionaries opined that 
the knowledge drawn from ‘original’ canonical sources provided the most effective tool 
to convert, or to, in Hardy words, really enter the land and win a portion of territory - 
metaphors drawn from the at that time overarching British colonial enterprise.  
The Normativity behind the Idea of Essence  
Some general and well-known consequences of this nineteenth century positivistic 
textual attitude are the second-class treatment and evaluation of (the information 
derived from) later, non-canonical texts, archaeological sources, and contemporary, 
popular forms and expressions of ‘Jainism’ and ‘Buddhism.’ These consequences 
resulted not only from the fact that nineteenth century scholars located, as we just have 
seen, the essence of the Jain and Buddhist tradition in the ancient canonical texts, but 
also because they viewed that essence as normative. Eckel, drawing from Ernst Troeltsch’s 
article “Was heist ‘Wesen des Christentums’?” shows how in historical studies the 
concept of essence has “two inescapable functions.” The concept of essence has a critical 
principle and a developmental principle.  
It [i.e. the concept of essence] is a critical principle that abstracts from the historical 
manifestations of a tradition and creates a normative image against which 
concrete historical cases can be compared and evaluated. It is also a developmental 
principle that functions, in Troeltsch’s words, as “a driving spiritual force which 
contains within itself purposes and values and which elaborates these both 
consistently and accommodatingly.53 
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The essence distilled from canonical sources; the ‘Jainism’ and ‘Buddhism’ marked and 
advanced as the original Jainism and Buddhism, became a normative reference point 
against which scholars would evaluate other, later forms and popular expressions of the 
traditions. In other words, the positivistic aspect of the textual attitude of nineteenth 
century European scholars should be understood as having this threefold peculiarity of 
locating the essence in texts, as considering that essence to be the original Jainism and 
Buddhism, and of qualifying this – and, in their opinion merely ‘revealed’ - original 
Jainism and Buddhism as normative.  
Devaluation of non-canonical Sources 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century description of the origins of the Jain 
and Indian Buddhist ascetic organisations drawn from the canonical texts was 
considered to be not only a faithful, historical account, but also to be reflecting the 
monastic institutions’ essence and thus, so to speak, their ‘golden period’. If 
contemporary praxes of Jain and Buddhist ascetics in respectively India and Ceylon, or if 
the monastic reality presented in later texts or in archaeological and epigraphical 
sources would contradict the monastic reality of the authoritative, canonical sources, 
they would have to be explained away as a ‘falling from,’ or as a late change of (i.e. 
degradation from) the original monastic institutions. Schopen in his 1991 article 
“Archaeology and Protestant Presuppositions in the Study of Indian Buddhism” offers a 
good example of this latter. 
“Archeology…in service of written sources” 
Though archaeological remains and donative inscriptions strongly suggest that 
Buddhist monks in India owned personal property, Schopen shows how nineteenth 
century orientalists tried hard to explain away this evidence as it contradicted the 
textual monastic ideal.54  
[E]very time epigraphers, archaeologists, or art historians encountered evidence 
that even suggested the possibility that monks or nuns owned personal property 
they first signalled their surprise … and then immediately invoked either 
explicitly or implicitly the rules in the canonical monastic codes against it to 
assert, in one way or another, that they were not really seeing what they saw. 
Either that, or they neutralized what they were seeing by attributing it to a “late 
change” or implied “decline” within the tradition. They all axiomatically assumed 
that the textual ideal either was or had been actually in operation, that if it said so 
in a text it must have been so in reality. (Schopen 1991: 7-8) 
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Schopen justly calls this type of interpretation of archaeological evidence an 
“archaeology … in service of the written sources.” The reopening and interpretation of 
the Kaṅkālī Ṭīlā site at Mathurā in search of support for Hermann Jacobi’s textual 
argumentation on the independent origin of the Jain tradition (cf. above) is another 
notable example of ‘archaeology in service of the written sources.’ 
In search for material, archaeological evidence to corroborate Jacobi’s literary based 
argument of the independent origin of the Jain community, the Kaṅkālī Ṭīlā site at 
Mathurā was reopened in 1888.55 The manner in which the interpretation of the 
Mathurā finds suffered from being framed by the then on-going canonically based 
discussion on the origins of the Jain community, has been expounded with great lucidity 
by Kendall Folkert in his 1989 essay ‘Jain Religious Life at Ancient Mathurā: the Heritage 
of Late-Victorian Interpretation.’ Because of the overly concern with the origins of the 
Jain community at least three important aspects concerning the early Jain history 
remained untreated or misrepresented. First, the presence of a flourishing and 
important lay-community of which the Mathurā ‘Jain stūpa’ was a first-hand testimony, 
was bluntly ignored. Second, the Mathurā finds, that cover no less than five centuries 
(200 B.C.E. to 300 C.E.) were taken to show the ancient and unchanging character of the 
Jain tradition, thus simply silencing away “the extraordinary fluidity in Jain history.” 
Third, the question of the role of Mathurā itself, as a powerful tīrtha, in attracting the 
Jain presence remained unasked.56  
Second-class treatment of later textual sources 
Rhys Davids established the Pali Text Society in 1881 to facilitate the edition and 
translation of the Theravāda Buddhist Piṭaka.57 From the moment of its establishment, 
the Society received several requests of Ceylonese Buddhists to edit and translate texts 
they considered either important for practicing Buddhists or representative of 
Theravāda philosophy. Though Ceylonese Buddhists were together responsible for more 
than half of the Society’s financial income, their requests were granted neither 
enthusiastically nor rapidly. The texts they viewed to be significant were not canonical, 
and the efforts made to translate such texts were, therefore, seen as lost efforts in the 
Society’s more urgent and primordial goal of disclosing “original Buddhism” from its 
 
                                                     
55 Despite the fact that Jacobi’s 1884 argumentation on the historicity of Mahāvīra and the independent and 
authentic origin of the Jain community came to be generally accepted, a few scholars remained skeptical due 
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56 Cf. Folkert 1993 (1989). 
57 Cp. with the first rule of the Pali Text Society: “The Society is founded to edit in Pali, and if possible to 
translate into English, such Pali books as still exist in MSS. preserved either in Europe or the East.” See e.g. 
Journal of the Pali Text Society 1920-1923: vii. 
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canonical texts. Anāgārika Dharmapāla, the famous initiator of the Ceylonese Buddhist 
revival movement, presented the Pali Text Society in 1893 with a manuscript of 
Yogāvacāra’s Manual. Once the translation was accomplished by Mrs. Rhys Davids she 
introduced it as “untimely” not because it saw the light only thirteen years after 
Dharmapāla’s request, but because “so much important matter in the Pāli canon is still 
only accessible to Pāli readers.” She saw the translation of Yogāvacāra’s Manual as 
interfering with the more valuable work of publishing and translating the canonical 
texts, and if Mrs. Davids carried the task forward at all, it was only in acknowledgement 
to Dharmapāla’s financial support, so she writes in her preface: “it was incumbent upon 
us to meet the wishes of one who had shown the Society so much [financial] 
generosity.”58 In addition to such reluctance to translate non-canonical Buddhist texts, 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars’ normative qualification of 
their, so to speak, distilled Jain and Buddhist essence, is also visible in their assessment 
of contemporary praxes.  
Depreciation of contemporary expressions of Jainism and Buddhism 
Against the pure, original Jainism and Buddhism, late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century scholars tended to negatively evaluate contemporary praxes. This 
negative evaluation is hinted at, sometimes casually, sometimes bluntly (but therefore 
not necessarily maliciously), throughout their writings on Jainism and Buddhism. Rhys 
Davids, for instance, wrote how “The Buddhism of the Pāli Pitakas is not only a quite 
different thing from Buddhism as hitherto commonly received, but antagonistic to it.”59 
Another anecdotic example may be taken from I.B. Horner’s translation of the Pāli 
Vinaya. To her translation at Vinaya III.161 of the Pāli word pāpabhikkhū as “depraved 
monks” (literally meaning “bad monks”) she adds the following footnote: 
This acquiescence in “pāpabhikkhū” is curious. It reminds one of the lax monks, not 
uncommon in Burma at the present day, who do not keep the Vinaya precepts. There are 
said to be good and earnest monks who do keep them, but who are not seen about 
much for the very reason that they lead the good life, as intended. (Horner 2006 
(1938) BD I: 277, fn. 1, emphasis mine) 
From a different corner we have Henry Steel Olcott, co-founder of the Theosophical 
Society, being in disbelief on his arrival in Ceylon by “the shocking ignorance of the 
 
                                                     
58 See Snodgrass 2007: 195. Quotes Mrs. Rhys Davids in Snodgrass 2007: ibid. Another request for translation to 
the Society by Asian Buddhists that took a considerable amount of time (30 years) was the Abhidhammattha-
sangaha. Ibid. 
On Anāgārika Dharmapāla’s Buddhist revival movement, see a.o. Obeyesekere 1972 and Freiberger 2003. 
59 Rhys Davids (Buddhist Suttas 2: xxv) quoted in Snodgrass 2007: 198.  
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Sinhalese about Buddhism” as it did not match his “bookish conception” of ‘original 
Buddhism’. What is remarkable, however, is that instead of adjusting his image of 
Buddhism while living in this Buddhist country, he sat out teaching Ceylonese Buddhists 
how to be Buddhists.60 
Reservations of the Protestant Paradigm 
A first reservation concerns the very denomination “Protestant” paradigm. The 
denomination gives the wrong impression that all nineteenth century orientalist 
scholars were if not Protestants themselves, at least working within a Protestant 
dominant culture. Though true for the Victorian Rhys Davids, it cannot be said to be 
true for other nineteenth century pioneers, such as, for instance, the German Indologist 
Hermann Oldenberg (1854-1920). And yet, also Hermann Oldenberg in his 1881 
publication Buddha. Sein Leben, Seine Lehre, Seine Gemeinde searched to describe, just as his 
contemporary Rhys Davids, the ‘original’ Buddhism that he too located within the 
ancient, authoritative Pāli texts.61 
The nineteenth century insistence to view the Buddha as a social reformer, or to 
understand the beginnings of ‘Buddhism’ as a heterodox reaction against the 
dominating, corrupt and abusive “priest” or brāhmaṇa system, has also been explained 
as a result of the Protestant paradigm. Regardless whether this narrative is historically 
correct or not, the point that needs to be made here is that it was not the sole narrative 
in circulation. For instance, in contrast to Rhys Davids’ portrayal of the Buddha, 
Oldenberg’s account pushes the supposed reformist motives of the Buddha into the 
background and deliberately softens the contrasts between ‘Buddhism’ and 
‘Brahmanism.’ Almond explains the divergence between the two scholars’ accounts as 
the outcome of two different discourses, necessitated by different agendas, or at the 
very least, different convictions. The Buddha of Rhys Davids was described in religious 
terms, whereas the Buddha of Oldenberg came to be described within a political 
language and this at a time when socialism was viewed by many to be threatening to 
society. In the words of Almond: “A religious discourse [as used by Davids] – 
Protestantism, sacrementalism, sacerdotalism – has been replaced by a political one [in 
Oldenberg’s account]– democratic, lower classes, aristocracy, socialist… [I]n a context of 
anti-Catholicism [as for Rhys Davids], a radical social reformer rejecting the pretensions 
of a priestly ruling class could be embraced. But in a context of anti-Socialism [as for 
 
                                                     
60 See Prothero 1995: 296. Quote Olcott in Prothero 1995: ibid. Olcott together with Blavatsky, who both 
founded the Theosophical Society in 1875, were the first Americans (Blavatsky received U.S. citizenship) to 
convert to Buddhism in an Asian country. 
61 Oldenberg’s monograph was translated in 1927 into English. See Oldenberg, Hermann, 1927, Buddha. His life, 
his doctrine, his order. Calcutta: Book Co. 
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Oldenberg] a radical social reformer rejecting the pretensions of the secular ruling class 
was unacceptable.”62 Whereas Rhys Davids’ Buddha can be seen as a response to the 
ongoing crisis of faith in Victorian England, Oldenberg’s Buddha can be seen as a 
response to the ongoing crisis in politics.  
Davids’s and Oldenberg’s differing accounts form a paradigmatic example of how 
dominating ideologies codirect the analysis, assessment and presentation of source 
material. Today, many of the nineteenth and early twentieth century orientalist 
assumptions, ideologies or agendas can – for various and at times also most obvious 
reasons – no longer be agreed with. We are thinking here mainly of the imperial or 
colonial narrative. However, disagreeing with their assumptions must not mean that 
their conclusions should a priori be disagreed with too. As Silk noted, “If in evaluating 
the researches of our predecessors we give too much weight to their ideological 
motivations, we will end up throwing out many babies with the bathwater. In some 
cases, it may be better to keep the babies, and just change the water.”63 
In addition to highlighting one particular narrative at the cost of other nineteenth 
century narratives, the Protestant paradigm further seems to suggest that the portrayal 
of brāhmaṇas as protagonists of a corrupt priest-system is reflective of either Victorian 
(i.e. Protestant) resentments against Catholic institutions or, more general, of the 
European crisis of faith endured by the ongoing secularization and modernization 
processes. The image of the corrupt brāhmaṇa priest that, it may be noted, incidentally 
coincides with various Buddhist accounts of the brāhmaṇa,64 was also formed on pre-
existing western representations and ideas of the brāhmaṇa. The Indian brāhmaṇa had 
already entered the western imagination from the time of Alexander the Great onwards. 
Throughout the following centuries various representations of the brāhmaṇa developed 
first in Christian libraries and later on in ethnographical accounts too, and though some 
of the brāhmaṇa narratives are hard to reconcile with one another, they all share a 
framing Christian theological worldview. Within that Christian monogenetic frame 
holding that “the [whole] world had known the biblical God …. [and that the Christian] 
religion could be traced back to Adam and Eve and … that its remnants survived in the 
most distant quarters of the world,”65 the brāhmaṇa first came to be presented as a 
virtuous and faithful ascetic, as a true Christian exemplar. From the sixteenth century 
onwards, the brāhmaṇa entered the polemic vocabulary of Reformation and came to be 
represented in terms familiar to the nineteenth century Protestant paradigm, namely as 
 
                                                     
62 Almond 1988: 76, see also pp. 69-79. 
63 Silk 1994: 180. 
64 For an insightful analysis of negative accounts of Brahmins in Pāli sūtras, see Freiberger 2009. 
65 Gelders 2009: 571. 
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corrupt priests upholding a perverse system.66 In other words, the narrative of the 
corrupt brāhmaṇa priest cannot solely be accounted for by nineteenth century 
Protestant ideas about sacerdocy. It was inasmuch informed by a pre-existing sixteenth 
century image of the brāhmaṇa as Christian apostate, an image developed by and used 
within the reformist polemics.  
Another fact that needs to be underscored is that the ‘language of decline’ employed 
by nineteenth century scholars to describe all but the initial stage of Jainism and 
Buddhism is not restricted to the principles of the Protestant paradigm. True, the 
localisation of original Jainism and Buddhism in their ancient canonical texts can be 
understood as a tail end of some longstanding Protestant presuppositions concerning 
scriptures.67 However, the normative qualification of the origins of the two religions as 
original Jainism and Buddhism is not per se or only the result of a Protestant framework. 
As mentioned, at the basis of such normative qualification lies the nineteenth century 
scholars’ triple equation of origins, essence, and originality. With Troeltsch we have 
further seen that the qualification of a religion’s origins as normative is a natural 
consequence of the very concept of essence, that carries within itself a critical and 
developmental principle. It is not surprising, therefore, to see the nineteenth century 
orientalist devaluation of historical forms of Jainism and Buddhism finding 
correspondence with traditional Jain and Buddhist assessments of their own history. 
Indeed, wherever the idea of origins is qualified as normative the ‘language of decline’ 
may be expected to arise. Or also, it is safe to say that “a valuation of the past and a 
devaluation of the present [is]”, as John Cort noted “also a powerful tendency within the 
religious traditions themselves.” Giving the example of Jainism, he writes:  
“Jain cosmology locates contemporary humanity as being in the fifth spoke of the 
downward cycle of time. This is an era when liberation is impossible, and both 
religion and culture are in an irreversible state of decline. The 24 Jinas, however, 
lived in the middle two spokes of the cycle, when true dharma and liberation were 
possible. That was the “golden era,” of which the present is only a dim and fading 
reflection. Thus, Jain dogma and Orientalist scholarship coincide in their valuation 
of the past over the present. The assumptions behind these two subjective 
judgements (for that is what they are), however, are very different. Whereas the 
assumption behind Jain dogma is that of salvifically-oriented cosmology, that 
behind the Orientalist/Indological scholarship is based on European belief in the 
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“[t]he influence of the Renaissance emphasis on classics and classical origins may in fact have been greater on 
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value of history and culturally-mediated Renaissance and Protestant critiques of 
tradition.”  (Cort 1990: 48-9) 
Further, as it is well known, with the realization that the tradition’s present situation 
is only a weak reflection of its glorious past; that its temporal (and in many cases 
geographical)68 distance from its origins equals an alienation from its original, pure 
state, often comes the development of all sorts of strategies to enable if not to return, to 
at least stay as close and faithful as possible to the original. For, it is in its relation to the 
original, in its so-called continuation of the tradition’s origins, that a tradition can rest 
its claim to legitimacy, authenticity and hence authority too. 
 
Power Relations in the western Construction of Buddhism and Jainism 
“Knowledge is power.” It is easy to understand how this is true regarding the knowledge 
accumulation of nineteenth century missionaries in India and Ceylon on the ‘new 
religions’ they encountered. The knowledge they amassed concerning the various ‘new 
religions’ served as a powerful tool to convert. If they took pains to describe and reify 
the various peoples’ believes and practices into “religion-things,”69 or if they exerted 
themselves to collect and study the manuscripts containing the so-called sacred words’ 
of those new religions, it is because they believed that in doing so they could show 
people the internal inconsistencies and erroneous nature of their religious beliefs and 
practices to, in a second instance, introduce and convert them to the one and only true 
religion, being the one proclaimed by the missionaries themselves. As an example of 
knowledge serving as tool to convert, we may refer to the ‘Buddhism’ given by the 
Wesleyan missionary Spence Hardy. To quote again from his preface to Manual of 
Budhism:  
By the messenger of the cross, who may succeed me in the field [i.e. Ceylon] in 
which it was once my privilege to labour, this Manual will be received, I doubt not, 
as a boon; as it will enable them more readily to understand the system they are 
endeavouring to supersede, by the establishment of the Truth. I see before me, looming 
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missionaries reified the religion of the Jains. Arguing that the missionaries their “understanding of Indian 
religions was in large part an isomorphic projection and homologous expression of the longstanding 
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in the distance, a glorious vision, in which the lands of the east are presented in 
majesty; happy, holy, and free. I may not, I dare not, attempt to describe it; but it 
is the joy of my existence to have been an instrument, in a degree however feeble, 
to bring about this grand consummation. (Hardy 1853: xiii) 
  That “knowledge is power” is obvious here; knowledge of ‘Buddhism’ provided in his 
Manual is meant to serve the missionary goal of ‘establishing the Truth’, and thus 
‘freeing’ Ceylon and its people. Though far more subtle, power relations are also 
involved in the nineteenth century European academic knowledge production on 
Jainism and Buddhism. To see how this is true, it is useful to give Foucault’s short but 
effective definition of power. For, power, as a concept, is all too easily linked with its 
obvious forms of manifestations only, wherein a strong entity is having a clear political, 
economic and/or physical dominance over a weaker entity. Foucault’s definition of 
power succeeds, however, to capture subtler forms of dominion too. It reads «le pouvoir 
est une relation entre deux individus, c’est une relation qui est telle que l’un peut 
conduire la conduite d’un autre. »70 When orientalists located the ‘essence’ of Jainism 
and Buddhism in canonical texts, then the power to describe ‘original’ Jainism and 
Buddhism came to lie with those mastering the philological method. Jains and Buddhists 
desiring to co-define the orientalist discourse on their ‘religion,’ had to command and 
adhere to the recognized research methods of the western scholar. It is telling, for 
instance, to read how prior to becoming a Jain monk, Muni Jina Vijaya being desirous to 
participate and to be heard in the then on-going orientalist discourse on ‘his’ religious 
tradition, went to Germany in 1928 to meet Hermann Jacobi with the aim to, in his 
words, “acquiring first-hand knowledge of the methods of research [in German 
institutions] and with a view to establishing close contact with the German scholars 
working on Indological subjects and especially on Jain literature.”71  
Also, when Rhys Davids’ established the Pali Text Society in 1881 he created a 
platform that would both promote the study of Pāli texts and Buddhism, and 
institutionalize it. The institutionalization of Buddhist studies through an establishment 
as the Pali Text Society means that those who wished to join and be heard in the 
discussion on ‘what is Buddhism,’ or better, on ‘what is original Buddhism’ had to be 
able to adhere to its research norms, and have access to its recognized publishing 
systems. In other words, the authority and power of an institution as the Pali Text 
Society lies in the manner in which it directs both the content and methodology of 
Buddhological research.72  
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Part II: Anti-Essentialist Framework of Dialogues with(in) the Pāli 
Vinaya 
[T]he student [or scholar] of religion …. must be 
relentlessly self-conscious. Indeed, this self-consciousness 
constitutes his primary expertise, his foremost object of 
study. (Smith 1982: xi)73 
Continuing the previous chapters’ line of thought that a scholar is simultaneously 
speaking in and being spoken by a scholarly language, and keeping in mind the above 
quoted reflection of Jonathan Smith that ‘the student [or scholar] of religion…must be 
relentlessly self-conscious,’ it is a good opportunity here to consider the manner in 
which this current PhD research fits within the larger contemporary scholarly 
framework. For also this research is not only codirecting the general patterns of the 
present day scientific discourse but it is also, and if not much more, directed by those 
patterns.   
As mentioned at the onset, the questions of the dynamics and dialectics of the Pāli 
Vinaya’s ascetic others are framed, directed and inspired by the modern scholarly 
discourse on anti-essentialism. I defined the anti-essentialist discourse as the discursive 
thought rejecting the humanist idea that a subject is defined by an inherently present, 
unique and essential characteristic. For reasons I shall mention below, this discursive 
anti-essentialist thought started to seep through various academic disciplines of both 
the Faculty of Humanities and Faculty of Science after World War II, to gradually 
become a well-established and authoritative assumption during the 1970s and 1980s. It 
should be clear that what I call anti-essentialist discourse does not stand for a definite 
set of ideas, as if it was a discourse first formulated independently from the on-going 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
arrange with editors or translators to do their work, with printers to do the printing, and with publishers or 
other persons to distribute the volumes when printed.” See Journal of the Pali Text Society 1920-1923: vii. 
The lasting influence of the research norms and interests of the Pali Text Society on Buddhologists has been 
scornfully referred to by Tambiah as the “Pali Text Society Mentality”. See Hallisey 1990: 34. 
On the difficulty of Asian Buddhists to be heard in the European discussions on Buddhism because of their 
limited access to dominating western institutions, see Snodgrass 2007: 195.   
73 Smith 1982,  Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown, quoted by Richard King 2008 (1999), Orientalism and 
Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and ‘the mystic East’. London and New York: Routledge, p. 11. 
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scientific research or the social and political discourses, to subsequently become 
accepted by and uniformly integrated within the various academic disciplines of the 
Humanities and Science. Instead, I use anti-essentialist discourse here as a general 
category of thought to refer to various and distinct, but clearly observable, patterns 
(this is, in the luxury of retrospect) from the 1970s onwards within the various scientific 
disciplines to openly start questioning their traditional research topics, presuppositions 
and subject boundaries. What is important here, is the fact that this critical questioning 
was accompanied with a general de-essentialization of the traditionally received 
knowledge and boundaries of one’s discipline. We will return to these points later. 
As pointed out in the Introduction, to question the dynamics and dialectics of the ascetic 
others on the development of the early Buddhist ascetic community, is to try to 
apprehend, among other things, the mechanisms that made it possible for the early 
Buddhist ascetic community to be perceived and recognized as being both a distinct 
ascetic community among other communities and as ‘Buddhist,’ to use, once again, this 
anachronistic but conventional denomination. Further, in focussing on the early Jain-
Buddhist contact, this PhD is not so much trying to assess the degree of positive 
influence of the Jains on the development of the Buddhist ascetic community, or trying 
to determine which of the two communities was original in their agreement as 
Hermann Jacobi did, but instead it is seeking to understand how contact with members 
representing the Jain community stirred Buddhist ascetics to dialectically define 
themselves in terms of similarity and difference. In other words, this research deals 
with the dynamic and on-going processes of boundary-negotiation and self-definition 
through the definition of one’s multiple others. These two connected problems belong 
to the broader and complex issue of identity.  
To raise these questions of what made a ‘Buddhist’ Buddhist; what did it entail to be 
recognized by both fellow Buddhist bhikkhus (insiders) and non-Buddhist bhikkhus 
(outsiders) to be a Buddhist mendicant; or to consider under which circumstances and 
conditions one could become a member of the Buddhist ascetic community, is to raise 
questions pertaining to the dialectical subject of early ‘Buddhist’ identity, or better, 
identities. For, underlying this inquiry of what it meant to be a Buddhist bhikkhu during 
the formative stages of the Buddhist ascetic saṅgha, is an anti-essentialist assumption 
about the nature of identity. This is, I understand identity, whether of an individual 
subject or of a community, not as an innate essence pertaining to that individual or 
community, but as a dynamic, changing and dialectically negotiated notion. More 
specifically, I view identity as a relational concept, requiring and resulting from the so-
called process of othering.74 This means that we believe that the answer to the question 
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of what it means to be a Buddhist bhikkhu will not only vary diachronically, this is 
according to the differing time frames the question relates to, but also within one and 
the same synchronic moment. Within a synchronic moment, for instance, there may be 
as many definitions viable of a Buddhist bhikkhu as there are others to whom a bhikkhu 
dialectically relates. The significance and meaning of a Buddhist bhikkhu will alternate 
in accordance to his alternating ‘proximate others.’75 The definition of a Buddhist 
bhikkhu will depend thus on whether the bhikkhu is mainly relating (for whatever 
reasons) to a lay-follower, householder, relative, woman, man, brāhmaṇa, Jain, fellow 
Buddhist bhikkhu etc. To view the concept of identity as a relational one opens up the 
possibility for collating multiple definitions under the term ‘Buddhist bhikkhu’, 
definitions that, it should be noted, may but not necessarily need to complement one 
another. Also conflicting definitions may be found for ‘Buddhist bhikkhu.’  
It is apparent that when such a non-essential relational definition of ‘identity’ is 
applied to the study of the early Buddhist ascetic community, a complex, heterogenic 
‘picture’ is bound to emerge of that community. Any hope to find a clear-cut answer to 
what it meant to be a Buddhist bhikkhu during the formative stages of the saṅgha may, 
therefore, readily be dismissed. A simple definition can at the very best represent an 
abstracted and normative idea(l) of the Buddhist bhikkhu, but fails to transmit the 
dynamic and dialectical processes entailed in the very act of (self-) definition.  
Another presupposition underlying this research is the view that not a homogenized 
essence but a heterogeneous diversity will necessarily be characterizing the early 
Buddhist ascetic saṅgha. This stress on heterogeneity is not unique to this research. As 
we will shortly see, for Indology and the related fields of Buddhology and Jainology, to 
emphasize the heterogeneity of one’s research subject has been one of the strategies 
formulated to the post-colonial critique that late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century orientalist scholarship constructed essential and thus homogenized and 
stereotyped forms of knowledge regarding ‘the’ Indian ‘traditions.’  
In the previous chapter, we discussed in some detail Hermann Jacobi’s argumentation 
for considering the historical beginnings of the Jain tradition to be independent (i.e. not 
schismatic) from the Buddhist tradition. His concerns with origins, typical as we have 
seen for the then on-going scientific discourse, translated itself into questioning which 
among the brāhmaṇa, Jain and Buddhist ascetic traditions came first in matters 
concerning shared vows and precepts. Subscribing to the idea of the “purity of the 
historical prior,” Jacobi thus questioned who copied who, who borrowed from who, in 
other words, who came first, who was original? What needs to be pointed out here is the 
 
                                                     
75 The term ‘proximate other’ has been coined by Jonathan Smith. A critical discussion of this dynamic concept 
is given in Part III. 
 40 
fact that Jacobi’s pattern of argumentation is representative of a then on-going 
scholarly discourse producing homogenized and stereotyped products of knowledge on 
the early Indian traditions. A consequence, though most probably an involuntary one, of 
questioning the historical origins of the Jain tradition in the manner of Hermann Jacobi, 
is an oversimplification of the early Indian ascetic landscape into these three principal, 
well-defined, clear-cut and unchanging ascetic communities: brāhmaṇa, Jain and 
Buddhist. In searching who was older and/or original the questions concerning not only 
the fluidity within a tradition but also the fluidity between the brāhmaṇa, Jain and 
Buddhist traditions remained unasked. In addition, the idea developed that once the 
common precepts of the three traditions would be removed, the true original 
contribution of each ascetic community would come to the foreground. Ludwig Alsdorf, 
for instance, made this observation explicitly when considering the advantages of 
comparing Buddhist and Jain material. So he noted: 
La comparaison réciproque ne se borne pas à éclairer de façon surprenante maints 
détails de doctrine et de pratique: elle permet aussi – ce qui est plus important – 
de déterminer à partir des concordances le substrat commun des réformes 
religieuses76 du vie  siècle et, en faisant abstraction, de reconnaître ce que chacune de ces 
deux religions a réalisé d’original. (Alsdorf 1965 : 3, emphasis mine) 
Alsdorf made this observation in his 1965 reflection on the then “état present et 
taches futures” of Jain studies, a booklet republished in an English translation in 2006.77 
Not denying the many valuable and valid contributions to Jain studies contained in this 
booklet, I wish to point out, however, the problematic assumption underlying Alsdorf’s 
starting point, namely the very idea that there is something as an “original” Jainism and 
an “original” Buddhism to be uncovered; that there is something unique or essential to 
both traditions, that clearly separates them into two distinct entities. In other words, 
underlying Alsdorf’s research is an essentialist understanding of the notion of identity.  
In critical response to such views and methodologies as Jacobi’s and Alsdorf’s, 
approaches developed departing from the inherent complexity of any ‘entity.’78 This 
stress on heterogeneity fits within and belongs to the broader scholarly scientific 
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discourse on anti-essentialism, which started to gain ground in various academic 
disciplines from the 1970s onwards.  
Again, I would like to underscore the fact that the discourse on anti-essentialism does 
not stand for one specific academic movement or one definite set of ideas. With anti-
essentialist discourse I refer to the general trend translated in diverse manners, in the 
1970s among both theorists and post-colonial critics to question and reject some 
fundamental assumptions on which the disciplines of Humanity and Science had thus 
far relied, causing important shifts in the perception of the traditionally received 
knowledge, the structures of knowledge and the production of knowledge. One specific 
response to this new heightened awareness regarding one’s discipline’s tradition was to 
de-essentialize its products of knowledge, and to study and stress instead the inherent 
complexity and relativity of one’s research subjects. This argument may be exemplified 
with the specific cases of literary studies and identity studies, as their research 
questions and methodologies have often found and developed parallels in Jain and 
Buddhist studies. 
For literary studies, the 1970s marked fundamental changes in its key premises 
concerning ‘meaning.’ The humanist concepts that the meaning of a literary text was 
essentially contained within the text itself, unambiguous, consciously produced by the 
author, and comprehensible through a close reading of the text, became rejected and 
replaced for a (post)structuralist, non-essential notion of meaning. This is, the meaning 
of a literary text was no longer considered to be essentially present in that text, but to 
be dependent on the text’s multiple relations with various elements both inside and 
outside of it. Meaning became therefore something ambiguous and fluid. Further, in 
(post)structuralist literary theories the author was no longer viewed as the starting 
point or origin of a literary text. Instead language itself came to be positioned at the 
starting point. Language came to be seen as a ‘pre-existing structure’ (langue) that when 
used does not reflect but actively shapes reality. The author is presented then as one 
moving within those structures, combining its elements to create a particular parole. 
Meaning became consequently also understood as one of the possible products the 
system of language (langue) allows, and thus not as the conscious result of the author’s 
efforts. In accordance with these changing presuppositions on which literary studies 
were based, the central question underlying literary studies changed from what a text 
meant, to how a text produced meaning.79  
This general shift from an essential to a non-essential conception of a discipline’s 
subject matter can also be noted in sociological identity studies. Together with a 
 
                                                     
79 For a more comprehensive overview of the fundamental changes taking place in literary studies in the 
1970s, see Klages 2010 (2006), esp. pp. 1-9; 47-53. 
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changing focus from the question of individual identity to the question of collective 
identity, in the 1970s identity scholars gradually abandoned the idea that the attributes 
building up identity emerged from innate, essential characteristics. Studying ‘the “we-
ness” of a group,’80 identity scholars started to take up an anti-essentialist position by, 
for instance, stressing the social constructiveness of a collective’s identity, or later also 
by rejecting altogether the possibility of a homogeneous identity experience among a 
collective’s members. Also Cerulo in her helpful 1994 review of identity studies sees the 
1970s as marking a shift from an essential to a non-essential conception of identity. 
Pointing out that research on collective identity focuses on ‘the similarities or shared 
attributes around which group members coalesce,’ she notes how: 
Early literature [i.e. before 1970] approached these attributes as “natural” or 
“essential” characteristics – qualities emerging from physiological traits, 
psychological predispositions, regional features, or the properties of structural 
locations. A collective’s members were believed to internalize these qualities, 
suggesting a unified, singular social experience, a single canvas against which 
social actors constructed a sense of self. [But] [r]ecent treatments of collective 
identity question the essentialism of collective attributes and images. Anti-
essentialist inquiries promote the social construction of identity as a more viable 
basis of the collective self. Other works stress the problems inherent in collective 
categorization, presenting a postmodern challenge to arguments of unified group 
experience. (Cerulo 1994: 386-7) 
Both anti-essentialist approaches hinted at in the quote, namely the social 
constructionist and the postmodern approach, underscore in their own way the  
indefinite, changing or heterogeneous nature of a collective’s identity. For the social 
constructionist approach, ‘every collective becomes a social artefact – an entity molded, 
refabricated, and mobilized in accord with reigning cultural scripts and centers of 
power.’81 On the other hand, the postmodern, deconstructionist approach while 
questioning the very possibility of a homogenous experience of a collective, stresses the 
variation within identity collectives and draws attention to ‘the complex, often 
contradictory, nature of collective existence.’82 The point here being that both 
approaches firmly reject the possibility that a collective’s or any subject’s identity is 
constituted of essentialist attributes. 
 
                                                     
80 Cerulo 1997: 386. 
81 Ibid.: 387. 
82 Postmodern approaches to collective identity saw several flaws in the constructionist approach. For the 
postmodern, the constructionist approach ‘reinscribes an essentialist logic at the very level of historicism;’ 
‘underemphasizes the role of power in classification process;’ and has ‘an insufficient agenda.’ Cf. Ibid.: pp. 
391-2. 
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These changes in the conception of and approach to the research subjects in literary 
studies and sociological identity studies are two paradigmatic examples of the general 
trend within the various academic disciplines in the 1970s and 1980s to de-essentialize 
both their subjects of research and products of knowledge.  
In broad brush strokes, this trend may be understood as a reflexive and much needed 
response within academic circles to the changing world scene of post-World War II, the 
1968 cultural revolutions, and the subsequent heightened political awareness in 
academia brought about by theorists of knowledge such as Michel Foucault and Jacques 
Derrida.83 The discipline of Indology and the related but younger disciplines of 
Buddhology and Jainology had, in addition, to consider the rising and angry voice of 
those who had previously been a ‘colonial agent.’84 Finally, in 1978 Edward W. Said’s 
Orientalism heralded the era of post-colonial cultural studies.  
Orientalism was received, not without criticism,85 as a powerful analysis of the 
construction of European knowledge of the Islamic Middle East during the colonial 
period. Within ‘orientalistic’ disciplines it effected a critical re-evaluation of the 
disciplines’ history, methodology and premises. Though Said’s case study cannot be 
extrapolated without difficulties to the fields of Indology, Buddhist studies or Jain 
studies,86 sufficient successful exercises have already been made to show how there is 
 
                                                     
83 The post-World War II socio-political background of the nineteenth century modern university had changed 
so drastically that the traditional configuration and interpretation of the sciences became challenged. The 
difficulty to further sustain the discipline of anthropology in its original conception may be viewed here as an 
example par excellence of this. Anthropology was initially a social science that had seen the light during and 
because of the colonial rule of the nineteenth century world powers. It was a science intent on describing the 
‘primitive’ people ‘who were under actual or virtual colonial rule.’ After 1945, however, ‘[a]nthropology  was 
forced to redefine its focus rather radically, since both the concept of the “primitive” and the reality it was 
supposed to reflect were disappearing …. anthropologists “came home”.’ Orientalists who had primarily been 
‘textual ethnographers,’ became historians. With the hegemonic position of the US, the US university system 
became the dominant university model. What would also come to have a significant impact on the Humanist 
structures of knowledge, would be the rise of the two new fields of Area studies and Religious studies in the US 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Cf. Wallerstein 2004, op cit.: 7 & 11, 7-12. See also Lopez 1994: 8-13 that specifically 
treats the socio-political background of Buddhology in the US.  
84 This was naturally also true for the discipline of anthropology. 
85 The criticism on Said’s Orientalism has become as standardized as the list of the many lucid points that have 
been and still are being appraised. Among the points of criticism, the most relevant one for our current 
purpose is the fact that Said has treated the colonial subject as a completely passive subject, a subject not able 
to respond to, direct or use to his own advantage the dominant colonial discourse.  For books critical of Said, 
see a.o. Varisco 2007 and Irwin 2006. I thank Oliver Freiberger for having brought those two publications to 
my attention. 
86 With regards to Buddhist studies, Donald Lopez notes three important points preventing one to consider the 
initial western representation of ‘Buddhism’ as an identical act of orientalism as the European representation 
of the colonized Islam World was: (1) the Buddhist world was not ‘frighteningly’ proximate to Europe as the 
Islam world was, (2) a direct political role of Buddhist studies is not evident, (3) Buddhist studies was 
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something distinctly ‘orientalist’ about the western knowledge production in those 
three fields during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.87 When 
disentangling ‘orientalist’ processes from the need of a specific historical context of 
western colonization, or when trying to view, as Snodgrass has suggested, Said’s case 
study as “a much more general process of the way one society forms knowledge of 
another,” we are able to identify various ‘orientalist’ features in nineteenth century 
western Indological knowledge.88 This is also true for the western production of 
knowledge concerning ‘the’ Indian Buddhist tradition, the study of which occurred in 
the absence of a specific colonial context for the simple reason that “[b]y the time that 
India became part of the British empire, Buddhism was long dead there, present only in 
the form of palm leaf manuscripts, stone inscriptions, statues, and monuments.”89 In the 
absence of a specific colonial context for the western study of Indian Buddhism, what 
then can be considered to be typically ‘orientalist’ about it?  
One typical ‘orientalist’ aspect is the manner in which European conceptual 
frameworks have been transposed onto the subjects of study or, reversely, how the 
subjects of study were drawn into the European conceptual frameworks. Richard King 
has amply shown how ‘orientalist’ discourses are characterized by this ‘projection of 
domestic concerns, tension and power struggles onto the colonies abroad.’90 A specific 
example of this, is the manner how Catholic and Protestant struggles were read into the 
historical beginnings of both the Jain and Buddhist traditions. As we have seen in our 
discussion of the so-called Protestant paradigm, there was an insistence to present 
Mahavīra and the Buddha as reformers of the corrupt brāhmaṇa priests.  
As discussed, a current belief of late nineteenth century and early twentieth century 
scholarly discourse was the view that the Jain and Buddhist ‘canonical’ texts contained, 
if read adequately, the real ‘essence’ of the Jain and Buddhist traditions. This brings us 
to a second, and for our current purpose, very significant ‘orientalist’ feature of 
Indological endeavour, namely the fact that Indological discourses created essentialized 
products of knowledge (cf. above). In the words of Donald Lopez, this characterizing 
feature is “the representation of the complex as the simple, of the co-mingled as the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
conducted by scholars of various nationalities, and thus not only by nationals of the colonizing countries. Cf. 
Lopez 1995: 11. 
87 For the field of Indology see among others Tull 1991; Pollock 1993; Alduri 2011 and the reaction of 
Grünendahl 2012 on the publications of both Pollock 1993 and Alduri 2011; McGethin 2010. For Buddhist 
studies see e.g. Eckel 1994; Lopez 1995; Hallisey 1995; Freiberger 2003; Franklin 2005; Snodgrass 2007. For Jain 
studies, see a.o. Orr 2009 and Numark 2013.  
I thank Tillo Detige for having brought to my awareness many of the references referred to here. 
88 Snodgrass 2007: 200. 
89 Lopez 1995: 11. Lopez does not fail to note that the situation was different in Sri Lanka and Burma. 
90 King 2008 (1999): 155. 
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pure.”91 The positivistic textual attitude of orientalist scholars of that time led to 
representations of the Indian traditions as ahistorical and homogenised entities. The 
preference of orientalist scholars for the information provided in classical Indian texts 
to the actual complex and varied contemporary practice of these traditions, made them 
locate the true and original essence of these traditions within textual sources only. As 
we discussed in great detail in the preceding chapters, this had several consequences. 
For our current argumentation, we may underscore the fact that the knowledge thus 
obtained and presented was highly essentialist in nature. It was essentialist because 
scholars not only believed that the Buddhist and Jain traditions had, in the first place, 
something that could be determined as their essence, but also because they believed that 
the essence of the Buddhist and Jain traditions could only be retrieved from their 
‘canonical’ texts and this by means of a careful philological reading. The presented 
knowledge was further essentialist in the manner in which it viewed all history and 
contemporary practices of these traditions as degenerations from their initial pure, 
original state. In other cases orientalist scholarship simply denied history altogether, 
presenting the complex Indian traditions as ahistorical or static and unchanging 
entities. This essentialist attitude resulted in homogenized, stereotyped conceptions of 
what the Indian traditions are, but most importantly what they had been in their more 
remote and therefore more glorified and pure past. 
For instance, within the field of Jain studies it was not uncustomary in the nineteenth 
and first half of the twentieth century to present the early Jain ascetic community as a 
homogeneous, well-defined community with a set of ascetic praxes that hardly changed 
in the course of the centuries. John Cort in his introduction to Open Boundaries discusses 
the main models in which the Jain tradition has commonly been portrayed by western 
scholarship. He notes how western scholarship has dominantly presented the Jain 
tradition as a ‘fundamentally unoriginal movement,’ this being a result of a 
‘degenerationist model’ wherein 
a supposedly pure, original ur-Jain doctrine is contrasted with the later impure, 
degenerated Jainism largely composed of half-understood and ill-digested Hindu 
influences and accretions. It is a powerful Orientalist doublebind: “pure” Jainism is 
defined as conservative and unchanging, and all innovations are portrayed as 
degenerations. Original Jainism is the essence of Jainism, historical Jainism 
consists of a falling away from that essence. (Cort 1999 (1998): 3) 
Such models for interpreting not only the Jain but also, as we have shown, the Indian 
Buddhist tradition have proven to be highly problematic. First, by stereotyping Indian 
traditions into ahistorical and fixed entities, they fail to recognize both the historicity 
 
                                                     
91 This is for Lopez a standard feature of the Orientalizing process. Cf Lopez 1994, op cit.: 15. 
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and the inherent complexity and heterogeneity of these traditions. Second, post-
colonial critics have correctly pointed out how western scholars hegemonised the 
authority and power to speak of these Indian traditions. For, when the true essence of 
the Jain and Indian Buddhist tradition comes to be located within their classical and 
canonical texts, the power to speak about these traditions comes to lie with those who 
can correctly extract their essence from the texts, those being the orientalist scholar 
with his philological skills (cf. ‘Power Relations’ above). Third, the essentialist, textualist 
approach has resulted in a negative appreciation of the contemporary practices of the 
Indian traditions. Contemporary practices came to be negatively evaluated  against the 
‘extracted essences’ of the philologist or against the “purity of the ‘original texts’” tout 
court.92  
These problems inherent to an essentialist approach have been identified and 
recognized by scholars both within and outside the disciplines of Indology, Buddhology 
and Jainology. Within the current and previous two generations of orientalist scholars 
we can observe the formulation of new approaches and presuppositions in answer to 
the post-colonial critique and in general accordance to the changing academic climate 
of the 1970s and 1980s. To avoid the fallacy of ‘the act of orientalism’ in general (if, 
indeed, this can be avoided completely)93 and essentialization in particular, new 
research strategies have been developed. One strategy has been to develop that which I 
have termed an anti-essentialist approach. This is, research on the Indian Buddhist or 
Jain tradition that no longer sets out to describe their real, original or pure essence, but 
aims to instead understand their inherent complexity, constant change and fluidity, and 
this in both a diachronic and synchronic fashion. Multiple scholarly research of the past 
few decades, including this current PhD, should be understood within this anti-
essentialist discourse. 
The manner how orientalist scholarship started to de-essentialize its subjects of 
research and products of knowledge bears great similarity to the processes of de-
essentialization within literary studies and identity studies. We have seen how literary 
studies began to view meaning as ambiguous and fluid, as being dependent on changing 
elements both within and outside the literary work. In a similar fashion, the positivistic 
philological perspective that had accompanied the essentialist attitude of the textual 
orientalist, began to be replaced for a historical one. Traditional texts began to be 
 
                                                     
92 Cf. King 2008 (1999): 146. See also above ‘Devaluation of non-canonical Sources.’ 
93 One might justly ask whether the act of ‘orientalism’ is not bound to be present to some higher or lesser 
degree in any scholar’s formation of knowledge about ‘the’ Orient. For, as has been remarked, ‘the very act of 
interpretation by Western Orientalists when approaching the Orient inevitably involves an appropriation and 
‘colonialization’ of the material under consideration. Indeed, this is not only an issue for the Orientalist, or 
even for the Westerner, but for everyone involved in the hermeneutical moment.’ King 2008 (1999): 95. 
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approached as normative, prescriptive sources whose significance or meaning was 
unfixed and dependent on their specific historical contexts. Also, just as the postmodern 
deconstructionist approach within identity studies emphasized the heterogeneity 
within collectives, the heterogeneity within the various Indian traditions came to be 
studied. This anti-essentialist scholarship within the different fields of ‘orientalist’ 
studies may be exemplified. 
 
Not surprisingly, many examples can be found from the 1970s onwards. To start, we 
can think of the numerous studies, presented at conferences and/or published in 
articles and monographs, that explicitly start off from the question of identity within 
Buddhist, Jain, or other Indian ‘religious’ traditions. In a first instance the question of 
identity, this is when it is relationally conceived in terms of self and other, enables the 
researcher to study the dialectic formation of a tradition from within the tradition 
itself, thus avoiding – to some extent at least – the imposition of conceptions and 
formations from outside the studied tradition. In a second instance, and also due to the 
paradigm shift from the essentialist conception to the social constructivist and 
postmodern deconstructionist conception of ‘identity,’ scholars started to stress the 
heterogeneity, relativity or ‘multiplicity’ of what it meant to be Jain or Buddhist at any 
given time and place. 
As a specific example of such anti-essentialist scholarship within Jain studies, we may 
return once more to John Cort’s Open Boundaries. The edited volume, being a brilliant 
academic testimony to the inherent complexity of that what we call the Jain tradition, 
proceeds from a clear anti-essentialist perspective and aim. So we read in the 
introduction: 
it is useful to view Jainism not as a thing but rather as a style, one style (or family 
of styles) among many in South Asia. In the end, … efforts in pursuit of simple 
definitions, useful as they may be in clarifying one’s thought, peter out in 
inconclusiveness. We do not have a single Jainism, but multiple Jainisms, and 
multiple visions of what Jainism is. We have contested identities of what it means 
to be Jain, and …. these contested identities of what it means to be Jain can only be 
studied as paired with contested identities of what it means to be non-Jain. (Cort 
1999 (1998): 12-3) 
Departing from this notion of ‘multiple Jainisms,’ the volume succeeds in 
deconstructing any single, static notion one may have had regarding the Jain tradition 
into ‘multiple, contested’ notions and it does this without losing all grip on ‘Jain reality’ 
when speaking of these ‘multiple Jainisms.’ The individual articles that each sought ‘to 
locate Jain materials in a … dynamic, reciprocal, and interactive relation to South Asian 
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society,’ demonstrate well the indefinite, relational meaning of that what is termed Jain 
at any given time and place.94  
Of contemporary date, we can cite the Indological and Buddhological research being 
conducted at the consortium ‘The Käte Hamburger Kolleg (KHK) Dynamics in the History 
of Religions between Asia and Europe.’ This consortium, established in 2008 under the 
direction of Volkhard Krech at the Rühr University in Bochum, is a paradigmatic 
example of a research centre which perspectives and aims are clearly framed by an 
‘anti-essentialist’ standpoint. Stressing, as the consortium’s title suggests, the multiple 
dynamics in the historical development of religions, the research consortium 
thematically studies seminal dynamic stimuli in the history of religions such as their 
interreligious and socio-cultural contacts, their processes of religious differentiation and 
demarcation, or their intra- and inter religious conflicts. The centre further focusses on 
religions’ formative, expansionary and contemporary stages, moving back and forth 
between micro, meso and macro levels of analysis, between case studies and theoretical 
frameworks, and between exemplary and comparative studies.95 The KHK consortium in 
being able to bring together these different transdisciplinary methodological 
approaches with high thematic specialization is not only further complexifying our 
understanding of the various religious traditions, but is also pushing, or perhaps better, 
transcending the traditional academic boundaries of religious studies. We may end by 
quoting the first paragraph from the blurb of the book series Dynamics in the History of 
Religions as it captures the anti-essentialist premise so fundamental to the KHK research 
consortium: 
The so called world religions and other religious traditions are not, and have 
never been, homogenous, nor have they formed or evolve in isolation. Trying to 
overcome cultural stereotypes and their ideological misuse, the series “Dynamics in the 
History of Religions” focuses on the crucial role of mutual encounters in the origins, 
development, and internal differentiation of the major religious traditions. The 
primary thesis of the series consists in the assumption that interconnections of 
self-perception and perception by the other, of adaptation and demarcation are 
 
                                                     
94 Cort 1999 (1998): 3.  Other examples of studies that underscore the inherent complexity within either the 
Jain or Buddhist tradition, are studies investigating the processes of othering within the Jain or Buddhist 
tradition, see e.g. Folkert 1993 (1975-1989), Krämer et al. 2010; Lindquist 2011, Deeg 2013 and Maes 2015 
(forthcoming). 
95 The consortium is artificially divided into four research fields, being ‘Formation,’ ‘Expansion,’ ‘Notions,’ and 
‘Globalisation’ which are integrated into the three transversal focus groups of ‘Inclusion and Demarcation,’ 
‘Transfer and Resistance,’ and ‘Dynamics and Stability.’ For more information of the research activities, visit 
the KHK website: http://www.khk.ceres.rurh-uni-bochum.de (Last accessed: 27th  of December 2013)  
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crucial factors for historical dynamics within the religious field. (Krech, emphasis 
mine)96 
In conclusion, I hope to have convincingly shown how an anti-essentialist discourse 
started to gain ground and became prominent in various disciplines of post-World War 
II academia. The anti-essentialist discourse not being a single set of well-defined ideas 
can, however, be clearly observed in the several processes of de-essentialization in a 
discipline’s premises, goals, and products of knowledge. And it is within this anti-
essentialist scholarly framework that this current PhD Dialogues with(in) the Pāli Vinaya 
should be understood. Though the very possibility of being able to study the Pāli Vinaya 
today is a direct result of the heyday of nineteenth century Buddhological activities,97 
the questions raised to the Pāli Vinaya in the course of this dissertation are aimed to 
further complexify or de-essentialize our pre-conceived conceptions regarding the early 
Indian Buddhist ascetic tradition.    
 
Part III: The Pāli Vinaya 
The main source text used in this PhD is the Pāli Vinaya, the disciplinary code of the 
Buddhist Theravāda school. The Pāli Vinaya is a large and highly redacted ascetic text 
regulating many and diverse aspects of ascetic life through detailed descriptions of legal 
procedures, ceremonies, multiple do’s and don’ts and several hundreds of rules (Pāli 
sikkhāpada, Skt. śikṣāpada) for the Buddhist bhikkhu and bhikkunī. The text leads in each 
one of these hundreds of ascetic regulations with an introductory story recounting the 
occasion and the specific incident that would have necessitated their formulation, 
making it a potentially rich source of information regarding the formative stages of the 
early Indian Buddhist ascetic community. However, as Vinaya experts have pointed out, 
 
                                                     
96 Book blurb of the series Dynamics in the History of Religion.  
Available at: http://www.brill.com/publications/dynamics-history-religions. Last accessed: 23rd of December 
2013. 
9797 This is, without the orientalist scholar looking for a Buddhist canon after the model of the Christian 
biblical canon the study of Pāli texts such as the Pāli Vinaya would not have taken such an important place in 
the Buddhological research activities. Further, the Pāli ‘canon’ is easily accessible to present day scholars, as it 
is usually taken up in the library collections of the Indology or Buddhology department of universities. And 
this too is a direct result of nineteenth century scholarly activities, more specifically, of Rhys Davids’ 
establishment of the Pali Text Society in 1881 which became an institute with authoritative knowledge 
regarding Buddhism. Cf. p. 31 ff. 
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there are several serious difficulties with consulting the Pāli Vinaya as a historical 
document. Regarding factuality and completeness of the Pāli Vinaya, we cannot be sure 
to what extent the precepts (and this is true for all Vinayas) were actually observed and, 
turning this problem around, we do not know how much of the precepts regulating the 
early Indian Buddhist ascetic life have factually been included in the Pāli Vinaya.98 
Broadly speaking, the main difficulties with consulting the Pāli Vinaya as a historical 
source relate to (1) its complex textual development and (2) its overt concern for 
tradition versus historical facts. Elucidating these difficulties, this chapter, and by 
extension this whole PhD, argues for considering the Pāli Vinaya as a nevertheless rich 
source of information regarding many diverse facets of early Indian Buddhist ascetic 
life. At the same time, the basic internal structure of the Pāli Vinaya will be expounded 
as this will prove helpful for understanding the many extracts from the Pāli Vinaya 
coming up in the following chapters.   
Structure of the Pāli Vinaya  
Much light on the language, internal structure and textual development of the Pāli 
Vinaya has already been thrown by renown philologists such as Oskar von Hinüber, 
Kenneth Roy Norman, Anthony Kennedy Warder, Wilhelm Geiger, Dieter Schlingloff and 
Edith Nolot. For a detailed exposition, I therefore refer to the works of these authors.99 
The Pāli Vinaya is divided into three main parts: the Suttavibhaṅga; the Khandhaka 
and the Parivāra. The Suttavibhaṅga meaning “explanation of the (Pātimokkha-)sutta” 
contains and comments on the Pātimokkhasutta or the 227 rules of conduct for Buddhist 
bhikkhus and the 311 rules of conduct for Buddhist bhikkhunīs,100 which are 
systematically arranged according to the gravity of offense committed when 
 
                                                     
98 On this issue see among others Schopen 1989; 1991; Collins 1990: 89, 102; Hallisey 1990: 207-8; Clarke 2009: 
35-9. For helpful methodological guidelines to extract ‘social and religious realities’ from Vinayas, see 
Witkowski (forthcoming) and Nattier 2003: 63-69. See also Part II “Nattier’s ‘Principle of Irrelevance’ and 
‘Principle of Counterargument’,” where the methodological guidelines are explained in some detail. 
99 See von Hinüber 1996 & 1999 both works containing many references to other scholars on Vinaya, and von 
Hinüber 2001 (1986); Norman 1980; 1989; 1990-2001; Warder 1967 & 2001 (1963, 1974², 1991³); Geiger 1994; 
Schlingloff 1964 and Nolot 1994.  
100 For an edition and translation of both the Bhikkhu-and Bhikkhunīpātimokkha, see The Pātimokkha, William 
Pruitt (ed.) & K.R. Norman (tr.), 2001.  
The Pātimokkha had to be known by heart for its fortnightly recitation on uposatha day. For a religio-historical 
analysis of this pātimokkha ceremony, see Holt 1999: 2, 16, 106-137 and Holt 1978 where he considers it as a 
cultic celebration of the disciplinary rules through which both the complete purity (pārisuddhi) and corporate 
identity of the early Buddhist ascetic saṅgha could be established and preserved. On uposatha, see also Hu-von 
Hinüber 1994. 
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transgressing the rule of conduct.101 The Suttavibhaṅga leads in every rule of conduct of 
the Pātimokkha with an introductory story (vatthu) recounting the supposed when and 
why of the rule’s promulgation (cf. below). Following the introductory story is the 
formulation of the rule of conduct in question (paññatti)102 accompanied with the type of 
penalty incurred for transgressing it. This is followed by a word for word commentary 
(Padabhājaniya) and a casuistry (“Kasuistik”, anāpatti “no offence”).103 Sometimes this is 
concluded with an exposition of other exemplary cases (vinītavatthu), which, if 
necessary, is followed by a reformulation of the initial rule of conduct.104 In accordance 
with this structure, Nolot distinguishes three types of introductory stories in the 
Suttavibhaṅga: a principal introductory story justifying the need for the Pātimokkha 
rule; a secondary introductory story justifying the modification of the Pātimokkha rule; 
and an annexed introductory story treating a specific case at the end of the casuistry.105  
The Khandhaka (“mass”) is divided into the Mahāvagga (“great division”) and 
Cullavagga (“small division”). Also the Khandhaka contains many rules of conduct and 
just as in the Suttavibhaṅga here too they are embedded in a larger text. Also in the 
Khandhaka the precepts are provided with an introductory narrative, but apart from 
one exception106 not with a word for word commentary.107 In addition to a set of rules, 
the Khandhaka gives an account of the Buddha’s enlightenment; of the first council; it 
further contains technical descriptions of ordination procedures and ceremonies such 
 
                                                     
101 Thus we have, in descending order of gravity: pārājika rules (offences involving defeat, for more details on 
the consequences of transgressing a pārājika rule, see Clarke 2009. On the term ‘pārājika’ see a.o. Heirman 
1999); saṃghādisesa rules (offences entailing a formal meeting of the saṅgha); aniyata rules (indefinite rules, the 
consequence of transgressing such a rule is to be determined according to the gravity of the offence); 
nissaggiya-pācittiya rules (offences entailing expiation with forfeiture, such offences require a ‘confession of 
the fault and forfeiture of the item involved in the offence’); (suddha-)pācittiya rules (offences involving 
expiation, such offences can be ‘redressed through a general confession that does not specify the fault being 
confessed,’ this is equally so for the pāṭidesanīya and sekhiya rules); pāṭidesanīya rules (offences require a 
confession); sekhiya rules (are rules of training, there are no consequences for transgressing such a rule); 
adhikaraṇasamatha (seven ways for settlement). For a discussion of this classification of the Pātimokkha 
precepts and the sanctions for breaking a particular precept, see The Pātimokkha, William Pruitt (ed.) & K.R. 
Norman (tr.), 2001, pp. xlvii-lv. 
102 The exact formulation of the rule of conduct may vary with the formulation of the Pātimokkha. Cf. Nolot 
1994: 103. 
103 See Schlingloff 1964: 538, n. 22; Nolot 1994: 103. 
104 It may be noted that the Pāli terms given for the different divisions of the Suttavibhaṅga, this is vatthu 
(introductory story); paññatti (rule of conduct); anupaññatti (additional conditions); padabhājaniya (word for 
word explanation ); anāpatti (exceptions to the rule); vinītavatthu (exemplary cases), are given in the account of 
the first council at Vin II 286 (line 23-29) (BD V 396) and are discussed in the Samantapasādika commentary on 
pārājika I. Cf. von Hinüber 1996: 13 §22.  
105 Cf. Nolot: 1994: 105. 
106 Vin I: 103-4. 
107 Cf. von Hinüber 1996: 15.  
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as the fortnightly pāṭimokkha recitation, and the pavāraṇā and kaṭhina ceremonies held at 
the end of the vassa or rain-retreat.  
The third part, the Parivāra (“appendix”) is a highly technical text giving a 
“systematic survey of law” and presupposes both the Suttavibhaṅga and Khandhaka 
parts.108   
The Crux of the Pāli Vinaya’s Textual Development 
Having developed over a long period of time, the Pāli Vinaya presents itself as a very 
fragmented, heterogeneous text. First, the various ‘Māgadhisms’ encountered in the so-
called Pāli language109 suggest that the Pāli Vinaya is in part the result of a transposition 
from (an) earlier eastern version(s).110 Second, the Pāli Vinaya knows a complex textual 
development for having ensued from a set of ascetic regulations that was first brought 
from India to Sri Lanka during Aśoka’s reign, before being written down into a Vinaya 
compilation in the first century BCE. The textual fragmentation of the Pāli Vinaya is still 
well observable at the temporal gap between the precepts and their accompanying 
introductory story in the Suttavibhaṅga. In this section of the Pāli Vinaya introductory 
stories often betray a made up character by misunderstanding or showing a different 
concern than the precepts they introduce.111 This has been examined in detail by 
Schlingloff who noted how many introductory stories in the Suttavibhaṅgha fail to 
grasp either the meaning or underlying motivation (or both) of the precept they 
introduce, while still other introductory stories betray their made up-character by 
having been clearly spun around one particular word or concept of the precept.112  
 
                                                     
108 Cf. von Hinüber 1996: 21-22. The Parivāra will in our discussion of the Pāli Vinaya be left out of 
consideration. 
109 Though Buddhists traditionally view “Pāli” to be the language wherein the Buddha taught, it may be noted 
with von Hinüber that “Pāli has never been a spoken language neither in Magadha [the cradle of Indian 
Buddhism] nor elsewhere… [Pāli] has been created as some kind of lingua franca presumably used in a large 
area at a time considerably later than the Buddha.” Cf. von Hinüber 1996: 5. Further, the term ‘Pāli’ was “not 
originally the name of a language, but a term meaning firstly a line, bridge, or causeway, and thence a ‘text.’” 
Cf. Collins 1990: 91.  
110 On the Māgadhisms in the Pāli language and the Pāli canon being in part the result of a ‘transposition’ of 
(an) earlier eastern version(s), see Warder 1967: 7-14; Norman 1980; Norman 1989, von Hinüber 2001 (1986) 
and von Hinüber 1996: 4-5, §7-9. See also von Hinüber 1999: 47f. & 84f. where he argues for a temporal or 
geographical distance between the Pātimokkhasutta and the Padabhājaniya (the word for word commentary) 
on the basis that the monetary unit pāda occurring in a precept of the Pātimokkhasutta has been replaced by 
māsaka in the accompanying Padabhājaniya section.  
111 Cf. von Hinüber 1996: 13, §20; Schlingloff 1964: 536-551. 
112 Cf. Schlingloff 1964: 458f. 
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Oskar von Hinüber pointed out that such introductory stories misunderstanding the 
precept will not be found in the Khandhaka section. For, in this section ‘the author(s) 
could drop rules no longer understood, which is not possible in the fixed 
Pātimokkhasutta: suttaṃ hi appaṭivattiyaṃ, … [meaning] “for it is impossible to revoke the 
(Pātimokkha-)sutta.”’113 Apart for the complex textual relationship between the various 
ascetic regulations and their accompanying introductory stories, different textual layers 
can also be present within one and the same introductory story.114 Finally, a complex 
textual development also characterizes the Pātimokkha, the rules and legal procedures 
of the Khandakha; as well as the relationship between the Suttavibhaṅga and 
Khandakha sections of the Pāli Vinaya.115  
Tradition Versus Historical Facts 
Another main difficulty with consulting the Pāli Vinaya as a historical document is the 
problem of tradition versus historical facts. Given the invented tone of many 
introductory stories and their temporal distance from the precepts, it is clear that they 
were – contrary to what we would have liked - not developed as faithful historical 
reports. But then the question presses itself why were they developed?  
Being structured around the principles of what today is called ‘case law,’ the Pāli 
Vinaya needs to ground each of its precepts on a specific incident. It needs to record the 
facts of the controversy that led to the formulation of a particular regulation. The 
overall function of the introductory stories within the Pāli Vinaya is precisely this: 
recounting the alleged when and why of each Pāli Vinaya regulation, providing thus a 
reference frame for future incidents.116  
When we question the function of introductory stories by considering their narrative 
structure, then their prime function appears to have been the creation of the very 
tradition they claim to represent. The typical narrative structure of introductory stories 
effects a strong traditional story regarding the origin and development of the Buddhist 
ascetic saṅgha. As I will illustrate with an introductory story below, this is created by 
reverting to stock phrases; by using a repetitive structure; and, most importantly, by 
 
                                                     
113 von Hinüber 1996: 20, §37. 
114 For linguistic tools to relatively date (fragments of) the various introductory stories, see Nolot (1994: 106-
107). 
115 Cf. von Hinüber 1996: 19, §37 where he notes how the Suttavibhaṅga and Khandhaka “have a long history of 
development and of mutual influence” and where he gives a provisional sketch of the development of the 
various parts of the Suttavibhaṅga and Khandhaka sections.  
See also ‘Epilogue’ where tools are expounded to relatively date Vinaya passages. 
116 On the type of law embodied in the Pāli Vinaya, see also Dutt 1996 (1924): 25. 
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placing the executive role for every legal decision with the Buddha himself.  It is this 
great emphasis on tradition that makes extracting historical data from the Pāli Vinaya a 
particularly hazardous task.  
 
Recognizing this and other, so to speak, ‘flaws’ of the Pāli Vinaya as a ready historical 
document for the ins and outs of early Indian Buddhist ascetic life, scholars have been 
quick to point out that the Pāli Vinaya has nevertheless a rich historical value too. For 
instance, according to Charles Hallisey the Pāli Vinaya is historically valuable “in its 
being a coherent expression of a particular Buddhist mentalité.”117 Also, if not 
representing actual Indian Buddhist ascetic life, it is at least “providing us with rich 
insights into how the canonical authors/redactors, the ascetic lawmakers, envisaged the 
Indian Buddhist experience […] .”118 Shayne Clarke in a recent study highlighted the 
value of Vinaya introductory stories as follows: 
Whether the narratives attached to ascetic regulations are based on historical 
events or not, it is precisely the narratives that are […] invaluable for the historian 
of religion or religious thought. What is of importance here is not the historicity 
of the event, but the value that the ascetic traditions themselves attached to and 
invested in it. Such stories must be, at least in part, credible or plausible […] .119 
Concurring with this opinion that introductory stories are indeed invaluable for the 
present day researcher, I hope that my reading of the Pāli Vinaya presented in the 
following sections shows how introductory stories can disclose much valuable 
information on the dialectical role non-Buddhist ascetics played on the development of 
the early Buddhist ascetic community.  
Introductory Stories, an Example 
Introductory stories follow, as mentioned, a typical narrative structure. The first 
sentence of an introductory story invariably starts with a temporal setting ‘tena kho pana 
samayena’ or ‘now at that time’ before starting to recount the supposed incident that led 
the Buddha to promulgate a particular regulation. The Suttavibhaṅga gives in tandem 
with the temporal setting a spatial setting, thus starting all of its principal introductory 
 
                                                     
117 Hallisey 1990: 208. Compare on this point also Dutt 1996 (1924): “[E]ven those [introductory] stories which 
are obviously legendary are valuable as letting us into the social, moral and mental atmosphere of the times in 
which they originated.” 
118 Clarke 2009: 36. Clarke formulated this pointed observation with regard to all Indian Buddhist monastic law 
codes, thus not particularly to the Pāli one. 
119 Clarke 2009: 36.  
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stories with ‘tena samayena buddho bhagavā X viharati Y,’120 with X being the name of the 
village or town where the Buddha was staying, and Y being the particular ārāma or cetiya 
(‘shrine’) within that village or town. Schlingloff correctly pointed out that the purpose 
of such a spatio-temporal framework lies in historicizing the introductory stories.121 
In case the introductory story is one ushering in a Pātimokkha precept, then the 
spatio-temporal setting is followed by an account of the supposed incident which, in 
turn, is succeeded by a series of stock phrases expressing how the incident came to be 
known; how it subsequently came to be reproved by a particular individual or a group of 
‘people’ (manussā) or monks that were ‘annoyed, angry and speaking dispraisingly’ 
(ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti); and how it came to be reported to the Buddha through a 
short or long chain of particular witnesses. This is followed by some more stock phrases 
containing a reprimand of the Buddha given to the wrong-doer(s) and his reasons for 
promulgating the precept.  
An example of an introductory story from the Suttavibhaṅga may be given. Quoting 
the introductory story to pācittiya LXXXV (Vin IV 1-2), I marked in bold the stock 
phrases and placed in italic all repetitions, so that the construction of a typical narrative 
structure through stock phrases and repetition may become visually apparent. 
Tena samayena buddho bhagavā Sāvatthiyaṃ viharati Jetavane Anāthapiṇḍikassa 
ārāme. tena kho pana samayena Hatthako Sakyaputto vādakkhitto hoti. so 
titthiyehi saddhiṃ sallapento avajānitvā paṭijānāti paṭijānitva avajānāti aññen’ 
aññaṃ paṭicarati sampajānamusā bhāsati saṃketaṃ katvā visaṃvādeti.  
titthiyā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti: kathaṃ hi nāma Hatthako Sakyaputto 
amhehi saddhiṃ sallapento avajānitvā paṭijānissati paṭijānitvā avajānissati aññen’ 
aññaṃ paṭicarissati sampajānamusā bhāsissati saṃketaṃ katvā visaṃvādessatīti. 
assosuṃ kho bhikkhū tesaṃ titthiyānaṃ ujjhāyantānaṃ khīyantānaṃ 
vipācentānaṃ. atha kho te bhikkhū yena Hatthako Sakyaputto ten’ 
upasaṃkamiṃsu, upasaṃkamitvā Hatthakaṃ Sakyaputtaṃ etad avocuṃ: saccaṃ 
kira tvaṃ āvuso Hatthaka titthiyehi saddhiṃ sallapento avajānitvā paṭijānāsi … 
visaṃvādesīti. 
ete kho āvuso titthiyā nāma yena kenaci jetabbā n’eva tesaṃ jayo dātabbo ’ti.  
ye te bhikkhū appicchā122 te ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti: kathaṃ hi nāma 
Hatthako Sakyaputto titthiyehi saddhiṃ sallapento avajānitvā paṭijānissati paṭijānitvā 
avajānissati aññen’ aññaṃ paṭicarissati sampajānamusā bhāsissati saṃketaṃ katvā 
visaṃvādessatīti. atha kho te bhikkhū bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ.  
atha kho bhagavā etasmiṃ nidāne etasmiṃ pakaraṇe bhikkhusaṃghaṃ 
sannipātāpetvā Hatthakaṃ Sakyaputtaṃ paṭipucchi: saccaṃ kira tvaṃ Hatthaka 
 
                                                     
120 ‘Now at that time the Buddha, the Bhagavat, was staying at X in Y.’ 
121 Schlingloff 1964: 538. Cf. Nolot 1994: 105. 
122 appiccha < apa + iṣ ‘desiring little’ => unassuming, contended, modest 
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titthiyehi saddhiṃ sallapento avajānitvā paṭijānāsi…bhāsasi saṃketaṃ katvā 
visaṃvādesīti. 
saccaṃ bhagavā. 
vigarahi buddho bhagavā: kathaṃ hi nāma tvaṃ moghapurisa titthiyehi saddhiṃ 
sallapento avajānitvā paṭijānissasi … bhāsissasi saṃketaṃ katvā visaṃvādessasi. n’ etaṃ 
moghapurisa appasannānaṃ vā pasādāya – pa – evañ ca pana bhikkhave imaṃ 
sikkhāpadaṃ uddiseyyātha: 
sampajānamusāvāde pācittiyan ti. 
 
At that time Buddha, the Bhagavat, was staying at Sāvatthī in the Jeta Grove in 
Anāthapiṇḍika’s monastery (ārāme). Now at that time, Hatthaka, son of the 
Sakyans, came to be overthrown in debate. He, talking with titthiyas (i.e. adherents 
of a different ascetic community), agreed while just having denied; denied while 
just having agreed; shunned (a question) by another; deliberately lied (and) after 
making an appointment (with titthiyas) he deceived with words. 
The titthiyā-s were irritated, angry and speaking dispraisingly: How can this 
Hatthaka, son of the Sakyans, who is talking with us agree while just having denied 
(and) deny while just having agreed, shun (a question) by another, deliberately lie (and) 
having made an appointment, deceive with words? 
Monks  heard these titthiyas who were irritated, angry and speaking dispraisingly. 
Then these monks approached Hattahaka, son of the Sakyans, having approached 
(him) they spoke thus to Hatthaka, son of the Sakyans: 
“Is it true, reverend Hatthaka, that you when talking with titthiyā-s agree while just 
having denied …. deceive with words?” 
“These [matters] are indeed true, reverend ones, these titthiyā-s should be 
conquered in whatever way, victory should not be given to them.” 
Those who were modest monks were irritated, angry and speaking dispraisingly: 
“How can this Hatthaka, son of the Sakyans, when talking with titthiyas agree while 
just having denied (and) deny while just having agreed, shun (a question) by another, 
deliberately lie (and) having made an appointment, deceive with words?” 
Then these monks told the matter to the Bhagavat.  
Then the Bhagavat, on this occasion, in this connection, having had the bhikkhu 
saṅgha convened, questioned Hatthaka, the son of the Sakyans:  
“Is it true, as is said, that you Hatthaka, when talking with titthiyas agree while just 
having denied …. having made an appointment deceive with words?” 
“It is true, Bhagavat.” 
Then the Bhagavat rebuked him: “How can you, foolish man, when talking with 
titthiyas agree while just having denied …. having made an appointment, deceive with 
words?” 
It is not, foolish man, for the benefit of un-believers [‘pa’= nor for the increase in 
the number of believers, but, foolish man, it is to the detriment of both 
unbelievers and believers, and it causes wavering in some]. 
And thus, monks, this rule of training should be set forth: 
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“In telling a conscious lie, there is an offence of expiation.” (trsl. partly following 
I.B. Horner BD II 164-166) 
It may be noted that both the amount of repetition as well as the rebuke of the Buddha 
occur in a shortened version in our quoted introductory story. Hermann Oldenberg, the 
editor of the Pāli Vinaya abbreviated the repetitions and stock phrases after their first 
occurrence (indicated with “…” in the text), this is also true for the Chatta Sangayana 
edition.123 Be as it may, the typical narrative structure of introductory stories may be 
clear. By reverting to stock phrases and using a rigid, repetitive narrative structure 
wherein the Buddha is playing the executive role for every legal decision, they produce 
a strong traditional story concerning the origin of each precept. The following chapters 
break, as it were, through this one-dimensional, normative façade of the Pāli Vinaya and 
bring to the foreground the many dialogues of the early Buddhist community with its 
wider ascetic landscape. 
In a first instance, I try to break through the one-dimensional, normative façade of the 
Pāli Vinaya by searching for concrete dialogue opportunities. By means of a 
methodological reading of the Pāli Vinaya based on Nattier’s ‘principle of irrelevance’ 
and ‘principle of counterargument,’124 I draw a typology of contact opportunities for the 
early Buddhist bhikkhu and his ascetic others. How easily could a Buddhist bhikkhu come 
 
                                                     
123 In the first and thus lengthier introductory story of the Suttavibhaṅga (i.e. the introductory story to 
pārājika I) the rebuke of the bhikkhu’s offence is first uttered by monks and later, when the Buddha is informed 
of his disciple’s misdeed, repeated by the Buddha himself. In both cases, the content and wording of the 
rebuke are identical. There is only a difference in the mode of address: monks address their fellow bhikkhu 
with ‘āvuso’, while the Buddha addresses his disciple with ‘moghapurisa’ (‘foolish man’). Cf. BD I 35-37.  
Similarly, the introductory story to pārājika I gives both a lengthier rebuke of the Buddha as well as a fuller 
version for his reason to promulgate the precept. The full rebuke reads as follows:  
“It is not fit, foolish man, it is not becoming, it is not proper, it is unworthy of a recluse, it is not lawful, it 
ought not to be done. How is that you, foolish man, having gone forth under this dhamma and discipline 
which are well taught, are not able for your lifetime to lead the Brahma-life which is complete and wholly 
purified? How can you strive, foolish man, while dhamma is taught by me in various ways for the sake of 
passionlessness….foolish man, by me for the sake of passionlessness. Foolish man, is not dhamma taught by me 
in various ways for the waning of passion ….the destruction of pleasures of the senses…the allaying of the 
fever of the pleasures of the senses been declared? . . . . It is not, foolish man, for the benefit of un-believers, 
nor for the increase in the number of believers, but, foolish man, it is to the detriment of both unbelievers and 
believers, and it causes wavering in some” (tr. I.B. Horner BD I 36-37) 
The fuller version of the Buddha’s reason to promulgate a precept, here pārājika I reads: 
“On account of this, monks, I will make known the course of training for monks, founded on ten reasons: for 
the excellence of the Order, for the comfort of the Order, for the restraint of evil-minded men, for the ease of 
well-behaved monks, for the restraint of the cankers belonging to the here and now, for the combating of the 
cankers belonging to other worlds, for the benefit of non-believers, for the increase in the number of 
believers, for establishing dhamma indeed, for following the rules of restraint.” (tr. I.B. Horner BD I 37-38) 
124 See p. 84 ff. 
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into direct or indirect contact with his ascetic others, and how frequent was this 
contact? As we will see, nearly any basic and daily activity of a Buddhist bhikkhu could 
give rise to contact. What did this mean for the boundary negotiation of the early 
Buddhist ascetic community, or also, how much of a ‘Buddhist’ (to use an anachronistic 
term) was an early Buddhist bhikkhu? The contact opportunities drawn from the Pāli 
Vinaya will be substantiated with similar and other examples taken from the Jain 
Āyāraṅga Sutta. Being the oldest extant Jain (Śvetāmbara) text on ascetic conduct 
(‘āyāra’), the Āyāraṅga Sutta (Skt. Ācāraṅga Sutta) will be, next to the Pāli Vinaya, a 
second principal source text used in this PhD. The Sutta has been edited and translated 
by Hermann Jacobi in respectively 1882 and 1884.125 
Despite the fact that the historical start of the Jain ascetic tradition precedes the 
development of the Indian Buddhist ascetic tradition, its ‘canonical’ literature cannot 
claim the same antiquity as the early Pāli texts. According to a Jain tradition itself, the 
collecting and writing down of Jain ‘canonical’ texts did not occur before the middle of 
the fifth century A.D., implying a long and complex textual development of the Jain 
‘canon.’126 Beyond this late composition date, parts of the content of the Jain ‘canon’ may, 
however, have a greater antiquity. Indeed, based on an investigation of metre and 
language, Jacobi suggested that the most ancient parts of the Āyāraṅga Sutta, and at the 
same time of the Jain ‘canon,’ must approximately date from the end of the fourth or 
the beginning of the third century B.C.127 
 
                                                     
125 Edition: The Âyâraṃga Sutta of the Çvetâmbara Jains, Hermann Jacobi (ed.), London: Pali Text Society, 1882. 
Translation: Jaina Sūtras. Part I: The Âcârâṅga Sūtra, The Kalpa Sūtra, Hermann Jacobi (tr.), Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass Publishers Private Ltd (Sacred Books of the East vol. 22), 1989 (1884). 
The first of the two books constituting the Āyāraṅga Sutta has also been edited and translated by Walther 
Schubring: Ācārâṅga-Sūtra (Ester Śrutaskandha) Text, Analyse und Glossar, Walther Schubring (ed.), Abhandlungen 
für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vol. 12, no 4, Leipzig, 1910. For Schubring’s translation see Pure Life 
(Bambhacerāiṃ). 
For the first book of the Āyāraṅga Sutta there exists both a word and reverse word index, and a pāda and 
reverse pāda index, see Yamazaki, Moriichi & Ousaka, Yumi, 1994 & 1996. 
126 For the reason why I put ‘canonical’ between quotation mark, see above fn. 45. The Jain tradition I am 
alluding to  is the Śvetāmbara tradition regarding the ‘second council of Valabhī,’ held during the middle of 
the fifth or the beginning of the sixth century A.D., that was presided over by Devarddhi Kṣamāśramaṇa and 
during which a Jain canon was collected and written down, in order to prevent a complete loss of the Jain 
suttas. Cp. Deo 1956: 21 ff, Winternitz 1999 (1983, revised edition): 416 ff. 
127 Cf. Jacobi 1989 (1884) (SBE 22): xli-xliii. Jacobi considers the first of the two books of the Āyāraṅga Sutta to 
constitute the eldest part. Together with the first book of the Āyāraṅga, Jacobi also considers the 
Sūyagaḍaṃga (Skt. Sūtrakṛtāṅga)  and the Uttarajjhayaṇa Sutta (Skt. Uttarādhyayana Sūtra) to belong to the 
oldest strata of the Jain canon. 
On metre as a tool to relatively date the various parts of the Āyāraṅga Sutta and other Jain texts, see 
Schubring’s ‘The Canon of the Śvetāmbara Jainas,’ in his Mahāvīra’s Words (2004), pp. 1-32.  See also 
Winternitz 1999 (1983, revised edition): 414 ff. 
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The Āyāraṅga Sutta, composed in Ardhamāgadhī,128 is divided into two main parts 
(suyakkhaṃdha, Skt. śrutaskhandha), each being subdivided into various lectures 
(ajjhayaṇa) and contains, in the words of Dundas, “doctrinal statements about the nature 
of reality, concerning particularly the soul and action, a biography of Mahāvīra and 
injunctions about monastic discipline.”129 Its early date (relatively speaking, that is) 
together with its many precepts and guidelines for the daily life of the Jain ascetic, 
makes the Āyāraṅga Sutta a valuable textual source for conceptualizing the early Jain 
ascetic life. Further, when taken together with the Pāli Vinaya, the Āyāraṅga Sutta helps 
conceptualizing the early Indian ascetic life in general. I will therefore frequently be 
referring to this Sutta when discussing the contact opportunities of early ascetics (cf. 
upcoming section ‘A Brief Typology of Contact Opportunities’), as well as in the sections 
‘Processes of othering in the Pāli Vinaya,’ and in the final section called From ‘Ascetic’ to 
‘Ascetic other.’ 
In the section ‘Processes of othering in the Pāli Vinaya,’ I bring to the foreground the 
important role of dialogue between the early Buddhist ascetic community and its wider 
ascetic landscape by means of identifying and analysing processes of othering in our 
main source text. This is, I examine when and how the Pāli Vinaya narratives refer to 
the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s ascetic others. I will thus show how the early Buddhist 
ascetic community both negotiated its identity and reflected on the importance of its 
ascetic practices in direct relation to these ascetic others. In my examination of the 
processes of othering, I argue that the terms a community adopts and/or develops to 
refer to its so-called others, can reveal much of the manner how these others were 
perceived and related to, and how a community perceives itself vis-à-vis his others. In 
this context, I offer an examination of the various denominations found in the Pāli 
Vinaya for the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s ascetic others (cf. Appendix ‘Labelling the 
Ascetic other’). 
In the final section, the role of dialogue in the early Buddhist ascetic community will 
be illustrated by means of a philological excursion of the Pāli term titthiya, and other 
kindred terms. I show how the Pāli term ‘titthiya,’ being the denomination most 
frequently used to refer to the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s ascetic other, underwent a 
semantic shift wherein its initial meaning of ‘an’ ascetic came to be narrowed down to 
designate ascetic others only. Underlying this semantic shift lies, I argue, a shift of the 
 
                                                     
128 On Ardhamāgadhī as scriptural language, see Dundas 2002² (1999): 69 ff. Though within the Jain Śvetāmbara 
tradition, Ardhamāgadhī is considered to be the language wherein Mahāvīra preached, this is historically not 
correct. Ardhamāgadhī (‘half Māgadhī’) was ‘certainly not the vernacular in which Mahāvīra himself 
preached, [it] evolved from some underlying dialect, presumably a variety of Māgadhī, into a specifically Jain 
scriptural dialect, a sacred language which could be differentiated from Sanskrit […].’ Ibid: 70. 
129 Dundas 2002² (1999): 73. 
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manner how the early Buddhist ascetic community perceived itself within its wider 
ascetic landscape, and related to its various ascetic others.  
  61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dialogues in the Pāli Vinaya 
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A Brief Typology of Contact Opportunities  
How well did early Buddhists knew their Jain ascetic other?   
Early Buddhist bhikkhus knew their Jain ascetic other, and they knew them well. They 
displayed a knowledge that went beyond the clichéd features of Jain doctrine and 
praxes; a type of knowledge suggestive of intensive contact between early Buddhist 
bhikkhus and nigaṇṭhas.1 Before starting to analyze the various contact opportunities for 
early Buddhist bhikkhus and nigaṇṭhas, I first discuss some nigaṇṭha references in early 
Buddhist texts that illustrate well the fact that early Buddhist bhikkhus had a very good 
knowledge of their Jain ascetic other.  
When referring to them with ‘nigaṇṭha,’ Buddhist monk-redactors showed their 
familiarity with the internal naming policy of the Jain ascetic community.2 They knew 
Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and they were acquainted with various peculiarities of Jain 
soteriology. The Jain conception of vegetation and the four elements as living beings 
endowed with the faculty of sense (Pkt. ekindiya jīva, Pāli ekindriya jīva) was known to 
early Buddhists. In fact, several Pāli Vinaya passages indicate that this Jain concept of 
ekindriya jīva together with some consonant ascetic praxes fuelled Jain-Buddhist 
debates.3   
Buddhists or for these points, perhaps better, learned Buddhist bhikkhus4 also knew 
that some Jain bhikkhus considered a harmful physical action to be more pernicious than 
 
                                                     
1 For examples of Buddhists displaying a detailed knowledge of subtle features of Jain disciplinary conduct, see 
a little further in this chapter. 
2 For a discussion of the ‘internal’ use of ‘nigaṇṭha’ (AMg. nigaṇṭha; niyaṃṭha) see the appendix in the following 
section ‘Labelling the Ascetic other,’ lemma ‘Nātaputta Nigaṇṭha; nigaṇṭha; nigaṇṭhasāvaka.’  
3 Cf. Maes 2010-2011.  
4 These soteriological differences are very subtle in nature and I doubt that ‘all’ ‘Buddhist’ and ‘all’ ‘Jain’ 
bhikkhus were aware of these differences, hence my choice for ‘learned bhikkhus.’ 
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a harmful speech or thought.5 Both learned Buddhist and Jain bhikkhus distinguished 
three locales of an action: body, speech and mind. In agreement with this tripartite 
division learned bhikkhus of both communities laid down ‘three types of wrongs for 
effecting an evil deed,’ wrong of body (kāyadaṇḍa), wrong of speech (vacīdaṇḍa), and 
wrong of mind (manodaṇḍa). Following this scheme, ‘stealing’ would thus be divided into 
the act of stealing, voicing the intention of stealing or inciting another to steal, and the 
thought of stealing.  
Learned bhikkhus of both the Jain and Buddhist community discussed the karmic 
trace, or the wholesomeness or unwholesomeness, of an action according to this 
tripartite scheme. Buddhists and Jains appeared to have developed differing opinions on 
this point, and from what may be inferred from both early Jain and Buddhist suttas, they 
not only knew that they were at variance on this point, but they also appeared to have 
debated with one another over this issue. Be as it may, both Buddhists and Jains did not 
hesitate to ridicule one another’s position in their respective texts. Before turning to 
give an illustration, I would like to note that both Jains and Buddhists developed a 
nuanced ‘philosophy of action.’6 The (un)wholesomeness of an action could not only be 
assessed according to differing criteria (e.g. in terms of its direct effect of causing 
suffering or happiness, in terms of its contribution to progress on the path to 
liberation),7 but also according to its specific discourse. This is, the (un)wholesomeness 
of an action may also be assessed differently when treated  in a purely karmic discourse, 
or when treated within a social discourse or context. For instance, for Buddhists (the 
type of) intention, which in the tripartite scheme of action is located within the mind,8 
is considered the most important factor for determining the karmic trace of an action, 
irrespective of its (physical) effects. In a certain sense, intention is a conditio sine qua non 
for an action to produce a karmic trace (whether positive or negative). This primordial 
importance of intention for Buddhists is also seen within the legal scheme of the Pāli 
 
                                                     
5 Put to practice, however, the intention could dominate the physical consequences. The Jain ideal of complete 
abstinence from harming one-sensed facultied beings was for obvious reasons impossible: living means 
breathing, eating and sleeping – all activities involving to some extent the hurting of ekindriya jīvas. The Jain 
mendicant was, therefore, encouraged to develop samiti (‘circumspection’) in his actions (cf. UD 24.2), in 
unintentionally harming small living beings he was not to blame. In Malayagiri’s commentary of the 
Vavahārasutta (‘Manuals of Monastic Proceedings’), being the third of the six Cheyasuttas, one can read how 
only an intentional act of transgression incurs guilt. Vyavahāra Bhāṣya Pīṭhikā, Bollée (tr. & ed.) 2006: 90. On 
samiti see Maes 2010-2011: Part I ekindriya jīva in Jain scriptures; Dundas 2002²: 164. See Mette 2002: 213-226 for 
an analysis of the Pāriṣṭhāpanikī-niryukti being a commentary on the fifth samiti or ‘the disposal of bodily 
excreta’ (uccāra).  
6 Regarding the ‘philosophy of action’ developed by Buddhist bhikkhus, see Harvey 2003 (2000): 46ff. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Cf. MN I 377 (tr. Horner, Middle Length Sayings Vol II: 42) where it is noted how a wrong intention belongs to 
‘the wrong of mind.’ 
  65 
Vinaya where the presence or absence of intention is crucial for determining whether 
or not a bhikkhu committed an offence.9 Nevertheless, the bhikkhu who merely intents to 
transgress a precept (but does not physically transgress it) is generally speaking not 
considered to have committed an offence. For determining the gravity of an offence, the 
Pāli Vinaya also takes into consideration the social impact of a bhikkhu’s action. When 
we consider again our example of ‘stealing,’ this means that in the Pāli Vinaya the 
thought or intention of stealing will not be treated similarly (i.e. as severely) as the act of 
stealing.10 This being said, both Jains and Buddhists in (mis)representing (and ridiculing) 
each other’s’ views on the pernicious effects of the wrong of body, speech and mind 
could transpose an argument of their opponent that was made within a karmic discourse 
to a social discourse, or vice versa.  
In the Upāli Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya (MN I 371- 387) the Buddhist view on the 
pernicious effects of the wrong of body, speech and mind is explained in direct 
opposition to the Jain one. In the narratological setting of a dialogue between the 
Buddha and a disciple of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta named Dīghatapassin, the Jain position of 
viewing the wrong of body as graver to that of thought is introduced, refuted and 
superseded by the correct, this is, Buddhist view.11 If this passage of the Upāli Sutta 
gives us some insights into the fact that (learned bhikkhus of the) Buddhist and Jain 
communities were aware of their subtle doctrinal differences, it also provides us an 
illustrative example of the rivalry that at times must have coloured the Jain-Buddhist 
interaction. It proceeds in telling how the nigaṇṭhas lost to the Buddhist community one 
of their prominent lay donors, the householder Upāli (gahapati Upāli). Though being 
warned by Dīghatapassin that “the recluse Gotama is a magician [māyāvin] and [that he] 
knows a converting magic [āvaṭṭanī] by which he converts disciples of other sectarians 
[aññatitthiyānaṁ sāvaka],”12 the householder Upāli sets out to go and refute the Buddha’s 
standpoint on “the three types of wrong.” During his debate with the Buddha the 
householder Upāli naturally – for we are reading a Buddhist Sutta after all - comes to 
realize the superiority of the Buddha’s teaching to the one of the nigaṇṭhas, and instead 
of upholding Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta’s view, he ends up taking refuge to the Buddha 
(bhagavat), the dhamma and the saṅgha of bhikkhus (bhikkhusangha). The rivalry between 
Buddhists and Jains becomes even more explicit, when the monk-editors do not hesitate 
 
                                                     
9 It is well known, for instance, that a bhikkhu who transgressed a rule while being mad is not found ‘guilty.’ 
10 This may be illustrated with a section of the Casuistry to pārājika II, this is, the offence involving defeat for 
stealing: “If, intending to steal, he thinks: ‘I will steal these[se] goods…” he either searches for a companion, or 
goes himself, there is an offence of wrong-doing [dukkaṭa]. If he makes them quiver, there is a grave offence 
[thullaccaya]. If he removes them from the place, there is an offence involving defeat [pārājika].” (Vin III 48, trsl. Horner 
BD I 80, emphasis mine) 
11 Cf. Upāli Sutta MN I 372 ff. (trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 477 - 492). 
12 MN I 375.12-14 (trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 480) 
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to make this conversion of the householder Upāli the direct cause of Nigaṇṭha 
Nātaputta’s death. Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta was unable to hear the householder Upāli 
praising the Buddha and “hot blood then and there gushed from his mouth.”13 
That Jains too were aware of their doctrinal difference with Buddhists regarding “the 
three types of wrong” is seen from a passage of the Jain Sūyagaḍa (Skt. Sūtrakṛtānga). 
They, on their part, ridicule the Buddhist emphasis on intention by noting how a 
bhikkhu, according to Buddhist reasoning, is not committing an offence when eating a 
roasted baby thinking it to be a vegetable, while committing an offence when eating a 
vegetable and mistaking it for a roasted baby.14  
Concerning the disciplinary conduct of nigaṇṭhas, early Buddhists knew how some of 
them observed nakedness as an ascetic practice; they knew that nigaṇṭhas could be 
strong practitioners of tapas; that they tried to avoid  drinking water containing living 
beings; and that they practiced the plucking out of hair and beard.15 But apart from 
these typifying features early Buddhists displayed also a familiarity with subtle 
practices of the Jain ascetic. To illustrate this important point, let us turn to the 
Kandaraka Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya (MN I 341-347). The Kandaraka Sutta 
enumerates various ascetic practices of ‘men practicing tapas’ (puggala attantapa). The 
same list of ascetic practices is repeated at various places in the Sutta Piṭaka.16 
 
                                                     
13 MN I 387.5-6 (trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 492)  
14 Cf. Sūyagada II. 6 § 26-29, trsl. Jacobi SBE 45: 414-5. For a discussion of references to Buddhists and their 
believes and praxes in earlier Jain Ṥvetāmbara literature, see Bollée 1974. 
15 For Buddhists referring to the Jain praxis of nakedness, see e.g. Vin I 305 (trsl. Horner BD IV 436). For 
Buddhists on the Jain praxis of drinking hot [i.e. boiled, lifeless] water see e.g. MN I 376 (trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 
[1995]: 481-2). In this MN passage the Buddha points out how an ill nigaṇṭha needing cold water (sītodaka) to 
recover from his illness will rather die than drink any water other than uṇha (‘hot,’ i.e. devoid of living beings) 
one. That Buddhists associated a nigaṇṭha with tapas is shown by the epithet ‘tapassī’ often met with in names 
of Jain ascetics, see e.g. Dīghatapassī nigaṇṭho at MN I 376. Jaini considers the ‘dīgha-’ of the epithet Dīghatapassī 
to be referring to the many long fasting practices of the Jains. Cf. Jaini 2001 (1979): 21. Concerning the 
‘plucking out the hair,’ see MN 349 where it is said to be practiced by men devoted to tapas (i.e. nigaṇṭha). The 
Pāli term ‘kesamassulocana’ further corresponds to the technical term in Jain texts. That in the daily reality of 
the Jain bhikkhu there was some flexibility regarding this practice, is seen at the Kappa Sutta where shaving the 
head is incidentally mentioned as a valid action next to the plucking out of the hair. Cf. Kappa Sutta 57 (trsl. 
Jacobi SBE 22: 308). 
16 Cf. Kandaraka Sutta (‘The Kandaraka’) MN I 343 (trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 446-447). The same list of 
austerities appears in: the Mahāsīhanāda Sutta (‘The Greater Discourse on the Lion’s Roar’) MN I 77.28-78.22 
(trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 173) where the Buddha himself claims to have performed this asceticism (tapassitā) 
when he was ‘a supreme ascetic’ (paramatapassin); the Cūḷadhammasamādāna Sutta (‘The Shorter Discourse on 
the Destruction of Craving’) MN I 307.21 – 308.19 (trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 406-407) where the practices are 
introduced by the Buddha in a sermon to his disciples as ‘the way of undertaking things that is painful now 
and ripens in the future as pain’; AN I 295.1-296.15 chapter XVI Acelaka (‘The Unclothed’) (trsl. Woodward, 
Vol. I, 1979: 272-274) where they are introduced as the practices of the self-tormentor; AN II 205.24 - 211.29 
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Summarized by Freiberger, “the list comprises the violation of decencies; several 
restrictions concerning the acceptance, the amount, and the types of food; restrictions 
concerning the types of clothes; and a few other practices of mortifying the body.”17 In 
the translation of Ñāṇamoli (2001 [1995]: 446-447) the list reads: 
Here a certain person goes naked, rejecting conventions, licking his hands, not 
coming when asked, not stopping when asked; he does not accept food brought or 
food specially made or an invitation to a meal; he receives nothing from a pot, 
from a bowl, across a threshold, across a stick, across a pestle, from two eating 
together, from a pregnant woman, from a woman giving suck, from a woman in 
the midst of men, from where food is advertised to be distributed, from where a 
dog is waiting, from where flies are buzzing; he accepts no fish or meat, he drinks 
no liquor, wine, or fermented brew. He keeps to one house, to one morsel; he 
keeps to two houses to two morsels; … he keeps to seven houses, to seven morsels. 
He lives on one saucerful a day, on two saucerfuls a day . . . on seven saucerfuls a 
day. He takes food once a day, once every two days . . . once every seven days; thus 
even up to once every fortnight, he dwells pursuing the practice of taking food at 
stated intervals. He is an eater of greens or millet or wild rice or hide-parings or 
moss or ricebran or rice-scum or sesamum flour or grass or cowdung. He lives on 
forest roots and fruits, he feeds on fallen fruits. He clothes himself in hemp, in 
hemp-mixed cloth, in shrouds, in refuse rags, in tree bark, in antelope hide, in 
strips of antelope hide, in kusa-grass fabric, in bark fabric, in wood-shavings 
fabric, in head-hair wool, in animal wool, in owls’ wings. He is one who pulls out 
hair and beard, pursuing the practice of pulling out hair and beard. He is one who 
stands continuously, rejecting seats. He is one who squats continuously, devoted 
to maintaining the squatting position. He is one who uses a mattress of spikes; he 
makes a mattress of spikes his bed. He dwells pursuing the practice of bathing in 
water three times daily including the evening. Thus in such a variety of ways he 
dwells pursuing the practice of tormenting and mortifying the body. This is called 
the kind of person who torments himself and pursues the practice of torturing 
himself.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(trsl. Woodward, Vol. I, 1979: 218-219) also introduced here as the practices of ‘the self-tormentor’ (attantapo); 
the Udumbarikāsīhanāda Sutta (‘The Great Lion’s Roar to the Umbarikans) DN III 40 (trsl. Walshe 1987: 387) 
introduced as the higher austerities (tapo-jigucchā) practiced by the paribbājaka Nirgrodha; the Mahāsīhanāda 
Sutta (‘The Great Lion’s Roar’) DN I 165-166 (trsl. Walshe 1987: 153-154) where it is introduced as ‘tapo-pakkamā 
ekesaṃ samaṇa-brāhmaṇānaṃ’ (‘all kinds of ascetic practices undertaken by certain śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas’).  
In the Mahāsaccaka Sutta (‘The Greater Discourse to Saccaka’) MN I 238.12-35 (trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 333- 
334) not the complete list, but the part on the restrictions for the acceptance, the amount, and types of food is 
repeated. Here the practices are said to be performed by three ājīvikas, named Nanda Vaccha, Kissa Sankicca 
and Makkhali Gosāla. 
17 Freiberger 2006: 238. 
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Offering in his 1971 article “Anmerkungen zum buddhistischen Häretikerbild” a 
minute examination of both the content and terminology of this list of ascetic practices, 
Willem Bollée was able to identify several parallels within Jain, Brāhmaṇical and pūraṇic 
sources. The various ascetic practices of our Kandaraka Sutta bear thus reference to 
tapas practitioners of not just one ascetic community, but of several ascetic 
communities.18 It is therefore interesting to note that the redactor(s) of this list did not 
choose to organize the various practices according to the various types of ascetics, but 
according to the ascetic practices concerning ‘food,’ ‘clothes,’ and ‘body.’ Regardless 
whether this was a deliberate choice or not, the division tells us much how ‘food,’ 
‘clothes’ and ‘body’ were three important locales of identity (cf. further).19 Also, since a 
few of the listed practices may be found practiced by members of several ascetic 
communities (cf. below), it would have been difficult to divide the practices according to 
‘ascetic community.’ Be as it may, several of the practices listed in the Kandaraka Sutta 
are known to have been practised by members of the Jain community. 
What is most interesting about the Kandaraka Sutta is that in addition to ‘gross’ or 
‘typifying’ Jain practices (such as the practice of plucking out the hair as noted above),20 
it also lists, as we shall shortly see, ascetic practices and injunctions found in Jain texts 
that are highly specific in detail. This detailed knowledge points to intensive contact 
between early Buddhists and Jains. Anticipating the discussion in the next section on 
contact occasions and contact places, I can already point out that contact with Jains 
certainly must have been intense (in terms of frequency and nature) during the 
formative stages of the Buddhist community. Direct and indirect contact with other 
ascetics appear to have been part of the daily reality of early Buddhists. What this might 
have meant for the ‘boundaries’ between the two communities will be considered later, 
but for now, I wish to point out that the clear distinctions implied by our analytical 
categories (here, ‘Buddhist’ and ‘Jain’) cannot be taken to (always) have been so neatly 
present in the early ascetic Indian landscape.  
‘The Buddhist’ might in relation to ‘the Jain’, not be relating to ‘the Jain’ but solely to 
a specific practice or doctrine of a nigaṇṭha, a practice or doctrine that the nigaṇṭha 
might, moreover, be sharing with other samaṇas or brāhmaṇas. Therefore, in his relation 
with nigaṇṭhas, ‘the Buddhist’ might at times have been more relating to a samaṇa other 
 
                                                     
18 See also Freiberger 2006: 238-239 who pointing out the contradictory nature of some practices, takes the list 
“to represent the practices of various types of ascetics rather than the ascetic career of one individual.” 
Freiberger joins here the argument of Julius Dutoit (1905, Die duṣkaracaryā des Bodhisattva in der buddhistischen 
Tradition, Strassburg: Trübner). 
19 See especially the chapter ‘Householder’ further in this section. 
20 Cf. Kandaraka Sutta MN I 342.23-24 (nakedness): ekacco puggalo acelako hoti; MN I 343.13-14 (plucking out of 
the hair and beard): Kesamassulocako pi hoti kesamassulocanānuyogam-anuyutto.  
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(or, if you will, a samaṇa equal) than a nigaṇṭha other, and at other times, vice versa. In 
other words, boundaries between Buddhists and nigaṇṭhas might be blurred or 
sharpened in accordance with the specific practice or doctrine that a Buddhist was 
relating to. In the following discussion of the ascetic practices of the Kandaraka Sutta, 
this blurring and sharpening of boundaries will become clear when I point out how 
some ‘Jain’ practices were, for instance, not practiced by all Jains, or how they might 
have been practiced by ājīvikas or brāhmaṇa ascetics as well, or even by Buddhist 
bhikkhus too. The first practice of the so-called ‘attantapo’ might immediately illustrate 
this point: ‘Idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo acelako hoti’, ‘Here, bhikkhus, a man becomes 
unclothed.’ (MN I 342.23)  
MN I 342.23, or on the ascetic practice of nakedness 
Any scholarly account dealing with the early Indian ascetic landscape, researching its 
various ascetic communities, their practices and distinctive marks, is sooner or later 
bound to be snarled up with the question of acelaka or the ascetic practice of nakedness 
among the members of the early Jain ascetic community. Did the nigaṇṭhas that the early 
Buddhists knew, practice nakedness? Though within a later period of the Jain 
community self-conscious Digambaras fully institutionalized acelatva or nakedness by 
putting it forward as a fundamental observance to the path of enlightenment,21 
nakedness seemed to have been an optional practice for the earliest members of the 
community.  
If it is difficult to state with any confidence whether or not the nigaṇṭhas referred to 
in the earliest Buddhist texts were practitioners of acelatva, it is because the term ‘ni-
gaṇṭha,’ bearing reference to the ideal ‘knot-less’ state of the Jain mendicant, is, in the 
words of Balbir, “devoid of descriptive content.”22 In itself, the term nigaṇṭha does not 
provide any clue regarding the presence or absence of a cloth or a garb for the Jain 
mendicant.23  
 
                                                     
21 The split of the Jain community into Śvetāmbara and Digambara is supposed to have taken place around the 
first century AD. Cf. Balbir 2000: 14. See also Schubring 2000² (1962): §26 where he takes the nakedness of 
sculptured figures at Mathura that date around the second century AD, to indicate that the schism must have 
occurred already by then. 
22 Balbir 2000: 14. 
23 On (the etymology of) the term nigaṇṭha (Pkt. niggantha; niyaṇṭha ) see a.o. Caillat 1975: 33; Balbir 2000: 4 
showing how the etymological explanation of nigaṇṭha provided in Buddhist texts corresponds to the one 
attested within the Jain tradition itself.  
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Also the denomination acela(ka) that is frequently used in Buddhist texts to refer to 
naked ascetics is not helpful as the term appears to have had a generic application.24 The 
Padabhājaniya to pācittiya XLI gives for acelaka “yo koci paribbājakasamāpanno naggo,” or 
“whoever is being naked has reached (the stage of) a wanderer.”25 The accompanying 
introductory story to pācittiya XLI links acelakas with ājīvikas.26 Though nakedness is also 
at other places in the Pāli Vinaya explicitly associated with ājīvikas,27 there is no reason 
to join Jacobi in taking the term acela(ka) in Buddhist texts to be exclusively referring to 
ājīvikas.28 Such an exclusive interpretation is already complicated by the Padabhājaniya 
understanding any naked wanderer for acelaka.  
To point out the difficulty of gaining a clear idea whether the nigaṇṭhas of Buddhist 
texts were practitioners of acelatva, we may turn to two enumerations or classifications 
of various ascetic groups at Saṃyutta-Nikāya (SN) I 78 and Aṅguttara-Nikāya (AN) III 
383-4.  
SN I.78 gives the following enumeration of ascetic groups:  “ . . . ca jaṭilā . . . ca nigaṇṭhā 
. . . ca acelā . . .  ca ekasāṭakā . . . ca paribbājakā.” AN III 383-4 while reproducing Pūraṇa 
Kassapa’s sixfold classification of men,29 lists the following groups of ascetics and 
layfollowers: “bhikkhū . . . .  nigaṇṭhā ekasāṭakā . . . . gihī odātavasanā acelakasāvakā. . . . ājīvika 
ājīvakiniyo.”  
First, regarding Pūraṇa Kassapa’s classification of men, it may be remarked that if the 
term acelaka was indeed exclusively used for denoting ājīvikas, why the need then to 
make a distinction within one and the same enumeration between acelakas (more 
specifically, acelakasāvakā referring here most probably to the lay disciples of acelas) and 
ājīvikas? Further, with ‘ekasāṭaka’ meaning ‘one-cloth,’ ‘nigaṇṭhā ekasāṭakā’ at AN III 383-4 
has been taken as testimony “to the clothed state of at least some Jaina monks in 
Mahāvīra’s time.”30 The difficulty with such an interpretation, however, is that ekasāṭaka 
 
                                                     
24 Within the Pāli Vinaya the term acelaka occurs in the Padabhājaniya to pācittiya XLI (BD II 349; Vin IV 91).  In 
the Suttapiṭaka there are 149 references for the forms acelo, acelaṃ, acelassa; and more than thirty references 
for a form of acelaka. See Maes 2015 (forthcoming) for an extensive discussion of the light this metonymical 
denomination acela(ka) throws on the early Buddhist community’s process of othering.   
25 Vin IV 92, trsl. I.B. Horner BD II 349. 
26 The introductory story in question is quoted at p. 108 ff. where it is discussed in detail in the context of 
direct contact possibilities at vihāras. 
27 Cf. Vin I 290-32 (BD IV 414-17) and Vin III 212 (BD II 45-7). See also Maes 2015 (forthcoming). 
28 Jacobi SBE 45 (2004 [1895]): xxx-xxxi. 
29 Basham identified Pūraṇa Kassapa as having been an important leader of the ājīvika community. On Pūraṇa 
Kassapa and his sixfold division of men (abhijātis), see Basham 1981 (1951): 80f. & 243-6. 
30 Jaini 2001 (1979): 18. Jaini points out how Śvetāmbaras themselves have referred to this Pāli passage in order 
to argue to their Digambara other for the clothed state of Jaina mendicants during Mahāvīra’s time. 
Digambaras take this passage to refer to “certain laymen who progressively renounce their possessions while 
continuing in the household life.”   
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is read as an adjective defining nigaṇṭha while ekasāṭakā is here most probably a noun 
and part of an enumeration, just as ‘gihī odātavasanā acelakasāvakā’ and ‘ājīvika 
ājīvakiniyo’. If in the absence of the conjunction ‘ca’ it remains uncertain whether 
‘ekasāṭaka’ should be read as an adjective or noun, the enumeration at SN I.78 leaves no 
room for doubt. In this enumeration nigaṇṭhas are explicitly separated from ekasāṭakas 
(and acelas) with the conjunction ‘ca.’ Despite the presence of this conjunction ‘ca,’ Nalini 
Balbir proposes the possibility of considering the acelas and ekasāṭakas of this list as 
referring to subdivisions of the nigaṇṭhas.31 As we will see, Balbir’s suggestion is in part 
justified when considering the information contained in the commentary texts. 
If the information regarding nigaṇṭhas and acelatva often appears “contradictory” in 
the early Buddhist texts, the same holds true for the later commentarial literature.32 
Collating explicative references of nigaṇṭhas in the Pāli commentaries, Balbir notes how 
nigaṇṭhas are sometimes understood to be naked ascetics (nagga);33 to be 
purimabhāgapaṭichanna or ‘covered (paṭichanna) in the front (purima) parts (bhāga);’34 to 
be white-robed ascetics (setapaṭa-nigaṇṭha-rūpa-dhārino);35 to be white-robed 
‘aḍḍhapālikā’ ascetics,36 and, to add one more, they are sometimes taken to be ekasāṭaka 
(‘having a single cloth’).37 Further, in a reference in Buddhaghosa’s Dhammapada-
Aṭṭhakathā (Dhp-a) a distinction is made between acelaka nigaṇṭhas who are star naked 
(sabbaso apaṭicchanna) and nigaṇṭhas who wear a ‘front and back’ cloth (purima-passa).38  
 
                                                     
31 Balbir 2000: 13-14. 
32 Balbir 2000: 11-16. The Pāli commentaries “in their final form date about one millennium after the Buddha 
and Mahāvīra and certainly long after the split between the Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras…” Balbir 2000:14. 
33 Cf. Udāna-aṭṭhakathā of Dhammapāla (Ud-a) 338 (line 22) using the compound nagga-nigaṇṭha. See also 
Buddhaghosa’s Sāratthappakāsinī (Spk) III 100 (line 7). (both passages quoted by Balbir 2000:14) 
34 Cf. Buddhaghosa’s Manorathapūraṇī (Mp) III 334 on AN III 276 “ājīvako ti naggapabbajito, nigaṇṭho ti 
purimabhāgapaṭicchanno.” (quoted by Balbir 2000:14) 
35 Cf. Ud-a 330 (line 20). (quoted by Balbir 2000:14) 
36 Cf. Samantapāsādikā of Buddhaghosa (Sp) 1213 (line 6): “yathā setapaṭā aḍḍhapālikā nigaṇṭhā pārupanti.” 
(quoted by Balbir 2000:15). On aḍḍhapālika (Skt. ardhaphālaka) nigaṇṭhas see Schubring 2000² [1962]: §26; on the 
possibility of ardhaphālaka or ‘partially covered’ bhikkhus being the Jain Yāpanīyas bhikkhus, see “Jaina Monks 
From Mathura” of Jaini 1995 (reprinted in 2000). On the (now extinct) Yāpanīya Jain sect, see also Upadhye 
1973 and  Upadhye 1974 (reprinted in 1983). 
37 ekasāṭaka nigaṇṭhas are nigaṇṭhas “who move about with a small piece of cloth tied on their hands with one 
end of which they cover the frontal portion of their body.” Jaini 2000: 308. Cf. Ud-a 330-31: “ekasāṭakāti. 
ekasāṭaka-nigaṇṭhā viya ekaṃ pilotika-khaṇḍaṃ hatthe bandhitvā eken’antena hi sarīrassa purima-bhāgaṃ 
paṭicchādetvā vicaraṇakā.” (quoted by Jaini 2000: 319, n.35) 
38 Cf. Dhp-a (c. fifth century AD) III 489 (line 17-19) where conversing bhikkhus say the following: “sabbaso 
apaṭicchannehi acelakehi ime nigaṇṭhā varatarā ye ekan purimapassam pi tāva paṭicchādenti . . .”, which may be 
translated as “Those who cover [themselves] with a front and back [cloth] [or, those who cover themselves 
with a cloth covering the front and back] are better nigaṇṭhas than the acelakas who are completely uncovered 
[apaṭicchanna, i.e. naked].” For an alternative and in my opinion incorrect translation of this passage, see 
Burlingame 1921:196. 
 72 
These various distinct qualifications of nigaṇṭhas are insightful for imagining the Jain 
community of that time, even if their exact meanings and reference fields are not 
always obvious. They point to the plain but significant conclusion that the Jain 
community knew multiple internal divisions concerning the wearing or not wearing of a 
cloth, or robe. It would be erroneous, in my opinion, to try to interpret the various 
qualifications simply within the twofold framework of the Śvetambara and Digambara 
division. This is not to deny the possibility that some of these qualifications indeed bore 
reference to Śvetāmbara and Digambara ascetics, for the division had already occurred 
about three centuries before the Pāli commentarial literature was redacted. But to 
relegate the nagga-qualification to the Digambara ascetics, the setapaṭa-qualification to 
the Śvetambara ascetics, and to understand all other qualifications to be reflecting 
“gradual” or “in between” stages, would, in my opinion,  be a too gross simplification of 
what must have been a more heterogeneous reality. The very development of the 
various terms (acela, nagga, aḍḍhapālika, ekasāṭaka, setapaṭa etc.) referring to a particular 
clothed or unclothed state of the Jain mendicant, points to the fact that the – at times 
subtle, at least in our eyes  – differences were considered to be meaningful differences. 
The practices revolving around ‘cloth’ and ‘nudity’ were considered to be significant 
practices around which boundaries could be drawn, resulting in multiple divisions 
within the Jain community and between ‘the’ Jain and other communities.  
The so-called “contradictory” information of our texts need not to be understood as 
contradictions per se, but may be seen as reflections of what must have been a 
heterogeneous reality. Such a reality was most probably the case for both the period 
reflected in the later commentarial literature, as for the nigaṇṭhas of our early Buddhist 
texts. That among the nigaṇṭhas of our early Buddhist texts there may have been some 
nigaṇṭhas who practiced acelatva as well as some nigaṇṭhas who wore a cloth and/or a 
robe, is perhaps seen confirmed in the Āyāraṅga Sutta, the oldest extant disciplinary 
text of the Jains. The Sutta appears to simply be assuming a heterogeneous reality with 
regard to the practice of wearing (or not wearing) a cloth or robe, when encouraging 
Jain bhikkhus who respectively use “three robes” (bhikkhū tihiṃ vatthehiṃ) “two robes” 
(bhikkhu dohiṃ vatthehiṃ) and “one robe” (bhikkhu egeṇa vattheṇa) to try not to beg for an 
additional robe.39 Further, for all these types of Jain bhikkhus, the three-robed bhikkhu, 
the two-robed bhikkhu and the one-robed bhikkhu, we find the instruction to dispel his 
(most) used-up garment(s) once the hot season has arrived, leaving the choice with the 
mendicant whether he throws away just one, or all his robes; whether he wanders 
 
                                                     
39 Cf. AS I.7.4 § 1 where Jain bhikkhus using three robes are encouraged to not beg for an additional robe: ‘je 
bhikkhū tihiṃ vatthehiṃ parivusite . . . tassa ṇaṃ no evaṃ bhavati: cautthaṃ vatthaṃ jaissāmi.’ Similarly AS I.7.5 § 1 
and AS I.7.6 § 1 where Jain bhikkhus using respectively two and one robe are encouraged to not beg for an 
additional one. 
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clothed or naked.40 This flexibility regarding the amount of garments (vattha) is 
remarkable. It shows how in the early Jain community multiple practices concerning 
the robe co-existed, complicating any scholarly attempt to neatly classify the various 
ascetics of the early Indian landscape according to their clothing practices. Further, 
when the Āyāraṅga Sutta allows a naked bhikkhu (bhikkhu acela) to use a kaḍibhaṃdhaṇa 
or a type of loin cloth if he finds it too difficult to leave his private parts uncovered, the 
Sutta assumes as unproblematic the presence of acela mendicants in the early Jain 
community.41 The Āyāraṅga Sutta reflects thus a reality of the early Jain community 
where both clothed and naked (acelaka) Jains co-existed, and a gradation of different 
possibilities between the Jain mendicant’s clothed state and naked state. When 
considering these facts, together with the fact that the term acela(ka) in the early 
Buddhist texts was most probably a generic denomination, it is safe to conclude that the 
nigaṇṭhas of the Buddhist texts could have referred to both clothed and naked Jain 
ascetics.42 
With this let us return to our discussion of the Kandaraka Sutta list of ascetic practices. 
The remark that the so-called attantapo becomes naked (acelako hoti) may thus have 
borne reference to some ascetics of both the ājīvika community and Jain community.43 
 
                                                     
40 See e.g. AS I.7.4 § 1 addressing the Jain bhikkhu with three robes “But know further, that, after winter is gone 
and the hot season has come, one should leave off the used-up (garment of the three), being clad with an 
upper and under garment, or with the undermost garment, or with one gown, or with no clothes – aspiring to 
freedom from bonds Penance suits him.” (trsl. Jacobi 1989 (1884) SBE 22: 68). Similarly for the bhikkhu with two 
robes, and one robe. See respectively AS I.7.5 § 1 and AS I.7.6 § 1. 
41 Cf. AS I.7.7 § 1. On kaḍibaṃdhaṇa see Jacobi 1989 (1884) SBE 22: 73. Later Jain Śvetāmbara commentaries 
explain acela as still being clothed. See Deo 1956: 161, n.114. 
42 It may be noted that also Bronkhorst considered the question of nigaṇṭhas and nakedness in his 2010 article 
“The riddle of the Jainas and Ājīvikas.” Departing from a division in the early Jain ascetic community between 
Pārśva’s followers characterized by taken the Four Vows (cātuyāma, cf. p 17) and the wearing of an ascetic 
garb, and between Mahāvīra’s followers characterized by taken the Five Vows and wandering naked, 
Bronkhorst argues for considering the ‘nigaṇṭhas’ in early Buddhist literature as bearing reference to Pārśva’s 
followers, and the Jain naked ascetics  (i.e. Mahāvīra’s followers) as being included within the general and 
broader category of ‘ājīvikas.’ Though being a valid suggestion, it rests on some unconvincing arguments, such 
as the argument to consider the terms ‘ājīvika/ājīvaka’ and ‘acela(ka)’ as synonyms. The fact that in Buddhist 
texts the so-called Four Vows are sometimes being attributed to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta (i.e. Mahāvīra) also 
complicates the argument, just as the fact that, as we have seen, both Jain and Buddhist sources suggest a wide 
array and gradation of practices related to the wearing or not wearing of an ascetic garb that prevent a simple 
twofold categorization of clothed and unclothed. 
43 I write some members of the ājīvika community for even though ājīvikas are habitually associated with 
nakedness in both early Buddhist texts and later Buddhist commentarial literature, pictorial and sculptural 
representations of ājīvikas as well as later textual and epigraphical sources on the ājīvikas present a more 
complex reality where ājīvikas also came clothed.   
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Before turning to discuss other and more subtle ascetic practices of the Kandaraka 
Sutta, we may conclude with observing how our analytical categories ‘Buddhist,’ ‘Jain,’ 
or ‘ājīvika’ may at times be inadequate for discussing the early Indian landscape. These 
analytical categories can give the wrong impression that boundaries between the 
‘Buddhist,’ ‘Jain’ and ‘ājīvika’ communities were at all times well-negotiated and 
perceptible. As our discussion on the practice of acelatva has demonstrated, there might, 
however, at times have been more similarity between two members of two distinct 
ascetic communities, than between two members of one and the same ascetic 
community. Ascetic practices as acelatva cut across community boundaries, making our 
analytical categories inadequate. 
MN I 342.26-27 
[1] he does not accept food brought or [2] food specially made or an [3] invitation 
to a meal. 
[1] nābhiṭaṁ [2] na uddissakaṭaṁ [3] na nimantaṇaṁ sādiyati (MN I 342.26-27) 
Early Buddhists, unlike the so-called attantapo of the Kandaraka Sutta, accepted 
invitations to a meal. This is evidenced by the many suchlike references found in the 
Pāli texts. Within the Pāli Vinaya it is standard to see the Buddha and the order of 
bhikkhus being invited to – and ‘silently’ accepting  the invitation to - a meal (bhatta) by 
a (lay) householder with the phrase: “adhivāsetu me bhante bhagavā svātanāya bhattaṃ 
saddhiṃ bhikkhusaṃghena” (‘Respected one, let the Bhagavat consent to a meal with me 
on the morrow together with the bhikkhusaṃgha’).44 In addition to the occurrence of this 
stock phrase, the Pāli Vinaya also holds ‘incidental references’ to bhikkhus accepting 
invitations to a meal, suggesting that it was both practiced and considered to be 
unproblematic by if not all, then by at least an important fraction of the early Buddhist 
saṅgha.45 I write “by at least an important fraction” for, as Freiberger noted, early 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
For examples of ājīvikas being explicitly associated with nakedness in the Pāli Vinaya, see n.27. For examples of 
ājīvikas being associated with nakedness in Buddhist commentarial literature, see Basham 1981 (1951): 37, 82-4 
and Schlingloff 1994: 71. For examples of clothed ajīvikas see Basham 1981 (1951): 107-109 and Schlingloff 1994: 
72-4. 
44 These invitations are usually extended by a lay follower after having received a talk on dhamma. By those 
who are about to take refuge to the Buddha, dhamma and saṅgha the invitation to a meal is extended after 
having received a ‘gradual instruction’ or anupubbikathā (translated by Horner with ‘progressive talk’).  See e.g. 
Vin I 236 (MV VI 31.12; trsl. Horner BD IV 324 ). 
45 e.g. Vin IV 177: tena kho pana samayena bhikkhū kulesu nimantitā bhuñjanti. (‘Now at that time bhikkhus ate 
invited by families’). On ‘incidental references’ or ‘the principle of irrelevance’ to distract historical 
information from normative sources, see p. 84 ff. 
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Buddhist texts display a tension between critics and advocators of ascetic praxes, 
suggesting the presence of ascetically inclined Buddhist bhikkhus next to monastic 
members of the early Buddhist saṅgha.46 It is not unlikely that some of these ascetic 
bhikkhus or ‘monks of ascetic temperament’ who, in the words of Freiberger ‘lived “on 
the edge” of the Middle Way’47 might have refused invitations to a meal. This ascetic 
praxis was one of the five points of restraints demanded by Devadatta - and made 
optional by the Buddha.48 It also occurs in a discussion on nine dhutaṅga in the Sappurisa 
Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya where “the context clearly shows that practicing the nine 
dhutaṅgas was common and accepted among Buddhists of the time.”49 However, if some 
members of the Buddhist saṅgha refused to subsist on invitations, it is clear that others 
certainly did and that the monk-editors principally considered this to be unproblematic. 
For nigaṇṭhas, however, the disciplinary texts are unambiguous in rejecting this practice; 
accepting an invitation to a meal was totally not done. Whether this means that early 
Jain ascetics never actually accepted an invitation, we cannot know. But that the 
soteriological and ethical frames underlying the Jain precepts could not support 
invitations to a meal is unambiguously clear from the information contained in their 
scriptures (cf. below).  
When consulting their disciplinary codes, we are led to assume that nigaṇṭhas would 
have refused to even consider an invitation to a meal. This may be deduced from the 
often repeated injunctions in the Āyāraṅga Sutta, the oldest extant disciplinary text of 
the Śvetāmbaras, prohibiting the Jain ascetic from accepting food that was specially 
prepared for him. If, when preparing food, a householder does anything that could 
involve the killing of living beings (including the one-sensed beings) such as grounding 
 
                                                     
46 Cf. Freiberger 2006 “Early Buddhism, Asceticism, and the Politics of the Middle Way.” In this excellent article 
Freiberger also argues (p.250-1) how “the concept of the Middle Way was a rhetorical tool against severe 
asceticism; its polemical power was more important than its (varying) contents. Apparently it was created, or 
at least used, to criticize not only non-Buddhist ascetics but also Buddhist ones. …. . While assuming that the 
Middle Way doctrine is targeted also at Buddhists, it is tempting to consider the possibility that the other 
“extreme” mentioned there, the indulgence in sensual pleasures, points to saṅgha members as well.” Ibid: 250-
1.  
47 Freiberger 2006: 243-244. 
48 The famous account of the schematic Devadatta demanding the Buddha to implement five dhutaṅgas as 
stringent precepts is taken up in the introduction to saṅghādisesa X (Vin III 171-4, BD I 296-303), and repeated 
in the Cullavagga that contains a more detailed account of Devadatta’s aspirations (Vin II 184-206, BD V 259-
90). The second dhutaṅga request, on refusing invitations to a meal, reads:  yāvajīvaṃ piṇḍapātikā assu, yo 
nimantanaṃ sādiyeyya, vajjaṃ naṃ phuseyya (‘For as long as life lasts let them be beggars for alms; whoever 
should accept an invitation sin would besmirch him.’). Freiberger justly suggests to read the dispute between 
Devadatta and the Buddha as reflecting “two voices within early Buddhism, one demanding more radical 
practices and one rejecting them.” Freiberger 2006: 243. 
49 Freiberger 2006: 244. For the list of the nine dhutaṅgas see MN III 40.23-42.18. 
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grains, or winnowing fossil salt for “the sake of the mendicant” (bhikkhupaḍiyâ), then 
the mendicant should consider that food to be impure (aphâsuya) and unacceptable 
(aṇesaṇigga).50 In other words, grounded grain or winnowed fossil salt were as such not 
prohibited for the Jain ascetic. They became prohibited when they were grounded or 
winnowed for the mendicant’s sake. For the same reason, the editors of the Āyāraṅga Sutta 
would like the Jain ascetic not to visit his relatives for, on seeing him, they might “for 
his sake, procure or prepare food.”51 However, that this rule is prescriptive – as all Jain 
and Buddhist disciplinary rules are - and therefore not necessarily reflecting actual 
historical praxes, can be seen from the fact that a different precept simply assumes the 
reality of Jain mendicants visiting their relatives, when regulating that a Jain mendicant 
wishing to visit their relatives should inform a thera and be “accompanied by a well-
versed monk (bahussuë babbhāgame) if he was still unripe in knowledge (appasuya 
appāgama).” This precept can be find in the Vavāhara Sutta. 52 As the Vavāhara Sutta is of 
a later date than the Āyāraṅga, the facts that this precept assumes the reality of Jain 
mendicants visiting their family and that this is contrary to the information reflected in 
the Āyāraṅga regulation, remind us, therefore, not only of the prescriptive nature of our 
sources, but also of the importance to allow ambiguity (or complexity, or so-called 
contradictions) to arise in both our synchronic and diachronic discussions of the early 
Jain and Buddhist ascetic communities. Be as it may, the Vavāhara Sutta echoes the 
Āyāraṅga Sutta’s insistence to not consume food that has been specially prepared for 
oneself, by instructing the Jain mendicant who is visiting a relative to accept “only that 
[food] which was cooked before his arrival (puvvāgamaṇeṇaṁ puvvaütte).”53 The ethical 
concern that living beings would be harmed or killed for the sake of the mendicant also 
underlies the Jain precepts prohibiting the nigaṇṭha to accept food brought to him [1].54 
The three prohibitions to not accept food brought; specially made for, and an invitation 
to a meal can also be found repeatedly in the Dasaveyāliya Sutta (Skt. Daśavaikālika 
Sūtra).55  
 
                                                     
50 Cf. AS 62: II.1.6 §8; §9 (Jacobi 2002 [1884] SBE 22: 104) 
51 AS 65: II.1.9 §2 (Jacobi 2002 [1884] SBE 22: 111) 
52 Deo 1956: 283, with reference to Vav. [Vyavahāra] 6.1.  
53 Ibid. Note how the technical category of āhākammia (Skt. ādhākarmika) was developed to denote unfit food 
involving the killing of living beings in its preparation (for the bhikkhu?). Cf. Deo 1956: 231, Jacobi SBE 22: 81. 
For some more injunctions against accepting food that has been specially prepared for a Jain mendicant, or 
śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas see AS 50: II.1.1 § 12; AS 52: II.1.2 § 6.  
54 Cp. e.g. AS 50: II.1.1. § 13 where food which has been brought out of the house for the sake of śramaṇas and 
brāhmaṇas is not allowed for the nigaṇṭha. See also Nis 3.13-15 where the nigaṇṭha is not allowed to accept food 
brought from a distance beyond three houses. Cf. Deo 1956: 285. 
55 Dasaveyāliya Sutta (DS, Leumann (ed.) & Schubring (tr.) 1977 [1932]) 5.55: ‘He should avoid (alms) especially 
prepared for him personally, bought, mingled with food prepared for monks (in general), (alms) which has to 
be fetched, (alms) which is given after the original quantity has purposely been increased, (alms) which has 
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MN I 342.27-31 
After these three prohibitions the Kandaraka Sutta continues with some more detailed 
restrictions on food, for most of which one may also find striking parallels in Jain texts. 
It reads: 
 [4] he receives nothing from a pot, from a bowl, across a threshold, across a stick, 
across a pestle, [5] from two eating together, [6] from a pregnant woman, [7] from 
a woman giving suck, [8] from a woman in the midst of men, [9] from where food 
is advertised to be distributed, [10] from where a dog is waiting, [11] from where 
flies are buzzing; [12] he accepts no fish or meat, he drinks no liquor, wine, or 
fermented brew. 
 
[4] so na kumbhīmukhā patigaṇhāti na kaḷopimukhā patigaṇhāti, na eḷakamantaraṁ na 
daṇḍamantaraṁ na musalamantaraṁ, [5] na dvinnaṁ bhuñjamānānaṁ, [6] na 
gabbhiniyā, [7] na pāyamāmāya [8] na purisantaragatāya, [9] na saṅkittisu, [10] na yattha 
sā upaṭṭhito hoti, [11] na yattha makkhilā saṇḍasaṇḍacārinī, […].56 (MN I 342.27-31 ) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
been borrowed, (and alms) which is destined partly for the household and partly for the monk’; DS 6.49: ‘Those 
who accept food … bought, prepared, or fetched for them, are privy to murder, thus it was said by the Great 
Sage.’ DS 10.4 ‘(When a meal is prepared,) animals and plants, (the former) living in the earth (or) on grass or 
wood, are terrified. He who, therefore, does not eat or drink that which is prepared exclusively for him nor 
causes (another person) to (do so) – he (is) a (true) monk.’ 
For a discussion of the Dasaveyāliya Sutta, see p. 203. 
56 MN I 342.31-32 further also mentions ‘na macchaṁ na maṁsaṁ na merayaṁ na thusodakaṁ pibati.’ (‘He accepts 
no fish or meat, he drinks no liquor, wine, or fermented brew.’)  I have left this reference out of consideration, 
since the question of ‘vegetarianism’ in the early Indian ascetic landscape is a historical very complex 
question, requiring a detailed study. Cf. p. 140 ff. Within the early Buddhist community, divergent opinions 
circulated (and thus most probably also divergent practices) concerning the question of ‘vegetarianism.’ Cf. p. 
140 ff. The earliest Jain ascetics, or better, among the earliest Jain ascetics there appeared to have been meat 
and fish eaters (cf. appendix ‘Labeling the Ascetic other,’ lemma ‘Nātaputta Nigaṇṭha; nigaṇṭha; nigaṇṭhasāvaka,’ 
p. 139 ff.). Further, when consulting the Dharmasūtras, we may note that the question of meat eating is 
interpreted in various ways with respect to the various types of individuals under consideration. For instance, 
the abstinence from eating meat is explicitly prescribed for the young brahmacārin or student (see e.g. DS of 
Āpastamba I.2.23; I.4.6), while for ‘a student who has returned home’ meat appeared to have been permissible 
(this may be incidentally inferred from the following prescription that states how ‘meat that has been cut with 
a knife used for slaughtering is not fit to be eaten.’ DS of Āpastamba I.17.33, tr. Olivelle 2000:53, see also I.17.29-
39 that discusses which animals may (not) be eaten). The same texts, prescribes for the ‘forest hermit’ 
(vānaprastha) that ‘he should roam about, living on roots, fruits, leaves, and grasses, and finally on what he 
happens to find lying about,’ thus implying an abstinence from meat and fish for the forest hermit.  (DS of 
Āpastamba II.22.2, tr. Olivelle 2000: 105) 
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The first two praxes under [4] may readily be contrasted with the following suttas of the 
Dasaveyāliya: 
kaṃsesu kaṃsa-pāesu kuṇḍa-moesu vā puṇo ǀ 
bhuñjanto asaṇa-pāṇāī āyārā paribhassaī   ǁ51 ǁ 
sīodaga-samārambhe matta-dhoyaṇa-chaḍḍaṇo  ǀ 
jāiṃ chaṇanti bhūyāiṃ diṭṭho tattha asaṃjamo ǁ 52 ǁ 
pacchākammaṃ purokamma siyā tattha na kappaī ǀ 
eyamaṭṭhaṃ na bhuñjanti nigaṇṭha gihi-bhāyaṇe ǁ 53 ǁ 
 
51. [A bhikkhu] who takes food and drink from a brass vessel (kaṃsesu), a bowl 
(kaṃsa-pāesu), or a pot (kuṇḍa-moesu), falls from good conduct. 52. Lack of self-
control is to be perceived, when living beings are hurt by the use of cold water 
[and] by washing and cleaning a vessel. 53. Where cleaning [of the vessel] after 
[use or] before [use] is to be [foreseen], it is not allowed to accept [the alms]. For 
this reason, the Free Ones do not eat from a householder’s vessel (gihi-bhāyaṇe). 
(DS Leumann ed. & Schubring tr. 1977 [1932]: 6.51-53, trsl. 99-100) 
Similarly, Āyāraṅga II.1.7 §3 prohibits the Jain ‘bhikkhu’ and ‘bhikkhuṇī’ (for that is how 
the Jain mendicant is mostly referred to in the Āyāraṅga)57 from accepting food that is 
kept in an earthen vessel (maṭṭiolitta asaṇa), for fear that the layman would for the sake of 
the mendicant break the earthen vessel and thus injure earth-bodied beings.58  
Also the following three practices mentioned in the Kandaraka Sutta, namely: “he 
receives nothing [5] from two eating together, [6] from a pregnant woman, [7] from a 
woman giving suck” can be found in Jain disciplinary codes. These three are, for 
instance, encountered in the Dasaveyāliya –and in the same sequence: 
37. If of two persons engaged in taking their meal the one should invite him, he 
should not accept that which is given, unless he has made out the kind disposition 
[of the other person]. 38. [But] if both should invite him, he should accept (it) 
because it is allowed food. 39. He should avoid food and drink of all kinds destined 
for a pregnant woman [and] being eaten by her, [but] he should eat that which she 
has left. 40. It may happen that a pregnant woman in her ninth month sits down 
for his sake, when standing, and rises when sitting; 41. [and alms thus given] is not 
 
                                                     
57 bhikkhu was thus not a term exclusively used by ‘Buddhist’ ascetics to refer to their members. It had a wider 
application within the ascetic landscape. Note also how the ‘group of five monks’ the Buddha decides to teach 
dhamma to after his awakening are also termed ‘bhikkhu’. Cf. Vin I 8 (BD IV 13) where ‘the group of five monks’ 
is termed ‘pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū’. 
58 The sutta further states that the layman breaking an earthen vessel, might also injure fire-bodied beings, 
wind-bodied beings, plants and animals Cf. AS 61, II.1.7 §3: ‘assaṃjae bhikkhupaḍiyâe maṭṭiolittaṃ asaṇaṃ … 
ubbhiṃdamâṇe puḍhavikâyaṃ samâraṃbhejjâ, tahâ teuvâuvaṇassatitasakâyaṃ saṃâraṃbhejjâ.’ 
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allowed to monks, [and] he should refuse [it, saying]: “I may not accept such 
[alms]”. 42. If she brings food and drink having put down her crying boy or girl to 
whom she is giving the breast, 43. that food and drink is not allowed. (DS Leumann 
ed. & Schubring tr. 1977 [1932]: 5.1. 37-43, trsl. 90-1)59 
MN I 342.32-343.3 
Following these, the Kandaraka Sutta continues with minute restrictions concerning the 
amount of food: 
So ekāgāriko vā hoti ekālopiko, dvāgāriko vā hoti dvālopiko — sattāgāriko vā hoti 
sattālopiko; ekissā pi dattiyā yāpeti, dvīhi pi dattīhi yāpeti — sattahi pi dattīhi yāpeti; 
ekāhikam – pi āhāraṁ āhāreti. dvīhikam – pi āhāraṁ āhāreti — sattāhikam – pi āhāraṁ 
āhāreti, iti evarūpaṁ addhamāsikam – pi pariyāyabhattabhojanānuyogamanuyutto 
viharati. (MN I 342.32-343.3) 
In the translation of Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, this reads: 
He keeps to one house, to one morsel; he keeps to two houses to two morsels;… he 
keeps to seven houses, to seven morsels. He lives on one saucerful a day, on two 
saucerfuls a day … on seven saucerfuls a day. He takes food once a day, once every 
two days…once every seven days; thus even up to once every fortnight, he dwells 
pursuing the practice of taking food at stated intervals. (Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 
446)  
These practices of the so-called attantapo are reminiscent of the many fasts and food 
restrictions practiced by nigaṇṭhas. Jains classified tapas into ‘external tapas’ (bāhiraa 
tavo) and ‘internal tapas’ (abbhintaraa tavo). While internal tapas consisted of expediation, 
studying, meditation and the like, much of the external tapas resolved around various 
types of fasts and food restrictions.60 Nigaṇṭhas could keep temporary fasts (itvara 
anaṣana) for a day upto six months.61 Fasting was considered to be a quintessential tapas 
 
                                                     
59 See also DS 7.4 and Vav 10.1. For a discussion of the DS, see p. 203. 
60 The six divisions of abbhintara(y)a tavo (‘external tapas) are: “[1] atonement for any faults committed, [2] 
respect both for one’s ascetic superiors and for the truths embodied in the Jain religion, [3] service to one’s 
fellow ascetics, [4] study and reflection, [5] the giving up of personal attachments, [6] and meditation.” Dundas 
2002²: 166, cf. Uttarādhyana Sutta (UD) Jacobi 2004 [1895] SBE 45: 179 ff. The six divisions of bāhira(y)a tavo 
(internal tapas) are, according to the UD, (1) anaṣana (‘fasting’); (2) avamôdarikā (‘abstinence’); (3) bhikśācaryā 
(‘collecting alms’); (4) rasaparityāga (‘abstention from dainty food’); (5) kāyakleṣa (‘mortification of the flesh’); 
(6) saṃlīnatā (‘taking care of one’s limbs’). UD 30 ‘The Road to Penance,’ Jacobi 2004 [1895] SBE 45: 174 ff. On 
bāhira(y)a and abbhintara(y)a tavo see a.o. Caillat 1975: 91 ff; ‘Asceticism’ in Dundas 2002²: 163 ff. 
61 Cf. Deo 1956: 188. The UD divides fasting into temporary (itvara) and ‘life-long,’ this is, fasting unto death 
(maraṇakāla). UD Jacobi 2004 [1895] SBE 45: 175. 
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by nigaṇṭhas. This is seen in the Uttaradhyāyana Sutta where a theoretical mathematical 
calculation allows for no less than 16 777 216 types of fasts.62  
Two other categories of external tapas that seem to be alluded to in the quoted MN 
extract are the avamôdarikâ tapas (‘abstinence’) and the bhikśācaryā tapas (‘collecting 
alms’). The first, avamôdarikâ tapas consists of a  “[g]radual reduction of food, from a full 
meal of thirty-two morsels to one of one morsel.”63 Under the category of bhikśācaryā 
tapas all types of self-imposed restrictions for one’s alms-begging are understood. So a 
nigaṇṭha could set out for alms imposing beforehand restrictions concerning the places 
he would go to, or, as in our quote, the amount of mouthfuls he would be accepting.64 
Concerning this latter, compare also the following allowance from the Jain Kappa Sutta: 
A monk who during the Paggusan [i.e. rain retreat] restricts himself to a certain 
number of donations, is allowed to accept (e.g.) five donations of food, and five of 
drink; or four of food, and five of drink; or five of food, and four of drink. (Kalpa 
Sûtra, Jacobi SBE 22: 300)65 
Other ascetic practices of the so-called attantapo in the Kandaraka Sutta could be singled 
out as having been practiced by Jains, but the discussion of our selected group of 
practices suffices to draw the following important conclusion. Early Buddhists, or at the 
very least the editors and reciters of this passage on the attantapo, knew their Jain 
ascetic others. This is evident from the striking correspondences between the detailed 
food praxes of the attantapo and the alms-begging instructions and tapas possibilities 
treated in canonical texts of the nigaṇṭha and nigaṇṭhī. The fact that some of these food 
praxes are so subtle in nature reflects a deep inside-out knowledge. For how to notice 
that an ascetic is not accepting food directly from a vessel, or from a pregnant woman, 
or that an ascetic is ‘keeping to one house, to one morsel’ unless one is aware of the 
existence of these ascetic practices? To know that Jain ascetics performed these ascetic 
practices is to have a detailed knowledge of the Jain other, a knowledge that goes 
beyond the obvious and typifying features. This in turn, suggests contact. Without 
contact, knowledge of the other is not possible. But how are we to understand contact, 
be it direct or indirect between the early Buddhist saṅgha and other samaṇa 
communities? How were the ideas, practices and doctrines of non-Buddhist samaṇas 
exposed to ‘the’ Buddhist bhikkhu? When and how did other samaṇas challenge the 
 
                                                     
62 UD 30.10, Jacobi 2004 [1895] SBE 45: 175. 
63 Jacobi 2004 [1895] SBE 45: 175, fn. 2. 
64 Cp. UD 30.14 & 15, Jacobi 2004 [1895] SBE 45: 176. “Abstinence [bhīkśācārya tapas] is briefly of five kinds: with 
regard to a. substance; b. place; c. time; d. state of mind; e. development. a. He who takes less food than he 
usually does, in the extreme case but one mouthful, performs abstinence with regard to substance.” 
65 For a discussion of the Kappa Sutta, see p. 197. 
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monastic organization of the Buddhist saṅgha? And how frequent was this contact? Was 
it accidental or regulated? Which places and occasions could bring about contact, and 
what did it mean for the boundaries between the various samaṇa communities? The 
following chapters address these questions by offering a typology of contact possibilities 
for the early Buddhist bhikkhus.  
Direct and Indirect Contact 
It is well-known that the early Jain and Buddhist community developed in much the 
same region of eastern India, a region which some scholars have designated “Greater 
Magadha.”66 To this we may add that within this region of eastern India the members of 
the Jain and Buddhist community (and of other samaṇa communities too) wandered and 
resided in very close vicinity to one another. 
 Michael Willis retracing the (amount of) steps of an ideal wandering Buddhist 
bhikkhu at Sanchi around the 3rd C BCE, suggested that such a bhikkhu must have 
wandered around five kilometres a day.67 This is not much and one may assume that the 
earliest Jain and Buddhist bhikkhus covered a similar distance. This limited wandering 
radius combined with (or perhaps resulting in) the fact, as our analysis of direct contact 
opportunities will show, that samaṇas could bump into other samaṇas while performing 
 
                                                     
66 Already in 1924 Sukumar Dutt in his Early Buddhist Monachism referred to the region where the Buddhist 
tradition developed and flourished with “Greater Magadha.” In more recent scholarship Johannes Bronkhorst 
revived the notion of “Greater Magadha” with his similarly titled 2007 monograph.  
Bhaskar (1972) argued for geographically locating the development of the early Jain and Buddhist 
communities in the same regions of eastern India by means of charting the places where Mahāvīra and the 
Buddha are said to have been spending the rains (vassaŋ vassati). On the problem of considering the names of 
places in Buddhist literature as historical elements see Schopen 1997 ‘If You Can’t Remember, How to Make it 
Up: Some Monastic Rules for Redacting Canonical Texts.’ In this article Schopen identifies some redactional 
rules in the Kṣudrakavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya instructing redactors, a.o., which place-name to use if 
they forgot where a sutta was delivered or a rule promulgated. Though these redactional rules are late (ca. 4th-
5th century CE) they raise the awareness of the possibility that also the place-names of so-called ‘early’ 
Buddhist literature were determined by a similar set of rules or system. That this was indeed the case is 
convincingly argued by Schopen who pointing out how according to one of these redactional rules ‘stories of 
the past’ should be set in ‘Vārāṇasī,’ shows how more than four hundred of the five hundred Pāli Jātaka stories 
are set in Vārāṇasī. 
67 Michael Willis presented his idea of a bhikkhu walking an average distance of five kilometer a day during the 
conference “Network and Identity” (Ghent, 18th-20th December 2013) in his paper entitled “Early Historic 
Buddhism and Buddhists in Central India: Networks in Miniature.” 
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any of their daily activities, reflects a very close socio-geographical proximity of the 
various samaṇa groupings. As I will demonstrate, any basic activity of the early Buddhist 
bhikkhu could give rise to direct contact with his samaṇa others. Going for alms, eating, 
wandering, bathing, and even resting and sleeping were occasions for early Buddhist 
bhikkhus to come into direct contact with other samaṇas. Also public festal events 
appeared to have brought samaṇas of various communities together.  
Before the establishment of some sort of permanent and exclusive resident quarters 
for Buddhist bhikkhus (where contact with the ‘outside’ world becomes a highly 
regulated matter), direct contact with their ascetic others seemed to have been a part of 
their daily reality. Many places, events and facilities that Buddhist bhikkhus frequented 
for eating, resting or sleeping were not exclusively provided or erected for Buddhist 
bhikkhus, but for ‘everyone’ (sabbe, savvajaṇa), and as such they inevitably functioned as 
platforms for direct contact opportunities.68  
My treatment of the various direct contact opportunities will problematize the notion 
of a ‘Jain’ ascetic and a ‘Buddhist’ ascetic. It will problematize the idea that difference (in 
however many different ways this could be negotiated) between a ‘Jain’ and a ‘Buddhist’ 
bhikkhu was being negotiated in such a manner that a ‘Jain’ could indeed at all times be 
distinguished from a ‘Buddhist,’ and vice versa. The various direct contact opportunities 
will show that in many cases neither the activity nor the place of an ascetic supplied or 
secured his distinct identity. During the earliest stages of the development of the 
Buddhist community, the socio-geographical proximity between Buddhist bhikkhus and 
other ascetics was often such that no material boundaries supported their distinct 
identity. To appreciate the significance of this socio-geographical proximity, this is, of 
this absence of material boundaries, one may consider the significance of the presence of 
material boundaries on the development of identity. 
It is not difficult to understand how the presence of permanent and fully equipped 
Buddhist monasteries both minimizes and regulates direct contact opportunities. Such 
monastery-complexes providing cooking, eating, bathing, sleeping and other facilities 
within their very boundaries, restrict the possibility for the Buddhist bhikkhu to 
(spontaneously) come into direct contact with his ascetic others while performing any of 
these basic activities. (The absence of) archaeological and epigraphical evidence 
suggests that such Buddhist monastery-complexes were not a feature of the Buddhist 
community before or even during the Mauryan period (ca. 322 BCE-185 BCE). They 
appear, however, as an established feature during the Gupta empire (ca. 320-550 CE), 
pointing to the fact that it is most probably “in the period between the Mauryan and 
 
                                                     
68 Cp. AS 57-8: II.1.5.§ 4 where food is said to be prepared for all (savvajaṇa). 
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Gupta empires . . . that Buddhist communities came to be fully monasticized, 
permanently housed, landed, propertied, and – to judge by almost any standard – very 
wealthy.”69 Regarding the notion of identity, one may remark that such monastery-
complexes provide Buddhist bhikkhus with an important source of identity. Part of their 
self and community definition becomes provided, supported by and intimately linked 
with these monastery-complexes. By their very structure monastery-complexes create a 
material boundary between ‘the Buddhist bhikkhu’ and the ‘outside’ world. In the 
absence of such permanent monastery-complexes during the earliest stages of the 
Buddhist community, Buddhist bhikkhus of that time evidently had different sources of 
identity, if indeed, as it will become apparent throughout our discussion of direct 
contact opportunities, a clearly negotiated and perceptible distinctiveness or identity 
can at all be taken for granted. 
It further may already be remarked that if some passages of the Pāli Vinaya reflect an 
absence of material boundaries, some other passages reflect a stage where Buddhist 
bhikkhus started to settle down in vihāras having material boundaries and with various 
facilities. Though these vihāras certainly did not reach the material complexity and 
sophistication of the Buddhist monastery-complexes of the Guptan period, they did 
start, as it will be illustrated, to (materially) separate Buddhist bhikkhus from the 
‘outside world.’ In the final part I will discuss the development of these vihāras in the 
early stages of the Buddhist community, and consider their impact on both contact and 
identity negotiation.  
Nattier’s ‘Principle of Irrelevance’ and ‘Principle of Counterargument’ 
In what follows, I discuss and illustrate direct contact opportunities arising either from 
a particular activity (e.g. alms-begging) or from a specific socio-geographical space (e.g. 
public rest-house). The aim is to offer a critical contribution towards the, so to speak, 
‘materialization’ of contact opportunities – being a dynamic contributor for  dialogue - 
between Buddhist bhikkhus and their ascetic others; it is not to offer an exhaustive 
overview of direct contact opportunities.70  
 
                                                     
69 Schopen 2007: 60. In the introduction to his article on the ambivalence of the practice of Buddhist bhikkhus 
wearing ‘clothes of the dead,’ Schopen also points to the fact that the language used in the Aśokan inscriptions 
suggests that Aśoka did not know Buddhist monasteries since the tax reductions he granted to “the place of 
the Buddha’s birth,” is not granted “to a monastery or even to a monastic group, but to the village of Lumbini 
itself.” Ibid.: 61. 
70 For an exhaustive overview of direct contact opportunities one naturally would need to consult many other 
sources, to begin with the remaining Buddhist texts of the Pāli canon. 
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The direct contact opportunities are drawn from the Pāli Vinaya and from the lecture 
piṃḍeseṇâ (‘Begging of Food’) of the Jain Āyāraṅga Sutta. Though being drawn from 
normative sources, I will present these direct contact opportunities as socio-historical 
realities on the basis of a methodological reading that follows Nattier’s ‘principle of 
irrelevance’ and ‘principle of counterargument.’ Before explaining these two principles, 
I briefly want to remark that it has not been my intention to try to relegate the different 
contact opportunities into an absolute timeframe. This is not only because of the 
complex textual stratification within each used source text, but also between the source 
texts themselves.71 I hope the following pages convince the reader, however, that both 
texts are informative and can be used as complementary sources in the quest of 
visualising dialogue opportunities between early Buddhist and Jain ascetics.  
The ‘principle of irrelevance’ entails the idea that items mentioned in a normative 
narrative that are “unrelated to the author’s primary agenda” can be taken to reflect 
social realities of that time. I will refer to such items as socio-historical realities 
incidentally referred to.  
The ‘principle of counterargument’ holds the idea that if an author of a normative 
text prohibits X it may be taken to indicate that at least one person did X since 
otherwise the need would not have been felt to explicitly prohibit it.72  
Needless to say, both principles should be applied critically and appropriately. If we 
read the whole of the Pāli Vinaya with solely the ‘principle of counterargument’ in 
mind, for instance, then virtually all precepts must be taken to bear reference, albeit 
negatively, to situations that really did occur. As we know, it is proper to the legal 
structure of the Pāli Vinaya to have an introductory story to each precept with a 
bhikkhu, a bhikkhunī, or a group of bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs doing exactly that which will 
be prohibited in the precept the story introduces.73 However, when going through the 
Pāli Vinaya, one intuitively understands that some precepts were formulated in 
theoretical elaborations on and modifications of already existing precepts. Or that some 
precepts were formulated in theoretical consideration on how an ideal bhikkhu should 
 
                                                     
71 Cf. p. 50 ff. and p. 58 ff. for a discussion of the dates of the texts. 
72 Nattier 2003: 63-69 ‘Extracting Historical Data from a Normative Source’. Nattier suggests two more 
principles. The ‘principal of embarrassment’ being the idea that “When an author reveals, in the course of a 
discussion, something that is quite unflattering to the group or the position that he or she represents, there is 
a high degree of probability that the statement has a basis in fact.” The ‘principle of corroborating evidence’ is 
based on the idea that if two or more independent sources agree in their representation of X, then X might 
very well have been as described in those sources. 
73 See also Dutt 1996 (1924): 25 discussing why the introductory stories to each precept were felt to be 
necessary in the legal law code of the Pāli Vinaya: “In primitive conception, every law being an adjudication 
and command, the ‘state of facts’ on which the adjudication was made could not be dispensed with in laying 
down the law.” 
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(not) behave; or in theoretical reflection on how to (not) act upon both factual and 
imagined possibilities the ‘outside’ world offers; or also, that some precepts were 
formulated in analogy with already existing law systems. In other words, not all 
precepts can be taken to have been formulated in negative response to factual incidents. 
On this critical note, let us turn to consider some direct contact opportunities for early 
Buddhist and Jain bhikkhus. 
Eat and Meet 
Going for alms 
The daily quest for food was a most basic activity that brought alms-begging ascetics 
into both direct and indirect contact with other ascetics. I will show how contact 
opportunities arose from the alms-begging activity itself; from certain public facilities 
and events; and from donating householders. The latter played a most vital role, for 
without donating householders ascetics could simply not have developed their practice 
of alms-begging. In addition, they oftentimes appeared to have been donating alms-food 
to ascetics irrespective of their specific affiliation. This fact, as we shall see, was 
conducive to bring ascetics into both direct and indirect contact with one another.  
The denominations ‘bhikkhu’ and bhikkhunī (AMg bhikkhu and bhikkhuṇī, Skt. ‘bhikṣu’ 
and bhikṣuṇī, ) are found in both the Pāli Vinaya and the Jain Āyāraṅga Sutta to refer to 
their male and female mendicants. The root ‘bhikṣ’ means ‘to beg for alms’, and this 
‘alms begging’ is indeed one significant practice shared between (some) Buddhist and 
Jain ascetics.74  
Though the Pāli Vinaya contains ample evidence of Buddhist bhikkhus accepting 
‘invitations to a meal’75 and of householders going to Buddhist bhikkhus to offer and 
provide them with food at their own place of residence,76 an equally ample amount of 
 
                                                     
74 For a discussion of the meaning of the term bhikkhu in Jain texts, see Caillat 1975: 34 where she points to the 
divergence between the etymological meaning of the term (‘one who lives of charity’) and the applied 
meaning of the term. According to the twelfth century commentator Malayagiri ‘bhikkhu’ in the Jain Kappa and 
the Vavahāra Sutta refers ‘not [to] one who lives of charity etc. [= etymological meaning], but one who 
correctly devotes all his efforts towards his salvation, and who knows how to control himself [= applied 
meaning].’ Ibid. 
75 On the practice of accepting an ‘invitation to a meal’ (nimantaṇaṁ sādiyati) see my discussion of ‘Food 
restrictions’ in the previous section ‘How well did early Buddhists knew their Jain ascetic other?’. 
76See e.g. the introductory story to pāṭidesaniya IV (BD III 115-116, Vin IV 181-182) from which one incidentally 
can infer the fact that it was not unusual for people to go to the jungle lodgings (āraññaka senāsana) of bhikkhus 
to prepare a meal (bhatta) for the bhikkhus there, in the bhikkhus’ very own dwelling-places. See also MV VI.24.1 
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evidence indicates that some Buddhist bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs lived up to their name 
and went themselves to the householders’ residences to beg for alms.77 And here, a 
direct contact opportunity arises. On their way to, and at a householder’s place, 
Buddhist bhikkhus could and certainly did come across other ascetics. Explicit examples 
of such encounters are, however, not found in the Pāli Vinaya. This is not surprising 
considering the text’s economic and strategic (mis)use of references to the ascetic others 
of the early Buddhist.78 Luckily the Jain Āyāraṅga is more helpful on this point. To 
illustrate that alms-begging ascetics could meet their ascetic others when going for 
alms, we may turn to the Jain Āyāraṅga (p. 58) sutta II.1.5 §6, translated by Jacobi as: 
 “When a [Jain] monk [bhikkhu] or [Jain] nun [bhikkhuṇî] on a begging tour [? 
samâna] perceives that a Sramana [samaṇa] or Brâhmana [mâhaṇa], a beggar 
[gâmapiṃḍolaga] or guest [atihi] has already entered the house, they should not 
overtake them and address (the householder) first. Knowing this, they should go 
apart and stay where no people pass or see them. But when they perceive that the 
other has been sent away or received alms, and has returned [to his ārāma], they 
may circumspectly enter the house and address the householder.” (Jacobi SBE 22: 
102) 
This sutta with its rather dramatic image of mendicants overtaking other mendicants to 
be first in receiving alms at a householder’s house, may serve as an illustration to show 
how householder’s houses could be frequented by various mendicants from a same or 
different ascetic community, and this at one and the same time too. Whether Jain 
bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs on seeing other alms-begging ascetics entering a householder’s 
house that they were about to enter themselves really did stop, turned away, and went 
to find a place nearby where no one could see them, we cannot say. This is the 
normative prescription of the redactors of our sutta: it shows the redactors’ opinion on 
how a Jain mendicant ideally should behave in such a circumstance. It, therefore, does 
not –necessarily – reflect a socio-historical reality too. However, with the principle of 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(Vin I 219; BD IV 300-301) where Buddhist bhikkhus wandering from one town to another in a caravan-like 
formation are joined by people who cook for them. 
Alms-food could also be send (pāheti) to a bhikkhu by his upaṭṭhākakūla or by the family who ministers him.  See 
e.g. introductory story to pācittiya XLVI (Vin IV 98; BD II 362-3). 
Note also that by means of the principle of counterargument one may deduce that some Buddhist bhikkhus 
might also have prepared their own food. Cp. MV VI.17.3: “Monks, one should not make use of what is cured 
indoors, cooked indoors, cooked by oneself [sāmaṃ pakkaṃ]. Whoever should make use (of any of these things), 
there is an offence of wrong doing.” (Vin I 211; trsl. I.B. Horner BD IV 287, emphasis mine) 
77 This is for instance well-reflected in the development of the denomination ‘piṇḍacārika bhikkhu’ to indicate a 
‘Buddhist bhikkhu walking for alms-food’ occurring in several introductory stories of the Pāli Vinaya (e.g. Vin 
IV 78; BD II 321). 
78 Cp. p. 123 ff. and p. 168 ff. 
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counterargument one can assume with a large degree of certainty that some Jain 
mendicants must not have stopped and turned away but simply joined others in their 
alms-begging quest at a householder’s place. Also, and more importantly for our present 
question of direct contact opportunities, this passage provides us with the socio-
historical information that mendicants belonging to different communities could meet 
at householders’ places for alms. This is evidenced by the fact that it is incidentally 
referred to in our sutta. The reality of different ‘samaṇas, brāhmaṇas, beggars and guests’ 
meeting at a householder’s place for alms-food is here simply assumed. In addition, this 
socio-historical reality presented in our sutta is not an isolated case. It is referred to in 
several other suttas of the piṃḍeseṇâ of the Āyāraṅga Sutta, which further suggests that 
meeting a samaṇa or brāhmaṇa other at a householder’s place did not happen 
infrequently when begging for alms. For instance, in the preceding sutta  (sutta II.1.5 § 5) 
one finds an instruction for the Jain mendicant very similar to the one just quoted 
above. Sutta II.1.5 § 5 instructs the Jain mendicant to go and stand in a place where no 
one can see him when noticing that a ‘samaṇa, brāhmaṇa, beggar or guest’ has already 
entered the householder’s place he himself intended to enter for alms. This sutta, as the 
one just discussed, also simply assumes the possibility of a Jain mendicant coming across 
other non-Jain mendicants when wandering for alms among householders.  
Another interesting piece of information that may be inferred from these suttas by 
means of the ‘principle of irrelevance,’ is the socio-historical fact that householders who 
offered food (if not all, then at least some of them) offered alms to mendicants 
irrespective of their specific ascetic affiliation. After instructing a Jain mendicant to go 
and stand where no one can see him in case others have already entered a householder’s 
place, sutta II.1.5 § 5 continues a little further thus: 
Another man [paro] may bring and give him food . . . while he [i.e. the Jain 
mendicant] stays where no people pass or see him, and say unto him: ‘O long-lived 
Sramana! [âusaṃto samaṇâ] this food . . . is given for the sake of all of you 
[savvajaṇâe nisaṭṭhe]; eat it or divide it among you. (trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 101, 
emphasis mine) 
These suttas (II.1.5 § 5 and II.1.5 § 6) indicate that it was not unusual for householders to 
donate to samaṇas of different ascetic communities. This is not to exclude the possibility 
that some householders chose to donate to only one particular community or even to 
one particular bhikkhu,79 but the point is that contrary to the various normative 
statements found in both Jain and Buddhist texts that lay-followers supporting their 
 
                                                     
79 Note how there is a Pāli term for designating a family supporting (a) particular bhikkhu(s): upaṭṭhakakula. A 
bhikkhu being dependent on a certain family or families is called a ‘kulūpaka bhikkhu.’ See e.g. Vin III 187 (BD I 
330). 
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community (should) only support their community,80  the socio-historical reality did not 
(always) agree with the textual ideal. (Some) householders (sometimes) offered alms to 
mendicants irrespective of their ascetic affiliation. This fact is also seen in suttas of the 
piṃḍeseṇâ of the Āyāraṅga that discuss what mendicants should do, or should not do, 
when a festival is being held nearby. As I will discuss below, for donating householders, 
festivals functioned as merit-making opportunities. Preparing and serving food for all 
who subsisted on alms offerings, donating householders turned festivals into direct 
contact platforms for the various alms-begging samaṇas.  
Public Rest-Houses (āvasatha) 
Other direct contact platforms for samaṇas arising from the combination of donating 
householders and specific socio-geographical places are the āvasathas. Āvasathas, 
sometimes also called āvasathāgara, were public rest-houses where householders could 
donate alms-food and provide a sleeping place to passing wanderers.81 What makes 
āvasathas true contact platforms is that they were erected not solely for the needs of 
Buddhist bhikkhus, but for all ascetics. Further, references to āvasathas in the Pāli Vinaya 
inform us that also travelling householders could stay there. In other words, āvasathas or 
public rest-houses were strong contact hubs where Buddhist bhikkhus could meet and 
enter into dialogue with both their ascetic other and householder other.82  
The references to āvasathas in the Pāli Vinaya show that public rest-houses could be 
erected both by individual householders or by a group of householders;83 and that these 
 
                                                     
80 At Vin I 246 (BD IV 340) Keniya the Jaṭila, one devoted to brāhmaṇas (brāhmaṇesu abhippasasanna), is being 
told by the Buddha that ‘for those giving alms, desiring merit, the [Buddhist] Order is indeed the chief.’ At Vin 
I 236-327 the general Sīha whose family always had  been supporting the Jains and who wishes to become a 
Buddhist layfollower repeats the following words he once heard the Buddha say: “Gifts should be given to me 
[i.e. the Buddha] only, not to others should gifts be given; gifts should be given to my disciples only, not to the 
disciples of others should gifts be given. What is given to me is alone of great fruit, what is given to others is 
not of great fruit; what is given to my disciples alone is of great fruit, what is given to the disciples of others is 
not of great fruit.” (trsl. I.B. Horner BD IV 323) For a discussion of this Vinaya passage see p. 153. Cp. also the 
Upāli Sutta in the MN 483 where the householder Upāli converted from being a Jain disciple to a Buddhist 
disciple is presented as repeating the same words of the Buddha. 
81 “āvasatha” as “public rest-house” occurs in four distinct Pāli Vinaya narratives: Vin IV 17-20 = pācittiya VI 
(āvasathāgāra); Vin IV 69-71 = pācittiya XXXI; Vin IV 161-164 = pācittiya LXXXIV; Vin I 226-230 = MV VI.28 
(āvasathāgāra).  
82 On the householder being an important dialectic other in the development of the early Buddhist 
community, see p. 131 ff. 
83 Vin IV 17-20 mentions an āvasathāgāra made ready by a certain woman (aññatari itthi) (= individual 
householder); Vin I 226-230 talks of an āvasathāgāra prepared by the lay-followers of Pāṭaligāma (= a group of 
householders). 
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could be of a permanent structure84 that was either enclosed or open.85 They further 
seem to also have been of varying accommodation capacities and facilities (cf. below).  
Where exactly āvasathas were located in relation to the dwellings of householders 
and the dwellings and/or wandering routes of ascetics is not entirely clear. Since 
householders were responsible for both their erection and maintenance, we may 
assume that they were located somewhere that was within reach of householders. 
Āvasathas must, therefore, have been erected within villages and towns.86 One could 
suggest that smaller āvasathas or āvasathas erected and maintained by an individual 
householder might (initially) have been part of a householder’s dwelling itself. Being 
derived from the root āvas ‘to dwell,’ the term āvasatha has the non-technical meaning 
of ‘abode.’ Despite the term’s indefiniteness regarding the type of abode(s), it is not 
unlikely that ‘āvasatha’ may have been (part of) a householder’s dwelling. The term 
occurs in the Pāli Vinaya in two compounds where it is clearly associated with the realm 
of householders. This is, the household-robe allowed to menstruating bhikkhuṇīs is 
called ‘āvasatha-cīvara,’ and at Vin IV 20 the compound ‘āvasatha-dvāra’ is used to refer to 
the door of a living-room of a householder’s dwelling (nivesana). Being located within 
the householder’s realm, āvasathas might, therefore, very well have sprung from 
householder’s abodes themselves. Larger ones may have been detached from a specific 
householder’s dwelling. Vin I 226 speaks, for instance, of the lay-followers of Pāṭaligāma 
inviting the Buddha and his bhikkhu-saṅgha to their āvasatha. The fact that this āvasatha is 
considered to be able to accommodate lay-followers and the Buddha and his bhikkhu-
saṅgha, suggests that āvasathas could be large. Further, with the lay-followers of 
Pāṭaligāma collectively referring to the āvasatha as “theirs,” the “public” character of 
āvasathas is apparent. As there is no indication that they were privately owned, larger 
āvasathas appear to have been an integral part of the infrastructure of a village or town.  
Be as it may, both small and larger āvasathas must have been located in the vicinity of 
householders, as they were the ones erecting and maintaining them.  
 
Regarding the varying facilities, the āvasatha or public rest-house mentioned in the 
introductory story to pācittiya XXXI (Vin IV 69-70), quoted in detail below, appears to 
provide “staying” and “eating” facilities for wandering ascetics; at Vin I 226-227 (BD IV 
 
                                                     
84 The fact that at Vin IV 17-20, e.g., the public rest-house is said to [only] be made ready (paññattaṃ hoti) 
suggests an already existent construction.  
85 Cf. Padabhājaniya to pācittiya LXXXIV: “within an āvasatha means: inside the āvasatha when an āvasatha is 
fenced in; the precincts when it is not fenced in.” (BD III 80, Vin IV 163: “ajjhāvasatho nāma parikkhittassa 
āvasathassa antoavasatho, aparikkhittassa upacāro.”) 
86 Note how at Vin IV 17-20 the public rest-house is explicitly located in a village. Also at Vin I 226-230 is the 
public rest-house located in a village (cf. Pāṭaligāma). 
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309) the āvasatha is used as a sort of dhamma hall where both lay-followers and bhikkhus 
met to listen to the Buddha giving a talk on dhamma; and at Vin IV 17 the āvasatha 
appears to be a place where both wandering bhikkhus and travellers could spend the 
night. In other words, characteristic of an āvasatha is that not only it could be used for 
various purposes, but also that its facilities were public. As such, they were direct contact 
platforms bringing Buddhist bhikkhus, other ascetics and (donating and travelling) 
householders together. The introductory story to pācittiya XXXI offers a good example: 
Now at that time, not far from Sāvatthī, alms-food [piṇḍa] came to be prepared in a 
public rest-house [āvasatha] by some guild [pūga]. The group of six monks, 
dressing in the morning, taking their bowl and robes, entering Sāvatthī for alms-
food, (but) not obtaining alms-food, went to the public rest-house [āvasatha]. 
People, saying: “At last reverend ones [bhaddantā] have arrived,” respectfully 
served them. Then also on the following day as the day after that the group of six 
monks . . . [pa], dressing in the morning . . . [pa] going to the public rest-house 
[āvasatha], ate (a meal). Then it occurred to the group of six monks: 
“What difference do we make?” Having gone to the monastery [ārāma], then 
tomorrow it will be right to return just here.” Staying on and on just there, they 
ate alms-food at the public rest-house. Adherents of other ascetic communities 
[titthiyā] went away.  People were [irritated, angry (and)] speaking dispraisingly: 
“How can these recluses, sons of the Sakyans, staying on and on, eat alms-food at 
the public rest-house? The alms-food at the public rest-house is not prepared 
merely for them, the alms-food at the public rest-house is prepared simply for 
everybody [sabba].” 
Monks heard these people who were [irritated, angry (and)] speaking 
dispraisingly. Those who were modest monks were [irritated, angry (and)] 
speaking dispraisingly: “How can the group of six monks, staying on and on, eat 
alms-food at a public rest-house?” . . . [pa] 
“Is it true, as is said, that you monks [stayed on and on and ate alms-food at a] 
public rest-house?” 
“It is true, Bhagavat.” 
The Buddha, the Bhagavat, rebuked them [. . . .] It is not, foolish men, for pleasing 
those who are not (yet) pleased . . . And thus, monks, this rule of training should 
be set forth: 
One meal at a public rest-house may be eaten. If he should eat more than that, 
there is an offence of expiation.” 
And thus this rule of training for monks came to be laid down by the Bhagavat. 
(Pācittiya XXXII, Vin IV 71-72; trsl. partly following I.B. Horner BD II 303-304) 
This Pāli Vinaya passage is very informative. The pācittiya rule itself suggests that it was 
an accepted practice among Buddhist bhikkhus to go to āvasathas and to enjoy the alms-
food prepared by devoted householders. The introductory story illustrates, on the other 
hand, how an āvasatha was a place where Buddhist bhikkhus could come into contact 
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with their ascetic others (titthiya, Skt. tīrthika).87 This contact opportunity arises both 
from the place itself (an āvasatha being an open public place) and from donating 
householders (here a ‘guild’) who are presented as preparing alms-food for “simply 
everybody.” 
Festivals 
Public festal events, such as religious festivals (AMg. maha),88 festive entertainments 
(AMg. saṃkhaḍi; Pāli samajja),89 and public feasts (Pāli ussava)90 also constituted direct 
contact opportunities for samaṇas. Both Buddhist and Jain canonical texts associate 
public festal events with the many temptations of worldly existence improper for the 
bhikkhu: alcohol, gossip, seduction, sex, music, dance, perfume etc.91 As caricatural 
depictions of the excesses of a householder’s life, public festal events often serve as a 
rhetorical device to laud the samaṇa lifestyle in contradistinction to the householder 
one. However, despite the fact that Jain and Buddhist canonical sources condemn public 
festal events for their worldly temptations and excesses, their precepts for their 
bhikkhus against attending public festal events; their regulations on what to avoid or 
how to behave at public festal events; together with references to bhikkhus being at a 
public festal event, indicate that early Buddhist bhikkhus and Jain bhikkhus did go and 
hence, as I will illustrate, could meet one another on such occasions. 
In the introductory story to pācittiya XXXVII (Vin IV 85; BD II 335) a group of bhikkhus 
are presented as going to a festival on the mountain top. People seeing those bhikkhus 
 
                                                     
87 The term titthiya literally means ‘one belonging to a tīrtha (‘ford’)’ and in general bears reference to any 
member of the early Indian society who followed a specific ascetic path stipulated by a certain ‘tīrthika’ or 
‘ford maker.’ In Buddhist texts such as the Pāli Vinaya, however, the term is almost exclusively used to 
designate members of an ascetic community other than the Buddhist one. For an in-depth analysis of the term 
titthiya, see p.174 ff. and p. 187 ff. 
88 The Ardhamāgadhī term ‘maha’ can (cf. PSM, s.v.) be related either to the Sanskrit word ‘maha’ meaning ‘a 
feast, a festival’ or to the Sanskrit word ‘makha’ meaning ‘sacrifice, offering’ beside ‘a feast, festival, or any 
occasion of joy or festivity.’ I chose to translate it with ‘religious festival’ as its use at AS 51-52 (cf. quote in 
text) indicates that maha was a feast or a festival (with food during which sacrifices may have been performed 
or offerings donated) that were held on or for an auspicious occasion or day. 
89 The Ardhamāgadhī term ‘saṃkhaḍi’  is a deśi word meaning a ‘feast, banquet’ or ‘food prepared for relatives 
and others on festive occasions such as weddings etc.’ (cf. PSM, s.v.) 
The Pāli term ‘samajja’ stands for ‘festive gathering; fair’ and is thought to have originated from a mountain 
cult as ‘it was especially held on the mountains near Rājagaha.’ (cf. PED, s.v.)  
90 The Pāli term ‘ussava’ is related to the Skt. word ‘utsava’ meaning ‘feast, making merry, holiday’.  
The distinction between ‘maha’, ‘saṃkhaḍi’, ‘samajja’ and ‘ussava’ is not always clear, however, their common 
aspect is clear: during all these festive occasions food is being served and people are brought together.  
91 See e.g. Vin II 107-108 (BD V 145) where the group of six bhikkhus are being rebuked for going to a festival on 
a mountain-top (giragga-samajja) as they, just like householders, were enjoying the dancing, singing and music. 
For examples taken from the Āyāro see a little further in main text. 
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offered them food. The issue expressed in the pācittiya offence is not with the fact that 
bhikkhus are at a festival (samajja), but that they are eating at the ‘wrong time’. Similarly, 
at Vin IV 179 (BD III 111) bhikkhus being at a festival (ussava) is taken as an unproblematic 
setting to introduce the main point under discussion, this is, whether or not a bhikkhu 
should accept food from families agreed upon as learners. That festive events could turn 
into direct contact platforms, may be illustrated with the following suttas from the 
Āyāraṅga:   
A [Jain] monk or a [Jain] nun on a begging-tour should not accept food . . . . on a 
festival [maha] of Indra or Skanda or Rudra or Mukunda or demons [bhûta] or 
Yakshas [jakkha] or the snakes [nâga], or on a festival in honour of a tomb [thûbha], 
or a shrine [ceiya], or a tree [rukkha], or a hill, or a cave, or a well, or a tank, or a 
pond, or a river, or a lake, or the sea, or a mine – when on such-like various 
festivals [virûvarûvesu mahâmahesu] many Sramanas and Brâhmanas, guest, 
paupers, and beggars are entertained with food, & c. [out of one or two or three or 
four vessels, pots, baskets, or heaps of food; such like food which has been 
prepared by the giver . . . is impure and unacceptable] . . . .  
But when he perceives that all have received their due share, and are enjoying 
their meal, he should address the householder’s wife or sister or daughter-in-law 
or nurse or male or female servant or slave and say: ‘O long-lived one [âuso]! (or, O 
sister!) will you give me something to eat?’ After these words of the mendicant, 
the other may bring him food [asaṇa], & c., and give it to him. Such food, & c., 
whether he beg[s] for it [jâejjâ] or the other give[s] it, he may accept, for it is pure 
[phâsuya] and acceptable [paḍigâha]. (AS 51 - 52: II. 1.2 § 3 - 4, trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 92-
93, emphasis mine) 
And also, 
When he [i.e. the Jain bhikkhu] has eaten or drunk at a festive entertainment 
[saṃkhaḍi], he might vomit (what he has eaten), or not well digest it; or some 
other bad disease or sickness might befall him. (1) 
The Kevalin says this is the reason: 
A mendicant [bhikkhû], having drunk various liquors [soḍa], together with the 
householder or [the householder] his wife [gâhâvatiṇî], [together with other] 
monks [parivâyaa, Skt parivrājaka] or nuns [parivâiyâ, Skt. parivrājikā], might not 
find the (promised) resting-place [uvassaya] on leaving the scene of entertainment 
and looking out for it; or in the resting-place he may get into mixed company 
[sammissîbhâva]; in the absence of his mind or in his drunkenness he may lust after 
a woman [itthi] or a eunuch [kilîva]; approaching the mendicant (they will say): ‘O 
long-lived Sramana [âusaṃto samaṇâ]! (let us meet) in the garden [ârâma], or in the 
sleeping place [uvassaya], in the night or in the twilight.’ Luring him thus by his 
sensuality (she says): ‘Let us proceed to enjoy the pleasures of love.’ He might go 
to her, though he knows that it should not be done. 
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These are the causes to sin, they multiply continuously. Therefore should a well-
controlled Nirgrantha [saṃjae niyaṃṭhe] not resolve to go to any festival [saṃkhaḍi] 
which is preceded or followed by a feast [puresaṃkhaḍi vâ paccâsaṃkhaḍi]. (AS 53: 
II.1.3 § 1-2, trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 94-95) 
These suttas of the Āyāraṅga illustrate well how public festal events were perceived to 
be offering serious pitfalls for a mendicants’ conduct. Liquor, seducing women, seducing 
eunuchs, consuming ‘the pleasures of love,’ are all but small matters. And though as 
platforms of temptation, public festal events are best avoided by mendicants, these 
suttas inform us that ascetics did hang around such events. Suttas AS II. 1.2 § 3 – 4  in 
instructing the Jain mendicant when he may accept alms-food at a festival (maha), 
simply assumes the socio-historical reality of Jain mendicants attending a festival. 
Similarly, by means of both the principle of irrelevance and the principle of 
counterargument we may infer from suttas II.1.3 § 1-2 that Jain mendicants hung around 
festive entertainments (saṃkhaḍi) and partook of the feast served at these occasions. 
The presence in this context of both the stock enumeration of all those subsisting on 
food (samaṇa mâhaṇa gâmapiṃḍolaga atihi), and of paribbājakas (AMg. parivâyaa) further 
corroborates the fact that public festal events could function as direct contact 
opportunities.  
In addition, we can again infer from these examples that householders – or at least 
some householders –  offered alms to mendicants irrespective of their specific ascetic 
affiliation. Householders are here presented as distributing food (and offering resting-
places ‘uvassaya’92) on festal events to any wanderer. This is an important socio-historical 
fact that needs to be taken fully into consideration when considering the processes of 
identity negotiation of early Buddhist bhikkhus. In the final section of this part on 
contact I will go more deeply into the various dynamic roles of householders in the 
processes of identity negotiation of the early Buddhist bhikkhus. First, some more direct 
contact opportunities may be discussed. I turn to direct contact arising from non-
exclusive sleeping and residence facilities.  
Sleep and Meet 
The Pāli Vinaya hosts a wide range of different sleeping facilities for the Buddhist 
bhikkhu. The long period of time over which our monastic text developed undoubtedly 
accounts for some of this diversity. Because of (or thanks to) its long oral tradition, 
 
                                                     
92 The PSM defines ‘uvassaya’ [Skt. upāśraya] as ‘a place where Jain sādhus could make their dwelling’. It bases 
its definition from several Jain texts, but not from the Āyāro. In our passage quoted above it appears, however, 
to be a place prepared by a householder where Jain bhikkhus but also other people could spend the night. 
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some sleeping practices and residence facilities that became obsolete in the course of 
the development of the early Buddhist saṅgha still made it into the Pāli Vinaya. On the 
other hand, the co-existence of various sleeping practices and residence facilities at one 
time and place also must be contributing to the diversity. While some sleeping practices 
and residence facilities recorded in the Pāli Vinaya suggest the presence of (material) 
boundaries separating the members of the Buddhist community from the ‘outside’ 
world,93 other sleeping practices and residence facilities indicate ‘open’ boundaries. It is 
on these latter ones that we will focus.  
Titthiyaseyyā 
Concerning ‘open’ or ‘mixed’ sleeping places, we are already familiar with āvasathas (Pāli 
Vinaya) and uvassayas (Āyāraṅga). In addition to these public rest-houses, Buddhist 
bhikkhus searching for a sleeping place, could encounter other ascetics at titthiyaseyyās. 
The term ‘titthiyaseyyā’, literally meaning a ‘sleeping place of (a) titthiya(s) (Skt. tīrthika),’ 
occurs in three separate but near identical Suttavibhaṅga passages of the Pāli Vinaya.94 
It occurs in the casuistry section of pācittiya XLVII, pācittiya LXXXV and pāṭidesaniya I.  
Pācittiya XLVII prescribes a bhikkhu to not enter a house for alms-food just before or 
after he has been invited and provided with a meal elsewhere. Pācittiya LXXXV prohibits 
a bhikkhu from entering a village at the wrong time without having asked for permission 
first; and pāṭidesaniya I forbids a bhikkhu to accept alms-food from a bhikkhunī who is not 
a relation and who ‘has entered among the houses’ (antaragharaṃ paviṭṭhāya), this being 
the standard Pāli expression to refer to the active begging for alms-food among 
householders. 
A common feature of these three Vinaya rules is the exception made in their 
accompanying casuistry section for a bhikkhu who is either going to or who is at a 
titthiyaseyyā.95 This exception is significant as it points to the fact that Buddhist bhikkhus 
could frequent sleeping places of titthiyas. These may, therefore, be considered as 
specific socio-geographical places that could give rise to direct contact opportunities.  
One may critically remark that three references to titthiyaseyyās is a truly negligible 
amount for such a large text as the Pāli Vinaya. It would indeed be problematic to state 
on the basis of only these three references that it was common for Buddhist bhikkhus to 
 
                                                     
93 Cf. following section ‘a Dwell and Meet’ where the growing materiality and sophistication of Buddhist 
sleeping/dwelling facilities will be discussed.  
94 Vin IV 101 (in the ‘exception to the rule section’ to pācittiya XLVII; BD II 367); Vin IV 166 (in the ‘exception to 
the rule section’ to pācittiya LXXXV; BD III 86); Vin IV 176 (in the ‘exception to the rule section’ to pāṭidesaniya 
I; BD III 106). 
95 For pācittiya XLVII and LXXV there is no offence if he is going to a titthiyaseyyā. For pāṭidesaniya I there is no 
offence if he is at a titthiyaseyyā. 
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go to a titthiyaseyyā. On the other hand, one should also not deny this possibility. Though 
very few, there are references. These are, furthermore, incidental which suggests that 
the practice was considered unproblematic. The point I wish to make is that when 
consulting the normative Pāli Vinaya for extracting historical information of how the 
early Buddhist saṅgha might have organized itself, or how, with respect to contact 
opportunities, it stood in dialogue with other ascetic communities, one has to be 
especially sensitive to these odd references. While the Pāli Vinaya will not hesitate to 
frequently repeat (and partly because of this repetition also establish) the ideal norm, it 
will certainly not mention as frequently or reflect as transparently the (changing) 
realities on the ground. For these, one has to be sensitive to the information contained 
in such ‘incidental’ references whose historical value are not dependent on their 
frequency in the text, but on their ‘innocent’ or ‘incidental’ nature. Regarding 
titthiyaseyyās one may, therefore, state that it was an unproblematic practice of early 
Buddhist bhikkhus to frequent sleeping places of other ascetics, despite the fact that only 
three references are met with in the Pāli Vinaya. 
 
In the above discussion of direct contact opportunities arising from the combination 
of alms-donating householders and alms-begging ascetics, I pointed out that the very 
possibility of ascetics meeting one another when walking for alms, suggested that they 
resided in very close vicinity to one another. I further would like to draw attention to 
the fact that during such moments of direct contact, the activity itself of the ascetic (i.e. 
alms-begging) does not support his distinct identity. We cannot assume that when a 
‘Jain’ bhikkhu and a ‘Buddhist’ bhikkhu are receiving alms at a festal event or at a 
householder’s place, they were (always and easily) recognized to be two bhikkhus 
belonging to two distinct ascetic communities. Unless their distinctiveness was 
translated into visible, known and unambiguous dietary restrictions, or distinguishing 
emblems and garbs, the specific affiliation of ascetics might have gone unnoticed during 
direct contact.96 In the course of this and the following section I will return to ‘food’ and 
‘clothing’ as being two important locales for placing identity or for establishing 
meaningful difference. We will see how many passages and precepts of the Pāli Vinaya 
regulating the garb of the Buddhist bhikkhu can be understood as a conscious effort of 
the monk-editors to distinguish the members of the Buddhist community from their 
ascetic others. For the moment, I wish to remark that despite the gradual codification 
and clear desire of uniformization of the Buddhist bhikkhu’s garb, various ‘options’ or 
better ‘practices’ co-existed within (and throughout) the (early) history of the Buddhist 
community. The best known example of this variety is the practice of wearing ‘rags 
 
                                                     
96 I will return later to these two possible locales (food and garb) for placing identity (or distincitiveness). 
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taken from the dust heap’ (paŋsukūla)97 existing next to the practice of wearing ‘the 
yellow robes’ (kāsāyāni vatthāni).98 The same is true regarding dietary regulations: also 
here a variety of food-practices was being adhered to by the various members of the 
Buddhist community.99 In other words, a variety of practices (or meaningful differences) 
existed not only between two distinct ascetic communities, but also within one and the 
same ascetic community. This co-existence of various practices regarding food and 
clothes might at times have resulted in a greater similarity between two ascetics of 
distinct affiliation, than between two ascetics of one and the same community. This is to 
underscore the fact that one cannot assume that in direct contact a ‘Buddhist’ was 
surely recognized to be a ‘Buddhist’ and a ‘Jain’ to be a ‘Jain.’ In many instances of direct 
contact the distinction between a ‘Buddhist’ and a ‘Jain’ might not have been 
unambiguously established.100 But what is more is that the presence of ‘open’ sleeping 
places (as is, e.g., indicated by the Pāli Vinaya references to ‘titthiyaseyyās) suggests that 
distinctive boundaries between a ‘Jain’ and a ‘Buddhist’ might not only have been 
lacking during direct contact opportunities, but also at their ‘places of being,’ this is, 
their places of sleep and/or residence.   
For also the possibility of early Buddhist bhikkhus frequenting titthiyaseyyās 
problematizes the notion of a ‘Buddhist’ bhikkhu being clearly identifiable among his 
contemporaneous but distinct ascetic others. The very possibility of attending 
titthiyaseyyās, in addition to the already discussed āvasathas and uvassayas,  indicates the 
presence of sleeping places with open boundaries within the Indian ascetic landscape. In 
other words, it indicates the presence of sleeping places that because of their ‘open’ 
nature, cannot bestow a separate identity to Buddhist bhikkhus. Such places instead 
accentuate the shared samaṇa-component of Buddhist bhikkhus with their 
contemporaneous wanderers. 
Also passages of the Āyāraṅga Sutta complexify this idea of clearly distinguishable 
samaṇa communities who resided and wandered in geographically close but 
nevertheless still separate locations. The Āyāraṅga Sutta contains references indicating 
that samaṇas of differing affiliation met one another not just when going for alms or 
when attending public festal events or facilities, but also at their vihāras. An example 
may be given. Among the several instructions of sutta II.1.1. §8, we find the instruction 
for the Jain bhikkhu and bhikkhuṇī to not enter or leave the grounds of a vihāra 
 
                                                     
97 On the (problematic) practice of wearing paŋsukūla see Schopen 2007 and Witkowski (forthcoming). 
98 On kāsāyāni vatthāni see Heirmann 2014. 
99 While some Buddhist bhikkhus might have made a conscious effort to avoid eating meat or fish, other 
Buddhist bhikkhus might have not. 
100 What must at all times have been perceptible, however, is their samaṇa status. 
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(vihārabhūmi)101 together with an ascetic belonging to a different community 
(annautthia).102 Applying the principle of counterargument, we can deduce that Jain 
bhikkhus and bhikkhuṇīs must, at times, have been together with other ascetics at 
vihārabhūmis. The indefiniteness of both the term annautthia and its contextual use, does 
not allow us to determine the (possible) affiliation(s) of these ascetics. This 
indefiniteness, however, does not alter the main point of our argument, namely, that 
the distinction between the followers of differing ascetic communities was very often 
not provided or supported by distinct socio-geographical places and facilities. The socio-
geographical closeness between Jain and other ascetics is further seen in suttas II.1.1 §7, 
§9 and §10 that respectively prohibit a Jain bhikkhu to enter the abode of a householder 
for alms-food together with an annautthia; to wander from village to village together 
with an annautthia; and to give his alms-food to an annautthia.103  
The socio-historical reality of ‘mixed’ sleeping places may be illustrated with a final 
example taken from the Āyāraṅga Sutta. At Āyāraṅga (p. 77) II.2.3 §2 the Jain bhikkhu is 
asked to be extra vigilent when entering or leaving a small (public) lodging (appagāra 
uvassa), since “There might be a badly bound, badly placed, badly fastened, loose 
umbrella [chatta], pot [matta], stick [daṃḍa], staff [laṭṭhī], [seat (bhisî)] robe [cela], hide 
[cilimilî], leather boots [cammakosa] or piece of leather [cammacheda] belonging to 
Sramanas or Brâhmanas [samaṇa va mâhaṇa]; and the mendicant, when leaving or 
entering (the lodging) at night might stumble or fall; stumbling or falling he might hurt 
his hand or foot […], kill […] all sorts of living beings.” (AS 77: II.2.3 §2; tr. Jacobi SBE 22: 
130). The reality of having to share a lodging with various other ascetics belonging to 
different communities is also here simply assumed. 
 
                                                     
101 Śīlaṅka’s commentary gives the technical meaning of a ‘place of study’ to the Prakrit term vihārabhūmi 
(‘grounds of a vihāra’). Cf. Jacobi SBE 22: 90 who follows Śīlaṅka’s interpretation. Simalarly, the Jaina Pāribhāṣika 
Śabdakośa (JPŚ) gives for vihārabhūmi: “That place, which is earmarked for performing Svādhyāya (scriptural 
studies and teaching) by the ascetic (Muni).” JPŚ 315, s.v. 
102 annautthi(y)a is the Ardhamāgadhī equivalent of the Pāli aññatitthiya (Skt. anyatīrthika). For an etymological 
excursion of these terms, see the final section: From ‘Ascetic’ to ‘Ascetic other.’ 
103 Cf. AS 50: II.1.1 § 7-10, trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 90. The Jain bhikkhu and bhikkhuṇī should also not do any of these 
activities together with a householder (gāratthia). The purpose for these regulations is to, according to the 
Āyāraṅgasuttas themselves, protect the dietary restrictions of the Jain bhikkhu and bhikkhuṇī;  they are meant 
to ensure that the Jain bhikkhu accepts his alms-food (bhīkṣā) in conformity to all the canonical instructions. As 
householders and annautthias do not adhere to the same dietary restrictions and alms-begging instructions, 
they might entice the Jain bhikkhu or bhikkhuṇī to commit an offence related to food. This shows how ‘food’ 
was an important source of identity. 
 98 
Outdoor Open Sleeping Places 
Thus far we have discussed sleeping places that were open to various ascetics either 
because of their public nature or because of their non-exclusive character. We provided 
the example of public rest-houses (such as āvastahas [Pāli] and uvassayas [Amg.]) and of 
titthiyaseyyās that allowed the presence of various affiliated ascetics. To these mixed and 
open-boundaried sleeping places, we can add sleeping-places giving rise to direct 
contact opportunities because of their location in public spaces. Ascetics spreading their 
sleeping-mat in a public sphere cannot make demands on having exclusive rights to 
these places as this simply goes against the ‘public’ aspect of a public sphere. I am 
referring to places such as cemeteries (susāna), places at the root of a tree (rukkhamūla), 
or any place in - what the Pāli Vinaya calls -  ‘open air’  (ajjhokāsa). On the basis that 
sleeping or residing at any of these places was considered to be an ascetic practice, I will 
argue that some Buddhist bhikkhus resorted to these sleeping places (or practices) even 
once the Buddhist community started to settle down in monastery(-like) complexes. 
For, despite monk-editors condemning asceticism (at times laudably, at other times 
silently), asceticism kept being practiced during (and after) the ‘monasticization’ period 
of the Buddhist community, by an albeit minor but nevertheless important fraction of 
bhikkhus (cf. below). To introduce this special type of open sleeping places, we turn to 
the beginning of the sixth chapter of the Cullavagga: 
At one time the Buddha, the Bhagavat was staying at Rājagaha in the Bamboo 
Grove at the squirrels’ feeding place. Now at that time lodgings [senāsana] had not 
been permitted to monks by the Bhagavat. So these monks stayed [viharanti] here 
and there: in a forest [arañña], at the root of a tree [rukkhamūle], on a hillside 
[pabbata], in a glen [kandarā], in a mountain cave [giriguhā], in a cemetery [susāna], 
in a forest glade [vanapattha], in the open air [ajjhokāsa], on a heap of straw 
[palālapuñja].104 Early in the mornings these went out from this and that place: 
from the forest  . . . [omission of repetition is according to Vinaya edition] from 
the heap of straw, pleasing when approaching and when receding, when looking 
before, when looking back, when bending back (their arms), when stretching 
them out, their eyes cast down and possessed of pleasant behaviour.  
Now at that time a (great) merchant [seṭṭhi] of Rājagaha went early one morning to 
a pleasure grove [uyyāna]. The (great) merchant of Rājagaha saw these monks 
going out from this and that place: from a forest . . .  from a heap of straw, and 
seeing them he made up his mind. Then the (great) merchant of Rājagaha 
approached those monks; having approached, he spoke thus to those monks: “If I, 
 
                                                     
104 Horner (BD V 204, fn. 1) notes that the same enumeration occurs at D I 71, M III 3, A II 210 and a shorter one 
at A I 241. 
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revered sirs, were to have dwelling-places [vihāra] built, would you stay in my 
dwelling-places? [me vihāresu]” 
“Householder [gahapati], dwelling-places [vihāra] have not been allowed by the 
Bhagavat.” 
“Well then, revered sirs, having inquired of the Bhagavat, tell me (what he says).” 
“Very well, householder,” and these monks, having answered the (great) 
merchant of Rājagaha in assent, approached the Bhagavat; having approached the 
Bhagavat, having greeted him, they sat down at a respectful distance. As they 
were sitting down at a respectful distance, these monks spoke thus to the 
Bhagavat: “Bhante, the (great) merchant of Rājagaha is anxious to have dwelling-
places built. What line of conduct should be followed by us, Bhagavat?” Then the 
Bhagavat on this occasion having given reasoned talk addressed the monks, 
saying: 
“I allow, monks, five (kinds of) abodes [lena]: a dwelling-place [vihāra], a curved 
house [aḍḍhayoga], a long house [pāsāda], a mansion [hammiya], a cave [guhā].” (CV 
VI 1.1-2, Vin II 146-7, trsl. partly following Horner BD V 204-5) 
Despite being compound and (thus) ahistorical, this Vinaya passage is insightful for 
our current purpose. Listing various sleeping/resident places, it provides several 
examples of ‘outdoorsy’ places in the public sphere where bhikkhus could be 
encountered. The inconsistent use of semi-technical terms points to the passage’s 
compound nature. The term ‘senāsana’ in the first part of the introductory story is in the 
second part replaced by ‘vihāra’ that, in turn, is replaced in the allowance-formulation 
by lena.  This is in itself sufficient to establish the ahistorical nature of the incident 
narrated in the introductory story. Reinforcing its ahistorical tone, however, is its 
suspicious ideal portrayal of both the Buddhist bhikkhus and the gahapati desiring to 
build them vihāras. Following the allowance-formulation, we find the gahapati building 
no less than sixty vihāras in one day. Fuelling the gahapati’s singular charity was his 
anxious desire for merit (puñña) and heaven (sagga).105 Pondering whether having 
vihāras constructed for the Buddhist saṅgha will indeed secure him merit and heaven, he 
is reassured by the Buddha who thanks him with the following verses: 
“They ward off cold and heat and beasts of prey from there 
And creeping things and gnats and rains [vuṭṭhi] in the cold season [sirisa]. 
When the dreaded hot wind arises, that is warded off. 
To meditate and obtain insight in a refuge and at ease 
The gift of a dwelling-place [vihāradāna] is praised by the Buddha as chief [gift] to 
an Order. 
 
                                                     
105 PED gives for ‘sagga:’ “Sagga [Vedic svarga, svar+ga] heaven, the next world, popularly conceived as a place 
of happiness and long life (cp. the pop. etym. of "suṭṭhu -- aggattā sagga" PvA 9 […])” PED 662, sv. 
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Therefore a wise man [paṇḍita], looking to his own weal [attha], 
Should have charming dwelling-places built so that those who have heard much 
can stay therein. 
To these food and drink, raiment and lodgings [vathhasenāsana] 
He should give, to the upright, with the mind purified. 
(Then) these teach him dhamma dispelling every ill; 
He, knowing that dhamma, here attains nibbāna, cankerless [anāsava].” 
(CV VI 1.1-2, Vin II 147-8, trsl. partly following Horner BD V 205-6) 
The Buddha’s verses of thanks unambiguously promote the comforts of vihāras.106 
Offering protection from wild animals, from the discomfort of buzzing and stinging 
insects;  offering shelter from the rain, the cold, or simply the fickleness of the weather, 
vihāras are presented as positive supports of a bhikkhu’s meditational practices and 
general religious progress. That a bhikkhu was able to book results on his path to 
liberation thanks to vihāras, is further presented as being conducive to also the religious 
progress of the ‘wise man’ (paṇḍita) who donated the vihāras. These verses of thanks are 
interesting. They seem to provide bhikkhus with arguments to talk wealthy 
householders (gahapati) into donating vihāras. They also clearly echo the stance of 
monastic bhikkhus on the advantages of residing in concrete material dwelling places. In 
fact, this whole passage serves to introduce a technical section on constructing and 
furnishing vihāras. The section’s many stipulations and allowances point to 
sophisticated and comfortable dwelling places, reflecting a stage in the early history of 
the Buddhist saṅgha during which bhikkhus (or at least “the monastic camp” of the early 
Buddhist saṅgha) started or wanted to start to settle down in monastery-like complexes 
(cf. further).  
 
The sections of the introductory story thus far discussed, appear to suggest that once 
dwelling places had been permitted and once the types of abodes had been regulated, 
Buddhist bhikkhus abandoned their practice of staying in outdoor places. From that 
moment onwards, according to our introductory story, Buddhist bhikkhus would have 
stopped staying in open places such as forests, roots of trees, cemeteries or simply ‘the 
open air.’ This suggestion is untenable and this for several reasons.  
Not only is the transition from any stage to another gradual (this is to a higher or 
lesser degree according to whether the transition is the result of a natural process or of 
an artificial stimulation), but also the customs of a former stage remain practiced – for a 
longer or a shorter period of time - alongside the ‘new’ practices. This was certainly also 
the case for outdoorsy sleeping/resident practices. Once the early Buddhist saṅgha 
 
                                                     
106 On the varying reference field of the term vihāra, see the following section. 
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(gradually) started to settle itself in monastery-like complexes, the practice of staying in 
outdoor places was not at once abandoned. In fact, it is safe to state that a fraction of the 
Buddhist bhikkhu community kept using some of the outdoor lodgings listed at the 
beginning of the introductory story, even after sophisticated, well-equipped monastery-
complexes had become an established feature of the Buddhist bhikkhu community. The 
underlying reason is that staying at some of these outdoor lodgings was considered to 
be an ascetic practice. Staying in a ‘forest’, at ‘the root of a tree’, in a ‘cemetery’, and in 
the ‘open air’ is viewed in several places within Buddhist texts to be an ascetic practice. 
Whether staying at any of these places was viewed as an ascetic practice from the 
beginning of the Buddhist community, or whether it only became thus considered once 
staying within monastery-complexes had become the established norm, one cannot 
know. In any case, the practices’ occurrence in several enumerations of ascetic 
practices, indicates their characterization as ascetic. This enables us to state that the 
practice of staying at any of these outdoor lodgings was still being performed by some 
Buddhist bhikkhus even when monastery-complexes became prominent for, as 
Freiberger noted, ‘despite “monasticization,” severe asceticism continued to exist 
throughout Buddhist history.”107 In addition to being mentioned in various lists of 
ascetic practices, such as the one of the dhutaṅgas,108 the practice of staying in a ‘forest’, 
at ‘the root of a tree’, in a ‘cemetery’, and in the ‘open air’ is also at several places 
incidentally being referred to in the Pāli Vinaya.109 When considering these facts 
 
                                                     
107 Freiberger 2006, op. cit.: 248. 
108 The dhutaṅga list of Devadatta occurs in two separate Pāli Vinaya passages: Vin III 171-4 (BD I 296-303) & Vin 
II 184-206 (BD V 259-90). A list of nine dhutaṅga practices occurs at Sappurisa Sutta of the MN. See also the 
Mahāsakuludāyi Sutta of the MN with a list of some ascetic practices, including the practices of sleeping at the 
root of a tree etc. See also the four nissayas at Vin I 58. For a discussion of these ascetic practices, see 
Freiberger 2006. On dhutaṅgas see Dantinne 1991. 
109 For an incidental reference to bhikkhus staying in the ‘open air’ (ajjhokāsa) see e.g. Vin IV 39 (BD II 238; 
introductory story to pācittiya XIV). 
An incidental reference to staying at the foot of a tree (rukkhamūla) is encountered in the casuistry section to 
pācittiya XV (Vin IV 41-42; BD II 243 - 246) stipulating the removal of a sleeping-mat (seyyā) by bhikkhus before 
they leave a vihāra. The casuistry informs us that a bhikkhu commits (only) an offence of wrong-doing if he 
does not remove his seyyā if it was spread, among other places, ‘at the foot of a tree.’ See also the casuistry 
section to pācittiya XVII (Vin IV 45; BD II 252) listing various dwelling possibilities of Buddhist bhikkhus, among 
which ‘the open air’ (ajjhokāsa)  and ‘foot of a tree’(rukkhamūla). 
Vin IV 308 (BD III 343; introductory story to pācittiya LII) incidentally refers to a Buddhist bhikkhu (the 
venerable Kappitaka who was the venerable Upāli’s preceptor) living in a cemetery (susāne viharati); Vin IV 89 
(BD II 344-345) refers to a Buddhist bhikkhu who while living in a cemetery (susāne viharati), refused to accept 
alms and instead fed himself on the food that people had deposited in a cemetery or at the foot of a tree for 
the departed masters (ayyovosāṭitakāni). This incident is used to introduce pācittiya XL stating that ‘whatever 
monk should convey to his mouth nutriment not given,’ commits an offence of expiation. 
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together with the fact that neither these places nor the practice of staying at any of 
these places were exclusively ‘Buddhist,’ I may conclude with stating that ‘forests’, 
‘roots of a trees’, ‘cemeteries’, and ‘open air’ were sleeping/resident places that could 
bring a Buddhist bhikkhu directly into contact with an ascetic other. 
Dwell and Meet 
‘Open’ vihāras  
Extending my argument that during the earliest stages of the Buddhist and Jain ascetic 
communities some of the mendicants’ sleeping places and facilities were of ‘open’ 
nature, I would like to propose here that also some vihāras were of ‘open’ nature. 
Functioning as study, sleeping or (semi-)permanent resident facilities, certain vihāras 
were not necessarily or inherently exclusive, but could be open to various ascetics. 
These vihāras may, therefore, be viewed as also having been potential direct contact 
platforms.  
The exact interpretation(s) of the term vihāra will be discussed below, for the 
moment it suffices to define vihāra as a demarcated social space within the Indian 
landscape that was generally understood to be for the benefit of wandering ascetics. As 
direct contact platform, a vihāra-ground was, I suggest, open to wanderers of differing 
affiliations and was thus not per se for the benefit of wanderers of one particular 
community only. I believe that the exclusivity of a vihāra-ground was not an initially 
given, but was something that developed over time. The development of the exclusivity 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
That the practice of living in a forest was a well-known practice is seen for instance in the fact that a special 
denomination developed to refer to bhikkhus living in the forest: ‘āraññaka bhikkhu.’ The practice must have 
been quite prominent for Vin I 92 even allows an āraññaka bhikkhu to live independently, something which is 
not allowed for other Buddhist bhikkhus. Some incidental references to Buddhist bhikkhus staying in āraññaka 
senāsana or ‘jungle lodging’ is found at Vin IV 181-184 (BD III 115-119; pāṭidesaniya IV) where Sakyan woman 
are said to set off for the āraññaka senāsanas in order to give alms-food to the bhikkhus residing there. Further, 
that the practice of living in a forest was performed by bhikkhus even when the Buddhist community started to 
settle down in monastery-like complexes, is seen at Cullavagga VIII. In this section that clearly reflects an 
evolved stage of monastic settlement, we find a passage stipulating “an observance (vatta) for monks who are 
forest dwellers (āraññaka bhikkhu) and which should be observed by monks who are forest dwellers,” that 
contains several small instructions directed specifically to forest bhikkhus (CV VIII.6.1-3; Vin II 217, BD V 304-
305). Several bhikkhus as actors of introductory stories are further presented as staying in the jungle, see e.g.  
the venerable Belaṭṭhasīsa who as actor of the introductory story to pācittiya XXXVIII  is presented as ‘staying 
in the jungle’ (‘araññe viharati’) (Vin IV 86; BD II 338). 
Regarding staying on a ‘hillside’, ‘glen’, ‘mountain cave’, ‘forest glade’ etc. the introductory story to 
sanghadisesa VI (Vin III 147, BD I 251) presents a certain bhikkhu as living in a thicket (vanasaṇḍa) on a slope on 
the Himalayas (Himavantapassa). 
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of a vihāra-ground undoubtedly went hand in hand with both a growing material 
complexity and sophistication of vihāras in general and, herewith correlated, a growing 
emphasis on a consciously articulated and negotiated distinctiveness of the different 
ascetic communities. 
 
The introductory story to pācittiya XVII is instructive for imagining the presence of 
both ‘Buddhist’ and non-Buddhist vihāras, and by extension for imagining the presence 
of exclusive and non-exclusive vihāras in the Indian ascetic landscape. Pācittiya XVII 
forbids a bhikkhu to throw out a fellow bhikkhu from a saṃghika vihāra (‘a vihāra 
belonging to the [Buddhist] saṅgha). Its introductory story tells us of a group of Buddhist 
bhikkhus who, looking for a place to spend the rains (vassaṃ vasati), decided to repair a 
large vihāra (mahāvihāra)110 that was lying in the neighbourhood111 of Anāthapiṇḍika’s 
‘monastery’ or ‘ārāma’. Some malicious Buddhist bhikkhus seeing them, concocted the 
plan to throw those bhikkhus out of the mahāvihāra once they finished repairing it and to 
use it for themselves. Whether or not this story is based on a historical incident is of no 
concern for our reading of the Pāli Vinaya. Regarding vihāras, however, we learn from 
this small introductory story that they could be situated in the neighbourhood of a 
‘monastery,’ this is, outside the precincts of an ārāma; that they could be of a concrete 
material construction (some vihāras were solely open demarcated spaces, cf. below); and 
that they were at the disposal of wandering mendicants for spending the rains. This 
allows us to formulate the hypothesis that in the early Indian landscape there were 
vihāras, whether commissioned by lay-people or guilds, whether built or owned by a 
wandering individual himself, that were ready to be used by any group of wandering 
ascetics.112  
In the introductory story to pācittiya XVII a group of bhikkhus looking for a place to 
spend the rains, just start repairing a mahāvihāra that, not unimportantly, is said to be 
situated in the neighbourhood of a ‘Buddhist’ ārāma, this is, the mahāvihāra is not 
situated within a Buddhist ārāma or within a demarcated space that is understood to be 
‘Buddhist’. Later in the story, when the malevolent bhikkhus try to throw them out, they 
asked whether the vihāra was one belonging to the Order (saṃghika). The Pāli Vinaya 
specifies a vihāra that is meant for the exclusive use of its bhikkhus with the term 
‘saṃghika’. A saṃghika vihāra is a vihāra belonging to the saṃgha or ‘[‘Buddhist’] Order.’113 
 
                                                     
110 Vin IV 44-45 (BD II 250-253). The same introductory story is used to Cūḷavagga VI.11 (Vin II 166). 
111 Pāli: paccantima  (‘bordering, adjoining, next to’). 
112 For an example of vihāras being commissioned by a gahapati see e.g. CV VI.1.2 (Vin II 146; BD V 204);  
113 ‘saṃghika vihāra’ will be explained in the Padabhājaniya section as a vihāra that ‘comes to be given to the 
Order, handed over to it.’ (saṃghiko nāma vihāro saṃghassa dinno hoti pariccatto). See e.g. Vin IV 45 (BD II 251); 
Vin III 163 (BD I 281). 
 104 
The very question of the malevolent bhikkhus whether or not the vihāra was one 
belonging to the Order reflects the possibility that it might not have been, which, in 
turn, reflects the possibility of the presence of non-exclusive vihāras, or of vihāras that 
though not belonging to the ‘Buddhist’ Order could be frequented by Buddhist bhikkhus. 
At this point, the paraphrasing of the introductory story to pācittiya XVII serves mainly 
for presenting the hypothesis of the (co-)existence of both exclusive and non-exclusive 
vihāras in the early history of the Buddhist saṅgha, it does not serve to press the 
argument already. 
Reference Field ‘vihāra’ 
Throughout her six volumes counting Book of the Discipline, Isaline Horner consequently 
translated the term ‘vihāra’ with ‘dwelling place.’ Scanning the various Pāli Vinaya 
contexts of the term, one soon notices, however, it’s very varied reference possibilities. 
Demarcated ‘open’ space  
As “dwelling place,” vihāra can stand for any demarcated space where bhikkhus could 
spread their sleeping mat.’114 As such, a vihāra does not per se need to stand for a 
material construction, it can stand for any place where one could spread his sleeping 
mat. ‘Vihāra’ can be used interchangeably with outdoor senāsanas or lodgings discussed 
in the previous section on ‘Open Sleeping Places.’ The term vihāra can, just as senāsana, 
refer to places as the ‘open air’ (ajjhokāsa) and ‘roots of trees’ (rukkhamūla) that could be 
located either within or outside the parameters of an ārāma ground.115  
Individual dwelling place 
As a material construction, ‘vihāra’ can stand for a bhikkhu’s individual dwelling place, 
ranging from a simple self-built hut,116 to a commissioned solid well-plastered and 
 
                                                     
114 To spread a sleeping place: seyyaṃ santharati. On santharati (‘to spread’) and its pp. santhata see Horner BD II 
xxi. For an example of such a use of ‘vihāra’ see Vin IV 41 (pācittiya XV) (BD II 243) where the group of 
seventeen bhikkhus are introduced as having spread their sleeping place (seyyaṃ santharitvā) in a vihāra 
belonging to the Order (saṃghika). Vihāra is here simply understood as a place (most probably within an 
ārāma) where one could sleep. A vihāra here does not per se need to be a material construction,  it could stand 
for any demarcated space where one could put his sleeping mat. The Padabhājaniya and casuistry section 
display an already much more sophisticated understanding of vihāra. Being part of the later strata of the Pāli 
Vinaya, they reflect later developments.    
115 I employ here ārāma in its restricted sense of a private park/monastery for ascetics, not in its general sense 
of a public park or garden for pastime. 
116 e.g. Vin III 41ff. (BD I 64 ff) for references to bhikkhus staying in various types (grass, mud, wood etc.) of huts 
(kuṭika). The huts are in this passage not explicitly equated with vihāra, but it is clear from the context, 
however, that they are used as individual dwelling places.  
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roofed dwelling,117 to a very sophisticated cell with various rooms and pieces of 
furniture (cf. further). As an individual dwelling place, a vihāra could also be located 
either within or outside the parameters of an ārāma ground. Vin IV 47 (pācittiya XIX) 
gives an example of the term vihāra standing for a bhikkhu’s individual dwelling place. It 
is here one commissioned by a benefactor118 and it appears to be located outside the 
precincts of a Buddhist ārāma. For, regarding where such an individual dwelling place 
may be built, pācittiya XIX only instructs that it should be established where there is 
‘little or no grass’ (appaharita). Another Pāli Vinaya passage (Vin III 155-157; 
saṅghādisesasa VII) with ‘vihāra’ standing for a bhikkhu’s individual dwelling place 
instructs how a site for such a dwelling (vihāravatthu) should be marked. It simply says 
that it should not involve any destruction. Both Vinaya passages do not mention ‘ārāma’.  
If every single vihāra would have been located within an ārāma ground and would thus 
have been part of a larger complex, one would expect to find instructions as to where it 
should be situated within the ārāma ground or where it should be positioned vis-à-vis 
other vihāras or facilities. In the absence of any indication that these individual vihāras 
were part of a larger complex, one may, therefore, suggest that (at least) some vihāras 
were ‘randomly’ located within the ascetic landscape. This is, some vihāras were not 
located within an ārāma or a demarcated ‘Buddhist’ ground. 
Monastery-complex  
At Vinaya IV 45-46 (BD II 254-5) the term vihāra stands for an open demarcated space 
with its grounds holding upari-vehāsa-kuṭī-s or ‘lofty cells with an upper part.’ When 
referring to a demarcated ground119 holding various material constructions and facilities 
for the Buddhist bhikkhu such as upari-vehāsa-kuṭī-s, then the term vihāra is used 
interchangeably with the term ārāma.  Both the term ‘vihāra’ and ‘ārāma’ can be used to 
refer to a monastery-complex itself.120 Though permanent and fully equipped 
monastery-complexes only became an established feature of the Buddhist community 
during the Mauryan and Guptan empires (cf. above), the process of ‘monasticization’ 
had certainly already begun by the time the Pāli Vinaya was being redacted. Several 
sections of the Pāli Vinaya reflect a stage of monasticization where the Buddhist 
 
                                                     
117 e.g. Vin IV 47 (BD II  257). 
118 Benefactor as a bhikkhu’s personal supporter is termed upaṭṭhāka. If an upaṭṭhāka commissions the 
construction of a vihāra for the bhikkhu he supports, then this vihāra is qualified as ‘sassāmika’ , this is, as 
‘having a master.’ Cf. Vin IV 47. 
119 A ground could either be demarcated by means of a ‘fence’, or, if not being fenced in (parikkhitta), it is 
understood to be demarcated by means of its agreed upon ‘precincts’ (upacāra). 
120 Cf. Cone’s PD Vol I: 329 ārāma, sv. 
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community started to settle down in rather sophisticated and (semi-)permanent vihāras 
or monastery-complexes.  
The growing material complexity and sophistication of Buddhist monasteries are well 
reflected in the following chapters of the Pāli Vinaya: among others Mahāvagga I.25, 
Cullavagga VI, and  Cullavagga VIII. At Cullavagga VI121 the term vihāra stands for the 
individual dwelling-places of bhikkhus within a monastery-complex, and at times it 
designates as pars pro toto the entire monastery-complex itself (in these instances being 
used synonymously with ārāma). In this passage we learn of the types of roofs, windows, 
doors, and door-locks of the individual vihāras; and of the furniture allowed in a vihāra 
(couches, chairs, mattresses, a spittoon etc.). We further learn of the various 
possibilities to fence in a monastery-complex by means of bricks, stones or wood; and of 
the presence of verandas, porches122 and balustrades. We learn of the construction 
within a monastery-complex of assembly halls where bhikkhus could eat together 
(upaṭṭhanasāla),123 of a special hall to keep the drinking water (pāniyasāla), and of a fire 
hall (aggisāla). This whole chapter of the Cullavagga throws much light on how 
monastery-complexes became sophisticated material structures with diverse facilities 
increasing the independence, self-sufficiency and separateness of the Buddhist monastic 
saṅgha from the outside world. The same holds true for Mahāvagga I.25124 and 
Cullavagga VIII. To the various facilities of a monastery-complex just mentioned, 
Mahāvagga I.25 adds a privy (vaccakuṭī) and a steam-room (jantāghara).125 
 
                                                     
121 Vin II 146 ff. (BD V 204 ff.). 
122 The Pāli term for porch is koṭṭhaka. Rhys Davids and Hermann Oldenberg understand ‘koṭṭhaka’ to be ‘a room 
without a window’ (Vin Texts III 109 fn. 1) which in the Pāli Vinaya can be understood as a room at the gate of 
a monastery-complex, or as a storeroom (for grains?). For koṭṭhaka as a storeroom within a lay-house, see e.g. 
Vin III 161 (BD I 277), for koṭṭhaka as a storeroom within a monastery-complex, see Vin III 162 (BD I 278). 
Mahāvagga VI.14.3 mentions an udaka-koṭṭhaka or ‘water-vat’ used for the sweating treatment (sedakamma) (BD 
IV 278-279; Vin I 205). 
123 Apart for offering a (comfortable) shelter from the weather to eat, the upaṭṭhanasāla could also be used as an 
assembly hall to give dhamma talk to both bhikkhus and lay followers alike (cf. Vin III 70; BD I 120-1). If needed 
the upaṭṭhanasāla could also serve as a sleeping-place for novices, bhikkhus and lay followers (Vin IV 15; BD II 
194; Vin IV 42-43; BD II 243-244).  
124 MV I.25.6-25 ‘What is Due to a Preceptor’ (Vin I 49 ff.; BD IV 65 ff.) incidentally reflects the increasing 
sophistication of a monastery-complex when outlining the tasks of a ‘sadhivihārika’ or ‘ one who shares a vihāra 
[with his preceptor or upajjhāya].’ One encounters a near identical enumeration of the various facilities and 
material possessions of a monastery-complex (that here needs to be cleaned by a sadhivihārika) with 
Cullavagga VI. 
125 Horner (BD I 62) translates jantāghara with ‘bathroom’. Also Dutt (1996 [1924]: 183) understands jantāghara 
as a sort of common bath. ‘Steam room’ seems, however, a more apt translation. Though jantāghara has an 
uncertain etymology (see for various suggestions the PED 278 and Cone’s A Dictionary of Pāli 204 s.v.) the textual 
context makes it clear that a jantāghara was a sort of steam room as one should smear his face and body with a 
clay mixture before entering and sit on a chair (pīṭha) inside (cf. Vin I 47). Cone’s A Dictionary of Pāli gives ‘a 
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Contact possibilities at vihāras 
The reference field of the term vihāra in the Pāli Vinaya stretches thus from a simple 
place in the open where a bhikkhu could sleep (used interchangeably then with 
‘senāsana’), to a hut, to an individual cell within an ārāma-ground, to a large 
sophisticated and well-organized monastery-complex. Regarding the latter, the fact that 
it holds within its delineated grounds various facilities of which many are, moreover, of 
concrete material nature, increases not only the independence and separateness of the 
Buddhist community from the outside world, but also its exclusivity. 126  With eating 
halls, toilets, and steam-rooms located within the precincts of a monastery-complex, the 
possibility for a Buddhist bhikkhu to come into direct contact with other ascetics when 
eating, bathing, or seeking a suitable place to go to the toilet decreases significantly.  
Though such monastery-complexes thus both created and supported an exclusivity, 
they did not annihilate the possibility of direct contact altogether. Direct contact 
remained possible. It became, however much more regulated and controlled. The 
introductory story to pācittiya XLI provides a good example of such regulated direct 
contact at a ‘Buddhist’ monastery-complex: the distribution of the saṃgha’s excess of 
food to ‘those who eat scraps of food’ (vighāsāda).  
Pācittiya XLI forbids a bhikkhu to give with his own hands food to an acelaka or to a 
paribbājaka and paribbājikā. As we have seen, such precepts are also found in the 
Āyāraṅga. The presence of these precepts in both the Pāli Vinaya and the Āyāraṅga 
indicates that it must not have been unusual for ascetics of differing affiliation to 
exchange or to give (their) alms-food to one another.127 This, in turn, reflects once again 
their very close socio-geographical proximity. Providing an example of regulated direct 
contact, the introductory story to pācittiya XLI sets in with the venerable Ānanda asking 
the Buddha what to do with the surplus of food:  
Now at that time there came to be abundant solid food for the Order. Then the 
venerable Ānanda told this matter to the Bhagavat. He said: “Well, Ānanda, give 
the cakes [pūva] to those who eat scraps of food [vighāsāda].” 
“Very well, Bhagavat,” and the venerable Ānanda, having answered the Bhagavat, 
having made those who eat scraps of food sit down one after the other, giving a 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
heated room; a room with a fire (normally used before bathing, not for bathing?)’ and the 
Abhidhānappadīpikā (Abhp.), being the twelfth century Pāli dictionary (of synonyms) written by Moggallāna 
Thera of Ceylon, gives for jantāghara ‘aggisāla’ or ‘fire room’ (PED 278). On ‘bathhouses’ in Indian (and Chinese) 
Buddhist monasteries, see Kieschnick 2013; Heirman & Torck 2012: 27-32. 
126 When the terms vihāra and ārāma stand for such an organized monastery-complex that both creates and 
supports an exclusivity, then their qualification with ‘Buddhist’ (though still anachronistic) may become 
appropriate.  
127 Āyāraṅga sutta II.1.1 § 10 prohibiting a Jain bhikkhu to give his alms-food to an annauttia. Cf. above p. 98. 
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cake to each, gave two cakes to a certain female wanderer [paribbājikā], thinking 
that they were one. Neighbouring female wanderers spoke thus to this female 
wanderer: 
“This recluse [samaṇa] is your lover [jāra].” 
“This recluse is not my lover; he gave two cakes thinking that they were one.” 
And a second time . . . [pa] A third time did the venerable Ānanda, giving a cake to 
each one, gave two cakes, thinking that they were one, to this female wanderer. 
Neighbouring female wanderers spoke thus to this female wanderer . . .  
“This recluse is not my lover; he gave two cakes thinking that they were one.” 
Saying, “The lover is not a lover,” they quarreled. (Vin IV 91; trsl. mostly following 
I.B. Horner BD II 347). 
If this part of the introductory story would be a case of an introductory story that 
was developed post precept, then it was one spun around the term ‘paribbājikā’ and one 
focused on developing the teasing story line of two wanderers being lovers (jāra). Be as 
it may, concerning direct contact opportunities one can infer from the story that the 
distribution of the saṃgha’s excesses of food by Buddhist bhikkhus was for them another 
occasion, albeit a regulated one,128 to come into direct contact with other ascetics.129 The 
second part of the introductory corroborates this by narrating another such-like 
example of regulated direct contact. It also gives insights into an important issue arising 
from direct contact, this is, the issue of proximity.  
Then a certain ājīvika went to a distribution of food [parivesanā]. A certain 
[Buddhist] monk, mixing cooked rice with a quantity of ghee, gave a large alms-
meal [mahanta piṇḍa] to that ājīvika. Then that ājīvika, taking that alms-meal, went 
away. A certain [other] ājīvika said to that ājīvika: 
“Where, your reverence, was an alms-meal obtained by you?” 
“It was obtained, your reverence, at the distribution of food (made) by a shaven 
householder [muṇḍagahapatika]130 of that recluse Gotama.” 
Lay followers [upāsaka] heard this talk of those ājīvikas. Then these lay-followers 
approached the Bhagavat, and having approached, having greeted the Bhagavat, 
they sat down at a respectful distance. As they were sitting down at a respectful 
distance, these lay-followers spoke thus to the Bhagavat: 
“Bhagavat, these titthiyā-s desire blame for the enlightened one, they desire blame 
for dhamma, they desire blame for the Order. It were well, Bhagavat, that the 
 
                                                     
128 Also note how the venerable Ānanda is said to have made ‘those who eat scraps of food,’ sit one after the 
other. 
129 The introductory story focusses on the venerable Ānanda being mistaken for a paribbājikā’s lover, rendering 
the reference to the very act of distributing food (here ‘cakes’) ‘incidental’. 
130 I.B. Horner (BD II 348, fn. 1.) justly understands the term muṇḍagahapatika to be a term of humiliation. 
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masters [ayyā] would not give to titthiyā-s with their (own) hand(s). (Vin IV 91; trsl. 
mostly following I.B. Horner BD II 347-348 ) 
Apart from providing another case of Buddhist bhikkhus coming into regulated direct 
contact with other ascetics during a distribution of food, this part of the introductory 
story also problematizes the proximity between Buddhist bhikkhus and titthiyas. For, the 
problem with Buddhist bhikkhus giving food directly to other ascetics is mainly a 
problem of proximity. In fact, both this part of the introductory story advising Buddhist 
bhikkhus against distributing (the saṅgha’s surplus of) food to titthiyas, and pācittiya XLI 
explicitly prohibiting it, reflect the desire to keep other ascetics literally at arm’s length. 
Though the very structure of a monastery-complex partly grants this desire for distance 
(read also difference, cf. further), it clearly could not prevent direct contact altogether. 
Direct contact with his ascetic others remained a part of the Buddhist bhikkhu’s reality, 
also when his residence and sleeping facilities became more and more exclusive. This is 
also seen in the casuistry section to pācittiya XLI. The fact that it stipulates that a bhikkhu 
commits no offence when ‘he gives water [and thus not ‘solid food or soft food’ as 
mentioned in the precept] for cleansing the teeth’ to a titthiya, or also ‘if he gets 
someone to give, (but) does not (himself) give; if he gives depositing (it) near; if he gives 
ointment for external (use),’131 shows that direct contact with his ascetic others was a 
part of the Buddhist bhikkhu’s reality, also when the exclusivity of monastery-complexes 
started to ensure a certain separation and distance from the ‘outside’ world. In short, 
the rise of monastery-complexes did not annihilate direct contact opportunities, though 
they most probably did become less frequent, less accidental and more regulated. 
 
This overview of the reference field of the term vihāra in the Pāli Vinaya may be 
concluded by remarking that the exclusivity typical of monastery-complexes should not 
be read into all the ‘vihāras’ mentioned in the Pāli Vinaya. After all, there is not much 
exclusive about an ‘open space,’ or a place at a ‘root of a tree,’ or a ‘dwelling place 
needing repair’ being randomly present in the ascetic landscape. I write ‘randomly’ to 
stress the fact that certain vihāras used by Buddhist bhikkhus were, as we have seen, not 
situated within an ārāma or within a demarcated ‘Buddhist’ space.  
 Leaning on this fact that not all vihāras were of a strong exclusive nature, whether 
this was because of a lack of concrete material boundaries, or because of their random 
location within the ascetic landscape, I suggest that ascetics of different affiliation could 
also encounter one another at certain vihāras. That this indeed occurred was seen 
confirmed at Āyāraṅga sutta II.1.1. §8. By means of counterargument we could infer 
from the respective sutta that Jain bhikkhus and bhikkhuṇīs at times stayed with other 
 
                                                     
131 Vin IV 92; trsl. I.B. Horner BD II 349-350. 
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ascetics (annautthia) on a vihārabhūmi. It is further interesting to note that for Āyāraṅga 
sutta II.1.1. §8 the main issue is not particularly that Jain bhikkhus and bhikkhuṇīs are 
together with other ascetics on a vihārabhūmi, but that they are in the company of 
people who eat what - for them is - not allowed.132 In other words, the main issue lies in 
the fact that Jain bhikkhus would be together with ascetics who do not adhere to the 
same dietary restrictions. The same concern underlies both the prohibition for Jain 
bhikkhus to wander together with an annautthia; and the prohibition for Jain bhikkhus to 
enter a householders’ house together with an annautthia for alms food. To prohibit Jain 
bhikkhus from mingling with other ascetics on the ground that they eat what is not 
allowed, shows the importance of food as a source of identity. This is not surprising 
when considering the limited resources ascetics had to differentiate themselves from 
one another. Alms-donating householders will not discern subtle doctrinal differences 
between various ascetics, unless these differences are visually translated and, hence, 
noticeable to the naked eye. The food restrictions or special dietary of an ascetic 
constitute together with his begging-attributes and his ascetic garb one of the rare 
locales for identity. The following section concentrating more deeply on the role of 
householders in bringing about direct and indirect contact opportunities, will pause on 
such-like (unintentional) consequences of (in)direct contact on the identity negotiation 
of ascetic communities. 
Householders 
Though Buddhologists readily acknowledge the important role of householders in the 
development of the early Buddhist monastic community, they often fail to note the 
complexity and diversity of this role. Their role went beyond their, I do not deny 
paramount, input of ‘financial and material support.’ To begin, drawing on the 
vocabulary of social network theory, we may consider householders as having been 
important and dynamic information ‘hubs.’133 In spreading the knowledge of real or 
imagined ascetic practices, values and doctrines, householders played a most central 
role. Their great social mobility and their –for some,  intense - involvement in the ins 
 
                                                     
132 The sutta expresses it thus: ‘parihārio aparihārieṇa saddhiṃ’  translated by Jacobi as ‘a monk who avoids all 
forbidden food [being] together with one who does not.’ AS 50: II.1.1 §7 Jacobi SBE 22: 90. Ratnachandraji’s 
AMg. dictionary technically defines an ‘aparihāriya’ as “a Sādhu not abstaining from Mūla Guṇa and Uttara 
Guṇa; one of the five sorts of tainted Sādhus e.g. Pāsattha, Avasanna, etc.”, cp. R.AMg. (s.v. 304).  
133 Within social network theory ‘hubs’ are individuals who connect (groups of) individuals with socially 
different (groups of) individuals via their many ‘strong ties’ (close friends and family) and ‘weak ties’ 
(acquaintances). On social network theory see e.g. Granovetter 1983: “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network 
Theory Revisited.”  
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and outs of the (daily) life of ascetics, effected a diffusion of knowledge of ascetic life to 
members of both the householder community and ascetic community. Further, standing 
(more) easily in dialogue with the various members of society, householders were vital 
in constructing and spreading normative ideas of what ascetic life should be. In other 
words, householders too, just as ascetics, actively shaped the continuously changing, 
negotiated and contested samaṇa ideal. Their normative notions of ascetic life often 
came into conflict with the factual practices of Buddhist bhikkhus. This resulted not 
infrequently in the implementation of new regulations. Their dispraise of a particular 
behaviour of a Buddhist bhikkhu is brought forward as the catalyst of many Pāli Vinaya 
precepts. ‘Householders’ often take up the subject position of the stock phrase ‘manussā 
ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti’ (‘people were irritated, angry [and] speaking dispraisingly’). 
This stock phrase serves in introductory stories to mark the earlier mentioned action of 
a particular (group of) bhikkhu(s) as improper and is invariably followed by a reprimand 
of the Buddha and his reasons to promulgate an appropriate precept. It may be noted 
that I do not consider all precepts of the Pāli Vinaya that are preceded by this stock 
phrase with ‘householders’ in its subject position, to have factually been the result of 
‘complaining householders.’ For, as is apparent by now, I am not in favour of a linear 
reading and interpretation of the Pāli Vinaya. I take, however, the very fact that 
householders could take up the subject position of this stock phrase, to indicate that the 
Buddhist monastic community made conscious efforts to be in good terms with the 
householder community. If some of its practices, or lack of practices, came into conflict 
with the normative expectations of householders, it oftentimes would have tried to 
accommodate itself to meet these expectations. It may be noted that certain 
householders who financially and materially supported the ascetic community, might 
even have felt entitled to have a say in the organisation of the Buddhist bhikkhu’s ascetic 
life. 
Finally, in addition to affect the manner how the early Buddhist community 
organized its ascetic life, householders also played a dynamic role in the early ‘Buddhist’ 
identity negotiation. Concluding this section on contact, I specifically focus on how 
householders influenced the early Buddhist identity negation through the many direct 
and indirect contact opportunities they created for householders, Buddhist ascetics and 
the latters’ ascetic others.  
Direct Contact via the Mediating Role of Householders  
During the earliest stages of the development of the Buddhist ascetic community, the 
negotiation of sameness with other samaṇas was if not more, then at least as important 
as the negotiation of difference. This, I suggest, is an immediate result of the many 
direct contact opportunities brought about by the mediating role of the donating 
householder. Because of the facts that many householders donated alms-food to ascetics 
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irrespective of their specific affiliation, and that certain householders established and 
served at eating, resting and sleeping facilities open to all ascetics, direct contact with 
both his householder other and ascetic other was part of the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s 
daily reality. As we have amply illustrated in the preceding discussion, a Buddhist 
bhikkhu could stand in direct dialogue with both his householder and ascetic other at a 
householder’s residence when going for alms, or at āvasathas, or on auspicious days, or 
during festal events and meal times for recluses. Because he often stood in direct 
dialogue with both his householder and ascetic other, it was important for the Buddhist 
bhikkhu to be able to both negotiate sameness and difference. Let us begin with the 
importance for the early Buddhist bhikkhu to be able to claim the ‘samaṇa’ denominator.   
Sameness 
Having, maintaining and developing similarity with its ascetic samaṇa others was 
something to be desired if the Buddhist community wanted to be recognized and 
socially acted upon as a samaṇa community. A householder donating alms to all samaṇas 
might when offering alms to a Buddhist bhikkhu be perceiving and relating to a Buddhist 
bhikkhu, but he certainly will be perceiving and relating to a samaṇa. This latter is seen 
confirmed, for instance, in the denomination householders are said to have used to refer 
to Buddhist bhikkhus. In Pāli texts, householders (in fact, all ‘outsiders’ or all who are 
simply not a Buddhist bhikkhu) consequently refer to Buddhist bhikkhus with the terms 
‘samaṇā Sakyaputtiyā’ or ‘samaṇas who are sons (puttiya) of the Sakya.’ In direct contact, 
Buddhist bhikkhus had to be able to embody the samaṇa ideal. Negotiating their title to 
the samaṇa denominator must, therefore, have played an important, dynamic role in the 
early Buddhist identity negotiation. This aspiration of the early Buddhist bhikkhu 
community to belong to the wider samaṇa ‘community’ to be embodying the samaṇa 
ideal, is best reflected with the stock phrase with which the Buddha reprimands a 
reprehensible deed of his disciples: ‘It is not fit, foolish man, it is not becoming, it is not 
proper, it is unworthy of a recluse (assāmaṇakaṃ),  it is not lawful, it ought not to be 
done.’134 However, if among other samaṇas Buddhist bhikkhus wanted to be recognized as 
constituting a separate group, they also had to negotiate difference. And for this too, 
direct contact occasions acted as a dynamic force.  
Difference 
Concerning the negotiation of difference, direct contact can be considered as having 
been especially conducive to the introduction of visible distinction marks. Doctrinal 
differences, however important they may have been, were not per se sufficient to 
 
                                                     
134 This is part of the larger stock expression in which Buddhist bhikkhu(s) are being reprimanded for their 
deeds by the Buddha. For the full rebuke see e.g. Vin III 43 (trsl. I.B. Horner BD I 36). 
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support a distinctive identity. In direct contact difference had to be perceptible to the 
naked eye of both the householder other and ascetic other. Sutta 32 of lecture XXIII of 
the Jain Uttarajjhaṇa Sutta explicitly states how ‘the various outward marks’ of ascetics 
have a ‘distinguishing character’ and were ‘introduced in order that people might 
recognise them as such.’135 If not translated into visible marks or distinctive ascetic 
practices such as special dietary restrictions, doctrinal differences could by themselves 
not serve to draw observable boundaries between one and another samaṇa. This 
explains why various Pāli Vinaya narratives and precepts tackle the importance of 
uniformizing the Buddhist robe and bowl. As we will see in the following section 
‘Processes of othering,’ various sections of the Pāli Vinaya dealing with the robe and 
bowl of the Buddhist bhikkhu may be understood against this background of direct 
contact and boundary negotiation.   
When considering the fact that in direct contact the distinction between a Buddhist 
bhikkhu and another samaṇa could neither be provided by the bhikkhu’s ‘place of being’ 
(e.g. a householder’s residence) nor by his ‘activity’ (e.g. begging for alms), one cannot 
sufficiently underscore the importance of visible distinguishing marks. At the same 
time, this makes us appreciate the role monastery-complexes played in providing and 
supporting a distinctive Buddhist identity. Monastery-complexes could, by means of 
their material structure, provide a separateness to Buddhist bhikkhus from their ascetic 
others. With the development of more sophisticated and exclusive monastery-
complexes, difference became in addition to the outward marks also provided by the 
bhikkhu’s place of being. Difference became, in part, structurally provided. 
Indirect Contact via the Mediating Role of Householders 
Buddhist bhikkhus acquired a knowledge of their so-called ascetic other not only 
through direct contact opportunities, but also indirectly, via the mediating role of 
householders. As pointed out, the great(er) social mobility of householders made them 
true information ‘hubs’. If a Buddhist bhikkhu did not come directly into contact with his 
ascetic others, he nevertheless could still stand in dialogue with them via the ideas, 
practices, and values ‘brought in,’ so to speak, by householders. The Pāli Vinaya 
contains many examples of occasions for householders to be going to ‘Buddhist’ ārāmas 
and vihāras, showing how Buddhist bhikkhus did not have to ‘go out’ to be interacting 
with householders. An important, yearly occasion was the kaṭhina ceremony,136 during 
which lay-followers donated cloth to the bhikkhu saṅgha. Besides this regulated occasion, 
 
                                                     
135 Cf. Jacobi 2004 [1895], SBE 45: 123. On the function and symbolism of the ‘outward sign’ of the Jain ascetic 
stick, see Balbir 2000b. 
136 On the kaṭhina rite see, a.o. Holt 1999 (1981, 1995²): 134 ff. and Bechert 1968. 
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there were also multiple less official occasions for householders to go to the dwelling 
places of Buddhist bhikkhus. So we find householders going to the dwelling places of 
Buddhist bhikkhus to offer alms-food;137 we regularly find them to be simply ‘touring the 
dwelling places [of Buddhist bhikkhus or bhikkhunīs]’138 or to be going to a Buddhist ārāma 
to listen to dhamma talk.  At Vinaya IV 15 (BD II 194) lay-followers are even presented to 
be staying the night inside a Buddhist ārāma’s assembly hall (upaṭṭhanasāla) together 
with novices (navaka bhikkhu) after having listened to dhamma talk.139 Other occasions 
for householders and Buddhist bhikkhus to be in direct contact with one another on 
Buddhist premises, or better premises-to be, were created by devoted householders who 
donated or commissioned the building of a vihāra to either an individual bhikkhu, or to a 
local bhikkhu-or bhikkhuṇi saṅgha.140 It should be noted that on all these contact 
occasions,  Buddhist bhikkhus did not just interact with their householder other; they 
interacted with the householder’s pre-conceived ideas and normative expectations of 
what ascetic life should entail. Ideas and expectations of ascetic life that the householder 
formulated, consciously or unconsciously, during previous encounters with Buddhist 
bhikkhus, other samaṇas and brāhmaṇas, and in conversations with his householder 
confrères. Peculiar of interaction (whether it is direct or indirect, real or imagined) is its 
reflexive aspect. Both parties standing in interaction or dialogue with one another are 
bound - to a higher or lesser degree - to reflect, re-consider and, if found necessary, re-
adjust their own practices and ideas on both oneself and the other.  
The Pāli Vinaya mentions a few public meeting places and occasions that are helpful 
in conceiving the manner how normative ideas on Buddhist ascetic life came about and 
how these, in a second instance, coloured and shaped the perception of householders of 
how Buddhist bhikkhus (should) organize their ascetic life. Vinaya III 213-214 (nissaggiya 
VIII; BD II 50-51) gives the insightful example of a village assembly hall or sabhā where 
householders, and sometimes ascetics too,141 would converse with one another. On such 
occasions householders would, among other things, when talking about their 
experiences with ascetics, refine their knowledge and expectations of the ascetic 
 
                                                     
137 See e.g. Vin IV 181 (BD III 115) and Vin IV 182 (BD III 116). Cf. fn. 75. 
138 See e.g. Vin IV 169 (pācittiya LXXXVIII; BD III 92). 
139 Cf. fn. 123. 
140 This could result in intense contact. See e.g. Vin III 156 (BD III 156) where a householders who had a vihāra 
built for the bhikkhuni saṅgha continuously went to the nunnery (bhikkhunūpassaya) to see how the works were 
progressing. 
141 Cf. Vin IV 164-165 (pācittiya LXXXV; BD III 82-84) where the group of six bhikkhus sat down in a village 
assembly hall (sabhā) and upset householders with their ‘worldly talk’ (tiracchānakatha, lit. ‘animal talk’). Not 
expecting bhikkhus to be engaging in low, worldly affairs, the householders condemn them with the stock 
phrase ‘seyyathāpi gihikāmabhogino’ti’ meaning ‘just like householders enjoying pleasures of the senses.’ On the 
significance of this stock phrase, see the following section ‘Processes of othering.’ 
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members of society.142 Similarly, also ‘meeting-days for townspeople’ (negamassa samaya) 
were conducive to spreading the knowledge on both factual and ideal ascetic life among 
the members of the householder community. Vinaya III 219-221 (nissaggiya X; BD II 62-
65) gives the example of how householders during a ‘meeting-day for townspeople’ 
came to hear of the insistent begging of one particular Buddhist bhikkhu for a robe, and 
as a consequence collectively dispraised the insatiable desires of Buddhist bhikkhus. 
Regardless whether this is based on a factual incident, this reference together with the 
ones to sabhās or village assembly halls are helpful to envisage how householders were 
important information hubs concerning the spreading of both factual and normative 
ideas of the early Buddhist ascetic life. 
In conclusion, it may be said that both the direct and indirect contact opportunities 
between the early Buddhist bhikkhu and his ascetic others brought about via the 
mediating role of householders, lead to the dialectic identity negotiation of both 
sameness and difference. In the following section, ‘Processes of othering’, we will see 
how ‘the’ householder was also an important dialectic other of the early Buddhist 
bhikkhu. We will see how the householder was, just the ascetic other, also – to a higher 
or lesser degree – a ‘proximate other’ of the early Buddhist ascetic community. In a 
certain sense, a Buddhist bhikkhu was a bhikkhu insofar he was not a householder. 
 
 
 
                                                     
142 At Vin III 213-214 householders are becoming displeased with the excessive robe-begging of Buddhist 
bhikkhus while learning from each other at the village assembly hall or sabhā that they all individually gave 
robes to the same group of bhikkhus who told each one of these householders that Buddhist robes had been 
stolen. Regardless of the fact if this Vinaya passage is based on a historical event or not, it shows how public 
places such as a sabhā or a village assembly hall where householders would converse with one another, were 
conducive to spreading the knowledge on ascetic practices and in the formation of normative ideas of how 
ascetic life should be lead.  
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Processes of othering in the Pāli Vinaya 
Focussing on the various direct and indirect contact opportunities between the early 
Buddhists and their ascetic others, the previous section showed well how the early 
Buddhist community evolved in intense dialogue with its wider ascetic environment. 
Seen in this light, it is only evident to consider the various ascetic others as having 
constituted a dynamic force in the early Buddhist community’s development. It is in 
constant dialogue with its wider ascetic environment that the early Buddhist 
community negotiated an identity rhetoric and organised the ascetic life of its 
members. Regarding the latter, it is not difficult to understand how direct and indirect 
contact effected the formulation or establishment of various ascetic regulations and 
structures. Indeed, as we have seen in the section ‘Scholarly Frameworks, Past and 
Present,’ the many agreements between the ascetic regulations/vows between the early 
Buddhist, Jain and brāhmaṇa ascetic organizations, had led Hermann Jacobi to argue that 
both Buddhists and Jains extensively copied from the brāhmaṇa ascetic institution, 
which he regarded as having been the most authoritative model.1  
Further, other nineteenth century scholars and (near) contemporaries of Hermann 
Jacobi had already pointed out that in addition to regulations/vows, the Buddhist and 
Jain ascetic communities shared similar life-stories of their teachers; epithets; an 
extraordinary chronology, and so on.2 As we have seen, these similarities were during 
that time commonly drawn upon to erroneously argue for a schismatic origin of the Jain 
tradition. Today, however, these many similarities may serve to illustrate how the 
development of any organization needs to be understood as a development in dialogue. 
With respect to the early Buddhist community, its shared features with the Jain and 
other contemporaneous ascetic communities may, therefore, be interpreted as either 
pointing to a deep-rooted and unquestioned general outlook on how ascetic life should 
 
                                                     
1 Cf. p. 17 ff.  
2 Cf. Scholarly Frameworks, Past and Present, p. 18. 
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be led, or, on the other hand, as pointing to consciously articulated similarities in order 
to ensure a social recognition of its organisation. In either case, similarities are 
illustrative of this basic but important fact that the early Buddhist community evolved 
in dialogue.  
The aim of this section is to further bring out this dialogic aspect of the development of 
the early Buddhist community by examining in the Pāli Vinaya processes of othering 
brought about by the various early Buddhist ascetic others. In the discussion on contact 
opportunities, I have repeatedly pointed out how contact demanded the early Buddhist 
community to negotiate both ‘sameness and difference.’ Othering, as it will here be 
understood, is this on-going dynamic process of placing sameness and difference while 
negotiating one’s identity. Such a process of othering underlies both the individual search 
of identity, as the articulation of the collective identity of a community. The very notion of 
an individual or collective self depends on the ability to relate, in terms of sameness and 
difference, to the various subjects of one’s environment.  
Remembering the Pāli Vinaya’s normative nature and its stress on (creating ‘the’ 
Buddhist) tradition, we readily understand that the text will not transparently 
reproduce the early Buddhist community’s processes of othering. Subscribing to 
William Green’s view that the terminology a society develops to refer to its so-called 
others are “primarily clues to its self-understanding,”3 I examine the processes of 
othering by means of a critical discussion of the fact that the Pāli Vinaya holds several 
terms for the early Buddhists’ ascetic others. Drawing on the theory of “proximate other” 
of Jonathan Smith, I make explicit how the various ascetic others, whether real or 
imagined, had an important reflexive and dynamic impact on the early Buddhist ascetic 
community. This will be dealt with in part I. In part II I examine the process of othering 
by means of a close reading and analysis of a selected group of Pāli Vinaya passages with 
explicit references to supposed practices of the early Buddhists’ ascetic others. In this part, I 
will also briefly pause on the dialectic role of ‘the’ householder, and show how also the 
householder effected processes of othering. In the final part, part III, special attention is 
given to one particular denomination for the early Buddhists’ ascetic other, namely 
‘acela(ka)’ or ‘one without cloth.’ Pointing out the reflexive aspect of this metonymical 
denomination, I show how the term acela(ka), used in the Pāli Vinaya to refer to a certain 
group of ascetic others, reflects how Buddhist bhikkhus valued and stressed the 
importance of their practice of wearing a ‘cloth’ (cela) in direct relation to the practice 
of their ascetic others of being ‘acela’ or ‘without cloth.’  
In the course of my analysis, I will make explicit two aspects of the processes of othering 
of the early Buddhist ascetic community. I show how through processes of othering 
 
                                                     
3 Cf. Green 1985: 49, see further p. 134. 
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Buddhist bhikkhus, or at the very least the monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya, both negotiated 
a collective identity notion, and reflected on the significance of their own practices and 
values in direct relation to the ones of their ascetic others, whether real or imagined.  
Part I: What’s in a Name?  
Labelling the Ascetic other 
The terms the Pāli Vinaya uses to refer to the early Buddhist’s real or imagined ascetic 
others can, I believe, give valuable insights into the processes of othering of the early 
Buddhist ascetic community. For denominations are never neutral. They are value 
carriers and establishers. Each denomination gives a unique insight into how the early 
Buddhist community perceived and related to its ascetic other in terms of sameness and 
difference.  
When perusing the Pāli Vinaya a first plain but important observation that needs to 
be made concerns the fact that the Pāli Vinaya hosts a wide array of terms to refer to 
the early Buddhist’s ascetic others. This, in itself, is already reflective of the dynamic and 
dialectic force ascetic others exerted on the Buddhist ascetic saṅgha. For analytical 
purposes, the various terms may be grouped into three categories: one-to-one 
denominations; generic denominations; and metonymical denominations. Before starting to 
discuss these three categories of denominations, it should be noted that in appendix to this 
chapter (‘Labelling the Ascetic other’) a discussion is given of the various denominations’ 
reference field and occurrences in the Pāli Vinaya.  
By one-to-one denominations I understand terms having an explicit correspondence 
with an individual or a group of individuals belonging to the historical ascetic landscape 
of the early Indian Buddhist community. Belonging to this group are the terms nigaṇṭha, 
nigaṇṭhasāvaka, Nātaputta Nigaṇṭha, ājīvika, jaṭila and perhaps also paribbājaka.4 As it will 
be made explicit in the discussion of these denominations in the appendix ‘Labelling the 
Ascetic other,’5 the presence of such one-to-one denominations in the Pāli Vinaya show 
that early Buddhists knew how members of other contemporary ascetic communities 
 
                                                     
4 nigaṇṭha (Skt. nirgrantha) ‘without bonds,’ i.e. a Jain ascetic; nigaṇṭhasāvaka (Skt. nirgranthaśrāvaka) ‘a lay-
disciple of the Jain fold;’ Nātaputta Nigaṇṭha ‘Mahāvīra;’ jaṭila ‘matted hair ascetic;’ paribbājaka (Skt. parivrājaka) 
‘a paribbājaka wanderer.’ Cf. Appendix ‘Labelling the Ascetic other,’ p. 139ff. 
5 Cf. p. 139 ff. 
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denominated themselves, or at least, if the terms in question were not (the sole ones 
which were) applied internally, how they were commonly referred to by others (cf. 
Appendix ‘Labelling the Ascetic other,’ p. 139 ff.). Therefore these terms could have 
sufficed to refer to their contemporary ascetic others. Yet, despite the presence and 
knowledge of these denominations that, it should be stressed, had an unambiguous one-
to-one correspondence, they adopted a large vocabulary for their ascetic others with far 
more ambiguous terms. 
 The group of generic denominations holds terms referring to individuals or 
communities supposedly belonging to the historical ascetic landscape of the early 
Buddhist community, but whose ascetic affiliation is uncertain. In generic 
denominations the specific affiliation of the ascetic cannot be deduced from the 
denomination itself. Terms belonging to this group are the compound samaṇa-brāhmaṇa; 
and the terms samaṇa; brāhmaṇa; paribbājaka; aññatitthiya; aññatitthiya paribbājaka; 
titthiya; titthiyasāvaka; titthiyapakkanta; sabbapāsaṇḍika; and samaṇakuttaka.6   
Standing alone in the third category is the metonymical denomination ‘acela(ka).’ 
Though also having an ambiguous reference field, acela(ka) needs to be set apart from 
the group of generic denominations for its explicit reflexive element. As will be 
explained, in metonymical denominations the other is being referred to in direct 
relation to the self. This reflexive aspect typical of metonymical denominations makes 
the term ‘acela(ka)’ particularly suited for our present study of the processes of othering 
of the early Buddhist ascetic community. It will therefore be analysed in detail in Part 
III. 
 
Of all the Pāli Vinaya terms referring to ascetic others, the generic denominations are 
the ones reverted to most frequently, and then especially ‘titthiya.’ When including its 
occurrence in the compounds titthiyasāvaka and titthiyapakkanta,7 the term titthiya 
appears over seventy times in the Pāli Vinaya, spread over approximately forty 
different narratives (cf. Appendix ‘Labelling of the Ascetic other’). Among these various 
narratives are references to supposed practices of titthiyas that serve as negative 
reference points in the development of the early Buddhist community’s identity 
 
                                                     
6 samaṇa (Skt. śramaṇa) ‘recluse’; paribbājaka as a generic denomination can refer to any ascetic of any 
community; aññatitthiya (Skt. anyatīrtika) ‘(an adherent of) a different ascetic community’; aññatitthiya 
paribbājaka ‘a wandering ascetic having a different ascetic community/doctrine’; titthiya (Skt. tīrthika) ‘(an 
adherent of a) different ascetic community; titthiyasāvaka (Skt. tīrthikaśrāvaka) ‘a lay-disciple of a different 
ascetic community’; titthiyapakkanta ‘one gone over to a different ascetic community; sabbapāsaṇḍika ‘all 
heretics’; samaṇakuttaka ‘a sham recluse’. Cf. Appendix ‘Labelling the Ascetic other,’ p. 139 ff. A philological 
discussion of the terms titthiya and aññatitthiya will be given at Section IV ‘From ‘Ascetic’ to ‘Ascetic other.’ 
For an examination of the reference field of the term paribbājaka in the Pāli canon, see Freiberger (1997). 
7 For the meaning of these terms, see fn. 6. 
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rhetoric. It may already be noted that our selected group of Pāli Vinaya passages for 
examining the early Buddhist community’s processes of othering will contain this type 
of negative titthiya references.  
With the Pāli Vinaya’s unfailing stress and creation of ‘the’ Buddhist tradition, it is 
not surprising to note that the generic denominations are the ones most resorted to. 
Generic denominations can refer to the Buddhist’s ascetic others without accrediting 
the positive influence they had on the development of the Buddhist ascetic saṅgha. One-
to-one denominations if used too abundantly do. The very presence in the Pāli Vinaya of 
this wide array of terms referring to ascetic others, shows how they played a dynamic 
role in the development of an early Buddhist identity rhetoric. This especially becomes 
clear when ascetic contemporaries to the early Indian Buddhists are understood to be 
the latter’s ‘proximate other’. 
The Dynamic Concept of ‘proximate other’ 
The dynamic concept of ‘proximate other’ has been developed by theorist and historian 
of religion Jonathan Z. Smith in his essays entitled “Differential Equations: On 
Constructing the Other” and “What a Difference a Difference can make.”8 The core idea 
behind the concept of proximate other is that, unlike the ideologically (and  - in our 
case- geographically)9 remote other (as, for instance, the Native American Navajo is to 
the Indian Jain), the proximate other demands, and effects, a process of othering. The 
proximate other invites a discourse of difference wherein a rhetoric of self-definition 
and reflection can be developed. Unlike the remote other or absolute Other, the 
presence of a proximate other creates the basic need for the establishment, or at least 
the re-consideration, of boundaries where differences and similarities can be 
 
                                                     
8 “Differential Equations: On Constructing the “Other” in Smith, Jonathan [1992] 2004. Relating Religion. Essays in 
the Study of Religion. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 230-250. This essay was first 
delivered in 1992 as a University Lecture in Religion at the Arizona State University.  
“What a Difference a Difference Makes,” in Smith, Jonathan [1985] 2004, Relating Religion. Essays in the Study of 
Religion. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 251-301. This essay was initially developed 
as a keynote lecture for the 1984 conference at Brown University, entitled “To see ourselves as others see us” 
Christian, Jews, “Others” in Late Antiquity. An identically titled volume based on the conference was edited by 
Jacob Neusner and Ernest S. Frerichs in 1985. 
9 As the notion of distance is being drastically reconceived in our digitized world, geographical proximity – in 
literal terms of kilometers – is not indispensable for initiating processes of othering in present day societies. 
However, for the formative stages of the Buddhist community, during which time period verbal word-of-
mouth communication was the sole means of ideas to spread - the importance of geographical proximity is 
obvious. Regarding the concept of ‘remote other,’ Jonathan Smith gives as example the Kwakiutl as Christians’ 
remote other. Cf. Smith ([1992] 2004: 276). 
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negotiated. The dialectical force of the proximate other lies in the fact that when a 
community is defining its proximate other it is simultaneously defining itself. Dealing 
with and defining one’s proximate other entails “complex reciprocal relationships” and 
results in a double definition of ‘them’ and ‘us’ with this ‘us’ being defined vis-à-vis 
‘them’ and ‘them’ vis-à-vis ‘us’.10 It is in the presence of one’s proximate other that a 
‘theory of the other’ becomes compelling. In the words of Jonathan Smith: 
 [R]ather than the remote ‘other’ being perceived as problematic and/or 
dangerous, it is the proximate ‘other,’ the near neighbor, who is most 
troublesome. That is to say, while difference or ‘otherness’ may be perceived as 
being either LIKE-US or NOT-LIKE-US, it becomes most problematic when it is TOO-
MUCH-LIKE-US or when it claims to BE-US.  It is here that the real urgency of theories 
of the ‘other’ emerges, called forth not so much by a requirement to place 
difference, but rather by an effort to situate ourselves. This, then, is not a matter 
of the ‘far’ but preeminently of the ‘near’. The deepest intellectual issues are not 
based upon perceptions of alterity, but, rather, of similarity, at times, even of 
identity.11 
To this he further shrewdly adds: 
A “theory of the other” is but another way of phrasing a “theory of the self.”12 
Jonathan Smith formulated his reflections on ‘proximate other’ while investigating 
“the history of the western imagination of the ‘other.’” And though his reflections are 
therefore mainly framed by a historical perspective on the dynamics of cultural 
encounters, it is nevertheless highly relevant to question to what extent his dynamic, 
dialectical concept of ‘proximate other’ is applicable to the manner in which early 
Buddhists conceptualized and dealt with their contemporary ascetic others, for, as 
Jonathan Smith remarks: 
 [T]he issue of problematic similarity or identity seems to be particularly 
prevalent in religious discourse and imagination.13 
Indeed, the group of titthiya narratives that we selected for examining the process of 
othering in the Pāli Vinaya reflects an anxious concern of the early Buddhists to be 
 
                                                     
10 This phrasing of “us” and “them” is inspired by the writings of  Green and Smith on the specific issue of 
‘double metonymy’. Cf. Green (1985: 50) and Smith ([1992] 2004: 232). The issue of double metonymy is 
addressed in part III. 
11 Smith ([1992] 2004: 245). 
12 Smith ([1985] 2004: 275). 
13 Smith ([1985] 2004: 275). 
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distinctive from their contemporary ascetics. Before turning to a close reading of these 
Vinaya narratives, we need to make explicit that the ‘proximity’ of the various 
contemporary ascetic others is – naturally – gradated. As such there is not one but 
multiple proximate others. The presence of certain ascetic communities had 
dialectically a greater impact than others, or certain ideological claims and practices 
could dynamically challenge the Buddhist ideology and practices more fiercely than 
others. Considering the ‘issue of problematic similarity or identity,’ we can conclude 
that the ‘closer’ a (practice or ideology of a) community presents itself to the Buddhist 
community at a certain place and time, the ‘further’ the Buddhist community will need 
to differentiate itself from it.  
Part II: Othering with one’s proximate others 
titthiyas as proximate others 
The selected group of Pāli Vinaya passages contain references to supposed practices of 
titthiyas that explicitly serve as negative reference points for the formulation of several 
regulations. In other words, characteristic of our selected group of titthiya references is 
the fact that they serve to argue the importance to and for a Buddhist bhikkhu to not 
adopt a certain custom that would have supposedly been practiced by titthiyas. A 
recurrent narrative pattern in this context are Buddhist bhikkhus being rebuked for a 
particular action because it made them look like ‘seyyathāpi titthiyā’ or ‘just like 
adherents of a different ascetic community.’ It may be noted that already the 
occurrence of this stock phrase ‘seyyathāpi titthiyā’ in the Pāli Vinaya is, in itself, 
reflective of the early Indian Buddhist saṅgha’s on-going preoccupation to be marking 
boundaries from its ascetic, proximate others. Before we turn to a detailed analysis of 
the process of othering by means of a selective group of such titthiya references, a brief 
overview of these references may be given. 
Discussing suitable and unsuitable places for entering upon the rains (vassaṃ 
upagacchati), Mahāvagga III.12 declares a cāṭī (a large tank-type of vessel) to be 
unsuitable on the basis that Buddhist bhikkhus using a cāṭī had been rebuked by people 
for being ‘seyyathāpi titthiyā.’14 For the same reason Cullavagga V.10 prohibits the use of a 
 
                                                     
14 Cf. Vin I 153 (BD IV 202, emphasis added): “tena kho pana samayena bhikkhu cāṭiyā vassaṃ upagacchanti. manussā 
ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti, seyyathāpi titthiyā ’ti. bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. na bhikkhave cāṭiyā vassaṃ 
upagantabbaṃ. yo upagaccheyya, āpatti dukkaṭassā ’ti.” 
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gourd and a ghaṭikaṭāha-vessel as alms-bowl.’15 The motivation of ‘seyyathāpi titthiyā’ is 
further also found in a secondary introductory story to nissaggiya XXII. While nissaggiya 
XXII prohibits Buddhist bhikkhus to ask for a bowl an exception is made for bhikkhus 
whose bowl is broken. According to the secondary introductory story, the reason for 
formulating the exception was caused by the fact that Buddhist bhikkhus were being 
rebuked by people for being ‘seyyathāpi titthiyā’ because one of them, having a broken 
bowl, had gone for alms to be put into his hands (hatthesu piṇḍāya carati), an action 
which appeared to have been associative of ‘titthiyas.’16 Similarly, at Mahāvagga I 70.1 
Buddhist bhikkhus are rebuked for being ‘seyyathāpi titthiyā’ for not using any begging 
bowl, and a little further, at Mahāvagga I 70.2 for not wearing any robe.  
Other titthiya references serving as negative reference points occur in the eighth 
chapter of the Mahāvagga. Mahāvagga VIII.27 lists various types of garments that the 
monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya perceived to be marking ascetics others, i.e. titthiyas. 
The garments are significantly termed titthiya-dhaja or an ‘emblem of an ascetic other.’ 
They consist of those made of kusa-grass, bark, wood-shavings, head-hair wool, animal 
wool, owl’s wings, antelope hide and also occur, as we have seen, in the list of ascetic 
practices of the so-called attantapa mentioned in the Kandaraka Sutta of the Majjhima 
Nikāya.17 According to the offences prescribed in this section of the Mahāvagga, a 
Buddhist bhikkhu commits a grave offence (āpatti thullaccayassā) if he wears such a 
garment since he should stay away from a titthiya-dhaja.   
 
                                                     
15 In Cone’s Dictionary of Pāli (DP) ‘ghaṭikaṭāha’ is defined as “a bowl that is a water-pot (or a turtle’s shell).” DP II 
78, sv.  Cf. Vin II 114-5 (BD V 156, emphasis added): “tena kho pana samayena bhikkhu tumbakaṭāhe piṇḍāya caranti. 
manussā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti, seyyathāpi titthiyā ’ti. bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. na bhikkhave 
tumbakaṭāhe piṇḍāya caritabbaṃ. yo careyya, āpatti dukkaṭassā ’ti. tena kho pana samayena bhikkhu ghaṭikaṭāhe 
piṇḍāya caranti. manussā ujjhāyanti [khīyanti vipācenti, seyyathāpi] titthiyā ’ti. bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. na 
bhikkhave ghaṭikaṭāhe piṇḍāya caritabbaṃ. yo careyya, āpatti dukkaṭassā ’ti.” 
It may be noted that a begging bowl made of bottle-gourd (lâupâya) is explicitly allowed in the Jain Āyāraṅga 
Sutta, next to those made of wood (dâru) and clay (maṭṭiyâ). Cf. AS II 102: 6.1 § 1. 
16 Cf. Vin III 245 (BD II 119, emphasis added): “tena kho pana samayena aññatarassa bhikkhuno patto bhinno hoti. 
atha kho so bhikkhu bhagavatā paṭikkhittaṃ pattaṃ viññāpetun ti kukkaccāyanto na viññāpeti, hatthesu piṇḍāya carati. 
manussā [ujjhāyanti khīyanti] vipācenti: kathaṃ hi nāma samaṇā Sakyaputtiyā hatthesu piṇḍāya carissanti seyyathāpi 
titthiyā ’ti. assosuṃ kho te bhikkhu bhagavato etaṃ atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. atha kho bhagavā etasmiṃ nidāne etasmiṃ 
pakaraṇe dhammiṃ kathaṃ katvā bhikkhu āmantesi: anujānāmi bhikkhave naṭṭhapattassa vā bhinnapattassa vā pattaṃ 
viññāpetun ti.” 
17 Cf. Vin I 305-306 (BD IV 436-437). Cf. p.67 ff. It may be noted that many of these types of garments (such as 
antelope hide) are listed under the insignia of the ‘brahmacārin’ or student in the prescriptive Dharmasūtras 
(DS). See e.g. the DS of Āpastamba I.2.39-3.10; DS of Baudhāyana I.3.14. The DS of Baudhāyana and the DS of 
Vasiṣṭha also prescribes ‘clothes of bark or skin’ for the forest hermit (vānaprastha; vaikhānasa) (DS of B II.11.15; 
DS of V 9.1). The Vasiṣṭha also prescribes that the parivrājaka ‘should wrap himself with a single piece of cloth, 
or cover his body with an antelope skin or with a garment of grass nibbled by cows.’ cf. DS of Vasiṣṭha 10.9 (DS 
ed. & trsl. Patrick Olivelle 2000). 
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Finally, there are two more references to supposed practices of titthiyas that may be 
considered illustrative of the early Buddhist bhikkhus’ process of othering. It consists of 
the negative references to the practice of silence (mūgabbata) and to the practice of 
nakedness (naggiya) of so-called titthiyas. Mahāvagga IV.1.11-12 (Vin I 159) and 
Mahāvagga VIII (Vin I 305) prohibit these two practices for Buddhist bhikkhus on the 
basis that a titthiya-samādāna (‘observance of titthiyas’) should not be observed.18 
Having enumerated all negative references to supposed practices of titthiyas, I 
proceed now to a detailed analysis of the processes of othering reflected in such types of 
negative titthiya references. I begin with a discussion of Mahāvagga I 70.1-6.  
Mahāvagga I 70.1-6 consists of six small narratives determining the offence committed 
for ordaining a candidate into the Buddhist saṅgha without having provided him first 
with what Isaline Blew Horner has termed the two “symbols of entry into the Order,”19 
these being the Buddhist robe (cīvara) and begging bowl (patta).20 For instance, 
Mahāvagga I 70.2 determines a dukkaṭa offence for monks who ordain a candidate into 
the Buddhist saṅgha without having provided him first with a Buddhist robe. The 
accompanying introductory story tells how a Buddhist bhikkhu who is acῑvara and who, 
in this case, goes for alms naked (‘naggā piṇḍāya caranti’)21 is thought to be ‘seyyathāpi 
titthiya.’ The concerning Vinaya passage reads as follows: 
tena kho pana samayena bhikkhū acīvarakaṃ upasampādenti. naggā piṇḍāya caranti. 
manussā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti: seyyathāpi titthiyā ’ti. bhagavato etam atthaṃ 
ārocesuṃ. na bhikkhave acīvarako upasampādetabbo. yo upasampādeyya, āpatti 
dukkaṭassā ’ti. (Vin I 90; MV I 70.2) 
 
                                                     
18 Cf. Vin I 159: “na bhikkhave mūgabbataṃ titthiyasamādānaṃ samādiyitabbaṃ. yo samādiyeyya, āpatti dukkaṭassa.” 
and Vin I 305: “na bhikkhave naggiyaṃ titthiyasamādānaṃ samādiyitabbaṃ. yo samādiyeyya, āpatti thullaccayassā 
’ti.” See further p. 128 ff where this passage is discussed in detail. 
19 Cf. BD III 13, fn. 5. 
20 When considering the various ordination formulas (kammavācā, see e.g. Vin I 56; 57), we may deduce that the 
rule that a candidate should at the time of his ordination be ‘complete as to bowl and robe’ (paripuṇṇ’ assa 
pattacīvaraṃ) was, relatively speaking, a late stipulation. For, the stock phrase ‘paripuṇṇ’ assa pattacīvaraṃ’ only 
appears in the youngest ordination formulas. 
MV I 70.1 states that one should not ordain one who is apattaka (‘without a bowl’); MV I 70.2 states that one 
should not ordain one who is acīvaraka (‘without robe’); MV I 70.3 states that one should not ordain one who is 
apattacīvaraka (‘without bowl and robe’); MV I 70.4 states that monks cannot ordain by means of lending a 
bowl; MV I 70.5 states that monks cannot ordain by means of lending a robe; MV I 70.6 states that monks 
cannot ordain by means of lending a bowl and robe. As all six narratives form one unit, I have chosen to 
discuss the process of othering by specifically focusing on MV I 70.2.  
21 As the term cīvara, often used short for ticīvara, stands for the three-piece Buddhist garb (antaravāsaka or 
inner robe; uttarāsaṅga or upper robe; and saṅghāṭi or outer cloak, cf. BD II 1, fn. 2; BD II 158) ‘acīvaraka’ could 
either mean (1) ‘one who is not in norm regarding the three-piece Buddhist garb [but still is wearing a or some 
robe]’ or (2) ‘one who does not have a robe at all [and who is thus naked]’. 
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Now at that time monks [each] ordained one who had no robe [acīvarakaṃ]. They 
walked naked for almsfood. People were irritated, angry [and] speaking 
dispraisingly: “just like an adherent of a different ascetic community.” [seyyathāpi 
titthiyā]. They told this matter to the Bhagavat. He said: 
“Monks, one without a robe [acīvaraka] should not be ordained. [For] whoever 
should ordain [such one], there is an offence of wrong-doing.” (trsl. partly 
following I.B. Horner, BD IV 114-5) 
The apparent difficulty here for allowing a Buddhist bhikkhu to be acīvara and, in our 
case, to be without any robe and thus naked, is that his distinctiveness from other 
ascetics risks to dissolve.22 Nakedness appears thus to be for the Buddhist saṅgha a 
signifying characteristic of a community other than itself. A Buddhist acīvaraka certainly 
is an acīvaraka but only perhaps a Buddhist. In other words, the problem is that the 
Buddhist acῑvaraka might, from the Buddhist’s point of view, become too similar with or 
even identical to a titthiya (Skt. tīrthika). In an identical manner, at Mahāvagga I 70.1 
Buddhist bhikkhus are being rebuked for walking for alms without a begging bowl 
(apatta) on the basis that they are ‘seyyathāpi titthiyā’ or just like adherents of another 
ascetic community. 
These Mahāvagga passages together with Pāli Vinaya narratives wherein types of 
begging materials and robes are declared unfit for the Buddhist bhikkhu may be quoted, 
and justly have been, to argue how the early Buddhist community desired at a certain 
point to be visually distinctive from its ascetic, proximate other.23 Though this is true, 
this is not all. In these narratives ‘the’ Buddhist bhikkhu is also dialectically defining 
himself in relation to his ascetic, proximate other. First, the Buddhist bhikkhu is relating 
to his real or imagined proximate other by simply becoming this other (here, in our 
case, by becoming naked or acīvara) before he, in a second instance, distinguishes 
himself from this very other by rejecting the practices he came to associate with him. As 
such these narratives contain informative traces of the processes of othering of the 
early Buddhist community. They show how the early Buddhist ascetic community, or at 
the very least the monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya, reflected on the importance of the 
Buddhist robe and begging materials in direct relation to the ones of their ascetic 
others. Further, in such-like Pāli Vinaya narratives, practices of ascetic others, whether 
 
                                                     
22 The fact that in our concerning Vinaya narrative it are people (‘manussā’) pointing out the inappropriateness 
for Buddhist bhikkhus to be acīvara does not alter our observation that nakedness was considered by the 
Buddhist community to be typifying a community other than itself. At Maes (2010-2011:90-102) it is argued 
that stock phrases such as ‘manussā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti’ mainly help structuring the Vinaya narratives 
and as such should not be taken to reflect the motive for the precepts they introduce. However, the varying 
subjects that may possibly be encountered in the stock phrase ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti (‘people,’ 
‘householders,’ ‘lay followers,’ ‘monks’, ‘modest monks’ etc.) reflect the (groups of) individuals who might to a 
greater or lesser extent have had a say in the ascetic organization and legislation of the saṅgha.  
23 Holt ([1981, 1995²] 1999: 135).  
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real or imagined, are never simply referred to. Practices supposedly marking titthiyas 
are drawn in, their significance and value experimented with to, at the end of this 
process, either be adopted as ‘Buddhist’ or rejected as ‘other’ (titthiya). In both cases, it 
will have effected a re-evaluation and if found necessary a (re-)negotiation of the 
Buddhist community’s own practices and values. These arguments will shortly be 
substantiated with a close reading of other Vinaya narratives prohibiting nakedness.  
With the theory of Jonathan Smith we have seen that it is especially the presence of a 
proximate other that is problematic. Generally speaking a theory of the other is a sine 
qua non for the establishment of any society, but in the vicinity of a proximate other, or 
in the presence of a community that is similar to one’s own, the need for a ‘theory of the 
other’ becomes “an urgent necessity.”24 The underlying dynamics of a society’s theory 
of the other have been discussed with great clarity by William Scott Green in the 
theoretical introduction of his essay ‘Otherness Within: Towards a Theory of Difference 
in Rabbinic Judaism’.25 In a most basic sense a theory of the other establishes or confirms 
the singularity of a community in (re)defining its collective identity. It further makes a 
community draw and reflect upon its boundaries. On a more dialectical level the theory 
of the other, and then, particularly of those viewed as proximate, are means by which 
communities can  
explore their internal ambiguities and interstices, experiment with 
alternative values and symbols, and question their own structures and 
mechanisms.26 
With these observations let us return to our Vinaya narrative wherein Buddhist 
bhikkhus are prohibited from being acīvara (‘without robe’) and thus naked on the basis 
that they might be perceived to belong to a community other than their own. What does 
this narrative do? Perhaps it relates the historical event wherein bhikkhus indeed went 
for alms naked and indeed were mistakenly thought of to be titthiyas, but perhaps it 
does not. What the narrative does tell, however, is how the early Buddhist ascetic 
 
                                                     
24 Green (1985: 49-50). 
25 Cf. fn. 8. Both Green’s (1985) and Smith’s ([1985] 2004) essays present similar views on the problem of the 
‘proximate other’ (though only Smith explicitly refers to this dialectical other with the term ‘proximate 
other’), but both have a unique approach. Green discusses the problem of the proximate other by means of a 
concrete ancient rabbinic discourse on the gentile (“non-Jew”). Defining the rabbinic Jewish community as 
principally a “textual community” and thus viewing their text as their authoritative center and source of 
definition, he argues that the “problematic proximity” of its others are conceived in terms of their attitude 
towards the texts. Smith, on the other hand, discusses in a somehow surprising but highly lucid manner,  the 
problem of the proximate other with its political and linguistic aspect respectively by means of  (1) the history 
of taxonomy in biology and the place of ‘parasite’ therein, and by means of (2) analyzing the ‘linguistic 
conquest’ of America. 
26 Green (1985:51). 
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community evolved in dialogue with its ascetic others. Containing traces of the 
processes of othering, it provides a glimpse of the dynamic, reflexive impact ascetic 
others had on the development of the early Buddhist ascetic community. Referring to a 
practice of ascetic other, whether real or imagined, the narrative illustrates how 
Buddhist bhikkhus, or at least the monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya,  questioned their own 
customs in direct relation to the ones of their ascetic others. Or also, the narrative 
shows how through processes of othering they, to follow Green’s formulation, ‘explored 
their own ambiguities’ and ‘experimented’ with alternative practices and values. When 
referring to the titthiyas’ ascetic practice of wandering naked, the monk-editors of the 
Pāli Vinaya reflect, so to speak, on the significance or additional value of being acīvara 
and thus, simultaneously (re)question their own practice of being cīvara or a wearer of 
robes. How quirky this issue might appear to the present day mind, it most probably 
was not a random matter for the early Indian Buddhists. On a historical note, we know 
that certain ascetics belonging to the ajīvīka community and most probably also the 
nigaṇṭha took up nakedness as an essential ascetic observance on their path to liberation 
(cf. p. 69 ff.). This certainly was a known and shared fact amongst the early Indian 
Buddhists. It is telling, for instance, that also another Mahāvagga passage reflects on the 
significance of nakedness by again prohibiting it and especially by, as we have 
mentioned at the onset, referring to it as a titthiya-samādāna or ‘an observance of 
ascetics belonging to a different community.’ It is worth quoting the passage at length: 
tena kho pana samayena aññataro bhikkhu naggo hutvā yena bhagavā ten’ upasaṃkami, 
upasaṃkamitvā bhagavantaṃ etad avoca: bhagavā hi bhante anekapariyāyena 
appicchassa santuṭṭhassa sallekhassa dhutassa pāsādikassa apacayassa viriyārambhassa 
vaṇṇavādī. idaṃ bhante naggiyaṃ anekapariyāyena appicchatāya santuṭṭhiyā sallekhāya 
dhutattāya pāsādikatāvya apacayāya viriyārambhāya saṃvattati. Sadhu bhante bhagavā 
bhikkhūnaṃ naggiyaṃ anujānātū ’ti. Vigarahi buddho bhagavā: ananucchaviyaṃ 
moghapurisa ananulomikaṃ appaṭirūpaṃ assāmaṇakaṃ akappiyaṃ akaraṇīyaṃ.  kathaṃ 
hi nāma tvaṃ moghapurisa naggiyaṃ titthiyasamādānaṃ samādiyissasi. n’ etaṃ 
moghapurisa appasannānaṃ vā pasādāya. vigarahitvā dhammikathaṃ katvā bhikkhū 
āmantesi: na bhikkhave naggiyaṃ titthiyasamādānaṃ samādiyitabbaṃ. yo samādiyeyya, 
āpatti thullaccayassā ’ti. (Vin I 305; MV VIII 28.1) 
 
Now at that time a certain monk, having become naked [naggo hutvā], approached 
the Bhagavat; having approached he spoke thus to the Bhagavat: “Bhagavat, in 
many a figure is the Bhagavat a speaker in praise of desiring little, of contentment, 
of expunging (evil), of punctiliousness, of graciousness, of decreasing (the 
obstructions), of putting forth energy. Bhagavat, this nakedness [idaṃ naggiyaṃ] 
is, in many a figure, useful for desiring little, for contentment, for expunging 
(evil), for punctiliousness, for graciousness, for decreasing (the obstructions), for 
putting forth energy. It were good, Bhagavat, if the Bhagavat were to allow 
nakedness [naggiyaṃ] for monks.” 
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The Buddha, the Bhagavat rebuked him, saying: “It is not becoming, it is not 
suitable, it is not fitting, it is not worthy of a recluse [assāmaṇakaṃ], it is not 
allowable, it is not to be done. How can you, foolish man, observe nakedness 
[naggiyaṃ], an observance of adherents of a different ascetic community 
[titthiyasamādānaṃ]? It is not, foolish man, for pleasing those who are not (yet) 
pleased. ...” 
Having rebuked him, having given dhamma talk, he addressed the monks saying: 
“Monks, nakedness, an observance of adherents of a different ascetic community 
[titthiyasamādānaṃ], is not to be observed. [For] whoever who should observe it, 
there is a grave offence.” (trsl. partly following I.B. Horner, BD IV 436) 27 
Underlying the rejection of nakedness (naggiya) in this Vinaya passage lies a deeper 
rejection of the titthiyas’ doctrinal motivation of this practice. Nakedness is here not 
linked with being acīvara as in MV I 70.2, but with a ‘samādāna’ or an observance of other 
non-Buddhist ascetics. This is a significant fact showing how nakedness was considered 
to be encompassing both doctrinal points and an ascetic practice of other non-Buddhist 
communities. Translating this thought to the historical ascetic landscape of early 
Buddhist India, we may note that one of the few fundamental points to have internally 
divided the nigaṇṭha community was the observance or rejection of the ascetic practice 
of nakedness and its doctrinal motivation. The great significance the two nigaṇṭha 
communities attached in being or not being ‘naggiya’ is nowhere else best seen in their 
later developed and adopted denominations of ‘Śvetambāra’ (‘White Clad’) and 
‘Digambara’ (‘Sky Clad’).  
Regarding the associative powers of nakedness with the ājīvika community, we may 
refer to Vinaya I 290-92 (BD IV 414-17) and Vinaya III 212 (BD II 45-7). Also these Vinaya 
passages beautifully reflect, so to speak, the Buddhist’s fear for nakedness. At Vinaya I 
290-92 bhikkhus were acīvara or naked as they were letting their bodies getting wet with 
the rain. Because of their nakedness, they were being mistaken for ājīvikas. To avoid a 
recurrence of this mistaken identity, a faithful householder asked the Buddha whether 
she could donate ‘cloths for the rains’ (vassikasāṭika) to the saṅgha, condemning 
nakedness (naggiya) as being impure (asuci) and objectionable (paṭikkūla).28 At Vinaya III 
212 we read how a bhikkhu in the unfortunate event of being robbed and, as the 
narrative implies, being stripped off his robe (achinnacīvara), is exceptionally allowed to 
 
                                                     
27 I.B. Horner (BD IV 436, fn 4) considers the term ‘samādāna’ to be a word play as “samādāna means both going 
for alms without taking the three robes with one . . ., and also adopting, undertaking, taking upon oneself.” 
Horner opines that the latter meaning must be intended here as it can be read in analogy with mūgabbata 
samādāna (‘vow of silence’) mentioned at Vin I 159 (cf. above p. 125).  
28 Cf. Vin I 293 (BD IV 418) where nakedness of women is also declared ‘impure’ (asuci), ‘abhorrent’ (jeguccha),  
and ‘objectionable’ (paṭikkūla). 
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beg for a robe from a householder,29 or if he is in the neighbourhood of a dwelling of 
fellow bhikkhus to ask for one there. In the absence of these options, he is instructed to 
cover himself with either a bed-cover (uttarattharaṇa), a ground-cover (bhummattharaṇa) 
or a mattress-cover (bhisicchavi)30 and if these options too would be unavailable, he 
should cover himself with grass (tiṇa) or leaves (paṇṇa), in short, with anything as long 
as he does not come naked. If he does come naked, however, he commits an offence of 
wrong-doing. According to the accompanying introductory story, the event supposedly 
effecting these regulations was the misrecognition of certain bhikkhus to be ājīvikas as 
they, having been robbed of their robe, were wandering naked. 
From these Vinaya passages prohibiting monks from wandering naked, we may safely 
deduce the fact that the early Buddhist community conceptualized ‘nakedness’ (naggiya) 
to be much more than the mere absence (a-) of robes (cīvara). For the Buddhist 
community nakedness was clearly not an accidental feature of being temporarily 
acīvara; nakedness was the robe or cīvara typifying ascetic communities other than itself.  
As such, these introductory stories throw light on the processes of othering of the early 
Buddhist ascetic community. They show how Buddhist bhikkhus, or at the very least the 
monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya, re-questioned and if necessary re-accommodated their 
own practices through reflection on the practices of their so-called ascetic other. When 
referring to the ascetic practice of nakedness, they, as it were, temporarily ‘internalize’ 
it, ‘experiment’ with it, to subsequently distance themselves from the possibility 
altogether by marking it as a difference between themselves and titthiyas. The difference 
thus marked is utterly significant as it starts to symbolize the very distinction between 
“us” and “them.” For, it is realized, if the “us” adopts the practice of nakedness it simply 
might become “them.”31 In other words, the awareness is raised of, what William Scott 
Green, calls “the possibility or the reality of otherness within.”32 Conversely, the cīvara 
in the presence of the possibility of being acīvara has become an essential part of what 
constitutes the early Buddhist identity.  
Householder as proximate other 
That the so-called titthiyas were the early Buddhist bhikkhus real or imagined proximate 
other is now, I hope, abundantly clear. Before turning to a discussion of the 
metonymical denomination acela(ka), I first would like to pause on the fact that also ‘the’ 
 
                                                     
29 The precept preceding this narrative prohibits a monk from asking a robe from a householder, unless he is a 
relative. Cf. nissaggiya (‘forfeiture’) VI at Vin III 211; BD II 45. 
30 For I.B. Horner’s interpretation of these technical terms, see BD II 46 & 47, fn. 3, 4 & 1. 
31 Cf. fn. 10. 
32 Green (1985: 50). Also quoted by Smith in Differential Equations, cf. Smith ([1992] 2004: 232). 
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householder could be considered as a, to a higher or lesser degree, proximate other of 
the early Buddhist bhikkhus. In accordance with our given explanation of ‘proximate 
other’ - namely that it invites a process of othering wherein differences and similarities 
are negotiated, ‘the’ householder may justly be noted to also have constituted a 
proximate other. For, as already noted in the section Contact, a Buddhist bhikkhu is in a 
way a bhikkhu insomuch as he is not a householder (gihin). Also the presence and 
interaction with the householder community dialectically helped shaping the Buddhist 
ascetic organisation and identity. When viewing the householder in this light, various 
narratives in the Mahāvagga and Cullavagga that negatively refer to supposed practices 
of householders can be understood in a similar fashion as the narratives with ‘seyyathāpi 
titthiyā.’ This is, as offering a space wherein typifying features of ‘the’ householder are 
drawn in and ‘experimented with.’ In such narratives, the Buddhist bhikkhu is being 
dialectically defined in apposition to his householder other. When negatively referring 
to practices of their so-called householder other, Buddhist bhikkhus reflect upon the 
meaning of their own practices in direct relation to the ones of their householder other, 
resulting in a further (re)definition of what it means to be a Buddhist bhikkhu. To give 
one such example of a Vinaya narrative dialectically referring to householders: 
tena kho pana samayena chabbagiyā bhikkhū uccāvace patte dhārenti sovaṇṇamayaṃ 
rūpiyamayaṃ. manussā ujjhāyanti [khiyyanti vipācenti seyyathāpi gihī] kāmabhogino ’ti. 
bhagavato etam atthaṃ arocesuṃ. na bhikkhave sovaṇṇamayo patto dhāretabbo, na 
rūpiyamayo patto dhāretabbo, … . yo dhāreyya, āpatti dukkaṭassa. Anujānāmi bhikkhave 
dve patte ayopattaṃ mattikāpattan ti. (Vin II 112; CV V 9.1) 
 
Now at that time the group of six monks used various kinds of bowls, made of 
gold, made of silver. People were irritated, [angry and speaking dispraisingly: “Just 
like householders] who enjoy pleasures of the senses.” They told this matter to the 
Bhagavat. He said: “Monks, a bowl made of gold should not be used, a bowl made 
of silver should not be used. […] . [For] whoever should use [such one], there is an 
offence of wrong-doing. (trsl. partly following I.B. Horner, BD V 152) 
The similarity with the ‘seyyathāpi titthiyā’ narratives is evident. The significance of 
both types of narratives does not lie in the fact whether or not they are recounting la 
petite histoire of the early Buddhist community, but in the fact that, through these 
narratives, their own customs and/or “internal ambiguities and interstices” can be 
envisaged and questioned. In our quoted example, the value of material wealth for the 
Buddhist bhikkhu is questioned in dialectical apposition with its place in the 
householder’s life. Associating the luxurious materials of gold and silver with the 
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householder realm, the question is considered how much a bhikkhu would still be a 
bhikkhu and not a householder in the presence of these luxurious items.33  
On a historical note, if such narratives cannot guarantee that Buddhist bhikkhus 
actually did avoid the use and possession of golden or silver objects, they nevertheless 
throw light on the fact how the early Buddhist community reflected on the significance 
of these materials in a bhikkhu’s life in relation to its place in a householder’s life.34 Apart 
from reflecting on this significance of (not) using various luxurious materials, many 
other practices and attitudes of the ideal bhikkhu is thought of in direct relation to the 
ones of householder. Thus we encounter the motivation of ‘seyyathāpi gihī kāmabhogino’ 
for prohibiting certain ‘fancy’ clothes and footwear;35 luxurious furniture;36 types of 
bodily care or ‘beauty treatments;’37 various ‘worldly’ activities or sensual pleasures;38 
 
                                                     
33 It may be noted that also within the Jain Āyāraṅga Sutta bowls made of luxurious material are explicitly 
prohibited. Thus we may read at AS 102: II 6.1. § 3 in Jacobi’s translation: “A monk or a nun should not accept 
any very expensive bowls of the following description: bowls made of iron, tin, lead, silver, gold, brass, a 
mixture of gold, silver, and copper, pearls, glass, mother of pearl, horn, ivory, cloth, stone, or leather; for such 
very expensive bowls are impure [aphāsuya] and unacceptable.” Jacobi SBE 22: 166-167. 
34 Various other passages in the Mahāvagga and Cullavagga prohibit golden and silver objects on the basis that 
Buddhist bhikkhus using them are ‘just like householders enjoying the sensual pleasures.’ Thus we encounter 
the motivation of ‘seyyathāpi gihī kāmabhogino’ at MV VI.12.1 (Vin I 203) for ointment-boxes made of gold or 
silver MV VI.12.3 (Vin I 204.1) for ointment-sticks made of gold or silver; MV VI 13.1 (Vin I 204.18) for nose-
spoons made of gold or silver; CV V.9.1 (Vin II 112.20) for bowls (patta) made of gold or silver; CV V.9.2 (Vin II 
112.32; Vin II 113.5) for circular bowl-rests (pattamaṇḍala) made of gold or silver and ornamentally carved; CV 
V.11.1 (Vin II 114.29) for the use of small knives with handles made of gold or silver; CV V.11.5 (Vin II 117) for 
the use of thimbles made of gold or silver; and at CV V.27.6 (Vin II 135.5) for the use of a dirt removing 
instrument for the ears made of gold or silver. 
35 MV V.2 V.2 (Vin I 185-186) prohibits all types of coloured, ornamented, and shaped sandals (upāhanā) 
because Buddhist bhikkhus wearing these were ‘just like householders enjoying sensual pleasures.’ MV V.12 
(Vin I 194) Buddhist bhikkhus are being criticized with ‘seyyathāpi gihī kāmabhogino’ for entering a village with 
their sandals on. Identical rebuke is found at MV VIII.11.2  (Vin I 287) for ivory coloured and ‘uncut’ 
(acchinnaka) robes; MV VIII.29 (Vin I 306) for variously coloured and decorated types of robes (cīvara), and for 
wearing jackets, garments of the Tirīṭa tree and turbans; CV V.2 (Vin II 105-6)  for wearing all types of 
ornaments and jewellery; CV V.4 (Vin II 108) for wearing woollen clothes with the fleece outside; CV V.29.2 
(Vin II 136.8 & 19 & 30) for the use of various types of waistbands; and for wearing buckles and blocks (to 
prevent the upper robe from being blown up by the wind) made of gold or silver; and CV V.29.5 (Vin II 137.8 & 
12) for wearing householders’ (gihini) under and upper garments. 
36 Passages prohibiting luxurious furniture items on the basis that Buddhist bhikkhus using them are ‘seyyathāpi 
gihī kāmabhogino’ are MV V.10.4-6 (Vin I 192) for certain shapes, material, decoration, rugs, animal hides of and 
for sitting furniture; CV VI.2.5 (Vin II 149.37)  for the use of high couches (ucca mañca); CV VI.2.6 (Vin II 150.20) 
for the use of very large squatting mats. 
37 Concerning types bodily care or what may be called beauty treatments or those types of activities that 
reflect a conscious concern with outward appearance, the motivation of ‘seyyathāpi gihī kāmabhogino’ is found 
at CV V.2.2-5 (Vin II 106) for respectively wearing the hair long;  smoothening the hair;  examining a face mark 
in a mirror or water-bowl; and for anointing the face;  CV V.27.2 (Vin II 133.31) for polishing the nails; CV 
V.27.5 (Vin II 134.20 & 35) for respectively cutting the hair with scissors (kattarikā) [and thus not shaving it off 
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and, finally, for specializing in particular areas of knowledge.39 The householder 
community can, therefore, correctly be conceived as being one of the several proximate 
others of the early Buddhist community that codetermined its organisation and 
identity. 
Part III: acela(ka) in the Pāli Vinaya 
This section analyses the denomination acela(ka). It shows how also the presence of this 
metonymical denomination in the Pāli Vinaya is reflective of the early Buddhist ascetic 
community’s processes of othering. More specifically, just as the introductory stories 
discussed in the previous part, the term acela(ka) points to the fact that Buddhist 
bhikkhus reflected on the significance and value of their practice of wearing a robe (or 
better ‘cloth’ or cela) in direct relation to the practice of their ascetic others of 
wandering naked.  On a more general level, I wish to draw attention to the fact that the 
development and/or use of metonymies within a community, shows the dynamic, 
dialectic impact proximate others have on a community’s development and self-
perception.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
with a razor (khura)]; and for removing grey hairs; CV V.27.3 (Vin II 134.9) for respectively shaving the beard, 
chest-hair, stomach-hair, whiskers into particular shapes and for removing body hair. The latter specifically 
concerns for bhikkhus, as the opposite is true for bhikkhunīs. At Vin III 260 (Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga, pācittiya II) 
bhikkhunīs bathing together with prostitutes are being rebuked by those latter for being ‘like women 
householders enjoying the sensual pleasures’ (‘seyyathāpi gihiniyo kāmabhoginiyo’) because they ‘let the body 
hair [sambādhe lomaṃ] grow’ which is subsequently turned into a pācittiya offence. 
38 The rebuke is seyyathāpi gihiniyo kāmabhoginiyo is thus found for bhikkhus going to a festival and enjoying the 
dancing, singing and music there (CV V.2.6; Vin I 107; cf. Vin IV 267 where the same rebuke is given for 
bhikkhunīs and a pācittiya offence is being stipulated); CV VI.3.2 (Vin II 152) for bhikkhus decorating their 
dwelling places with bold designs of women and men; CV V.1.3 (Vin II 105) for bhikkhus respectively using a 
rubbing board (aṭṭāna); a gandhabba-hand, a string of vermilion covered beads, and a scrubber (mallaka) while 
bathing; CV V.18 (Vin II 123.20) for bhikkhus sleeping on beds scattered over with flowers; CV V.19.1 (Vin II 
123.34) for bhikkhus eating while leaning against cushions.  
In this context also note how at CV V.19.2 (Vin II 124.8) Buddhist bhikkhus are rebuked for being ‘seyyathāpi gihī 
kāmabhogino’ because they ate from one dish, drank from one beaker, and shared one couch, cloth, covering 
and covering-cloth; and how at MV V.9 (Vin I 191) bhikkhus are similarly rebuked for respectively having got 
hold of cow, for having mounted a cow’s back, and for having touched the cow’s privy parts with lustful 
thoughts; and, finally, for killing a young calve.  
39 CV V.33.2 stipulates a dukkaṭa offence for learning or teaching metaphysics (lokāyata) as bhikkhus studying it 
were rebuked for being ‘seyyathāpi gihī kāmabhogino.’ Similarly for ‘worldly knowledge’ (tiracchānavijjā). 
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At Vinaya IV 91-92 a group of ascetic, proximate others (titthiyas) is denominated 
with the term ‘acelaka’ (‘one without cloth’).40 The denomination acela(ka) is a typical 
metonymical denomination.41 In terming a particular proximate other acela(ka) the 
Buddhist community is differentiating itself from that proximate other by highlighting 
in this denomination an ascetic custom (here, nakedness), expressed as the lack of a 
familiar practice among its members (the wearing of a ‘cloth’ or cela).42 The term 
acela(ka) therefore not only tells us a little bit about a real or imagined group of 
proximate others, but it also and mainly informs us how the monk-editors attached 
great importance to the practice of wearing a cloth of the Buddhist bhikkhus. In 
historical terms this means that the one denominated with acela(ka) might but not 
necessarily must have been acela, whereas the implied fact that the Buddhists were 
wearing a cloth most certainly was true, or at least, desired to be. 
The reflexive, dialectical aspect of metonymical denominations has also been noted 
by Jonathan Smith and William Green in their cultural theory of the other. 43 The latter, 
for instance, in stressing the importance of the semantic component of a society’s 
theory of the other cuttingly remarked that  
[T]he terminology it [i.e. a society] invents to describe and classify those besides 
itself, along with the social action such language entails, are primarily clues to its 
self-understanding.44 
He further noted that a society’s theory of the other is “an exercise in caricature” for, 
a society “does not simply discover its others, it fabricates them … .”45 With respect to 
metonymies this is easily understood. In metonymies such as acela(ka) only one aspect of 
 
                                                     
40 More specifically, the term acelaka is mentioned in Pācittiya XLI: “Whatever monk should give with his own 
hand solid food or soft food to a naked ascetic [acelaka] or to a wanderer [paribbājaka] or to a female wanderer 
[paribbājikā], there is an offence of expiation.” The Padabhājaniya gives for acelaka: “yo koci 
paribbājakasamāpanno naggo,” or “whoever being naked has reached (the stage of) a wanderer.” Cf. Vin IV 92; 
trsl. I.B. Horner BD II 348-9. See ‘MN I 342.23,’ fn. 24, p. 70.  
acela(ka) is used over a 180 times in the Suttapiṭaka. This shows that the term was frequently used to refer to 
the early Buddhist’s ascetic others. 
41 It may be noted that the reflections I make on the term acela(ka) in the Pāli Vinaya are by extension also 
valid for all (sections of) early Indian ascetic communities who used the term to refer to one of their real or 
imagined proximate others (or insiders). 
42 My explanation of the metonymical denomination acela(ka) is based on Smith’s cultural analysis of “the 
‘other’ represented metonymically.” He writes: “The metonymical model most frequently occurs in 
connection with naming. One group distinguishes itself from another by lifting up some cultural feature, 
expressed as the lack of some familiar cultural trait, the use of some unfamiliar cultural object (e.g., “fish-
eaters,” “garlic-eaters”), the presence of some marked physical feature (e.g., “whites,” “blacks”), or the 
characterization of difference by naming the other as a nonhuman species.” Smith ([1992] 2004: 232).   
43 See especially Smith  ([1992] 2004: 232-3). 
44 Green (1985: 49). 
45 Green (1985: 50). 
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the proximate other’s life is highlighted that, moreover, comes to represent this group 
of titthiyas (here the supposed fact that they were ‘without cloth’ and thus wandering 
naked). In the words of William Scott Green a society fabricates its proximate other by 
selecting, isolating, and emphasizing an aspect of another’s people’s life and 
making it symbolize their difference. To evoke the significant disparity of which 
otherness is composed, the symbol must correspond powerfully to the naming 
society’s sense of its own distinctiveness. …. . To be revealing and meaningful, it 
must reach inside the culture of the people who employ it, correlate to some piece 
of themselves that they believe prominently displays who they are, and induce 
response, perhaps fear or disgust, but also perhaps envy or respect. The 
construction of a theory of the other thus involves a double metonymy and a 
double distortion. In creating its others, a society confuses some part of its 
neighbor with its neighbor, and a piece of itself with itself, and construes each in 
terms of the other.46 
Bearing in mind these gained notions that through metonymies the proximate other is 
not just referred to but also ‘fabricated,’ and that through them a double dialectical 
process of (self-) definition is taking place, we can comprehend the additional value of 
metonymies to both one-to-one denominations and generic denominations. Through 
metonymies the possibility or the significance of an alternative practice or an internal 
ambiguity is reflected upon. Through these, alternative praxes and values are, so to 
speak, taken to the very boundaries of a community and experimented with. The result 
of such an ‘experiment’ is that at the end of the exercise the practice or value in 
question will either be internalized and further adopted, or alternatively, it will be 
rejected and marked as ‘other.’ It is important to underscore that the practice which 
comes to be rejected and marked as ‘other’ contributes as much to the ‘making-off’ of a 
community as the one which is internalized and adopted. The only difference being that 
the on-going definition of a community through rejection of what is so-called ‘other’ 
negatively takes shapes, effecting differences between one-self and one’s proximate 
other. These effected differences are highly significant. For, 
Difference is rarely something simply to be noted; it is, most often, something in 
which one has a stake. Above all, it is a political matter.47 
This is also true with respect to the processes of othering of the early Buddhist 
ascetic community. The importance of the differences marked between Buddhists and 
non-Buddhists during processes of othering, lies in the fact that they develop specific 
power relations. The negotiated differences start to represent typifying features on the 
 
                                                     
46 Green (1985: ibid). 
47 Smith ([1985] 2004: 252). 
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basis of which the Buddhist community can distance itself from its proximate other. 
And it is on the very ground of such formulated differences that the proximate other 
will be perceived and consequently treated as ‘other’ by the Buddhist community. A 
proximate other who desires to join the Buddhist ascetic saṅgha will first have to give up 
his ‘otherness’ to be able to become a Buddhist mendicant and to be recognized as such. 
Several regulations within the Pāli Vinaya can be understood within this framework, 
namely as aiming to dismantle the ‘otherness’ of candidates desiring the going forth. We 
can think, for instance, of the small regulations for aññatitthiyapubbas (‘those who 
previously belonged to a different ascetic community’) such as “if an aññatitthiyapubba 
comes naked (naggo āgacchati) a robe belonging to a preceptor should be looked about 
for.”48 Also the four month probation period (parivāsa) asked of certain 
aññatitthiyapubbas may be understood from this perspective.49 
To conclude, just as the discussed introductory stories referring to supposed 
practices of proximate others, also the metonymy ‘acela(ka)’ is reflective of the processes 
of othering of the early Buddhist ascetic community. Using the term acela(ka) to refer to 
some (groups of) ascetic, proximate others, the monk-editors show how they negotiated 
a ‘Buddhist’ identity in direct relation to these proximate others. Further, the use of the 
denomination acela(ka) reflects how in the existing reality - or in the imagined 
possibility  -  of nakedness as an ascetic practice, the importance of their own practice of 
wearing a cloth comes to be articulated. Finally, in using the term acela(ka) the 
difference between the practice of wearing a cloth and the ascetic practice of being 
naked comes to be marked as a typifying difference between themselves and their 
ascetic, proximate others.  
 
                                                     
48 Vin I 70: sace bhikkhave aññatitthiyapubbo naggo āgacchati, upajjhāyamūlakaṃ cīvaraṃ pariyesitabbaṃ. Directly 
following this instruction, another such regulation for aññatitthiyapubbas may be found: sace acchinnakeso 
āgacchati, saṃgho apaloketabbo bhaṇḍukammāya. (“If he comes without the hair of his head cut off, the Order 
should be asked for permission for shaving it close,” BD IV 89) 
49 Vin I 69 (BD IV 85): yo bhikkhave añño pi aññatitthiyapubbo imasmiṃ dhammavinaye ākaṅkhati pabbajaṃ, 
ākaṅkhati upasampadaṃ, tassa cattāro māse parivāso dātabbo. A notable exception to this four month probation is 
given to fire-worshipping jaṭilakas on the alleged basis that they are kammavādin and kiriyavādin and to 
aññatitthiyapubbas who are Sakyan by birth (Cf. Vin I 71; BD IV 89). Be as it may, it is noteworthy that the 
exception is granted on the basis of a shared and what must have been important similarity between the 
aññatitthiyapubba and the followers of the Buddha. See also Appendix ‘Labelling the Ascetic other,’ p. 145 ff., 
and p.168 ff. 
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Conclusion 
Though othering was a most important and dynamic process underlying the 
development of the early Buddhist ascetic community, it is a process that is generally 
not easy to identify and examine due to the normative nature of our sources. In this 
section we were to a certain extent able to break through the traditional story of the 
Pāli Vinaya and to identify some traces of the early Buddhist ascetic community’s 
processes of othering, thanks to our examination of the Pāli Vinaya’s multiple terms for 
ascetic others; our  particular attention to the term acela(ka); and our close reading and 
analysis of a selected group of Vinaya passages. I pointed out how already the presence 
of a wide array of terms referring to the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s ascetic others, as well 
as the stock phrase ‘seyyathāpi titthiya,’ are reflective of the dynamic, reflexive impact 
proximate others exerted on the development of the early Buddhist ascetic community. 
Further, we have seen how in the normative body of the Pāli Vinaya, both the 
metonymy acela(ka) and the references to real or imagined practices of proximate 
others, are reflective of the early Buddhist community’s on-going process of othering. 
More specifically, they showed how early Buddhist bhikkhus, or at the very least the 
monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya, reflected on the significance of their practices of 
wearing a cloth (cela) or a ‘Buddhist’ robe (cīvara) and of carrying an alms-bowl (patta) 
by considering the value of alternative practices of their so-called ascetic, proximate 
others. When observing the (real or imagined) possibility of not wearing any cloth 
(acela) or robe (acīvara) and to, hence, wander naked, the monk-editors revalued their 
own practice of wearing a cloth or robe and emphasized the importance to Buddhist 
bhikkhus to observe it. Otherwise, a meaningful difference between themselves and their 
proximate other could not be guaranteed. In their process of othering, they marked the 
difference (whether simply observed or negotiated) between themselves and their 
proximate other as a signifying difference. It is on the basis of such noted differences 
that the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s proximate other was related to and treated as ‘other.’ 
Similarly, we have seen how the monk-editors stressed the importance to Buddhist 
bhikkhus to adhere to the practice of carrying a begging-bowl by considering the value 
of the alternative practice of their ascetic, proximate others of not using a bowl (apatta). 
In the course of this discussion we also noted how ‘the’ householder could also be 
viewed as one of the early Buddhist bhikkhus’ proximate others. Several practices for 
Buddhist bhikkhus have been established in relation to their so-called householder 
other, as well as their reflection on and declaration of the (un)suitability of possessing 
certain objects. 
Finally, a last point may be made explicit. When during their processes of othering, 
Buddhist bhikkhus were considering the value of the practices of their so-called 
proximate others, they were, so to speak, temporarily ‘internalizing’ them and 
‘experimenting’ with them. On such moments they were, to use a Pāli Vinaya phrase, 
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‘seyyathāpi titthiyā or just like their ascetic, proximate others. In other words, the 
processes of othering of the early Buddhist ascetic community entailed an on-going 
flirtation with the other. 
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Appendix ‘Labelling the Ascetic other’ 
This appendix discusses in some detail the Pāli Vinaya’s denominations for the early 
Buddhist’s ascetic others by examining their reference field and occurrences in the text. 
One-to-One Denominations 
Nātaputta Nigaṇṭha; nigaṇṭha; nigaṇṭhasāvaka 
Pāli ‘Nātaputta’ concurs with Ardhamāgadhī ‘Nāṭaputta,’ being one of the various names 
current for Mahāvīra.1 The denomination ‘nigaṇṭha’ (with its variant spellings niggaṇṭha 
and nigandha)2 used in the Pāli Vinaya and other Buddhist texts to refer to Jain ascetics, 
also concurs with the internal naming policy of the early Jain ascetic community. This 
is, the Ardhamāgadhī term niyaṃṭha with its alternative forms nigaṇṭha and niggantha 
are one of the several denominations found in Jain texts to refer to their own ascetics.3 
Thus we have the many injunctions of the Jain Kappa Sutta being addressed to the 
‘niggantha’ and ‘nigganthi’ of the community,4 and the Āyāraṅga Sutta frequently 
referring to “the well-controlled Nirgrantha” or the “saṃjata niyaṃṭha.”5   
The Pāli term ‘nigaṇṭha’ bears “Māgadhism” in its spelling. Noticing that nirgrantha is 
the Sanskrit equivalent for Pāli nigaṇṭha, Jacobi correctly remarked that the expected 
form for Pāli should be ‘niggaṁtha,’ a form encountered in Ardhamāgadhī but not in Pāli. 
 
                                                     
1  See e.g. AS 125: II.15 § 17, trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 194. A variant spelling for AMg. Nāṭaputta is Nāyaputta. Among 
the other names/epithets found for Mahāvīra are Vaddhamāṇa (Skt. Vardhamāna) and Samaṇa. Cf. AS 124: 
II.15 § 15, trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 193. 
2 Cf. Jacobi 1880: 158. On the term nigaṇṭha, see also ‘MN I 342.23, or on the ascetic practice of nakedness.’ 
3 In addition to niyaṃtha (or nigaṇṭha and niggantha) other denominations may be found in Jain disciplinary 
texts referring to their ascetics. The AS addresses its precepts to the bhikkhu and bhikkhuṇi (e.g. AS 49: II). Also 
the terms muṇi (‘sage), acela (‘naked’) and aṇagāra (‘without home’) may be found, though the latter will be less 
frequently encountered in disciplinary texts. For muṇi, acela and aṇagāra see e.g. e.g. AS 28 -9: I.6.2 § 2 and I.6.3 
§ 1, § 2. For an overview of the various denominations of the Jain mendicant collected from the Jain 
disciplinary texts Kappa and Vavahāra-sutta, Nisīha-sutta and Jīyā-kappa see “The Jaina Religious: their Titles” in 
Caillat 1975, Atonements in the Ancient Ritual of the Jaina Monks, pp. 33-46 (translation from the French edition of 
1965).  
4 Cf. Kalpa-Sūtra, Schubring, ed. & tr., 1977 (1905). For a discussion of the Kappa Sutta, see p. 197. 
5 See e.g. AS 53: II.2.1.2 § 7, trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 94. 
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Jacobi therefore suggested that the Pāli form nigaṇṭha must have been adopted from a 
Māgadhī dialect, a fact he also observes for the Pāli term ‘Nātaputta,’ that with its 
Sanskrit form Jñatṛputra should have developed a palatal ñ instead of the dental n, this 
is, according to the phonetic laws of Pāli. Within Jacobi’s argumentation of the 
independent origin of the Jain community (cf. Section I ‘Scholarly Frameworks’), these 
“Māgadhisms” in the spelling of both nigaṇṭha and Nātaputta were drawn upon as 
testimony to the fact that “[N]igaṇṭha Nāṭaputta must have made part of the most 
ancient tradition of the Bauddhas, and cannot have been added to it in later times as 
both words conform, not to the phonetic laws of the Pāli language, but to those of the 
early Māgadhī.”6  
In the Pāli Vinaya, Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and his (lay) disciples are explicitly mentioned in 
only two separate narratives. At Mahāvagga VI.31 (Vin I 233, BD IV 318 ff.) we find 
Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta (i.e. Mahāvīra) dissuading his lay-follower (nigaṇṭhasāvaka) the 
general Sīha to go and see ‘the recluse Gotama.’ His dissuasion was in vain, however, as 
the general Sīha not only goes to meet the Buddha but also becomes the Buddha’s lay-
follower. When the general Sīha subsequently invites the Buddha and his order of 
bhikkhus to a meal, the nigaṇṭhas are presented as reacting rather emotionally. Thus we 
read how ‘Nigaṇṭhas, waving their arms, were moaning from carriage road to carriage 
road, from cross road to cross road in Vesālī: “Today a fat beast [pasuṃ], killed by the 
general Sīha, is made into a meal for the recluse Gotama, the recluse Gotama enjoys this 
meat [maṃsa], knowingly it was prepared for him, the deed [i.e. the killing of the 
animal] was done for his sake [paticcakamma].”’7 According to our Mahāvagga narrative, 
this Jain public condemnation would have stirred the Buddha to formulate a dukkaṭa 
offence for one who consumes meat when knowing that it had been especially prepared 
for him.8 Though the ascetic practice of abstaining from meat eating certainly knew 
some early Buddhist adherents and caused some intra-communal discussions on its 
 
                                                     
6 Jacobi 1880, op. cit.: 159. On the various Pāli, AMg., and Sanskrit forms for ‘nigaṇṭha’ see also Norman 1961: 
349f. 
7 Cf. Vin I 237: “ajja Sīhena senāpatinā thullaṃ pasuṃ vadhitvā samaṇassa Gotamassa bhattaṃ kataṃ, taṃ samaṇo 
Gotamo jānaṃ uddissakaṭaṃ maṃsaṃ paribhuñjati paṭiccakamman ti.”  (trsl. partly following I.B. Horner BD IV 
324).  
8 Cf. Vin I 238: “na bhikkhave jānaṃ uddissakataṃ maṃsaṃ paribhuñjitabbaṃ. yo paribhuñjeyya, āpatti dukkaṭassa. 
anujānāmi bhikkhave tikoṭiparisuddhaṃ macchamaṃsaṃ adiṭṭhaṃ asutaṃ aparisaṅkitan ti.” 
“Monks, one should not enjoy meat knowingly it was prepared for one. Whoever should enjoy [this meat], 
there is an offence of wrong-doing. I allow you monks, fish and meat [macchamaṃsaṃ] that are quite pure in 
three respects: if it is not seen, heard, suspected [to have been prepared for a monk].” (trsl. partly following 
I.B. Horner BD  IV 325) 
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(un)importance for leading a virtuous ascetic life,9 the actual issue expressed in this 
introductory story and dukkaṭa offence is not the meat eating in se but concerns the 
ethical question whether an ascetic can accept meat (and by extension any food) 
knowing that it had been prepared for his sake. Be as it may, this whole Mahāvagga 
passage is exceptional because it not only explicitly refers to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and 
his (lay-)disciples, but also because it openly accredits the nigaṇṭhas’ (albeit negative) 
influence on the formulation of an ascetic regulation, a rare feature for the traditional 
Pāli Vinaya.  
Further, regardless whether the recorded incident actually occurred or effected the 
formulation of the dukkaṭa offence, the passage strongly suggests that some Buddhists 
and Jains disagreed and debated on the question whether it was permissible to eat meat 
or fish that had been especially prepared for you. For, it is telling that for the monk-
editors this issue was evocative of nigaṇṭhas. Again, it should be stressed that the issue 
was not the meat or fish eating, but one’s degree of personal involvement in having 
alms-food prepared for his sake. Though Jains are well-known for having traditionally 
been strong advocators of strict vegetarian diets, passages of the Āyāraṅga Sutta 
suggests that this was not always the case. Early Jain ascetics, as has already been noted 
by Dundas and others,10 appeared to have been ‘pragmatic’ meat and fish eaters. This is, 
if meat or fish came to be donated as alms-food to a Jain ascetic, he was allowed to 
consume it on condition that the meat or fish had not been especially prepared for him, or 
did not contain too many bones. Regarding the latter, we read at Āyāraṅga II.I.10 § 5 
how: 
 “A [Jain] monk or nun on a begging-tour should not accept meat [maṃsa] or fish 
[maccha] containing many bones [bahukaṃṭaga], so that only a part of it can be 
eaten and the greater part must be rejected; for such meat or fish, &c., is impure 
and unacceptable.” 11 
 
                                                     
9 Among the more ‘ascetically inclined’ early Buddhist bhikkhus there certainly must have been advocators and 
practitioners of the ascetic practice of abstaining from eating meat and fish. The restrain from eating meat 
and fish was one of Devadatta’s dhutaṅgas, that was made an optional practice by the Buddha. This latter 
indicates that within the framework of the Vinaya it was not considered to be an essential practice for 
attaining the soteriological goal of mokkha. See also p. 75. 
For scholarly works treating the question of ‘vegetarianism’ in early Theravāda Buddhism and/or Jainism, see 
Asdorf & Bollée (ed.) 2010; Harvey 2003 (2000): 159ff (note, however, that he erroneously states that 
vegetarianism was practiced by Jains in the Buddha’s day); Schmithausen 1991a;  Schmithausen 1991b; 
Schmithausen 2009 and Stewart 2010. 
10 Dundas 1985. 
11 trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 114. See also AS II.I. 10 §6.  
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The presence of this precept (cp. also AS II.I.9 § 3 and  AS II.I.10 § 6) only makes sense 
in the reality that early Jain ascetics ate meat or fish. When considering this fact 
together with the many disciplinary prescriptions of the Āyāraṅga prescribing a 
nigaṇṭha to, as we have seen,12 strictly avoid alms food that has been especially prepared 
for him, it becomes reasonable to assume that our recorded introductory story in the 
Mahāvagga indeed alludes to a Jain-Buddhist dissension on the issue of eating meat 
knowing that it had been prepared for your own sake.  
A second (and already last) Pāli Vinaya narrative with an explicit nigaṇṭha reference is 
Cullavagga V.8 (Vin II 111, BD V 149-152) where Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta is mentioned in the 
standard list of the six so-called ‘heretical teachers’ who each in turn try to fetch a 
special sandalwood bowl that could only be caught by a perfected one with psychic 
powers (cf. DA ii 388). Needless to say Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, just as the other ‘heretical 
teachers,’ fails to catch the bowl, the honour being reserved for a Buddhist bhikkhu.  
ājīvika 
In the complete absence of primary ājīvika textual sources, we are unable to establish 
whether the denomination ājīvika was internally used by the so-called ājīvika-ascetics 
themselves. If it is nevertheless classified as a one-to-one denomination, it is because 
not only Buddhist texts, but also Jain texts use the term ājīvika (in AMg. ājīvaga) to refer 
to the followers of Makkhali Gosāla.13 The denomination ājīvika is found in the Aśokan 
inscriptions (‘ājīvikesu;’ ‘ājīvikehi’),14 further suggesting that it was a well-known and 
 
                                                     
12 Cf. p. 74 ff. 
13 From inscriptional evidence ājīvikas survived in India until the fourteenth/fifteenth century CE. Cf. 
Bronkhorst 2010: 266-7. On ājīvikas see Basham 1981 (1951), today still being the most comprehensive collation 
of ājīvika references taken from a wide variety of textual, sculptural and epigraphical sources. On the ājīvikas’ 
so-called philosophy of fatalism, see Bronkhorst 2000 and Bronkhorst 2002. 
It may be noted that another current Pāli form for ājīvika is ājīvaka. Though ājīvika is the favoured form in 
modern treatises on the subject, the most current form in the PTS edition of the Pāli canon is ājīvaka. Cp. 
Bronkhorst 2002: 521, n.3. 
For a discussion on the possible etymology of the term ājīvika, see Basham 1981 (1951): 101. 
Makkhali Gosāla is in Jain canonical literature termed Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta. On the alleged initial proximity 
between Mahāvīra and Makkhali Gosāla see especially the Jain Bhagavatī Sūtra. See also Basham 1981 (1951): 
39f. 
14 The denomination occurs in the Aśokan Edict VII on the Delhi-Torpa Pillar and supposedly in the Aśokan 
dedicatory inscriptions at the Barābar and Nāgarjunī Caves. In the Edict VII we thus read, in the edition and 
translation of Radhagovinda Basak: “देवानं िपये िपयदिस हेवं आहा (:―) धंममहामाता िप मे ते बहुिवधेस ु अठेसु 
आनुगिहकेस ुिवयापटा (,) से पवजीतनं चेव िगिहथानं च (;) सव(पासं)डसेु िप च िवयापटा (,) से संघठेिस िप मे कटे (,) इमे 
िपयापटा होहं ित ित (;) हेमेव बाभनेस ुआजीिवकेस ु िप मे कटे (,) इमे िवयापटा होहंित ित (|) िनघंठेस ु िप मे कटे (,) इमे 
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usual term within early Indian society to refer to the “ājīvika” ascetic community or to 
(one of) its members.  
In the Pāli Vinaya, ājīvikas are mentioned in nine different narratives. Though not 
disclosing a wide spectrum of information, the differing occurrences do nevertheless 
allow us, in a first instance, to confirm the historicity of the ājīvika movement. Both Vin 
II 130 and Vin III 135-137 confirm that ājīvikas constituted together an ascetic 
organisation that could be distinguished from others by mentioning ājīvakasāvakas or 
lay-followers of the ājīvikas. The very development of the term ājīvakasāvaka points to 
the fact that within early Indian society, certain householders identified themselves as 
being specific followers and/or supporters of ājīvikas, which could only be possible if 
ājīvikas were identifiable within the ascetic landscape as, precisely, ājīvikas. A certain 
coherence and distinctiveness of the ājīvika ascetics is also suggested by the mentioning 
of an ājīvikaseyyā or a ‘sleeping place for ājīvikas’ in the Bhikkhunivibhaṅga at Vin IV 
224. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
िवयापटा होहीत (;) नानापासंडसे ुिप मे कटे (,) इमे िवयापटा होहंित ित (|) पिटिविसठं पटीिविसठं तेसु तेस ुते (ते) (म)हामाता 
(|) धंममहामाता चु मे एतेसु चेव िवया(प)टा (,) सवेस ुच अंनेस ुपासंडसे ु (|)” (Aśokan Inscriptions, 1959: 108, emphasis 
added) 
“devānaṃ piye piyadasi hevaṃ āhā (:―) dhamamahāmātā pi me te bahuvidhesu aṭhesu anugahikesu viyāpaṭā (,) se 
pavajītanaṃ ceva gihithānaṃ ca (;) sava(pāsaṃ)ḍesu pi ca viyāpaṭa (,) se saṃghaṭhesi pi me kaṭe (,) ime viyāpaṭā 
hohaṃti ti (;) hemeva bābhanesu ājīvikesu pi me kaṭe (,) ime viyāpaṭā hohaṃti ti (I) nighaṃṭhesu pi me kaṭe (,) ime 
viyāpaṭā hohīta (;) nānāpāsaṃḍesu pi me kaṭe (,) ime viyāpaṭā hohaṃti ti (|) paṭivisiṭhaṃ paṭīvisiṭhaṃ tesu tesu te (te) 
(ma)hāmātā (|) dhaṃmamahāmātā cu me etesu ceva viyā(pa)ṭā (,) savesu ca aṃnesu pāsaṃḍesu (|)” 
“Thus says King Priyadarśī, the Beloved of the Gods: ― I have also employed the High state-officers called 
Dhamma-mahāmātas on many objects of favour or kindness, which may affect both ascetics and householders 
and they are also employed among all sects (or denominations). With regard to the interest of the 
congregation I have so ordered that they shall remain engaged (in their good). I have done this with regard to 
the Brāhmaṇas and the Ājīvikas also, so that they should remain employed (for their good). So also have I done 
this with regard to the Nirgranthas (Jainas), so that they should remain employed (for their good). With 
regard to various (miscellaneous) sects too I have done this that they should remain employed (for their 
good). The mahāmatas (High state-officers) of various kinds (are employed) to look after their respective 
duties, but the dhammamahāmatas are employed on such things and also on all other sects or denominations.” 
(trsl. Basak, Aśokan Inscriptions: 111-112, emphasis added) 
The other occurrence of ‘ājīvika’ would have been on the Barabar Hill Cave that treats dedicatory inscriptions. 
According to these inscripitions two caves would have been donated by Aśoka to ājīvikas. However, in both 
cases the reading of ‘ājīvika’ has been reconstructed, leaving thus some doubt whether ‘ājīvikas’ really were 
mentioned. Thus we have: “A. (1) लािजना िपयदिसना दवुाडसवसा (िभिसतेना) (2) (इयं) (िनगो)हकुभा िद(ना आजीिव) 
केिह (|) B. (1) लािजना िपयदिसना दवुा ― (2) डसवसािभिसतेना इयं (3) कुभा खलितकपवतिस (4) िदना (आजीिव) केिह 
(|)” (Aśokan Inscriptions, 1959: 153) “A. By King Priyadarśī, when he had been consecrated twelve years, was 
given (or granted) this Banyan-cave to the Ajīvikas. B. By King Priyadarśī, when he had been consecrated 
twelve years, was given this cave in the Khalatika hill.” (trsl. Basak, Aśokan Inscriptions: 154) 
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Of the last two referred to Vinaya passages it can be added that both the 
ājīvikasāvakas and ājīvikas are put in a rather poor light, reflecting a negative perception 
or rivalry sentiment of the monk-editors of the passages. Bearing reference to the 
members of a certain household, the ājīvika lay-followers at Vin III 135-137 are 
presented as both untruthful and as mistreating their daughter-in-law. At Vin IV 224 a 
certain man seeks to take revenge on bhikkhunī Thullanandā for having had him 
punished by the chief ministers because he tried to reclaim a store-room his deceased 
father once donated to the bhikkhunī saṅgha. A negative perception of ājīvika ascetics 
shines through when the man decides, as revenge, to make a sleeping place for ājīvikas 
(ājīvikaseyyā) near the ‘nunnery’ (bhikkunūpassaya) and when he asks them to talk down 
the bhikkhunīs. By presenting ājīvikas as vile speakers and as a (physically) threat for 
bhikkhunīs, the monk-editors of this passage betray their negative perception of ājīvikas. 
The same is true for Vin IV 91 where an ājīvika having just received food of a Buddhist 
lay-follower at a vihāra, is presented as ungrateful by speaking vilely about the Buddhist 
community to other ājīvikas.15 
In addition to confirming the historicity of the ājīvika community, and of providing 
some insights into the perception of the Buddhist monk-editors on this community, two  
other ājīvika occurrences in the Pāli Vinaya allow us to establish the fact that nakedness, 
as we have seen, was practiced by (certainly some) ājīvikas.16  
A somewhat isolated but interesting ājīvika reference occurs at Vin IV 74 where in a 
secondary introductory story to pācittiya XXXII, which prohibits Buddhist bhikkhus to 
participate in a group-meal (gaṇabhajana), we read how an ājīvika ascetic and close 
relative to King Seniya Bimbisāra of Magadha expresses his desire to the latter to 
organize “a meal for all the heretics” (sabba-pāsaṇḍika-bhatta). The rāja agrees on the 
condition that the ājīvika “would first entertain the bhikkhu saṅgha with the Buddha at 
their head.” On the ājīvika’s subsequent invitation of the Buddha and his bhikkhu saṅgha 
to the group-meal, the Buddha modifies the previously formulated pācittiya precept to 
allow Buddhist bhikkhus to participate in a “samaṇa-bhatta-samaya” or a “meal time for 
recluses.” In the light of our previous discussion of direct contact opportunities this is a 
very interesting passage as it points, once again, to the close interaction possible 
between the members of the various ascetic communities.  
Finally there are two more references to ājīvikas which, as Johannes Bronkhorst 
noted, are “least informative.”17 For beyond confirming the fact that the ājīvikas referred 
 
                                                     
15 See p. 108 ff. where the complete Vinaya passage is discussed in great detail. 
16 Thus Vin I 290-292 and Vin III 212 where naked Buddhist bhikkhus are being mistaken for ājīvikas. See p. 129 
for a critical discussion of these Vinaya passages.   
17 Cf. Bronkhorst 2000: 511 who also offers an examination of the ājīvika occurrences in the Pāli Vinaya as well 
as in some Pāli Suttas. 
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to in these passages (Vin I 291 and Vin II 284) were ājīvikas, they do not disclose any 
other type of information. Thus we have Upaka the ājīvika at Vin I 291 asking the 
Buddha about his teacher when the latter was on his way to Isipatana to teach dhamma 
after having attained enlightenment. And at Vin II 284 we read how ‘a certain ājīvika’ 
who had picked up a mandārava flower was asked by the venerable Mahākassapa 
whether he knew about the Buddha’s nibbāna.  
paribbājaka (one-to-one) 
See the lemma under the section of generic denominations, where I argue that the term 
could both have had a one-to-one correspondence, as well as a general reference field to 
refer to any ascetic of any community.  
jaṭila 
The term jaṭila as a one-to-one denomination bears reference to a particular group of 
brāhmaṇa ascetics whose headdress, as indicated by the term jaṭila (‘matted hair’) itself, 
constituted one of their important distinguishing characteristics.18 The brāhmaṇa 
identity of jaṭilas or ‘matted hair ascetics’ is seen confirmed at various places in the Pāli 
Vinaya.19 
It is, for instance, unambiguously stated at Vin I 25 (BD IV 35) where the narrative 
refers to the jaṭila Uruvelā-Kassapa with the term ‘brāhmaṇa.’ The brāhmaṇa identity is 
further evident from the jaṭilas’ socio-geographical location. The jaṭilas in the Pāli 
Vinaya are socio-geographically linked with ‘hermitages’. This is, they are found 
residing in an assama (Skt. āśrama) that, moreover, is said to be equipped with a ‘fire-
room’ (agyāgāra). Some Pāli Vinaya narratives further specify that the assama is being 
located within an arañña or forest. Finally, their brāhmaṇa identity can also be inferred 
from what jaṭilas are recorded to be doing, namely, as making sacrifices ([mahā]yañña, 
Skt. yajña).20 As executors of sacred sacrifices jaṭilas constituted, just as the Buddhist 
 
                                                     
18 Within the prescriptive Dharmasūtras (ed. & trsl. Patrick Olivelle 2000) the jaṭila headdress is prescribed for 
the vānaprastha. The DS of B. (2.11.15), for instance, says of the vānaprastha that ‘he shall wear matted hair 
[jaṭila] and clothes of barks or skin’. Cp. DS of V 9.1. Also the DS of G. prescribes the same for the vaikhānasa or 
anchorite at 3.34: ‘he shall wear matted hair and clothes of bark or skin.’ The brahmacārin or student may also 
wear matted hair. See e.g. DS of G. (I.27): ‘students may shave their heads completely, wear their hair matted, 
or keep just the topknot matted.’ 
19 On the historical question whether the early Buddhist ascetic community evolved in a brāhmaṇa 
(ideological) dominated environment, see Bronkhorst 2007; Bronkhorst 2010 and Schlieter 2010. For an 
analysis of ‘brāhmaṇa’ in early Buddhist texts, see Tsuchida 1991. For a study of the representation of the 
brāhmaṇa sacrifice, see Freiberger 1998.  
20 It may be noted that in the Dharmasūtras the forest hermit (who wears matted hair, jaṭila) is required to 
establish and maintain the sacred fire. Cf., e.g., DS of V 9.10. 
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bhikkhu saṅgha, a merit-making field for donating householders. In this respect jaṭilas 
were competitors of the early Buddhist bhikkhu. This competitiveness is nicely reflected 
in the following Pāli Vinaya ( I 26-27) passage: 
Now at that time a great sacrifice (made by) the jaṭila Uruvelakasspa was going 
forward, and the entire (population of) Anga and Magadha, taking abundant solid 
food and soft food, wanted to go (to it) . . . . and then it occurred to the Jaṭila  
Uruvelakassapa . . . if the great recluse [mahāsamaṇa, i.e. the Buddha] does a 
wonder of psychic power before the populace, the great recluse’s gains and 
honour will much increase, my gains and honour will decline. (trsl. I.B. Horner BD 
IV 36-37) 
It is interesting to note how jaṭilas as competitors of the early Buddhist bhikkhu stand 
out in the Pāli Vinaya. This is, compared to nigaṇṭhas and ājīvikas,  jaṭilas are dealt with 
differently. A most obvious example is the preferential treatment given to jaṭilas who 
wish to go forth into the Buddhist bhikkhu saṅgha. At Vinaya I 69-71 (BD IV 85-89)  we 
learn that whoever is an aññatitthiyapubba, this is, one who previously belonged to a 
different ascetic community, and who wishes to go forth into the Buddhist bhikkhu 
saṅgha needs to first undergo a four month during probation period (parivāsa). 
Exception is given, however, to aññatitthiyapubbas who are Sakyan by birth (jātiyā 
Sākiya)21 and, interestingly, to fire-worshipping (aggika) jaṭilas too.22  
Another remarkable difference between jaṭilas and nigaṇṭhas and ājīvikas is their 
narratological treatment. Though direct and indirect contact with nigaṇṭhas and ājīvikas 
constituted a dynamic and dialectic force in the development of the early Buddhist 
community, the explicit mentioning of nigaṇṭhas and ājīvikas appeared, as we have seen, 
to have been something to be avoided in the Pāli Vinaya. As we have pointed out a few 
times, the normative and traditional character of the Pāli Vinaya certainly partly 
accounts for this near silence. If the Pāli Vinaya would openly accredit the ascetic 
organisation and practices of samaṇa others to have inspired ascetic developments 
within the bhikkhu saṅgha, it would directly affect both the authority of the Buddha and, 
herewith correlated, the authority of the Pāli Vinaya itself. In this light, one 
understands how explicit references to samaṇa others in the Pāli Vinaya was something 
to be avoided, or how positive acknowledgements of their contribution was simply not 
done.  
 
                                                     
21 This is a special privilege given to the Buddha’s relation. 
22 The reason given is that jaṭilas would be affirming deeds (kammavādino) and affirming what ought to be done 
(kiriyavādino). 
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In comparison to samaṇa others, jaṭilas receive a different narratological treatment. It 
is not so that they are mentioned in much more separate narratives of the Pāli Vinaya,23 
but in the narratives where they do occur their presence and interaction with the 
Buddha is unproblematic.   
In the famous section of ‘The Wonders at Uruvelā’ (uruvelapāṭihāriyaṃ) with the three 
jaṭila Kassapas (BD IV 46ff., Vin I 35ff.), for instance, a remarkably long and intense 
interaction is recorded between the Buddha and the jaṭila Uruvelā-Kassapa. Before the 
jaṭila Uruvelā-Kassapa decided to become a disciple of the Buddha, we find the Buddha 
staying at his assama. While staying in this assama, the Buddha is being provided with 
food by this very jaṭila and performs one psychic wonder after the other.24 Among the 
many wonders the Buddha performed there is the chopping of wood when wood could 
not be chopped and the kindling of the sacred fires when the sacred fires of the jaṭilas 
could not be kindled. These two wonders are significant, for unlike many other passages 
in Buddhist texts, the Buddha is found here not condemning the brāhmaṇical practice of 
sacred fire, but as offering help for enabling its very execution. After each psychic 
wonder performed by the Buddha (the Pāli Vinaya gives the numerical total of 3500 
wonders) the jaṭila Uruvelā-Kassapa reflects: “Truly the great recluse [mahāsamaṇa] is of 
great psychic power . . . but yet he is not a perfected one as I am [na tv eva ca kho arahā 
yathā ahan ti],” until the Buddha, losing patience, decides to deeply stir Uruvelā-Kassapa 
with a saṃvega effect.25 How does the Buddha bring about this saṃvega effect or deep 
realization? Not by performing another 3500 psychic wonders, but with the following 
plain remark: “Neither are you, Kassapa, a perfected one [n’eva kho tvaṃ Kassapa arahā] 
nor have you entered on the way to perfection [na pi arahattamaggaṃ saṃāpanno], and 
that course is not for you by which you either could be a perfected one or could have 
entered on the way to perfection.” Hearing this, Uruvelā-Kassapa wishes at once to go 
forth, and so he does. He goes forth together with his 500 disciples and, as the narratives 
continues, he and his disciples all let their “hair (kesa), their braids (jaṭā), their bundles 
 
                                                     
23 jaṭilas (whether individual jaṭilas or groups of jaṭilas) occur in four distinct narratives in the Pāli Vinaya. Vin I 
24ff. (BD IV 46ff.) being the famous section of ‘Wonders at Uruvelā’ with the ‘going forth’ of the three jaṭila 
Kassapas and their disciples into the Buddhist saṅgha; Vin I 69-71 (BD IV 85-89) containing the exception for 
aggika jaṭilas to the probation period; Vin I 245ff. (BD IV 336ff.) where Keniya the Jaṭila invites the Buddha and 
his order of bhikkhus for a meal; Vin IV 107ff. (BD II 382ff.) where the Buddhist bhikkhu Sāgata stays in the fire-
room of Ambatittha the Jaṭila and remains unaffected by the venomous snake because of his psychic powers.  
24 Note how within the Dharmasūtras (ed. & tr. Patrick Olivelle 2000), vānaprasthas or forest hermits are 
prescribed to receive guests in their hermitage and provide them with almsfood. See e.g. DS of V 9.7-8: ‘when 
guests come to his hermitage, [he should] honor them with almsfood of roots and fruits. He should only give, 
never receive [… ].’ 
25 Cf. BD IV 42-43, Vin I 32: “Now, suppose I should deeply stir [samvejjayyaṃ] this matted hair ascetic [imaṃ 
jaṭilaṃ]?” 
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on carrying-poles (khārikāja-missa) and their implements for fire-worship (aggihutta-
missaṃ) be carried away in the water.” In other words, the jaṭilas are shedding off the 
attributes of their ascetic identity.  
When considering the different legal (i.e. probation period) and narratological 
treatment of jaṭilas in the Pāli Vinaya, we can conjecture that jaṭilas were perceived and 
related to, at the very least by the monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya, as a different type of 
dialectic other than the nigaṇṭha or ājīvika other. The question that presses itself then is 
why? Why were jaṭilas and not (also) nigaṇṭhas and ājīvikas excluded from the probation 
period (parivāsa) in the Pāli Vinaya? Why is the interaction with the Buddha and the 
three jaṭila Kassapas of Uruvelā, or with Keniya the jaṭila not problematized? Or why 
does the overall representation of jaṭilas in the Pāli Vinaya not follow the representative 
pattern of nigaṇṭhas or ājīvikas?  
One possibility for the different treatment of jaṭilas is that they were considered to be 
less ‘proximate’ than nigaṇṭhas or ājīvikas. With Jonathan Smith’s concept of ‘proximate 
other’ we have seen how contact with a proximate other is more challenging and 
problematic than contact with a remote other. The proximity of a proximate other was 
one that needed to be dealt with. When considering that within the basic division of the 
early Buddhist saṅgha’s wider environment nigaṇṭhas and ājīvikas were just as Buddhist 
bhikkhus located within the samaṇa realm, we understand how the proximity of 
nigaṇṭhas and ājīvikas offered a greater challenge than jaṭila brāhmaṇas who were located 
within the ‘non-samaṇa’ realm. This may explain why in the few instances in which 
nigaṇṭhas and ājīvikas are referred to explicitly they are held up to caricature or put in a 
bad daylight. Further, it also may account for the differing legal and narratological 
treatment of the jaṭilas. Being less proximate to early Buddhist bhikkhus than nigaṇṭhas 
and ājīvikas, the jaṭilas’ presence and interaction with the Buddha did not need to be 
problematized in a similar manner. However, though the differing proximity could in 
part account for the unproblematic references to the Buddha staying at a jaṭila’s assama 
and being provided with food by a jaṭila, or for the unusual long interaction of the 
Buddha with the three jaṭila Kassapas in the Mahāvagga section ‘Wonders at Uruvelā,’ it 
does not explain the function of these narratives. I would like to suggest that an 
important reason for these narratives to be included within the Pāli Vinaya lies in the 
fact that they establish the authority of the Buddha and the validity of his ascetic path to 
a ‘brāhmaṇa’ audience via a brāhmaṇa authority. This argument will now be expounded. 
Let us consider the Pāli Vinaya passage (Vin I 245, BD IV 336-337) where the Buddha 
is thanking Keniya the Jaṭila for having invited him and his bhikkhu saṅgha to a meal. 
When considering the complete narrative, we note a brāhmaṇa affirming the 
venerability of the Buddha in, so to speak, brāhmaṇa terms. The Vinaya narrative in 
question reads: 
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Then the Bhagavat, walking on tour, in due course arrived at Āpaṇa. Keniya the 
Jaṭila heard: “Verily, the recluse Gotama, the son of the Sakyans, who has gone 
forth from a Sakyan family, has reached Āpaṇa and is staying in Āpaṇa. A lovely 
reputation has gone forth concerning the Bhagavat Gotama, thus: . . . He explains 
with the spirit and the letter the Brahma-faring completely fulfilled and wholly 
pure. Good indeed it were to see perfected ones like this.” Then it occurred to 
Keniya the Jaṭila: “Now, what could I get conveyed to the recluse Gotama?” 
Then it occurred to Keniya the Jaṭila: “Now, those who were formerly seers of the 
brāhmaṇas [brāhmaṇānaṃ pubbakā isayo], makers of mantras, whose ancient 
mantras as sung, taught, and composed the brāhmaṇas of today still sing, still 
speak; they still speak what was spoken, they still teach what was taught, that is to 
say (by) Aṭṭhaka, Vāmaka, Vāmadeva, Vessāmitta, Yamataggi, Angirasa, 
Bhāradvāja, Vāseṭṭha, Kassapa, Bhagu – these abstaining from food at night, 
restrained from eating at the wrong time, (yet) consented to such things as drinks. 
“The recluse Gotama also abstains from food at night and is restrained from eating 
at the wrong time; the recluse Gotama is also worthy to consent to such things as 
drinks,” [...]. (trsl. I.B. Horner with minor modifications BD IV 336-337, emphasis 
added) 
This passage is very meaningful. The worthiness of the Buddha is here being 
explicitly stated by a brāhmaṇa and this in brāhmaṇa parlance. When noticing that the 
Buddha shares with the ancient seers (isi, Skt. ṛṣi) the practice of restrain from eating at 
‘the wrong time,’ and when deciding upon this that the Buddha is worthy of the same 
type of donation (here ‘drinks’) as the ancient seers (isi, Skt. ṛṣis), the brāhmaṇa Keniya 
the Jaṭila is placing the Buddha on the same pedestal as the ancient seers of the 
brāhmaṇas. The fact that the worthiness of the Buddha is explicitly expressed by a 
brāhmaṇa in brāhmaṇa terms (this is, the Buddha is being compared to ancient seers and 
not, for instance, to the Jina of the nigaṇṭhas) leads one to suspect that this narrative was 
intended for a brāhmaṇa audience and this, one may further postulate, to address some 
specific tenets of their so-called brāhmaṇical ideology. What is considered to be worthy 
of respect within the brāhmaṇical ideology are, among other things, the tradition of 
Vedic seers and brāhmaṇas themselves. For those brāhmaṇas, whether brāhmaṇa 
householders or jaṭilas, who desired to go forth into the Buddhist saṅgha, and who 
carried with them these tenets of  brāhmaṇical ideology, acknowledging the authority of 
the Buddha and the validity of his teachings could have given rise to conflict. Pāli 
Vinaya narratives such as the one with Keniya the Jaṭila in which the authority of the 
Buddha is confirmed via the authority of a brāhmaṇa must have encouraged brāhmaṇas 
who had gone forth into the bhikkhu saṅgha to (gradually) abandon the brāhmaṇical 
ideology they might have adhered to and that might have given rise to conflict, and to 
instead (gradually) accept and conform to the authority of the Buddha and his ascetic 
path.  
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Other examples may be drawn from the section ‘Wonders at Uruvelā. At several 
places within the section ‘Wonders at Uruvelā’ the authority of the Buddha is explicitly 
stated via the authority of a brāhmaṇa, more specifically, via the jaṭila Uruvelā-Kassapa. 
For instance, among the many psychic wonders that the Buddha performed while 
staying at Uruvelā-Kassapa’s assama, are the wonders of the Buddha arriving at the fire-
room before Uruvelā-Kassapa despite the fact that Uruvelā-Kassapa had departed for 
the fire-room first. When the Buddha would then offer the astounded Uruvelā-Kassapa a 
special fruit or flower he had plucked on his way to the fire-room, Uruvelā-Kassapa 
replied each time with the words: “No, great recluse, you alone are worthy of it, you 
alone eat it.”26 Though short, this answer is significant as it establishes the worthiness of 
the Buddha above the one of jaṭilas through the very authority of a jaṭila himself.  
Similarly, a little further in the section the superiority of the Buddha’s path above the 
one of jaṭilas is voiced by a jaṭila to a jaṭila. Once the jaṭila Uruvelā-Kassapa had gone 
forth together with his five hundred disciples, he was successively approached by Nadī-
Kassapa (head of three hundred jaṭilas) and Gayā-Kassapa (head of two hundred jaṭilas) 
who both asked about his experience of faring the Brahma-faring (brahmacariyā) under 
the Buddha. To their simple question: “Is this better, Kassapa?”27 Uruvelā-Kassapa 
powerfully answers: “Yes, friend, this is better.” 
Further, it may be noted that the distinctive brāhmaṇa language of the section 
‘Wonders at Uruvelā’ is also seen in the denomination ‘Angirasa’ (being the name of one 
of the Vedic seers) used to refer to the Buddha when he conquered with his psychic 
power the fierce serpent king who lived in Uruvelā-Kassapa’s the fire-room.28   
In conclusion, the Pāli Vinaya narratives with ‘Keniya the Jaṭila’ and ‘the Wonders at 
Uruvelā’ stand out not just for their unproblematic and, in the case of ‘the Wonders at 
Uruvelā,’ long and intense interaction of the Buddha with jaṭilas, but also for what they 
establish. What these narratives appear to do is the establishment of the authority of 
the Buddha and the validity of his ascetic path to a brāhmaṇa audience via a brāhmaṇa 
authority. The fact that jaṭilas as ascetic others were less proximate and, therefore, less 
problematic than nigaṇṭhas and ājīvikas cannot, as I have argued, fully account for their 
different legal and narratological treatment in the Pāli Vinaya. In general, it is against 
the normative structure of the Pāli Vinaya to explicitly refer to the early Buddhist 
bhikkhu’s ascetic others, regardless of their degree of proximity.29 One could suggest, 
 
                                                     
26 BD IV 39, Vin I 30: “alaṃ mahāsamaṇa, tvaṃ yev’ etaṃ arahasi, tvaṃ yev’ etaṃ paribhuñjāhīti.” 
27 BD IV 44, Vin I 33 (MV I.20.20, MV I.20.22): “idaṃ nu kho Kassapa seyyo ’ti. āmāvuso idaṃ seyyo ’ti.” 
28 BD IV 35, Vin I 25 (MV I.15.7). 
29 If the various ascetic others (samaṇa and brāhmaṇa) needed to be referred to (for whatever reasons) the 
monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya could and did appeal to the generic, indefinite term (añña)titthiya. 
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however, that the long and intense interaction of the Buddha with the three jaṭila 
Kassapas is due to the fact that jaṭilas formed one of the most prominent groups of early 
Buddhist “converts,” which is ultimately what the narrative ‘the Wonders at Uruvelā’ 
claims. But again, even if the narrative would contain a historical kernel, and jaṭilas 
formed indeed an important group of early Buddhist “converts,” it still would not 
account for the different narratological treatment of jaṭilas in general. Also nigaṇṭhas and 
ājīvikas went forth into the early Buddhist community, and yet, a similar narrative for 
these “converts” has not been developed. Part of the reason for these Pāli Vinaya 
narratives with jaṭilas must, therefore, lie in what they do: confirming the authority of 
the Buddha and his ascetic path. The fact that this is being established, as we have seen, 
in ‘brāhmaṇa’ terms and via the authority of a brāhmaṇa himself, made me suggest that 
these narratives were intended for brāhmaṇas. Finally, since the Pāli Vinaya is a text 
redacted by bhikkhus for bhikkhus, I would like to suggest that these narratives were 
directed at brāhmaṇas inside the Buddhist saṅgha. This is, these narratives may be seen to 
address those members of the Buddhist saṅgha who previously had been either a 
brāhmaṇa householder or a jaṭila and who, therefore, might have been active agents or 
passive carries of tenets of the so-called brāhmaṇical ideology. 
Generic Denominations  
sabbapāsaṇḍika 
Horner translates ‘sabba-pāsaṇḍika’ with “all heretics.” The term is used only once in the 
Pāli Vinaya. It occurs at Vin IV 74 where an ājīvika asks King Seniya Bimbisāra of 
Magadha to organize “a meal for all heretics” (sabba-pāsaṇḍika-bhatta). (Cf. above, p. 
144). It may be noted that Edict VII of Aśoka mentions respectively ‘sava(pāsaṃ)ḍesu’ 
‘nānāpāsaṃḍesu’, and ‘savesu … aṃnesu pāsaṃḍesu,’30 suggesting that the term 
pāsaṇḍa/pāsaṇḍika might have been a neutral and commonly used and understood 
umbrella denomination to refer to (ascetic of) all ascetic/religious folds within early 
Indian society. 
samaṇakuttaka 
The term samaṇakuttaka meaning “sham recluse” occurs in the introductory story to 
pārājika III. It is used at Vin III 68 ff. (BD I 116 ff.) in connection with the infamous 
Migalaṇḍika who deprived many Buddhist bhikkhus of their lives. According to the story, 
Buddhist bhikkhus being troubled because of contemplating on the impure asked 
 
                                                     
30 Cf. fn. 14.  
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Migalaṇḍika the samaṇakuttaka to deprive them of their lives. He did, wrongly thinking 
he was helping to cross over those who had not crossed (atiṇṇa).  
samaṇa-brāhmaṇa 
Within the Pāli Vinaya the compound samaṇa-brāhmaṇa (Skt. śramaṇa-brāhmaṇa) most 
regularly comes up with the stock phrase envisaging all groups of beings residing in the 
‘world,’ this is the loka with its “devas, Māras, and Brahmās; [and] with [its] samaṇas and 
brāhmaṇas [sa-samaṇa-brāhmaṇa], with its creatures [pajā], devas and men.”31  
Next to the Pāli Vinaya, the compound samaṇa-brāhmaṇa is also abundantly found in 
early Jain texts (AMg. samaṇa-māhaṇa) as well as being mentioned in the Aśokan 
inscriptions.32 Within the Sanskrit grammar Mahābhāṣya of the second century BCE 
grammarian Patañjali, the compound is cited as an example of a dvandva or a compound 
whose members oppose one another.33 Despite the fact that this dvandva compound 
suggests that, as Oliver Freiberger lucidly remarked, samaṇas and brāhmaṇas were 
considered to be two different groups within Indian society, it also suggests that they 
were considered, in some respect at least, to be similar, this is, to belong to – or to be 
constituting together - one larger category.34 Freiberger refers to this category as the 
category of ‘religious experts’ and argues that what is binding or bringing samaṇas and 
brāhmaṇas together into this compound – into this category of religious experts - is the 
fact that both samaṇas and brāhmaṇas function as a merit making field for donating 
householders. In other words, the samaṇa-brāhmaṇa compound brings together all 
ascetics of the early Indian landscape - to whom donating was generally considered to 
 
                                                     
31 See e.g. BD I 2 (Vin III 1): “so imaṃ lokaṃ sadevakaṃ samārakaṃ sabrahmakaṃ sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiṃ pajaṃ 
sadevamanussaṃ.” Also BD I 157 (Vin III 90). 
32 Within the Jain Āyāraṅga Sutta the compound samaṇa-māhaṇa appears, among other places, in a stock 
enumeration listing (groups of) individuals who subsist on food donations, e.g. AS II.1.2. §1: “behave 
samaṇamâhaṇe atihikavaṇavaṇîmae pagaṇiya,” meaning “many śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas, guest, paupers, and 
beggars.”  
For the occurrence of the samaṇa-brāhmaṇa compound in Aśokan edicts, see Anālayo 2009 where he notes how 
the sequence of the compound may vary both between edicts, and within one and the same edict and suggests 
that “[t]hough the sequence of the two terms employed in the early Buddhist discourses may indeed be 
reflecting a revaluation of the samaṇa vis-à-vis the Brahmin, similar to the tendency in the same discourses to 
mention the warriors (khattiya/kṣatriya) before Brahmins, Asoka’s edicts suggest that the sequence of such 
listings may not always have been invested with as much importance as nowadays assumed.” Cf. Anālayo 2009: 
155. 
33 Cf. Oliver Freiberger 2011.  
34 Cf. podcast on the Oslo Buddhist Studies Forum: "Freiberger, Oliver, 2011, Religion and Religions in the 
Construction of Early Buddhism." - Institutt for Kulturstudier Og Orientalske Språk.  
<http://www.hf.uio.no/ikos/forskning/nettverk/obsf/podcast/2011/obsf20110523.html>. Last accessed on 
the 10th of August 2014. 
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be beneficial, but simultaneously separates Buddhist bhikkhus, Jain bhikkhus, ājīvikas and 
other ‘samaṇas’ that might have been around at that time, from the group of brāhmaṇa 
ascetics. Both ‘samaṇa’ and ‘brāhmaṇa’ are umbrella terms, together referring to ‘the 
ascetics’ of society, individually each respectively referring to a samaṇa ascetic or leader 
and a brāhmaṇa ascetic or leader without, however, specifying the affiliation (in case of 
samaṇa) or the typifying practices or dress features (in case of brāhmaṇa). 
That the compound samaṇa-brāhmaṇa should be considered as bearing reference to a 
socio-historical category of religious experts is seen confirmed at various places within 
the Pāli Vinaya and other Buddhist texts where the compound is incidentally being 
referred to as a, so to speak, ‘donating category.’ At Vin III 44 (BD I 69-70), for instance, 
in one of the various secondary introductory stories to pārājika II, we read how King 
Seniya Bimbisāra is reminded by a bhikkhu [Dhaniya the potter] to once have said: “let 
the samaṇas and brāhmaṇas (samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ) enjoy gifts of grass, wood and 
water.”35 Early Buddhist bhikkhus who relied on the householders’ community for their 
material subsistence undoubtedly viewed brāhmaṇas in their specific capacity of merit-
making field as their competitors. It is in this light of competitiveness that we may 
understand the verses of thanks uttered by the Buddha to Keniya the Jaṭila for having 
invited and served him and his order of monks with a meal despite the fact, so we read, 
that he is one devoted to brāhmaṇas (brāhmaṇesu abhippasasanna) (cp. also p. 88). The 
verses of thanks read as follows: 
Sacrifices [yañña] are chief in fire worship [aggi-hutta-mukhā], Sāvitrī chief of 
(Vedic) metres, 
A king is chief of men, the ocean chief of waters, 
The moon is chief of the lamps of night, the sun chief of the luminaries 
For those giving alms, desiring merit, the Order is indeed the chief.” (Vin I 246, 
trsl. I.B. Horner BD IV 340, emphasis added) 
 
                                                     
35 Strictly speaking it is the venerable Dhaniya repeating the words of the king to the king himself. Vin III 44 
(BD I 69): ‘dinnañ ñeva samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ tiṇakaṭṭhodakaṃ paribhuñjantū ’ti.’ 
For another example in the Pāli Vinaya see Vin III 207 (BD II 37): “Then that robber-chief, taking the best 
meats of the cooked meat, tying (them up) in a leaf-packet, and hanging it up on a tree near the nun 
Uppalavaṇṇā, said: “Whatever recluse or brahmin [yo samaṇo yo brāhmaṇo] sees it, it is given (to him), let him 
take it, . . .  .”  
Another example where the compound samaṇa-brāhmaṇa is clearly understood as a ‘donating category’ may be 
taken from DN I 51.7-20 (14): “Lord, … there are various craftsmen . . .  [who] enjoy here and now the visible 
fruits of their skills [sandiṭṭhikaṃ sippa-phalaṃ upajīvanti], … [who] themselves are delighted and pleased with 
this, as are their parents, children and colleagues and friends, … [who] maintain and support ascetics and 
Brahmins [samaṇa-brāhmaṇesu], thus assuring for themselves a heavenly, happy reward tending towards 
paradise.” (trsl. Walshe 1987: 93, emphasis added) 
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samaṇa 
As noted in the previous section on Contact, in Buddhist texts the Buddha and 
Buddhist bhikkhus are referred to by outsiders (householders and non-Buddhist ascetics 
alike) with respectively ‘samaṇa Gotama’ and ‘samaṇa Sakyaputtiya.’ Such references 
account for the bulk of the samaṇa occurrences in the Pāli Vinaya. At Vin IV 74 we find, 
however, a samaṇa reference wherein the term is applied to refer to the category of 
samaṇa ascetics in general. When an ājīvika invites the Buddha and his bhikkhu saṅgha for 
a meal with the words: “The revered Gotama is gone forth; I, too, am gone forth. One 
who has gone forth is worthy to accept alms-food of one who has gone forth. Let the 
revered Gotama consent to (take) a meal with me on the morrow together with the 
Order of monks,”36 the Buddha accepts the invitation and formulates the following 
allowance: “I allow you, monks, to eat a group-meal at a meal-time for recluses 
(samaṇabhattasamaya).”37 Here samaṇa is generically applied, referring to all samaṇa 
ascetics within society. When considering references as this one, together with the facts 
that in direct contact, as we have seen, early Buddhists profiled themselves as samaṇas, 
it is clear that they considered themselves to fall under the reference field of the term 
‘samaṇa.’38 This is also true for the early Jain ascetics. Jain texts often use the term 
samaṇa as an epithet for Mahāvīra,39 and Jain ascetics are also recorded to be addressed 
by householders with ‘âusaṃto samaṇâ’ (‘o long lived samaṇa’), showing once again the 
wide currency of the term and hence the institution of ‘samaṇa’ in early Indian society. 
 
                                                     
36 Vin IV 74 (trsl. I.B. Horner BD II 311): “bhavaṃ pi Gotamo pabbajito ahaṃ pi pabbajito, arahati pabbajito 
pabbajitassa piṇḍaṃ paṭiggahetuṃ. adhivāsetu me bhavaṃ Gotamo svātanāya bhataṃ saddhiṃ bhikkhusaṃghenā ’ti.”  
37 The Padabhājaniya explains samaṇabhattasamaya with “samaṇabhattasamayo nāma yo koci 
paribbājakasamāpanno bhattaṃ karoti, samaṇabhattasamayo ’ti bhuñjitabbaṃ,” meaning: “whoever makes a meal, 
being one who has attained (to the stage of) a wanderer, this means that at the meal-time of recluses (a group-
meal) may be eaten.” (Vin IV 75; trsl. I.B. Horner BD II 312) 
It may be noted that outside the Pāli Vinaya one finds the term samaṇa more frequently used to refer to non-
Buddhist ascetics. Within the well-known Sāmaññaphalasutta (‘Sūtra Concerning the Fruit of Recluseship’), 
for instance, King Ajātasattu because of an auspicious full-moon night asks his ministers: “Can we not today 
visit some ascetic [samaṇa] or Brahmin [brāhmaṇa], to visit whom would bring peace to our heart?” On his 
question, the visit of the following ascetic leaders is suggested Pūraṇa Kassapa; Makkhali Gosāla; Ajita 
Kesakambalī; Pakudha Kaccāyena; Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta; Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta; and, finally, the Buddha. Cf. DN 
I 46 (trsl. Walshe 1987: 91). 
38 See also the Sāmaññaphalasutta where king Ajātasattu asks the Buddha whether samaṇas or brāhmaṇas gain 
visible fruits for having forsaken the world. Cf. n. 37. Before answering, the Buddha asks: “Abhijānāsi no tvaṃ 
mahā-rāja imaṃ pañhaṃ aññe samaṇa-brāhmaṇe pucchittho ti?” (DN I 51: 15, own emphasis)  
“Your majesty, do you admit that you have put this question to other recluses or to Brahmins?” (trsl. Walshe 
1987: 93, own emphasis). 
From the adjective ‘añña’ (aññe samaṇa-brāhmane) it is clear that the Buddha is considered to also belong to the 
samaṇa tradition.  
39 Cf. Kappasutta of Bhadrabāhu, ed. Jacobi, p.33: samaṇe bhagavaṃ Mahāvīre (trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 217). 
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Despite the facts that early Buddhist bhikkhus actively negotiated their right to the 
samaṇa denominator, and were perceived and recognized by outsiders to be samaṇas, 
they will not use the term samaṇa to refer to one another. This is, the term samaṇa will 
not be found applied internally in the Pāli Vinaya. To refer to its own members the Pāli 
Vinaya hosts, so to speak, its own set of terms.40 The point that needs to be stressed here 
is the fact that it is not because a term denoting an ascetic other and/or an ascetic 
category within Indian society is not applied internally, that this means that early 
Buddhists did not see themselves to fall under the term’s reference field, or that they 
could not positively associate with the ideas and ideals represented by the term. This is 
true not only for the term samaṇa but also, as we will see, for the generic denominations 
paribbājaka and (añña)titthiya. To be able to note how early Buddhist bhikkhus associate 
themselves with the ideas and ideals represented by the denominations they use for 
their ascetic others, helps us to better understand how the early Buddhist community 
perceived itself and related to its ascetic others within the Indian ascetic landscape. 
 
paribbājaka (generic) 
The term paribbājaka ‘wanderer’ (Skt. parivrājaka) is another term used in the Pāli Vinaya 
to refer to some - real or imagined - early Buddhists’ ascetic others. It appears to be a 
term that could be both applied with a one-to-one correspondence and generically.  
 
                                                     
40 The basic set being bhikkhu and bhikkhunī to which various qualifications can be added telling something 
about (1) the seniority of the bhikkhu or bhikkhunī (thera bhikkhu(nī) versus navaka bhikkhu(nī) ‘young,’ or ‘newly 
ordained’; and majjhima bhikkhu ‘a monk of middle standing’), or (2) about his or her qualities or shortcomings 
(appapuñña ‘of little merit;’ pesala ‘well-behaved;’ alajjin ‘shameless;’ patirūpa ‘suitable;’ appiccha ‘modest’; pāpa 
‘depraved;’ vyatta paṭibala ‘experienced and competent’); (3) about his ‘(im)purity’ (suddha bhikkhu anāpattika 
‘pure monks who are not offenders’ versus a bhikkhu sāpattika ‘a monk who is an offender’ [see e.g. Vin I 170]);  
(4) about his field of expertise (e.g. byatta vinayadhara ‘experienced, expert in discipline; suttantika ‘knowing 
the Suttantas;’ dhammakathika ‘teaching the dhamma;’ jhāyin ‘engaged in ‘jhāna’ [see e.g. Vin I 158] ); or (5) 
about their particular task in the running of the monastery (e.g. senāsanapaññāpaka ‘assigner of lodgings;’ 
bhattuddesaka ‘distributor of meals;’ yāgubhājaka ‘apportioner of conjey;’ phalabhājaka ‘approtioner of fruit;’ 
khajjabhājaka ‘apportioner of solid food;’ appamattakavissajjaka ‘disposer of trifles’ [see Vin IV 34; 155]; 
navakammikā bhikkhunī ‘a nun who is overseer of repairs’ [see e.g. Vin IV 211] ). For a systematic analysis of the 
various administrators and administrative roles in Indian Buddhist monasticism, see Silk 2008. Other terms 
current in the Pāli Vinaya to refer to their own Buddhist ascetics reflect the apprentice stage or teaching role 
of the members (e.g. a samaṇudda; samaṇera meaning ‘novice’ versus upasampanna ‘one who is ordained’); 
sikkhamānā ‘a female probationer;’ sāmaṇerī ‘a female novice’; and ācariya ‘teacher;’ upajjhāya ‘preceptor’). 
Other terms reflect the cohabitation of members (saddhivihārika ‘one who shares a cell;’ antevasin; antevāsika; 
antevāsibhikkunī  ‘apprentice’ ). 
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Who were the paribbājakas? 
Regarding the term’s possible reference field, differing scholarly opinions exist. Some 
scholars have argued to take the term paribbājaka in Buddhist texts as exclusively 
referring to brāhmaṇas while others claimed the term to be referring to all but Buddhist 
wanderers and still others to both Buddhist and non-Buddhist wanderers.41 Spurred by 
this scholarly dissension, Oliver Freiberger undertook a fresh contextual reading of the 
term in the Pāli canon and concluded that ‘paribbājaka’ should be understood as a 
general term for non-Buddhist ascetics whose particular ascetic affiliation the editors of 
the texts were unable or unwilling to identify. If differing scholarly opinion exists 
regarding the possible reference field of ‘paribbājaka,’ it is because the term is not 
univocally applied within Buddhist texts.  
The association of the term paribbājaka with brāhmaṇas is justified not only because 
the brāhmaṇa Dharmasūtras use the term parivrājaka to designate the fourth āśrama 
(‘order of life’),42 but also because in a few places within Buddhist texts the term is 
directly connected with brāhmaṇa. Thus we have, for instance, the ‘paribbājaka brāhmaṇa 
Sutta’ or the ‘Brāhmaṇa Wanderer Discourse’ in the Aṅguttara Nikāya.43 However, 
despite this fact that the term ‘paribbājaka’ may explicitly be linked with brāhmaṇa, it 
would be problematic to conclude on this basis that ‘paribbājaka’ in Buddhist texts 
exclusively refers to (a particular group of) brāhmaṇa ascetics, as some scholars have.  
The term seems at times to be used in simple apposition to the householder 
community, thus bearing ideally reference to any member of the ascetic landscape, or to 
anyone ‘having gone forth’ (pabbajita). In such cases, the term can generically be applied  
to refer to any ascetic without, however, specifying his or her affiliation. This accounts 
for the many ambiguous paribbājaka references. 
Further complexifying the reference field of paribbājaka is the fact that the term is 
also found in enumerations of groups of ascetics, raising the possibility that paribbājaka 
could also have stood for a demarcated and identifiable group of wanderers within the 
ascetic landscape.44  
Differing possibilities of the term’s reference field also occur in the Pāli Vinaya. There 
are eighty-two paribbājaka occurrences spread over thirteen individual narratives in the 
 
                                                     
41 See Freiberger 1997: 121-122 for an overview of the various scholarly opinions regarding paribbājaka’s 
reference range. 
42 e.g. see DS of B 2.11.16. On the āśrama system, see Olivelle 2004 (1993). 
43 AN I 157. See also Freiberger 1997: 124 (1.2 ‘brāhmaṇa paribbājaka’) 
44 See for instance AN III 276ff. giving the following enumeration of ten groups of ascetics: ājīvika; nigaṇṭha; 
muṇḍasāvaka; jaṭilaka; paribbājaka; Māgaṇḍika, Tedaṇḍika, Aviruddhaka, Gotamaka; and Devadhammika. Cp. 
Freiberger 1997: 127. 
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Pāli Vinaya.45 While some of these occurrences legitimate the scholarly proposition that 
paribbājaka might have denoted a recognized ascetic organisation or institution within 
the ascetic landscape, other occurrences point, as we will see, to a generic application of 
the term. 
paribbājaka – a specific wandering institution  
According to a tradition recorded in the first chapter of the Mahāvagga (Vin I 39-42), 
Sāriputta and Moggallāna were paribbājakas prior to having become disciples of the 
Buddha. When they went forth into the Buddhist saṅgha, they were joined by some two 
hundred and fifty other paribbājakas who had all up till then been leading the 
brahmacariyā life under the leadership of paribbājaka Sañjaya. In this recorded tradition, 
paribbājakas appear to have constituted a wandering community. Other references in the 
Pāli Vinaya support this possibility that individual paribbājakas might together have 
constituted a unit or an identifiable organization within the ascetic landscape. Thus we 
have at Vin III 240-1 a paribbājaka who, after having exchanged cloaks with a Buddhist 
bhikkhu, returns to the paribbājaka-ārāma or paribbājaka park. Such a reference to a park 
exclusively allotted to paribbājakas raises the possibility that paribbājakas formed an 
organized community. Further, at Vin II 130 we read of the infamous group of six 
bhikkhus that are mistaken for paribbājakas by a Buddhist lay-follower.46 The very fact 
that Buddhist bhikkhus could be mistaken for paribbājakas also suggests this possibility 
that paribbājakas could be identified and distinguished from other ascetic members of 
Indian society and might thus have constituted a separate community or institution. 
The same is true for Vin IV 120 and Vin IV 91. At Vin IV 120 Buddhist bhikkhus are 
prescribed to ‘disfigure’ their robe when new.47 According to the accompanying 
introductory narrative, the supposed reason behind this rule was the need to visually 
distinguish the robe (cīvara) of a Buddhist bhikkhu from the one of paribbājakas. Thus we 
read that when hirelings of the king (rājabhaṭa) retrieved the stolen robes of both 
paribbājakas and Buddhist bhikkhus and asked the latter to come and identify their robes, 
Buddhist bhikkhus were unable to do so. Being criticized for this, as the narrative 
structure of introductory stories demands it, the Buddha would have thereupon 
prescribed the precept to ‘disfigure’ a new robe, implying that a visual distinctiveness 
from paribbājakas’ robes would thus be ensured. What is of interest here is the need to 
 
                                                     
45 The number of individual passages excludes the Parivāra. 
46 The fact that the bhikkhus were wandering with sunshades (chatta) caused the lay-follower to mistake them 
for paribbājakas.  
47 This is applying one of the three modes of disfigurement (dubbaṇṇakaraṇa), being the application of a dark 
green, or mud(-coloured), or black dot or smudge on the new robe. See pācittiya LVIII and BD II 407 n. 1 for 
more information on the interpretation of this practice. 
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ensure a visual distinctiveness from paribbājakas (whether factual or imagined), 
confirming the possibility that paribbājakas might have constituted a group of 
wanderers distinguishable from other ascetic groups such as the Buddhist one. Also at 
Vin IV 91 a certain distinctiveness and thus unity of paribbājakas is implied when 
pācittiya XLI prohibits a bhikkhu to give food with his own hands to acelakas, paribbājakas 
and paribbājikās.48 These Pāli Vinaya passages make the proposition that paribbājakas 
constituted an identifiable and separate group of ascetic wanderers legitimate. 
paribbājaka – generic denomination 
However, at other places the term does not seem to designate a concrete, separate 
group of wanderers, but appears to function as a general denomination that can bear 
reference to all or any ascetic(s) of the early Indian society. That ‘paribbājaka’ could bear 
reference to differing ascetics when functioning as a generic denomination is seen 
confirmed in the fact that the compound ‘paribbājaka-samāpanna’ (‘having reached the 
stage of a wanderer) is in the Padabhājaniya once used to explain ‘samaṇa’ and once to 
explain ‘acelaka.’49 
Though early Buddhists will not be seen to use the term to refer to one another (for 
the same reasons as mentioned above for the term samaṇa, namely they had their own 
set of terms to refer to one another), they nevertheless appeared to consider themselves 
to fall under the term’s reference field when generically applied.  
At Vin I 101 King Bimbisāra of Magadhā observing that ‘aññatitthiya paribbājakas’ or 
‘paribbājakas having a different doctrine’ gained adherents by regularly coming together 
to recite dhamma, suggested the Buddha to do the same.50 The need for the qualification 
of paribbājaka with the adjective aññatitthiya (‘having a different doctrine’) is telling. The 
qualification aññatitthiya suggests that without it also Buddhist bhikkhus would have 
been designated with the term paribbājaka.  
Further, from the manner in which the Padabhājaniya explains ‘paribbājaka’ and 
‘paribbājikā’ it is clear that the compilers considered their fellow bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs 
to fall under the reference field of these terms. The commentary reads:  
 
                                                     
48 For a detailed discussion of the introductory story to pācittiya XLI see ‘Contact Possibilities at ‘vihāras,’ p. 108 
ff. For a discussion of ‘acela(ka)’ see p. 69 ff. and p. 133 ff. 
49 See respectively the Padabhājaniya to pācittiya XXXIII (Vin IV 75) and pācittiya XLI (Vin IV 92). See also Vin 
IV 224 mentioning the compound samaṇaparibbājaka which Horner views as a kharmadhāraya, thus taking the 
meaning ‘a paribbājaka who is a samaṇa.’ I see, however, no reason to exclude the possibility that this might be 
a dvandva compound.   
50 On the translation of ‘aññatitthiya paribbājaka’ as ‘paribbājakas having a different doctrine,’ see 160 ff. where 
the concerning Vinaya passage is also discussed in more detail. 
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paribbājako nāma bhikkhuṃ ca sāmaṇerañ ca ṭhapetvā yo koci paribbājakasamāpanno. 
paribbājikā nāma bhikkhuniñ ca sikkhamānañ ca sāmaṇeriñ ca ṭhapetvā yā kāci 
paribbājikasamāpannā.51 
Which may be translated as: 
paribbājaka means: setting aside [a Buddhist] monk and [a Buddhist] novice, 
whoever [else who] has entered the wanderer[’s-lifestyle]. paribbājikā means 
setting aside [a Buddhist] nun and a [Buddhist] female probationer, whoever [else 
who] has entered the wanderer[’s-lifestyle].52 
The reason why the Padabhājaniya provides a negative definition of the term lies in 
the fact that it explains ‘paribbājaka’ and ‘paribbājikā’ contextually, this is, it explains the 
terms in explicit relation to the precept it comments upon.53 In other words, the 
Padabhājaniya aims to further help a correct understanding and application of the 
precept. For instance, pācittiya XLI prohibits, as we have seen, a bhikkhu from giving food 
to an acelaka, paribbājaka and paribbājikā. When the Padabhājaniya to this precept 
separates (ṭhapetvā) Buddhist ascetics from the category of paribbājaka it means - in 
specific relation to the precept - that the bhikkhu, is allowed to give food to a fellow 
bhikkhu but is prohibited from giving it to other paribbājakas.54 The fact that the 
commentary finds it necessary to explicitly separate Buddhist bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs 
 
                                                     
51 Vin IV 92; BD II 349. 
52 I.B. Horner translates ‘yo koci paribbājakasamāpanno’ with ‘whoever has reached (the stage of) a wanderer,’ 
hereby showing that she understands paribbājaka as not referring to an individual wanderer but rather as 
representing, as it were, paribbājaka-tva, i.e. the (ideal) qualities of a paribbājaka. I join Horner to understand 
paribbājaka as not referring to an individual wanderer here, but instead of taking it to represent the abstract 
ideal of wanderer, I understand it rather as representing the ‘wandering lifestyle’ in opposition to the 
householder’s lifestyle.  
53 Not all words in the Padabhājaniya are explained in the same manner. Some are explained in a typical 
thesaurus fashion when either a near-synonym is offered or a (technical) definition of the term. These 
lexicographical explanations are complete on their own and can be understood in isolation from the precept it 
comments upon. On the other hand, we also have terms explained in specific relation to the precept. For a 
correct understanding of this explanation the broader Vinaya context needs to be considered. In a certain 
sense, these ‘contextual’ definitions provide an additional dimension to the precept; they (can) adjust or 
further specify how the precept needs to be understood or applied. This is here the case with ‘paribbājako’ and 
‘paribbājikā’. 
54 Similarly for the Padabhājaniya’s explanation of (1) the term paribbājikā mentioned in pācittiya XXVIII at Vin 
IV 285 (Bhikkhuṇīvibhaṅga) and of (2) the terms paribbājaka and paribbājikā mentioned in pācittiya XLVI at Vin 
IV 302 (Bhikkhuṇīvibhaṅga).  
It may be noted that Freiberger draws upon these same Padabhājaniya passages to argue that bhikkhus as 
followers of the Buddha wished to dissociate themselves from the terminology of other ascetics and did not 
want to be considered to be paribbājakas. Cf. Freiberger 1997: 125 & 130. 
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from the terms ‘paribbājaka’ and ‘paribbājikā’ evidences the fact that the monk-editors 
considered their fellow bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs to fall under the terms’ reference field.  
 
Concluding this excursion of the possible reference fields of the term paribbājaka, one 
may note that the term could be classified both as a one-to-one denomination (when 
referring to a representative of the paribbājaka institution that could be distinguished 
and demarcated from other ascetic organizations) and as a generic denomination (when 
bearing reference to any ascetic, this is to any member within the Indian society who 
‘went forth’). It may be noted that within the Jain Āyāraṅga Sutta the terms parivāyaa 
and parivāia, being the Ardhamāgadhī equivalents for Pāli paribbājaka and paribbājikā, are 
also seen used as generic denomination, leaving the affiliation of the denoted ascetic 
other undetermined.55 
aññatitthiya 
The compound aññatitthiya appears in the syntactic function of both adjective and 
substantive in the Pāli Vinaya. When employed as an adjective, aññatitthiya further 
defines the term paribbājaka. As adjective, aññatitthiya may be rendered as (a paribbājaka) 
‘having a different (añña) doctrine/community’ or (a paribbājaka) ‘following a different 
path to liberation.’ As substantive, aññatitthiya may be understood as ‘(an adherent or 
the head of) a different ascetic community.’ 
The term aññatitthiya is mentioned in four distinct narrative contexts, all of which 
belong to the Khandhaka. Just as the other generic denominations discussed thus far, 
aññatitthiya is in its core an indefinite term, referring to early Buddhists’ ascetic others 
while leaving their specific affiliation, doctrine, or teacher undetermined. Peculiar to 
the term aññatitthiya, however, is the fact that it not only generically refers to a group of 
early Buddhists’ real or imagined ascetic, proximate others (titthiyas), but that it also 
establishes a relation of differentiation with another group of titthiyas. The term’s 
differential nature is established by its first constituent ‘añña’ meaning ‘other’ or 
‘different.’ The ‘añña’-component indirectly relates to a different, this is, a second group 
of titthiyas from whom the (group of) individuals (who are directly pointed to with the 
term aññatitthiya) is differentiated. We will see how in all four Pāli Vinaya narratives the 
‘añña’-component of the term unmistakably relates to the Buddha and/or his disciples, 
suggesting that early Buddhist bhikkhus considered themselves, and were considered by 
others, to be titthiyas, at least for some time. 
 
 
                                                     
55 See e.g. AS 53: II.1.3 §2 (Jacobi SBE 22: 94). 
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A first occurrence of aññatitthiya can be found in the second section of the 
Mahāvagga (MV II 1-4) where the uposatha ceremony comes to be prescribed and 
regularized into the bimonthly recital of the Pātimokkha by a complete Order. The 
accompanying narrative relates that lying at the basis of the Buddha’s 
institutionalization of the uposatha ceremony is the custom of ‘aññatitthiya paribbājakas,’ 
which King Seniya Bimbisāra brought to the Buddha’s notice, to assemble and recite 
dhamma. Thus we read how King Seniya Bimbisāra shared the following thought with 
the Buddha: 
At present aññatitthiya paribbājakas assemble and speak dhamma on the fourteenth, 
fifteenth and eighth days of the half-month. These people approach them to hear 
dhamma. They obtain affection for the aññatitthiya paribbājakas, they gain faith [in 
them], the aññatitthiya paribbājakas gain adherents [pakkha]. Suppose the masters 
should also collect together on the fourteenth, fifteenth and eighth days of the 
half-month? 56 (MV II 3, trsl. partly following I.B. Horner BD IV 130)  
Regarding the ascetic affiliation of the aññatitthiya paribbājakas, the narrative does not 
provide sufficient additional information to identify it. The group of titthiyas with whom 
the term aññatitthiya establishes a relation of differentiation can, on the other hand, 
unmistakably be identified as the Buddha’s disciples. The añña-component bears 
reference to ‘the masters’ (Pāli ayyā) and since Bimbisāra’s words are directly addressed 
to the Buddha, it is clear that it are his disciples who are to be understood here by ‘the 
masters.’ 
 
The introductory narrative to the establishment of the rain retreat (vassavāsa; MV III 
1-3) also mentions aññatitthiyas. According to this narrative, while Buddhist monks had 
not yet taken up the habit to put on hold their itinerant existence during the rainy 
season, some group(s) of aññatitthiyas had. With green life abundantly sprouting up 
during the rainy season, touring Buddhist bhikkhus would inevitably trample down 
many of this green life and the small creatures it hosts. The lack of the Buddhist 
bhikkhus to adhere to a rain retreat and to hence harm plant live and other small beings 
was, according to our introductory story, subject to criticism. This criticism is voiced 
here by means of the common stock phrase of ‘manussā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti’ 
(‘people are angry, irritated [and] speaking dispraisingly’). The people in their criticism 
 
                                                     
56 Vin I 101: “etarahi kho aññatitthiyā paribbājakā cātuddase pannarase aṭṭhamiyā ca pakkhassa sannipatitvā 
dhammaṃ bhāsanti. te manussā upasaṃkamanti dhammasavanāya. te labhanti aññatitthiyesu paribbājakesu pemaṃ, 
labhanti pasādaṃ, labhanti aññatitthiyā paribbājakā pakkhaṃ. yaṃ nūna ayyāpi cātuddase pannarase aṭṭhamiyā ca 
pakkhassa sannipateyyun ti.” 
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contrast Buddhist bhikkhus with aññatitthiyas who unlike the Buddhist bhikkhus adhered 
to a rain retreat. At Vinaya I 137 we can read the people’s annoyance: 
  
People were angry, irritated [and] speaking dispraisingly: ‘How can these recluses, 
sons of the Sakyans, walk on tour during the cold weather and the hot weather 
and the rains, trampling down crops [and] grasses, harming life that is one sensed 
facultied [ekindriyaṃ jīvaṃ viheṭhentā] and bringing many small creatures to 
destruction. Will it be that those aññatitthiyas, whose dhamma is badly preached, 
cling to and prepare a rain retreat, will it be that these birds, having made their 
nests in the tree-tops, cling to and prepare a rain retreat, while these recluses, 
sons of the Sakyans, walk on tour during the cold weather and the hot weather 
and the rains, trampling down crops [and] grasses, harming life that is one sensed 
facultied and bringing many small creatures to destruction?’57 (trsl. partly 
following I.B. Horner, BD IV 183) 
 
 Just as with the occurrence of ‘aññatitthiya’ in the introductory story to the 
establishment of the uposatha ceremony, here too the narrative context as it stands offers 
insufficient information to determine with certainty the ascetic affiliation of the 
aññatitthiyas. However, as I have extensively argued elsewhere that the presence of the 
Jain technical term ‘one sensed facultied life’ (ekindriya jīva) in the Pāli Vinaya should be 
understood as a remnant of an inter-communal debate between early Buddhists and 
Jains on the principle of non-violence (anārambha), it is very likely that the aññatitthiyas 
referred to in this passage are Jains.58 Regarding the group of titthiyas from whom the 
aññatitthiyas (i.e. Jains) are differentiated, they too can be determined here to be the 
Buddha’s disciples or, as the people refer to them, ‘the sons of the Sakyans’ 
(Sakyaputtiyā). 
A third occurrence of aññatitthiya is in the lengthy introductory narrative to the dukkaṭa 
offence for the consumption of meat that has purposively been prepared for a bhikkhu’s 
sake. As it may be remembered, part of this narrative (MV VI.31)59 has already been 
discussed under the lemma ‘nigaṇṭha’ as it was one of the only two places in the Pāli 
Vinaya where nigaṇṭhas are explicitly mentioned. The narrative presented the nigaṇṭhas 
 
                                                     
57 Vin I 137: “manussā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti: kathaṃ hi nāma samaṇā Sakyaputtiyā hemantam pi gimham pi 
vassam pi cārikaṃ carissanti haritāni tiṇāni sammaddantā ekindriyaṃ jīvaṃ viheṭhentā bahū khuddake pāṇe 
saṃghātaṃ āpādentā. ime hi nāma aññatitthiyā durakkhātadhammā vassāvāsaṃ alliyissanti saṃkāpayissanti, ime hi 
nāma sakuntakā rukkhaggesu kulāvakāni kartivā vassāvāsaṃ alliyissanti saṃkāpayissanti, ime pana samaṇā 
Sakyaputtiyā hemantam pi gimham pi vassam pi cārikaṃ caranti haritāni tiṇāni sammaddantā ekindriyaṃ jīvaṃ 
viheṭhentā bahū khuddake pāṇe saṃghātaṃ āpādentā ‘ti.” 
58 Cf. Maes 2010-2011. 
59 This narrative is also taken up in the AN I 179ff.  
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as losing their lay-disciple the general Sīha to the Buddhist community, and as openly 
disapproving of the Buddhist custom to eat meat knowing the animal was prepared for 
their own sake (cf. p. 140 ff.). 
 The term aññatitthiya is pronounced by the general Sīha in a conversation with the 
Buddha. The general Sīha, who gained dhamma insight through the Buddha enunciating 
several of his doctrinal tenets, wished to be accepted as a lay follower (upāsaka). The 
Buddha, before admitting the general Sīha into his saṅgha, requested him to carefully 
consider his wish to become a Buddhist lay follower. The Buddha’s incitement seemed 
to have delighted the general Sīha who replied:  
 
I, reverend sir, am exceedingly pleased [and] satisfied because the Bhagavat spoke 
thus to me: ‘Now, Sīha, thoroughly consider [it], thorough consideration is good 
for well-known men like yourself.’ For, reverend sir, if aññatitthiyas would have 
secured me as a disciple [sāvaka], they would have paraded a banner all round 
Vesālī, saying: ‘The general Sīha has joined our disciplehood.’60 (trsl. partly 
following I.B. Horner, BD IV 322-323). 
 
The manner in which the term aññatitthiya is applied in this passage is similar to the 
two previously discussed cases: whereas it remains uncertain which specific group(s) of 
titthiyas is being referred to with ‘aññatitthiya,’ the differential aspect bears on the 
Buddhist ascetic community.  The latter can be concluded from the fact that the general 
Sīha, who is the one referring to the so-called aññatitthiyas, is addressing himself to the 
Buddha. In other words, the añña-component of the term aññatitthiyas bears thus once 
again reference to the Buddhist ascetic community.  
Regarding the specific group(s) of titthiyas the term aññatitthiya refers to, one could 
argue that the narrative context does offer sufficient information to unambiguously 
discern the ascetic affiliation of the aññatitthiyas to be Jain. Given the fact that the above 
quoted conversation between the general Sīha and the Buddha is set against the 
backdrop of a confrontation between the Jain and Buddhist community (cf. p. 140 ff.), 
one could indeed reasonably postulate that the term aññatitthiya refers to members of 
the Jain community. Further, the general Sīha’s remark that aññatitthiyas would have 
paraded a banner around Vesalī proclaiming his accession if he would have joined their 
community, could be interpreted as an allusion to the dīkṣā-mahotsava tradition of Jains. 
Being the “great initiation festival” of a candidate who has been granted permission to 
 
                                                     
60 Vin I 236: “iminā p’āhaṃ bhante bhagavato bhiyyosomattāya attamano abhiraddho yaṃ maṃ bhagavā evam āha: 
anuvijjakāraṃ kho Sīha karohi, anuvijjakāro tumhādisānaṃ ñātamanussānaṃ sadhu hotīti. mamaṃ hi bhante 
aññatitthiyā sāvakaṃ labhitvā kevalakappaṃ Vesāliṃ patākaṃ parihareyyuṃ Sīho amhākaṃ senāpati sāvakattaṃ 
upagato ’ti.” 
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go forth into the Jain ascetic community, the dīkṣā-mahotsava entails, among other 
things, a public procession during which the candidate gives away his worldly 
possessions to (lay)people, who gathered to celebrate this auspicious event. Needless to 
say, the higher the social status of the Jain disciple-to-be, the greater the public 
display.61 Nevertheless, despite these two arguments in favour of identifying the 
aññatitthiyas with Jains, there remains a serious objection against this identification.  
As stated above, the introductory narrative is one of the only two narratives of the 
Pāli Vinaya to openly mention Jains. For instance, the general Sīha is introduced at the 
start of the narrative as being a ‘nigaṇṭhasāvaka’ or, ‘a (lay-)disciple of the Jains.’ 
Mahāvīra is also explicitly referred to and this with the term ‘Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.’ 
Further, when the Buddha and his disciples were enjoying a meal offered by the general 
Sīha, the text records that ‘in Vesālī many nigaṇṭhas were wailing with outstretched 
arms… ’ (Vin I 237). By designating Jains with terminology peculiar to their community 
itself, the narrative clearly shows no hesitation here to explicitly refer to them. This 
raises the question why in the above quoted conversation the general Sīha would have 
opted for the generic, indefinite term aññatitthiya if the narrative specifically intended 
to refer to nigaṇṭhas. Undoubtedly, the monk-editors could have opted for the 
unambiguous term ‘nigaṇṭha,’ a choice which would have been in accordance with the 
terminology of the rest of the narrative. To reformulate our question from a 
narratological point of view: what effect does the use of the generic term aññatitthiya 
produce in the alleged conversation?  
The effect of employing the indefinite generic term aññatitthiya here is, I believe, 
twofold. Firstly, since, as stated above, ‘añña’ bears on the Buddha and his ascetic 
community, the use of ‘aññatitthiya’ effects a reaffirmation of the active membership of 
the Buddhist saṅgha in the larger ascetic landscape. Secondly (and simultaneously), the 
use of ‘aññatitthiyā’ elevates as superior the Buddhist saṅgha from this amorphous 
ascetic landscape. This is clear from the tone of the conversation between the general 
Sīha and the Buddha. When the general Sīha’s reply to the Buddha is considered again, it 
becomes apparent that the tone is in true praise of the Buddha (cf. Vin I 236: “I, 
reverend sir, am exceedingly pleased [and] satisfied because the Bhagavat spoke thus to 
me…”). Therefore, when the general Sīha compares the attitude of the Buddha towards 
his wish to become a layfollower with the praxis of aññatitthiyas to flaunt a new disciple, 
he goes beyond juxtaposing two ‘facts’ but openly chooses the Buddha’s attitude in 
 
                                                     
61 For a description of the dīkṣā ceremony, see Jaini 2001 (1979): 243 ff, 244: “Every dīkṣā ceremony is 
accompanied by great pomp and by the performance of various religious acts in the lay community: Jina-
worship, charity in honor of the new initiate, and so forth.” For a description of the dīkṣā-mahotsava among 
Jain bhikkhunīs, see Shāntā 1997 (1985): 458 ff. 
For a description of initiation ceremony among Digambara Jains, see Deo 1956: 355 ff. 
  165 
preference to the one of aññatitthiyas. This outspoken preference for the Buddha’s 
attitude places the Buddha and his saṅgha in a superior position to all other ascetic 
communities, creating an appraising dichotomy between Buddhist and non-Buddhist 
ascetics. In short, the rhetorical effect of the term aññatitthiya here is that it validates 
the participation of the Buddhist saṅgha in the ascetic landscape and simultaneously 
differentiates the Buddhist saṅgha from this landscape as a distinctively better 
community. 
The fourth and final reference to aññatitthiya in the Pāli Vinaya occurs in the famous 
Cullavagga narrative relating the establishment of the order of bhikkhunīs. According to 
the narrative, shortly after Mahāpajapatī was granted ordination, she requested the 
Buddha through the agency of Ānanda, to allow greeting between bhikkhus and 
bhikkhunīs according to seniority (vuḍḍha). Her request amounted to a suspension of the 
first of the eighth ‘important rules’ (garudhamma), which states that a bhikkhunī should 
always pay proper homage to bhikkhus, even if she has been ordained for a century and 
he but a day.62 The Buddha did not consent. When considering the part of the narrative 
preceding Mahāpajapatī’s request, the reader would tend to assume that the grounds 
the narrative will provide for the Buddha’s refusal must lie in the fact that this first and 
other seven garuddhammas played too much of a paramount importance for the 
admission of women in the Buddhist saṅgha to be abolished. For, the narrative states 
that Mahāpajapatī’s earlier acceptance of the eight garudhammas constituted her actual 
ordination. It also greatly emphasizes the importance to comply with these 
garudhammas by ending the formulation of each one of them with the injunction that 
“this rule is to be honoured, respected, revered, venerated, [and] never to be 
transgressed during her life.”63 According to the narrative, the motivation for the 
Buddha’s refusal does not rest, however, on the importance of the garudhammas, but on 
the fact that among aññatitthiyas male and female followers would equally not greet 
each other according to seniority, but according to gender. When at Cullavagga X.2.3 
Ānanda conveys Mahāpajapatī’s request to the Buddha, the Buddha’s reply reads as 
follows: 
 
This is impossible, Ānanda, it is impracticable that the Tathāgata would allow 
respectful greeting, rising from one’s seat, saluting with joined palms [or] paying 
 
                                                     
62 Cf. Vin II 255: “vassasatupasampannāya bhikkhuniyā tadahupasampannassa bhikkhuno abhivādanaṃ paccuṭṭhānaṃ 
añjalikammaṃ sāmīcikammaṃ kātabbaṃ.” 
“A nun who has been ordained [even] for a hundred rainy seasons should respectfully greet, rise up from her 
seat, salute with joined palms, do proper homage to a monk [even if he is] ordained but that day.” (trsl. partly 
following I.B. Horner, BD V 354). 
63 Ibid: “ayam pi dhammo sakkatvā garukatvā mānetvā pūjetvā yāvajīvaṃ anatikkamanīyo.” BD V 354, trsl. I.B. 
Horner. 
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proper homage to women [by monks]. For, Ānanda, these aññatitthiyas, whose 
dhamma is badly preached, will not respectfully greet, rise from one’s seat, salute 
with joined palms [or] pay proper homage to women; why then should the 
Tathāgata allow respectful greeting … [or] paying proper homage to women?64 
 
The differential aspect of aññatitthiyas again unmistakably bears on the Buddhist 
ascetic saṅgha. In this fragment it is the Buddha who is referring to aññatitthiyas 
signifying that the ‘añña’–component is reflexive, i.e. denoting the Buddha himself and 
consequently his followers, too. The ascetic affiliation of the aññatitthiyas is, just as for 
the other three aññatitthiya references, admittedly harder to determine. Though the 
ājīvika and/or Jain community might appropriately be presumed here, the context as 
such provides insufficient additional information to validate this conjecture.65  
Two notable features of the aññatitthiya reference under discussion are, first, that it is 
a positive reference, meaning that the greeting custom of aññatitthiyas is quoted to act 
accordingly, and second, that it is the Buddha himself who quotes their custom. The 
point here is not whether (a real specific group of) aññatitthiyas actually practiced this 
greeting custom, or whether the Buddha really referred to it, but that the narrative 
admits the Buddha to have mirrored his decision on what was customary among 
aññatitthiyas. In other words, what is striking here is that the narrative permits the 
Buddha himself to positively refer to a supposed praxis of aññatitthiyas to, as it were, 
legitimate the continuation of the observance of the first garudhamma. The combined 
effect of these two features may be made explicit. As the Buddha constitutes the highest 
legal authority in the general rhetoric of the introductory stories of the Pāli Vinaya, the 
recognition of praxes of aññatitthiya by the Buddha himself, validates them as a source 
of authority to rest ascetic decisions upon.66 This type of reference is very rare in the 
Pāli Vinaya, but the more valuable for precisely that reason. 
 
 
                                                     
64 Vin II 257-58: “aṭṭhānam etaṃ Ānanda anavakāso yaṃ tathāgato anujāneyya mātugāmassa abhivādanaṃ 
paccuṭṭhānaṃ añjalikammaṃ sāmīcikammaṃ. ime hi nāma Ānanda aññatitthiyā durakkhātadhammā mātugāmassa 
abhivādanaṃ paccuṭṭhānaṃ añjalikammaṃ sāmīcikammaṃ na karissanti, kim aṅga pana tathāgato anujānissati 
mātugāmassa abhivādanaṃ paccuṭṭhānaṃ añjalikammaṃ sāmīcikamman ti.” (trsl. BD V 358, trsl. partly following 
I.B. Horner). 
65 Cf. Mari Jyväsjärvi 2011: 2, where it is noted that it is unclear who is to be understood with the aññatitthiya-
reference under discussion, albeit that a post-canonical Jain text contains a similar injunction for their female 
renunciants.  
66 Jyväsjärvi dissertation ‘Fragile Virtue’ makes a similar observation based on this aññatitthiya reference. In 
the introduction of her dissertation ‘Fragile Virtue’ she states that this positive reference to the aññatitthiyas’ 
praxis “suggests that South Asian monastic and ascetic traditions that allowed women to renounce were 
looking to each other in trying to establish models for acceptable conduct for these female renunciants, 
particularly regarding how they should relate to male renunciants of their community.” Cf. Jyväsjärvi 2011: 2. 
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In conclusion, we may note how three of the four references to the practices of 
aññatitthiyas were positive references: their practices would have resulted in concrete 
disciplinary guidelines for the Buddhist saṅgha, these being the implementation of the 
rainy season retreat, the institutionalization of the uposatha ceremony and the 
insistence to observe the first garudhamma. Regardless whether the aññatitthiyas’ 
practices really would have effected these disciplinary guidelines, such positive 
references to the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s ascetic other are, as we noted, a very rare 
feature for the Pāli Vinaya. They are one of the very few instances to explicitly confirm 
the truism that the early Buddhist saṅgha modelled itself upon contemporary ascetic 
organizations.  
Further, the indefinite generic nature of the term aññatitthiya causes specific 
narrative effects which both underline the Buddhist saṅgha’s recognition of other 
ascetic communities and the Buddhist saṅgha’s self-validation as being the better one 
amongst them. The first of these two generated effects is best seen in the three positive 
references, with the Buddha’s supposed reference to the greeting regulations of 
aññatitthiyas to legitimate the continuation of the first garudhamma being the 
paradigmatic example. The term’s narrative effect of validating the Buddhist 
community as being the best one within the ascetic landscape is best represented with 
the reference to the custom of aññatitthiyas to flaunt a new disciple around town. The 
negative aspect of this reference results, as we have seen, in elevating as superior the 
Buddhist saṅgha from the wider ascetic landscape. 
Finally, one last result of our contextual reading needs to be stressed. We pointed out 
that the ‘añña’-component of aññatitthiya established a relationship of differentiation 
with a second group of titthiyas. In all four Pāli Vinaya narratives, the ‘añña’-component 
bore reference to members of the Buddhist ascetic community, implying that early 
Buddhists considered themselves and were considered by others to fall under the 
denomination range of the term titthiya. The meaning of this fact will be fully explored 
in the final section From ‘Ascetic’ to ‘Ascetic other.’ 
titthiya; aññatitthiyapubba 
titthiya is the generic denomination most frequently used in the Pāli Vinaya to refer to 
the early Buddhists’ ascetic others (cf. p.120). The various references to titthiyas in the 
Pāli Vinaya can broadly be divided into four categories.67 In the course of this discussion, 
the term aññatitthiyapubba will also be treated. 
 
                                                     
67 A philological analysis of both the terms titthiya and aññatitthiya is given in section IV From ‘Ascetic’ to 
‘Ascetic other.’  
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Incidental and neutral 
A first category of references to titthiyas consists of “incidental and neutral 
references.” In line with our previous discussion of Nattier’s ‘principle of irrelevance,’ I 
understand by this references to titthiyas that are characterized by the fact that they are 
not the focus point of the context wherein they occur (in this respect they are 
‘incidental’),68 nor do they give information regarding how these titthiyas were 
perceived or related to by the early Buddhist community (in this respect they are 
‘neutral’). In other words, these references do not offer any insight regarding the nature 
of the various relations between Buddhist bhikkhus and titthiyas, but only support the 
truism that the early Buddhist ascetic community lived in close symbiosis with titthiyas. 
Several of such incidental and neutral references have already been discussed in the 
section Contact. Thus we had the occurrence of ‘a sleeping place of (a) titthiya(s)’ 
(titthiyaseyyā) mentioned in a small standardized list of places that seem to have been 
frequented by Buddhist bhikkhus. As we have seen, the casuistry to Pācittiya LXXXV,69 
which prescribes that a monk should enter a village at the ‘right time,’70 mentions that a 
bhikkhu commits no offence “if he is going into a village; if he is going to the nun’s 
quarters; if he is going to the sleeping place of (a) titthiya(s); [. . .].” 
Another incidental and neutral reference to titthiyas that has already been discussed 
in the section Contact, is the reference at Vin IV 70.1 where it is said that titthiyas 
started to avoid going to a particular āvasatha or public-rest house as the group of six 
bhikkhus stayed there on and on.71  
Further, we have ‘titthiya’ and ‘titthiyasāvaka’ occurring in a standard enumeration of 
possible (groups of) people from whom a bhikkhu may have heard a valid reason to 
doubt the ‘purity’ (suddha) of a fellow bhikkhu (i.e. he committed an offence) and to 
subsequently suspend the ‘Invitation’ or pavāraṇā ceremony. The possible (groups of) 
people are: bhikkhus, bhikkhunīs, probationers, male and female novices, kings and their 
ministers, and finally also titthiyas and titthiyasāvakas.72 The reference to titthiyas and 
titthiyasāvakas in this passage is incidental and neutral. Being part of a standard 
enumeration, the two terms are not the focus point of the passage (incidental), nor does 
the reference involve a value judgment regarding titthiyas or their lay-followers 
(neutral).  
 
                                                     
68 Cf. p. 84 ff. 
69 Vin IV 164-66; BD III 82-6. Similarly for pācittiya XLVII and pāṭidesaniya I. ‘titthiyaseyyā’ respectively occurs at 
Vin IV 166.30; Vin IV 101.6 and Vin IV 176.37. Cf. p. 94 ff.  
70 ‘wrong time’ is defined as after noon until sunrise. Cf. BD III 86. 
71 Cf. Contact ‘Public Rest-Houses (āvasatha),’ p. 88 ff.  
72 Vin I 172 (BD IV 227): “bhikkhussa sutaṃ, bhikkhuniyā s., sikkhamānāya s., sāmaṇerassa s., sāmaṇeriyā s., 
upāsakassa s., upāsikāya s., rājūnaṃ s., rājamahāmattānaṃ s., titthiyānaṃ s., titthiyasāvakānaṃ sutan ti.” (= Vin I 
173.3-4) 
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A final incidental and neutral reference to titthiyas is found in the lengthy 
introductory story to saṃghādisesa II of the Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga where we read how an 
adulterous woman being on the run from her husband had tried to join a group of 
‘titthiyas’ but had not been permitted by them.73 
Competitiveness - Outspoken rivalry 
In terms of gaining adherents and of receiving both material support and recognition 
of one’s ascetic lifestyle and doctrinal tenets, the different ascetic communities 
constituted, as already pointed out a few times, each other’s opponents. A sense of 
rivalry and competitiveness might, therefore, at times have predominantly coloured the 
perception of early Buddhists of their ascetic others. Indeed, an explicit example of a 
rather strong sentiment of rivalry is recorded in the introductory story to pācittiya I, 
which prohibits the telling of a conscious lie (sampajānamusāvāda). Being overthrown in 
a debate with titthiyas, the bhikkhu Hatthaka went on to deceive these titthiyas by telling 
various lies. On being reprimanded for doing so, Hatthaka defended himself by 
remarking that: “[T]hese titthiyas  should be conquered in whatever way, victory should 
not be given to them.”74 
Another example where the rival spirit between the Buddhist community and  
titthiyas is perceptible, is in the phrase “ime … titthiyā avaṇṇakāmā buddhassa avaṇṇakāmā 
dhammassa avaṇṇakāmā saṃghassa,” meaning “these titthiyas desire blame for the 
Buddha, they desire blame for the [Buddhist] dhamma, they desire blame for the 
saṅgha.”75   
Competitiveness - Gaining disciples from titthiyas and loosing disciples to titthiyas 
The Pāli Vinaya holds particular terms, references and regulations indicating that the 
early Buddhist community not only attracted ‘titthiyas’ into its saṅgha, but also lost some 
of its own disciples to titthiyas. A few passages also suggest the possibility that some 
ascetics might have gone back and forth a few times between various ascetic 
communities. 
 
                                                     
73 The story continues to tell how the woman, being refused to go forth among titthiyas, approached the 
Buddhist bhikkhunī Thullanandā who did let her go forth. This would have caused the formulation of 
saṃghadisesa II which reads: “Whatever nun should knowingly receive a woman thief found to merit death, 
without having obtained permission from a king or an Order or a group or a guild or a company, unless she is 
allowable, that nun also has fallen into a matter that is an offence at once, entailing a formal meeting of the 
Order involving being sent away.” Vin IV 225  (trsl. I.B Horner BD III 182). 
74 Cf. Vin II 1 (BD II 165): “ete kho, āvuso, titthiyā nāma yena kenaci jetabbā, neva tesaṃ jayo dātabbo ’ti.” 
75 Cf. Vin IV 91 (BD II 348). This is put in the mouth of Buddhist lay-followers and is part of the lengthy 
introductory story to pācittiya XLI wherein the venerable Ānanda is distributing the saṅgha’s food left-overs to 
those who ‘eat scraps of food.’ For a detailed discussion of this introductory story, see p. 108 ff.  
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The term aññatitthiyapubba or ‘one who has previously belonged to another ascetic 
community,’ together with a small set of precepts regulating what should be done if an 
aññatitthiyapubba should desire to join the Buddhist saṅgha are indicative of the fact that 
the early Buddhist community gained adherents from other ascetic communities.76 At 
the same time, the development of a term such as titthiyapakkanta or ‘one who has gone 
over to another ascetic community,’ points to the reality that the early Buddhist 
community also lost some of its members to other ascetic organisations. Before 
discussing the various references to titthiyapakkantas, the small narrative introducing 
the formulation of the four month probation (parivāsa) or test period for 
aññatitthiyapubbas may be quoted. The narrative hints at the possibility of certain 
ascetics going over from one ascetic organisation to the other before, so to speak, 
making up their mind. Vin I 69 reads:  
Now at that time one who had previously belonged to another ascetic community 
[aññatitthiyapubba] when he was being spoken to by his preceptor regarding a rule, 
having refuted the preceptor, went over to the fold of that same ascetic 
community [titthāyatana] (as before), but having come back again, he asked the 
bhikkhus for ordination. (trsl. partly following I.B. Horner BD IV 85) 
The Buddha upon hearing this prescribes that such a particular aññatitthiyapubba 
should not receive ordination, whereas other aññatitthiyapubbas could providing that 
they successfully completed the probation period. Drawing on the principle of counter-
argument,77 one may deduce from this passage and accompanying regulations that some 
ascetics might actually have gone back and forth between various ascetic communities. 
If this was indeed the case, then this both might point to a certain (initial) degree of 
fluidity between the various ascetic communities, and further account for the facts how 
early Buddhist bhikkhus knew their ascetic others well (cf. p. 63 ff. and p. 68), and also 
 
                                                     
76 The Padabhājaniya to saṃghādisesa II of the Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga also incidentally confirms this reality of 
members of other ascetic communities going forth into the Buddhist saṅgha when defining [a woman thief] to 
be kappā or “allowable” [to receive ordination] as one who has [already] gone forth among other bhikkhunīs, or 
as one who has [already] gone forth among titthiyas (cf. Vin IV 227: “kappan nāma dve kappāni titthiyesu vā 
pabbajitā hoti aññāsu vā bhikkhunīsu pabbajitā.”).  
For the special regulations for an aññatitthiyapubba desiring to go forth and to receive ordination see Vin I 69 – 
71 (BD IV 85-89). Apart for a jaṭila and an aññatitthiyapubba who is Sakyan by birth, they all should undergo a 
probation (parivāsa) or a test period of four months. It is interesting to note that one of the reasons given for 
the aññatitthiyapubba to fail his probation period is if he becomes displeased when dispraise is being spoken 
about “the teacher, the views, the approval, the persuasion, the creed of that of the fold [tittha] from which he 
has come over [saṃkanto hoti],” or also if he becomes displeased when praise is being spoken about the 
Buddha, the dhamma and saṅgha. Cf. MV I.38.7 (Vin I 70, BD IV 86).  
See also p. 136 the importance of these regulations are discussed in the context of “othering.” 
77 Cf. p. 84. 
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how ‘new’ ascetic customs could be introduced. Also Vin I 86 and Vin II 279 confirm the 
possibility of ascetics going back and forth between communities, when regulating that 
respectively a titthiyapakkanta and a bhikkhunī wearing the saffron robes but joining the 
fold of another ascetic community, should no longer be able to receive ordination on 
coming back.78 
If various passages in the Pāli Vinaya incidentally confirm the reality of the Buddhist 
saṅgha losing members to other ascetic communities,79 others express a conscious effort 
or desire to prevent it. Mahāvagga I.27.4 (Vin I 54), for instance, stipulates a dukkaṭa 
offence for preceptors (upajjhāya) who do not forgive their saddhivihārikā (‘cell mate’) 
when the latter apologizes himself for not having conducted himself properly.80 The 
supposed incident that would have triggered the formulation of this dukkaṭa offence are 
saddhivihārikās leaving the Buddhist saṅgha and going over to a different ascetic 
community (titthiyesu saṃkamanti) because their preceptors did not forgive them when 
being apologized to.81  
To do like titthiyas do 
A third category consists of references to an ascetic practice or custom of titthiyas 
functioning as a positive reference point to implement a similar practice or custom. Not 
surprisingly, this category is with only one reference (three if we include ‘aññatitthiya’ 
references, cf. p. 160 ff.) the least represented category. At Vin II 151 (BD V 212) the 
 
                                                     
78 Vin I 86 (BD IV 110): “titthiyapakkantako bhikkhave anupasampanno na upasampādetabbo, upasampanno nāsetabbo 
’ti.” 
Vin II 279 (BD V 387) : “yā sā bhikkhave bhikkhunī sakāsāvā titthāyatanaṃ saṃkantā, sā āgatā na upasampādetabbā 
’ti.” 
79 titthiyapakkantaka is incidentally mentioned at Vin I 125.5; Vin I 136.1; Vin I 168.7; Vin I 307.7; Vin I 320.22;  
Vin I 322.10, all confirming that the possibility of losing adherents to other ascetic communities was a very 
actual one. See also Vin III 25.10-11 (BD I 43) where the Padabhājaniya to pārājika I mentions how there is for a 
bhikkhu a “declaration of weakness with the training not disavowed,” when he, among other possibilities, 
longs to become a titthiya, or longs to become a lay-disciple of titthiyas (titthiyasāvaka). 
80 Mahāvagga I.25 (Vin I 44-50; BD IV 57-67) stipulates what is due of a saddhivihārika to his preceptor. Among 
other things, a saddhivihārika should rise up early and arrange tooth-wood and a seat for his preceptor, he 
should provide him with drinking-water and conjey, he should wash the bowl of his preceptor once he 
finishes eating, he should sweep the cell if it gets soiled etc. 
81 Cf. Vin I 54: tena kho pana samayena upajjhāyā khamāpiyamānā na khamanti. bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. 
anujānāmi bhikkhave khamitun ti. n’eva khamanti. saddhivihārikā pakkamanti pi, vibbhamanti pi, titthiyesu pi 
saṃkamanti. bhagavato etam athaṃ ārocesuṃ. na bhikkhave khamāpiyamānena na khamitabbaṃ. yo na khameyya, 
āpatti dukkaṭassā’ti.” Cp. also MV I 57.2 (Vin I 84; BD IV 106, emphasis added): “tena kho pana samayena bhikkhu 
sāmaṇerānaṃ sabbaṃ saṃghārāmaṃ āvaraṇaṃ karonti. sāmaṇerā ārāmaṃ pavisituṃ alabhamānā pakkamanti pi 
vibbhamanti pi titthiyesu pi saṃkamanti.” (“Now at that time bhikkhus made a prohibition for novices in respect 
of an saṃgha’s entire monastery [ārāma]. The  novices, on being unable to enter the monastery, went away, 
and left the saṃgha, and went over to other ascetic communities.”) 
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Buddha allows a dwelling-place (vihāra) to be whitewashed, black coloured and red 
chalked because, according to the small narrative introducing this allowance, the 
sleeping place (seyyā) of titthiyas being whitewashed, black coloured and red chalked 
attracted many people visiting them.82 Regardless whether some particular sleeping 
places of titthiyas really lay at the basis of this allowance, it is a rare feature of the Pāli 
Vinaya to openly accredit titthiyas to have been a positive source of inspiration.   
To not do like titthiyas do 
A final category consists of the references to an ascetic practice or custom of titthiyas 
that serve as a negative reference point. These titthiya references throw valuable light 
on the early Buddhist ascetic community’s processes of othering. For a detailed 
discussion of these titthiya references, see ‘titthiyas as proximate others.’ (cf. p. 123)  
Metonymical Denomination 
acela(ka) 
For a critical discussion of the metonymical term acela(ka) meaning ‘one without cloth,’ 
see p. 133 ff. 
 
 
                                                     
82 Cf. Vin II 151 (emphasis added): “tena kho pana samayena titthiyānaṃ seyyāyo setavaṇṇā honti kāḷavaṇṇakatā 
bhūmi gerukaparikammakatā bhitti. bahū manussā seyyāpekkhakā gacchanti. bhagavto etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. 
anujānāmi bhikkhave vihāre setavaṇṇaṃ kaḷavaṇṇaṃ gerukaparikamman ti.” 
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From ‘Ascetic’ to ‘Ascetic other’ 
This section argues for opening up the conventional semantic range of the term ‘titthiya’ 
from ‘one belonging to a non-Buddhist ascetic community’ to also include ‘an adherent,’ 
or ‘a founder of an ascetic community.’ The reason for widening the semantic scope of 
the term ‘titthiya’ lies in the fact that early Buddhist bhikkhus, as I will make explicit, 
considered themselves, and were also considered by others, to fall under the semantic 
range of the term titthiya, at least for some time during the saṅgha’s early development. 
The reference field of ‘titthiya’ did not always, as it is commonly assumed, start by 
default outside the borders of the early Buddhist community. Conversely, during the 
earliest stages of the development of the Buddhist ascetic community, the reference 
field of ‘titthiya’ started within the very borders of the Buddhist community itself. This 
fact does not have to mean that early Buddhist bhikkhus used the term reflexively. For, 
as we have seen, to refer to one another early Buddhist bhikkhus had a wide set of terms, 
of which ‘titthiya’ was not a part.1 What it does mean, however, is that early Buddhist 
bhikkhus could, for some time at least, positively associate themselves (and be 
associated) with the term titthiya.  
This section aims to raise the awareness that even though the term titthiya in the Pāli 
Vinaya is being employed to (usually negatively) refer to the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s 
ascetic others, the term was in Buddhist and other circles not always and solely 
understood to point to ascetic others, and this in a negative manner. The term titthiya 
appeared to initially have had a more general and neutral meaning of an adherent/head 
of an ascetic community. It is in this general application of the term that the members of 
the early Buddhist ascetic saṅgha considered themselves, and were considered by 
others, to be titthiyas. This is an important observation. It points to a shift in application 
and understanding of the term titthiya which, in turn, indicates an underlying shift of 
 
                                                     
1 Cf. p.155, fn. 40.  
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the manner in which early Buddhist bhikkhus perceived both their ascetic others and 
themselves vis-à-vis them.  
This section is divided into two parts. In the first part, I demonstrate how the 
semantic range of titthiya should indeed be opened up to ‘an adherent/head of an ascetic 
community.’ This will be done in three moves. I start with a brief discussion of the 
manner how ‘titthiya’ is customarily understood and translated. In this discussion I point 
to the distinction between the meaning inferred from the use of the term titthiya, and 
titthiya’s etymological meaning. Second, the possibility that titthiya may indeed have 
initially meant an adherent/head of an ascetic community will be argued by means of a 
critical discussion of Edgerton’s understanding of titthiya’s corresponding form in 
Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, i.e. ‘tīrthika.’ Third, I will substantiate my argument to widen 
up the semantic range of the term titthiya by (re)considering the meaning of the 
presence of the compound aññatitthiya alongside the simplex titthiya in the Pāli Vinaya. 
In the second part, I proceed to explain how we are to understand the early Buddhist 
bhikkhu’s initial positive understanding of the term titthiya by means of (1) a philological 
excursion of titthiya and other kindred terms, and (2) by considering their application in 
literal versus metaphorical settings. 
Part I: The Semantic Range of titthiya Reassessed 
titthiya, Primary Denotations Reconsidered 
Thus far the term titthiya has been consequently translated with ‘(an adherent of) a 
different ascetic community.’ Lexicographers of the Pāli language provide a similar 
meaning, but generally appeal to terms that are deeply rooted in Christian theological 
language, such as ‘sect’ and ‘heretic.’2 The same is true for Isaline Horner who, in her 
translation of the Pāli Vinaya, usually rendered ‘titthiyā’ with ‘members of other sects.’3 
As it has already frequently and justly been noted that it is not unproblematic to 
transpose Christian theological terms in the understanding or translation of non-
 
                                                     
2 Cp. Cone’s A Dictionary of Pāli Part II 325, sv: “an adherent of another sect; a non-Buddhist ascetic.” Cf. The Pali 
Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary 302, sv: “An adherent of another sect (often as añña°), an heretic.” 
3 See e.g. BD III 182; BD V 156. Other translations of ‘titthiyā’ given by Horner are ‘members of (other) sects’ (BD 
IV 332); ‘followers of other sects’ (BD II 303); ‘adherents of other sects’ (BD II 367); ‘followers of sects holding 
other views’ (BD II 164). 
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Christian ‘religious’ movements,4 I have opted in my translation of ‘titthiya’ for the more 
neutral term ‘community’ instead of ‘sect,’ and ‘(non-Buddhist) ascetic’ instead of 
‘heretic.’ When we deal with the early Buddhist ascetic others, the terms ‘sect’ and 
‘heretic’ are simply inappropriate not only because they wrongly suggest that these 
ascetic others would have ‘branched-off’ from a ‘mainstream Buddhist tradition,’ but 
also because the terms imply that early Buddhists would a-priori have had a negative 
perception of those referred to with the term ‘titthiya.’ Though the manner how titthiyas 
are mentioned in the Pāli Vinaya often betray, as we have seen, a sense of 
competitiveness and rivalry,5 it would nevertheless be erroneous to consider a negative 
perception as being inherent to the term titthiya itself. This is, titthiyas are not per 
definition antagonistically perceived by the speaker or writer of the text; the term 
‘titthiya’ does not in itself entail any value judgment towards the ascetic other who is 
being referred to. In Buddhist texts the term titthiya is in itself, thus without considering 
the context in which it occurs, a neutral and general term to refer to the early 
Buddhist’s ascetic other. In short, when we consider its use, ‘titthiya’ may aptly be 
translated with ‘(an adherent/head of) a different ascetic community’ or an ‘ascetic 
other.’   
Buddhagosa, just as the present-day lexicographers of Pāli-English dictionaries, 
considers the term ‘titthiya’ to be a derivative of ‘tittha.’6 More specifically, titthiya is an 
adjective of appurtenance derived from the stem tittha and may thus be viewed to have 
the primary etymological denotation of (one) ‘belonging to a tittha.’7 There are three, 
interrelated, basic meanings for the Pāli term tittha (Skrt. tīrtha), these being: (1) fording 
place; (2) (head of a) community of ascetics; and (3) doctrine. The interrelatedness of 
these three meanings will be made explicit in the following part. For now, it suffices to 
note that the etymological meanings of titthiya,  (one) ‘belonging to a fording place;’ 
(one) ‘belonging to a community of ascetics;’ and (one) ‘belonging to a (particular) 
doctrine,’ have as such nothing exclusive in their denomination range. Unlike the 
 
                                                     
4 Cp. Dundas 2002² (1992): 45 who notes how “the use of the term ‘sect’, although ubiquitous in the description 
of religions, is not without problems, for it implies the existence, often awkward to substantiate, of a 
mainstream ‘official’ brand of a religion, from which a group emerges with a claim to purvey a purvey a purer 
variety of the faith.” 
5 Cf. p. 168 ff and p. 123 ff.  
6 See e.g. Cone’s A Dictionary of Pāli Part I 45, aññatitthiya, sv.  
Buddhaghosa explains ‘aññatitthiya’ with: “aññatitthiyā ’ti ettha titthaṃ vuccati laddhi, aññaṃ titthaṃ aññatitthaṃ, 
aññatitthaṃ etesaṃ atthī ’ti aññatitthiyā. ito aññaladdhikā ’ti vuttaṃ hoti.” This may be translated with: 
“‘aññatitthiyā’ means: here, ‘tittha’ is to be called doctrine [laddhi]; another doctrine is ‘aññatitthaṃ;’ 
‘aññatitthiyā’ means there is another doctrine for them; therefore it [i.e. aññatitthiyā] is called ‘aññaladdhikā.’  
Cf. Sp Vol V 1034.  
7 Cf. p. 188 ff. where titthiya as an ‘adjective of appurtenance’ is explained in detail. 
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manner how titthiya is used in the Pāli Vinaya to refer to the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s 
ascetic others, the etymological meanings do not per se bear exclusive reference to 
others; they  point to some particular aspect of an individual, leaving aside whether the 
individual being referred to should be considered as an ‘other’ or not. This will help us 
to understand how ‘titthiya,’ as I now turn to discuss, might initially have indeed just 
meant an adherent of an ascetic community. 
Edgerton’s consternation with the term ‘tīrthika’ 
Franklin Edgerton translates ‘tīrthika’ in his Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary with 
‘heretic’ and adds that the term is ‘like its relatives, pejoratively used.’8 Defining tīrthika 
in this manner, Edgerton joins the lexicographers of the Pāli language who give, as we 
have seen, a similar translation for titthiya. However, Edgerton was consternated by a 
passage in the Mahāvastu (‘Great Chapter’) of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādins9 in 
 
                                                     
8 See Edgerton’s BHS Dictionary 254, sv.  
Previous to Edgerton’s BHS Grammar and Dictionary (1957) the language of northern Buddhist texts was termed 
“mixed Sanskrit” (cf. Winternitz 1999 [1983, revised edition] Vol. II: 233) or also ‘Buddhist Sanskrit’ (cf. 
Mahāvastu, Jones 1949: x). Jones, in the introduction to his translation of the Mahāvastu, already critically 
remarked that the term ‘Buddhist Sanskrit’ conveys “nothing as to its origin and relation to other Indian 
dialects.”(Mahāvastu, Jones op.cit.) To a certain degree the same may be said of Edgerton’s term ‘Buddhist 
Hybrid Sanskrit (BHS).’ Though both terms reflect the (varying) degrees of Sanskritization of the language of 
northern Buddhist texts, they fail to reflect its underlying Prākrit. For this reason Gustav Roth’s designation 
‘quasi-Prākrit-cum-Sanskrit’ may be more apt, though being even more cumbersome than the designation 
BHS. Cf. Roth 2005² (1970): lx.   
Edgerton initially conceived the Prākrit of the northern Buddhist texts as an indication of the text-compilers 
having a poor command of Sanskrit, but he later reviewed this idea to its opposite. Edgerton’s revised 
conception may be summarized in the words of Emeneau: “The composers wrote or attempted to write in a 
Middle Indic (Prākrit) language, but they and/or the copyists knew Sanskrit and its prestige too well and could 
not keep Sanskrit out of it.” Cf. Emeneau 1954: 475; see also p. 477 for a clear outline of Edgerton’s view on the 
types of Prākrits underlying the BHS. 
9 The compilation date of the Mahāvastu is generally fixed between the 2nd century BC and the 4th century AD. 
Cf. Mahāvastu, Jones 1949: xi; Winternitz 1999 (1983, revised edition) Vol II: 237. The compilation was certainly 
completed by the 6th century AD, as from this time onwards the Mahāvastu is mentioned as an autonomous 
text in other sources, see Tournier 2012: 94.   
The Mahāvastu is a highly composite text and although it classifies itself into the Vinayapiṭaka, most scholars 
have usually dismissed its Vinaya claim and tend to regard it instead as an Avadāna collection on the twofold 
basis that (1) too little of its content directly concerns strict Vinaya matters (cf. Mahāvastu, Jones 1949: xii-xiii; 
Winternitz 1999 [1983, revised edition] Vol II: 232) as it mainly seems to narrate “practically all the history, 
quasi-history and legends (avadānas) relating to the Buddha…” (Mahāvastu, Jones 1949: xii) and (2) that “In 
almost all the colophons to the chapters the work is styled the Mahāvastu-Avadāna.” (Mahāvastu, Jones 1949: 
xiii). See also Tournier 2012 for a recent and critical assessment of the main scholarly contributions to our 
present day reception of the Mahāvastu text.  
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which the application of this term does not seem to lend itself to the interpretation of a 
non-Buddhist ascetic. The passage in question occurs in the Daśabhūmika section10 and 
concerns a celebration in verse of the activities of Bodhisattvas who have reached the 
eighth bhūmi (‘stage in their career’). We are informed, for example, that Bodhisattvas 
having reached the eighth stage ‘attain deep (levels of) meditations;’ ‘renounce life 
because of its vileness’ and that: 
अतः प्रभिृत तीिथर्का वा भविÛत भवसदूनाः | 
अतः प्रभिृत  कुÍछिÛत  कामां शंसिÛत िनवृर्ित ं||  
ataḥ prabhṛti tīrthikā vā bhavanti bhavasūdanāḥ | 
ataḥ prabhṛti kucchanti kāmāṃ śaṃsanti nirvṛtiṃ || (Le Mahâvastu, Senart 1977 (1882) 
Vol I: 106.8-9, emphasis added) 
 
Henceforth [i.e. from the eighth bhūmi onwards] as tīrthikā they become 
destroyers of existence;  
[and] they despise the objects of desires and praise release [nirvṛtiṃ]. (trsl. partly 
following J.J. Jones 1949 Vol I: 84, emphasis added) 
It is the use of ‘tīrthikā’ in this latter verse that probably confused Edgerton. With 
reference to this verse he remarks: “I suspect a corruption, and cannot explain the text 
as it stands . . .”11 His consternation is justifiable since in this verse the application of 
‘tīrthikā’ appears to conflict with its commonly attested meaning: it is used here not to 
refer to someone outside of the Buddhist realm, but it is said of Bodhisattvas; it is not 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Vincent Tournier, who recently made a new critical edition of the first two nidānas and the prologue to the 
Daśabhūmika section of the Mahāvastu, pleads to view the text as part of the Vinayapiṭaka of the 
Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādins. He finds the ‘avadāna-label’ from a narratological perspective only “an 
approximate appreciation” of its manifold textual genres and from a historico-critical perspective simply 
“inappropriate” since, as he points out, in the oldest retrieved Mahāvastu manuscript up till now (12-13th 
century), which was not available to the first generation of Buddhologists, the “expression Mahāvastu-Avadāna 
is a ghost word.” Cf. Tournier 2012: 98-99; 93; 95. 
10 If the complex composite nature of the Mahāvastu (Mv) could loosely be rendered as a patchwork, then its 
Daśabhūmika section may be conceived as a patchwork within this patchwork. Nevertheless, the various 
‘units’ making up the Daśabhūmika section (Mv I 63-157; Mahāvastu Jones 1949: 53-124) are linked together by 
a clear narrative thread and purpose: the main aim of the Daśabhūmika is to present the ten stages to 
enlightenment for Bodhisattvas. The greatest part of its content is presented as Kātyāyana’s answers to 
questions of Kāśyapa regarding various aspects of Bodhisattvas’ lives, such as their ‘characteristics’ (BHS 
adhyāśaya); their ‘state of heart’ (BHS citta) as they pass from one bhūmi to another; the deeds they refrain 
from doing; the merit they obtain for having thought ‘May we become perfect Buddhas;’ or also the reasons 
why they fail to progress to a next bhūmi etc. The Mahāyānic elements of the Daśabhūmika such as the 
description of the path of Bodhisattvas has already been noted by Winterntiz 1999 (1983, revised edition) Vol 
II: 236-237. 
11 Cf. BHS Dictionary 254, sv. 
 178 
used negatively but positively. Also Émile Senart, who painstakingly undertook the first 
critical edition of the Mahāvastu, appears to have been confounded by this use of 
‘tīrthikā’ as he comments: 
On attend ici la négation au lieu de वा; cette qualité de तीिथर्क, d’hérétiques, est bien 
étrange à promettre à ces futurs “destructeurs de l’existence [bhavasūdanāḥ].12 
Just as for Edgerton, the problem for Senart also appears to be the incompatibility of the 
notion that Bodhisattvas as tīrthikās could achieve the desirable goal of enlightenment 
or, in the words of the verse, destroy (the birth of their future) existence, as this would 
compel a positive understanding of the term tīrthikā. Therefore, in order to be able to 
read the usual negative denotation of ‘heretics’ in ‘tīrthikā,’ Senart would prefer to see 
the verse negated. This would mean an emendation of ‘vā’ (वा) to ‘na’ (न), which would 
change the verse’s meaning to: ‘Bodhisattvas as tīrthikās do not become destroyers of 
existence.’ However, when the larger narrative context of the verse in question is 
considered more closely, it becomes apparent that it is sound to not have a negation 
here and to attribute instead a positive meaning to ‘tīrthikā.’ For the sake of clarity Mv 
105.9 to Mv 107.7 may be quoted here: 
कुतः प्रभिृत भो िजनपुत्र बोिधस×वाः सवर्èवपिर×यागांæच पिर×यजिÛत 
दçुकरपिर×यागांæचेित || एवमकु्ते महाका×यायन आयुçमÛत ं महाकाæयपमवुाच || 
अçटमां  भिूम ं प्रभिृत भो  धुतधमर्धर बोिधस×वाः सवर्èवपिर×यागांæच पिर×यजिÛत 
दçुकरपिर×यागांæच कुवर्िÛत  इित || अçटमां  भिूम ं प्रभिृत भो  धुतधमर्धर बोिधस×वाः 
सàयक्सबंुद्धपूजया पूजियतåया इित || तत्रेदमÍुयते || 
 
अçटमां   प्रभिृत भिूम ंबोिधस×वा िजना×मज | 
सàयक्सबंुद्धा इित द्रçटåया अतः प्रभ×ृयिनवितर्याः || 
अतः प्रभिृत Úयानािन गàभीरािण लभिÛत ते | 
अतः प्रभिृत उ×तÜत ंज्ञानं तेषां प्रवतर्ते || 
अतः प्रभिृत भाषिÛत वाचां ज्ञानपुरोगमां | 
अतः प्रभिृत कुÍछ×ता आयुं मÑुचिÛत पिÖडताः || 
अतः प्रभिृत या शुद्धा तां जाितमनुयािÛत ते | 
 
                                                     
12 Le Mahâvastu, Senart 1977 (1882) Vol I: 460. 
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अतः प्रभिृत यं शुद्ध ंतद्रपूमनुभविÛत त े|| 
अतः प्रभिृत यं िलङ्ग ंइÍछिÛत भविÛत तथा | 
अतः प्रभिृत यं देवं इÍछिÛत भविÛत तथा || 
अतः प्रभिृत तीिथर्का वा भविÛत भवसदूनाः | 
अतः प्रभिृत कुÍछिÛत कामां शंसिÛत िनवृर्ित ं|| 
अतः प्रभिृत भिूयçठा भविÛत वदतां वराः| 
िशçया देवाितदेवानां सबंुद्धानां यशिèवनां || 
अÚयेçयिÛत ततः परे×य बुद्धैधर्मर्प्रकाशनैः | 
धमर्ं देशयथ प्राज्ञा प्रितगéृणथ ऋिषÚवज ं|| 
अतः प्रभिृत िवनयिÛत अहर्×वे सबुहंु जनं | 
अतः प्रभिृत िवनयिÛत शैक्षभमूौ बहंु जनं || 
अतः प्रभिृत अनुबद्धा देवा यक्षा सगéुयकाः | 
बोिधस×व ंमहास×वं याव×प्राÜता èवयंभतुा || 
अतः प्रभिृत तद्रपूं अग्र्य ंसदेवके लोके | 
अतः प्रभिृत वणȾ िप तेजोकीित र्यशोबल ं| 
लोकेन िवषम ंभवित बोिधस×वानम×ुतम ं|| 
अनु×पादाÍच बुद्धानां पंचािभज्ञा भविÛत ते | 
नैçक्रàयमनवुणर्यिÛत कामेषु दोषदिशर्नः || 
अतः प्रभिृत देवाæच असरुा ब्रéमणा सह | 
गणुःै तेषां अनुरÏयÛता आगÍछिÛत कृतांजली || 
वशीभतूान या चेçटा बोिधस×वान ताǺशी | 
अçटमाभिूम ंया चेçटा भविÛत ताǺशी तथा ||13 
 
                                                     
13 kutaḥ prabhṛti bho jinaputra bodhisatvāḥ sarvasvaparityāgāṃśca parityajanti duṣkaraparityāgāṃśceti // evamukte 
mahākātyāyana āyuṣmantaṃ mahākāśyapamuvāca // aṣṭamāṃ bhūmiṃ prabhṛti bho dhutadharmadhara bodhisatvāḥ 
sarvasvaparityāgāṃśca parityajanti duṣkaraparityāgāṃśca kurvanti iti // aṣṭamāṃ bhūmiṃ prabhṛti bho 
dhutadharmadhara bodhisatvāḥ samyaksaṃbuddhapūjayā pūjayitavyā iti // tatredam ucyate // 
aṣṭamāṃ prabhṛti bhūmiṃ bodhisatvā jinātmaja / 
samyaksaṃbuddhā iti draṣṭavyā ataḥ prabhṛtyanivartiyāḥ //  
ataḥ prabhṛti dhyānāni gambhīrāṇi labhanti te / 
ataḥ prabhṛti uttaptaṃ jñānaṃ teṣāṃ pravartate // 
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[The venerable Mahā-Kāśyapa asked the venerable Mahā-Kātyāyana:] “O son of 
the Jina, from what point onwards do Bodhisattvas renounce [the world] 
[parityajanti], by giving up all their possessions and abandoning wrong actions?” 
When this had been said, Mahā-Kātyāyana spoke to the venerable Mahā-Kāśyapa: 
“My pious friend,14 it is from the eighth bhūmi onwards that Bodhisattvas [begin 
to] renounce [the world], by giving up all their possessions and abandoning wrong 
actions.15 From the eighth bhūmi onwards, my pious friend, Bodhisattvas are to be 
honoured with the honour due to a perfect Buddha (saṃbuddha). On this point it is 
said [in verse]:   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
ataḥ prabhṛti bhāṣanti vācāṃ jñānapurogamāṃ / 
ataḥ prabhṛti kucchattā āyuṃ muñcanti paṇḍitāḥ // 
ataḥ prabhṛti yā śuddhā tāṃ jātimanuyānti te / 
ataḥ prabhṛti yaṃ śuddhaṃ tadrūpamanubhavanti te // 
ataḥ prabhṛti yaṃ liṅgaṃ icchanti bhavanti tathā / 
ataḥ prabhṛti yaṃ devaṃ icchanti bhavanti tathā // 
ataḥ prabhṛti tīrthikā vā bhavanti bhavasūdanāḥ / 
ataḥ prabhṛti kucchanti kāmāṃ śaṃsanti nirvṛtiṃ // 
ataḥ prabhṛti bhūyiṣṭhā bhavanti vadatāṃ varāḥ / 
śiṣyā devātidevānāṃ saṃbuddhānāṃ yaśasvināṃ // 
adhyeṣyanti tataḥ paretya buddhairdharmaprakāśanaiḥ / 
dharmaṃ deśayatha prājñā pratigṛhṇatha ṛṣidhvajaṃ // 
ataḥ prabhṛti vinayanti arhatve subahuṃ janaṃ / 
ataḥ prabhṛti vinayanti śaikṣabhūmau bahuṃ janaṃ // 
ataḥ prabhṛti anubaddhā devā yakṣā saguhyakāḥ / 
bodhisatvaṃ mahāsatvaṃ yāvatprāptā svayaṃbhutā // 
ataḥ prabhṛti tadrūpaṃ agryaṃ sadevake loke / 
ataḥ prabhṛti varṇo pi tejokīrtiyaśobalaṃ / 
lokena viṣamaṃ bhavati bodhisatvānamuttamaṃ // 
anutpādācca buddhānāṃ paṃcābhijñā bhavanti te / 
naiṣkramyamanuvarṇayanti kāmeṣu doṣadarśinaḥ / 
ataḥ prabhṛti devāśca asurā brahmaṇā saha / 
guṇaiḥ teṣāṃ anurajyantā āgacchanti kṛtāṃjalī // 
vaśībhūtāna yā ceṣṭā bodhisatvāna tādṛśī / 
aṣṭamābhūmiṃ yā ceṣṭā bhavanti tādṛśī tathā // 
14 ‘dhutadharmadhara,’ literally: ‘maintainer of the qualities of a purified man.’ The venerable Mahā-Kāśyapa is 
regularly addressed with this term. Cf. Edgerton’s BHS Dictionary 285 dhutadharma, sv.  
15 Mahā-Kātyāyana’s reply is a near-verbatim repetition of Mahā-Kāśyapa’s earlier question with the exception 
of the addition of the verb ‘kurvanti’. Thus ‘duṣkaraparityāgāṃśca kurvanti’ may be literally rendered: ‘they make 
the act of leaving duṣkara.’ Jones seems to view ‘duṣkara’ as denoting here ‘difficult sacrifices.’ Cf. Mahāvastu, 
Jones 1949: 83. Though ‘duṣkara’ can carry this technical sense, it seems more proper to view it here with the 
meaning of ‘doing wrong, behaving ill, wicked, bad’ (cf. Monier-Williams SED 487, sv) as duṣkara occurs in the 
compound ‘duṣkara-parityāgān’ and is hence something to be abandoned or parityāga, which Jones seems to 
omit from his translation. 
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“From the eighth bhūmi onwards, o son of the Jina [i.e. Mahā-Kāśyapa], 
Bodhisattvas are to be looked upon as perfect Buddhas, [for] henceforth they are 
not regressing [to a lower bhūmi].16 
Henceforth they attain deep [levels of] meditations [dhyāna], 
[and]17 their knowledge is purified. 
Henceforth they speak words that are founded on knowledge, 
[and] as wise men they renounce life [āyuṃ muñcanti] because of its vileness.18 
 
                                                     
16 i.e. Bodhisattvas who have reached the eighth bhūmi do not fall back or regress (anivartiyāḥ) to an inferior 
stage (bhūmi) when they pass from one life to another. This means that those Bodhisattvas who are in their 
eighth bhūmi can at their moment of passing away rest assured that they will not be reborn in a lower bhūmi. 
The reason given for this in the Mahāvastu is that apparently from the eighth bhūmi onwards Bodhisattvas 
only cultivate ‘pure karma’ (śubha karma) whereas their actions in the previous bhūmis still result in ‘mixed 
karma’ (vyāmiśra karma). Cf. Mv 102.6-9. 
anivartiyāḥ: Nom pl m ‘anivartiya’, being an adjective based on the root nivṛt with negative prefix ‘a’.  The verb 
nivṛt is here synonymous with the more frequently used vivṛt. Both these verbs share similar basic 
connotations such as “to fall back, to be withheld from” (cf. MW 560: sv nivṛt) or also “to turn back or away, 
depart” (cf. MW 988: sv vivṛt) and seem to obtain within the Daśabhūmika section a specific technical sense 
conveying the failure of Bodhisattvas of reaching the subsequent bhūmi of their career.  
In the Daśabhūmika the verb vivṛt if not standing on its own - as it is the case here with anivartiyāḥ - always 
occurs in connection with the reasons (karaṇa) why Bodhisattvas who are in a certain bhūmi fail to attain the 
succeeding one. In each description of the first seven bhūmis we come across Mahā-Kātyāyana giving the 
reasons why Bodhisattvas fail to proceed to a next bhūmi. So we can read, e.g., in the description of the second 
bhūmi:  
“aṣṭāviṃśadbhiḥ […] kāraṇehi bodhisatvā dvitīyāyāṃ bhūmau vartamānāḥ tṛtīyāyāṃ bhūmau vivartante.  
“Bodhisattvas who are staying [vartamānāḥ] in the second bhūmi “fall back” [vivartante] in the third bhūmi for 
twenty eight reasons.” (Mv 89.10-12, own translation, emphasis added; see also Mv 96.1-5; 110.1-5; 120.4-8; 
127.1-4 for identical formulations concerning the failure to progress to the next bhūmi). 
Jones who attaches the meaning of ‘to lapse’ to vivṛt - but not, it seems, in vivṛt’s literal sense of ‘falling back,’ 
but in the sense of ‘committing faults’ - finds the double locative case hard to interpret as it does not make 
clear in which bhūmi ‘the faults are committed in.’ He proposes therefore to either “not press too closely the 
present force of the participle vartamānās …. or … [to] give the second locative bhumau an ablative force, i.e. 
those who have successfully lived through one bhūmi lapse from the next.” (Mahāvastu, Jones 1949: 70, n. 2). I 
suggest that the second locative could remain in its ‘locative force’ if we interpret the literal sense of vivṛt, 
namely ‘falling back,’ in the technical sense of a ‘falling back, or regressing to a lower bhūmi’ and this at the 
moment of passing from one life to another and hence to fail to reside in the subsequent bhūmi.  Supporting 
evidence for interpreting ‘the falling back’ as a regression (and not, as Jones saw it, as a ‘committing of faults’ 
– which, of course, might be the cause of the regression) is the fact that in the Daśabhūmika section ‘vivṛt’ is 
first introduced in apposition to ‘saṃvṛt’ (‘to turn towards, to accomplish,’ i.e. to advance; Monier-Williams 
SED 1116 saṃvṛt, sv). Further, that it is a regression taking place when passing from one life to another is clear 
from the fact that in its very first use it is said of Bodhisattvas who are ‘saṃsaranto,’ i.e.  who are going through 
the cycle of life and death. For the use of ‘vivṛt’ and ‘saṃvṛt’ in this verse, see also Le Mahâvastu, Senart 1977 
(1882) Vol I: 436. 
17 The text gives ‘ataḥ prabhṛti’ or ‘henceforth.’ Each verse usually has twice ‘ataḥ prabhṛti.’ For the readability I 
have opted to not translate the second ‘ataḥ prabhṛti’ and to replace it with an ‘and’ instead. 
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Henceforth, whatever birth is pure, that is what they achieve, 
[and] whatever form is pure, that is what they win. 
Henceforth, they are born of whatever sex they wish, 
[and] they become the deva they wish to be.19 
Henceforth, as tīrthikās, they become destroyers of existence. 
[and] they despise objects of desires and praise release. 
Henceforth, they become the most excellent of eloquent men, 
pupils of the illustrious perfect Buddhas [saṃbuddha], the devas above all 
other devas. 
Thus are they bidden by the Buddhas, the preachers of dharma, at the moment of 
their passing away, "O wise men, teach dharma [and] take up the banner of the 
seer." 
Henceforth they train [vinayanti] many to become arhants,20 
[and]  they train many people in the [various] stages of discipleship [śaikṣa].21 
Henceforth, devas, Yaksas, Guhyakas,22 follow the great being, the Bodhisattva, 
until they realized their own nature.  
Henceforth, the form of the Bodhisattvas is supreme in the world of men and 
devas,  
[and] unsurpassed are the lustre, radiance [kīrtiya],23 and strength - which are 
hard to attain by the world - of Bodhisattvas. 
And though there are no Buddhas [in the world at that time] they develop the five 
super-knowledges,24[and] perceiving the harm in the objects of pleasure, they 
praise renunciation of the world (naiṣkramyam). 
Henceforth, devas, Asuras, together with Brahmās, allured by their virtues, come 
to them with hands joined in adoration. 
Such is the mode of life of the holy Bodhisattvas, such is [their] mode of life when 
they are in the eighth bhūmi. 
When we read this Daśabhūmika narrative, it becomes clear that the whole of Mahā-
Kātyāyana’s answer is in true praise of the Bodhisattvas who have reached the eighth 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
18 kucchattā abl. sg. of kuccha (Skt. kutsa) + tta (Skt. tva). On the Prākrit of this word, see Le Mahâvastu, Senart 
1977 (1882) Vol I: 460, cp. Mahāvastu, Jones 1949 Vol I: 83, n. 4. 
19 Literally: “Henceforth, that gender which they desire, thus they become. Henceforth, that god who they 
wish, thus they become.” 
20 Literally: “Henceforth, they train many people in arahantship.” 
21 śaikṣa is a technical term. A śaikṣa, or one who is undergoing training, has to traverse seven stages before he 
reaches the eighth which is aśaikṣa or arhant. Cp. Edgerton BHS Dictionary 532, sv.  
22 ‘In the popular mythology demigods and guardians of Kuvera’s wealth. From the root guh, “to hide”.’ Cf. 
Mahāvastu, Jones 1949: 84, n. 2. 
23 kīrtiya or kīrtika is a hyper Sanskrit form for Ardhamāghadī kittiā = Skt. kṛttikā, cf. Edgerton BHS Dictionary 
184 kīrtika, sv.  
24 paṃcābhijñā, see Mahāvastu, Jones 1949: 201, n. 2 for an enumeration of these types of knowledge. 
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stage of their career. If we suppose ‘tīrthikā’ has a negative connotation here, this would 
go against the spirit of the passage that even states how Bodhisattvas who are in their 
eighth bhūmi are “to be looked upon as perfect Buddhas.” Jones by translating ‘tīrthikā’ 
in the concerning Mahāvastu passage with “ascetic pilgrims” admits that the context 
constrains one to view the term here as denoting members of the Buddhist realm and 
this in a neutral/positive sense. Nevertheless, he too hastens to add in a footnote the 
odd use of the term as, he notes, ‘[u]sually in Buddhist Sanskrit this word has the bad 
connotation of “heretic,” Pali itthiya [sic, i.e. titthiya].’25 In other words, the difficulty for 
Edgerton, Senart and Jones with this Mahāvastu passage is that, provided that the 
reading is correct,26 it raises the possibility that tīrthikā could be applied in two distinct 
and apparently irreconcilable meanings: one being to pejoratively designate non-
Buddhist ascetics, the other being to (positively) refer to members of the Buddhist 
saṅgha itself.  Regarding this possibility Edgerton reflects: “it is barely possible that this 
one Mv passage preserves the original m[eanin]g., adherent (or founder) of (any) 
religion.”27 However, given the fact that both in Pāli and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit texts 
the term titthiya occurs in compounds such as ‘aññatitthiya’ (BHS anyatīrthika), and 
aññatitthiyapubba (BHS anyatīrthikapūrva),28 this possibility should not readily be 
dismissed but ought to be fully considered. 
 
                                                     
25 Ibid., 84, n.1. 
26 Vincent Tournier was kind enough to check the reading of this verse in the earliest complete copy of the 
Mahāvastu text, i.e. ‘manuscript Sa’ dating from the 12th- 13th century, a manuscript which, it may be noted, 
was not at Senart’s disposition at the time of his critical edition of the text. The manuscript reads for this 
verse: 
ataḥ prabhṛti tīrthikā vā bhavanti bhavaḥsūdanāḥ | 
ataḥ prabhṛti kucchati kāmāṃ saṃsanti nirvṛtiṃ | (Folio 30b, 1. 1-2) 
The verse clearly shows no major differences with Senart’s reading that would compel a different 
understanding of the word ‘tīrthikā.’ In the words of Tournier: “Il n'y a donc en ce cas précis que des variantes 
mineures (visarga intempestif, confusion des sifflantes, akṣara ti au lieu de nti) par rapport à l'édition de 
Senart.” (Tournier, personal communication, July 06, 2012). Tournier further noted in his research on the 
extant Nepalese manuscripts of the Mahāvastu that ‘manuscript Sa’ was rediscovered and copied by the pandit 
Jayamuni in 1657 AD after having been obsolete for a couple of centuries. Jayamuni’s copy, ‘manuscript Ta’ lay, 
in Tournier’s opinion, at the basis for the later copies of the Mahāvastu and can therefore be seen as “l’ancêtre 
commun de l’ensemble de la tradition manuscrite népalaise.” Tournier, personal communication, July 06, 
2012, see also Tournier 2012: 95-99. 
27 See Edgerton BHS Dictionary 254, sv (emphasis added). 
28 For the Pāli terms, see Appendix ‘Labelling the Ascetic other.’ Regarding the BHS terms, in the Mahāvastu, 
for instance, anyatīrthika occurs in three distinct compounds: anyatīrthikacarakaparivrājakā (Mv III 412.7), 
anyatīrthikapūrvo (Mv III 49.12-16) and anyatīrthikasaṃśritā (Mv III 353.14). 
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Who could be a titthiya? 
As we have discussed in detail in the previous section on othering, both the terms 
aññatitthiya and titthiya are generic denominations employed in the Pāli Vinaya to refer 
to the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s ascetic others. Despite this fact that both terms are thus 
reverted to for the same purpose (i.e. to generically refer to an early Buddhist bhikkhu’s 
ascetic other), they should not be considered to be identical. For, unlike the simplex 
titthiya, the compound aññatitthiya does not only refer to an early Buddhist bhikkhu’s real 
or imagined ascetic other, but it also establishes a relation of differentiation between 
this ascetic other with a second titthiya, or group of titthiyas. The differential nature of 
the compound aññatitthiya is established, as already noted, by its constituent ‘añña,’ 
meaning ‘other’ or ‘different.’29 To stress this inherent differential aspect of the term 
aññatitthiya, it could be translated with ‘another (group of) titthiya(s),’ instead of the 
common (but also correct) translation of ‘non-Buddhist ascetics.’30  
As it might be remembered, from our contextual reading of the term aññatitthiya in 
the Pāli Vinaya we were able to establish that the ‘añña’ component bore reference to 
the Buddha and/or his disciples. In other words, while the term aññatitthiya pointed to 
an indefinite group of titthiyas, it simultaneously differentiated this indefinite group of 
titthiyas from a second group of titthiyas who appeared to be the Buddha and his 
disciples. This fact implies that early Buddhist bhikkhus fell under the reference range of 
the term ‘titthiya.’ It shows that early Buddhist bhikkhus considered themselves, and 
were also considered by others (i.e. householders), to fall under the denomination range 
of the term titthiya, at least for some time when the term ‘aññatitthiya’ (or a Prākrit 
variant of it) was in vogue among them.31   
If our observations thus far are correct, then this means that the reference field of 
the simplex titthiya has not always started by default outside the boundaries of the 
Buddhist ascetic community, in order to point to an ascetic other. But on the contrary, if 
Buddhist bhikkhus indeed considered themselves, for some time at least, to also be 
titthiyas and could thus positively associate themselves (and be associoted) with the 
term, then the reference range of the term titthiya must initially not have started 
outside but within the very borders of the Buddhist ascetic community. This does not 
 
                                                     
29 Cf. Appendix ‘Labelling of the Ascetic other,’ sv. 
30 I thank Gudrun Pinte for having brought this fact to my attention. 
31 It may be remembered that from our contextual reading that the term aññatitthiya was three times used by a 
householder (more specifically, by the general Sīha and twice by King Seniya of Bimbisāra). This means that 
Buddhist bhikkhus were considered by householders to fall under the denomination range of ‘titthiya.’ Further, 
the term aññatitthiya was also once seen used by the Buddha himself, suggesting that also the Buddha/the 
Buddhist bhikkhus considered themselves to fall under the denomination range of ‘titthiya.’ Cf. Appendix 
‘Labelling of the Ascetic other,’ aññatitthiya.  
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need to imply, as I mentioned at the onset, that Buddhist bhikkhus would have used the 
term ‘titthiya’ reflexively (i.e. to refer to one another). Just as early Buddhist bhikkhus 
could positively associate themselves with the ideas and ideals represented by the term 
samaṇa without, however, using ‘samaṇa’ reflexively, just so early Buddhist bhikkhus 
could positively associate themselves with the ideas and ideals represented with the 
term titthiya without reverting to it to refer to one another. When we consider these 
facts, it becomes clear that the term titthiya has not always or solely functioned as a 
denomination to (negatively) refer to ascetic others (as in the Pāli Vinaya), but that it 
might also have been used to (neutrally) refer to an ascetic or a head of an ascetic 
community. In this light, the possibility that the term is neutrally used to refer to an 
ascetic in the Mahāvastu verse stating that Bodhisattvas from the eighth bhūmi onwards 
“as tīrthikā, they become destroyers of existence; … they despise the objects of desire 
and praise release,”32 becomes contrary to Edgerton’s opinion, very likely. 
 
This being said, it remains to be explained how the term ‘titthiya’ in the Pāli Vinaya 
(and other Buddhist texts) is predominantly used to (negatively) refer to non-Buddhist 
ascetics, while early Buddhists, as I have argued, seemed to have considered themselves 
to fall under the reference range of the term titthiya, at least for some time. The 
difficulty here is evident. It would be a contradiction in terminis that early Buddhists 
who viewed themselves to be titthiyas, would yet apply it to negatively refer to non-
Buddhist ascetics. In the following parts, I show how the meaning of ‘an ascetic’ and the 
meaning of ‘ascetic other’ were not simultaneously present in the term titthiya. They 
reflect a semantic shift. Underlying this semantic shift, lies a shift from applying the 
term in analogy with its wider Indian ascetic contexts to a specific Buddhist context. 
Part II: The Crossing Over to Liberation 
The previous chapters were able to establish that, contrary to what the common English 
translation ‘heretic’ or ‘adherent of a different sect’ suggests, early Buddhist bhikkhus 
had a positive understanding of the term titthiya. This means that they could associate 
with the notions or ideals inherent to or represented with the term titthiya. At least, this 
was true for some time. For, as we have noted, the manner in which the simplex titthiya 
is employed in the Pāli Vinaya alongside the compound aññatitthiya ,betrays both a loss 
 
                                                     
32 Mv I 106 8-9. 
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of association with these notions and ideals, and indicates a negative perception of 
whom is understood with the term. There where the use of the compound aññatitthiya in 
the Pāli Vinaya showed how early Buddhist bhikkhus considered themselves (and were 
considered by others) to fall under titthiya’s reference range, the use of the simplex 
titthiya shows a (conscious or unconscious) desire to dissociate from the term’s 
reference field. In other words, there is a perceptible shift in application and hence also 
in the understanding of the term titthiya by early Buddhist bhikkhus. This observation 
calls for further attention. Since the aññatitthiyas and titthiyas in Buddhist texts 
generally bear reference to the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s ascetic others, a shift in the 
application and understanding of these terms simultaneously indicates an underlying 
shift of the manner in which early Buddhists perceived both these ascetic others and 
themselves vis-à-vis them. To understand why this semantic shift of the term titthiya - 
most certainly gradually - occurred, is to better appreciate how the development of the 
early Buddhist community was characterized by an on-going dialogue with its wider 
ascetic landscape. 
In the following two chapters I show how the early Buddhist bhikkhus’ initial positive 
understanding of the term titthiya was in accordance with the wider Indian ascetic 
language of liberation. This is to say, I will demonstrate how (1) the term in Buddhist 
texts is deeply embedded in the expressions conveying the ultimate soteriological goal 
of enlightenment, or the definite release from the saṃsāric cycle of life and death, and 
how (2) this feature of the term titthiya is shared with its corresponding Ardhamāgadhī 
term in Jain texts.  
In order to demonstrate this, I first offer an etymological exploration of the term 
titthiya and some kindred terms such as titthakara and tittha. This etymological study will 
establish that titthiya and its cognates can be restored to the root √tṝ, meaning ‘to cross 
over.’ This disclosed fact will lie at the basis for unravelling the notions and ideals 
represented in titthiya, and in explicating how early Buddhist bhikkhus had initially a 
positive understanding of the term titthiya. 
In the second chapter, I show how the figurative use of the verb √tṝ and its derived 
forms are deeply embedded in the language of liberation, by means of quoting a 
selective group of early Buddhist and Jain textual fragments. 
Etymological Exploration of titthiya et al 
Table ‘√tṝ and its derivatives’ below gives a schematic overview of the terms to be 
discussed. A horizontal glance at the table clearly shows the phonological closeness 
between the corresponding Prākrit terms (Pāli and Ardhamāgadhī) and between most of 
their Sanskrit equivalents. The first horizontal column gives the third person indicative 
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singular of the root √tṝ. A vertical glance might already throw some insight into how all 
words are related to √tṝ. 
 
Table 1 √tṝ and its derivatives 
   Pāli Ardhamāgadhī Sanskrit 
√tṝ tarati (√tar) 
‘to cross over’  
  
tarati (√tar) tarati (√tṝ) 
 
 tittha 
1. fording place 
2. (head of a) community of 
ascetics 
3. doctrine 
tittha tīrtha 
 
 titthakara 
‘ford maker’ 
titthagara, titthakara,  
titthayara, titthayaära, 
titthaṃkara, titthaṃyara 
tīrthakara, 
tīrthaṅkara  
 
 
 aññatitthiya 
‘an adherent/head of a 
different ascetic community’ 
aṇṇautthiya anyatīrthika, 
anyayūthika 
 titthiya 
‘an adherent/head of a 
(different) ascetic 
community’ 
titthia tīrthika 
 
At present I will be mainly concerned in showing how these various terms can be 
brought to the etymon √tṝ.33 In a first instance I will point out how (anya)tīrthika should 
be viewed as a secondary derivative of ‘tīrtha,’ and how ‘tīrthakara’ is a tatpuruṣa 
compound consisting of the constituents ‘tīrtha’ and ‘kara.’ 
In a second instance, it will be shown how ‘tīrtha’ itself is a noun derived from the 
root √tṝ. The manner in which the various, and perhaps seemingly broadly differing 
meanings of these terms still constitute a semantic unit will be dealt with afterwards. 
Let us begin with tīrthakara. The compound may be broken up into ‘tīrtha’ and ‘kara.’ 
Being a tatpuruṣa compound, tīrthakara can literally be translated as ‘a builder or a 
 
                                                     
33 For a historical philological analysis of terms tīrtha and tīrthaṅkara, see also Parpola 2003.  
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maker (kara) of a ford.’ The Pāli and Ardhamāgadhī terms corresponding to tīrthakara 
(cf. Table 1) are unambiguous phonological developments of the latter.34 
In the Sanskrit word tīrthika the suffix ika- has been added to tīrtha. Of the many 
functions the suffix ika- can fulfil, forming adjectives of belonging (appurtenance) is the 
most common one.35 Renou in his Grammaire Sanscrite cites as examples for this ‘ika- of 
appurtenance’ āśvika (‘relating to the horse’) and dhārmika (‘belonging to a/the 
dharma’).36 In the same fashion, tīrthika should be understood as an adjective of 
appurtenance or, in other words, as primarily denoting ‘belonging to a/the tīrtha’.37 
As the Pāli term titthiya and Ardhamāgadhī titthia are clear equivalents of the just 
discussed Sanskrit tīrthika, no demonstration is needed to show how both Prākrit terms 
should equally be viewed as adjectives of appurtenance derived from the stem tittha-.38 
The orthography of ‘titthiya’ has, however, one peculiarity that calls for explanation: the 
substitution of –k- (of the suffix ika-) for –y-. For Pāli it is unusual to have a phonetic 
 
                                                     
34 See note 38 below for the phonological development of tīrtha > tittha. 
35 The suffix ika- evolved from the more frequently used ka- through intermediary of the latter’s female form ī-
kā-. Both suffixes effect the same semantic functions, but with different frequency. ika- or ka- attached to a 
noun (whose vowel then usually undergoes vṛddhi) can bring about adjectives of appurtenance; it can further 
also make an agent; make diminutives; make a term concrete or technical; or simply create expletives. Cf. A 
Sanskrit Grammar, William D. Whitney 1913⁴ (1886): 466-9, § 1222; Grammaire Sanscrite, Renou 1961² (1930): 244-
8, § 194-5. 
36 Ibid., Renou 1961² (1930): 248, § 195. 
37 Note that since the suffix ika- creates a secondary derivation of tīrtha we might justly expect a vṛddhi-
lengthening of the vowel ī into ai. The reason why we have no apparent vṛddhi lengthening here might be 
because we should not look at –ī- but  rather–īr- , which can be taken as a lengthening of the root vowel -ṝ of 
√tṝ from which tīrtha, as we will soon see, is ultimately derived. Or, an alternative explanation might be that –
ī-  did not undergo a vṛddhi alternation simply because it is part of a verbal noun and that “Un grand nombre 
de raciness verbales échappent aux alternances [vocales]. Les gr[ammairiens] excluent … le guṇa et la vṛddhi 
pour celles  qui comporte un ī ū ou une diphtongue entre consonnes.” Renou 1961² (1930): 76, § 70. 
38 For both titthiya and titthia we meet with two phonetic changes typical for the Prākrit languages, viz. the 
assimilation of a conjunct consonant (here, more specifically, a dominant assimilation of -rt- to –tt-) and the 
shortening of a long vowel followed by a consonant cluster (here the long ī altered to the short i due to the 
conjunct consonant –tt-). The latter is the result of the Law of Morae which demands that a syllable should not 
have more than two morae. Consequently, “where Skt has a long vowel before a double consonant …, Pāli [as 
generally also the other Middle Indic languages] has either: (a) a short vowel before a double consonant or (b) 
a long vowel with the following consonant simplified.” Geiger 1994: 4. See also ‘Das Zwei-Moren-Gesetz’ in von 
Hinüber 2001 (1985): 117-118 § 108-110 and Pischel 1999 (1981²): 89 §83 who explicitly cites tittha=tīrtha as an 
example of the shortening of long vowels in close syllables. 
For the Ardhamāgadhī titthia we may also note the usual elision for the intervocalic –k-. Cf. Pischel 1999 
(1981²): 163 §186. For an introductory overview of the common phonetic changes in Prākrit, see Woolner 1972: 
7-30; and for specifically Pāli see Warder 2001³: 213-8. For a concise and highly practical grammatical 
reference manual of Middle Prākrit (i.e. Māhārāṣṭrī, Ṡaurasenī, Māgadhī, Ardhamāgadhī, Jain-Māhārāṣṭrī and 
Jain-Ṡaurasenī) see Van Den Bossche 1999. 
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change of the intervocalic –k- to –y-. Though in many other Prākrits it is customary to 
find the medial –k- dropped39 (as it is, for instance, specifically the case here with 
Ardhamāgadhī titthia) or replaced by the hiatus-bridger -ẏ- ,40 this is not common for 
Pāli where “k, t, p [usually] remain unchanged.”41  Just as the intervocalic –k- (and, in 
fact, all other medial mutes) also the intervocalic semivowel –y- is generally dropped in 
all Prākrits,42 with the exception of the eastern Prākrit, Māgadhī that faithfully retained 
the ‘ya.’43 We might therefore suspect that the -y- spelling in titthiya was in agreement 
with the Māgadhī pronunciation of the term. In other words, this –y- spelling may be 
explained as a so-called ‘Māgadhism’ or a ‘Buddhistic Easternism,’ being one of the few 
orthographic reminders of the fact that the Pāli Vinaya is in part the result of a 
transposition from (an) earlier eastern version(s).44  
Having analysed tīrthika and titthiya, we need no separate explanation to see how 
Sanskrit anyatīrthika and Pāli aññatitthiya relate in a similar way to respectively tīrtha 
and tittha. Less obvious perhaps is the relationship of the Ardhamāgadhī term 
aṇṇautthiya to tittha (or, in a first stage to the root √tṝ) and its supposed correspondence 
with the two Sanskrit terms anyatīrthika and anyayūthika. Before tackling this 
phonological crux let us briefly pause at the significance of the fact that aññatitthiya 
seems to have been, from a historical-grammatical point of view, first and foremost an 
adjective. It may be recalled that in the Pāli Vinaya aññatitthiya was attested both in the 
syntactical function of an adjective and substantive.45 Since iya-, as we have seen, bears 
reference to the Sanskrit suffix ika- and forms an adjective of appurtenance, it is 
reasonable to suggest that aññatitthiya was initially used as an adjective (in our Pāli 
sources always further defining the undetermined paribbājaka ascetics) before it 
 
                                                     
39 Cf. Woolner 1972: 11 §9.  
40 The hiatus bridger or weakly articulated -ẏa- is only written in Jain manuscripts. Cf. Pischel 1999 (1981²): 163 
§ 187; Van Den Bossche 1999: 26 § 47. 
41 Cf. Woolner 1972: 12. See also Geiger 1994: 27 §35 where he observes that “on the whole, the free consonants 
are well preserved in Pāli. Unlike Pkt., it retains intervocalic mutes.” Note, however, that under the common 
phonetic changes of Prākrit which occur occasionally in Pāli he lists as a frequent example the “Interchange 
between the endings -ikā̌ and -iyā̌.” This is, as he writes, probably due to borrowings from, or influence of, 
other (local) dialects. As I suggest a little further in the text, I think the y-spelling of Pāli titthiya should be seen 
as, to use Geiger’s terminology, the influence of the Māgadhī dialect. Ibid., 27 §36. 
42 Cf. Pischel 1999 (1981²): 163 §186. 
43 Cf. Woolner 1972: 5-6; 58 where he notes that in Māgadhī the ‘ya’ (य) not only remains but also replaces the 
‘ja ’ (ज). 
44 Other such Māgadhī remnants or ‘Buddhistic textual Māgadhisms’ (or also, ‘Buddhistic Easternisms’) are the 
occasional –e ending for the usual Nominative sg. in –o, or the substitution of ‘r’ by ‘l’. Cf. Warder Pāli Metre 
1967: 9. On the Pāli Vinaya being in part the result of a transposition from an eastern version, see Section I, p. 
52 ff.  
45 Cf. Appendix ‘Labelling of the Ascetic other,’ lemma ‘aññatitthiya.’   
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semantically developed to a noun, but not, it seems, without absorbing the paribbājaka-
notion in its denotation. This is not to suggest a strict linear development of aññatitthiya 
as adjective to aññatitthiya as noun. Both functions of aññatitthiya could and most 
probably did appear simultaneously, but it is very likely that passages with aññatitthiya 
as adjective are indicative of a relative semantic/thematic older layer (than those with 
aññatitthiya as noun). These types of observations may serve as small but nevertheless 
useful tools when relatively dating the various Vinaya passages. 
To return to the philological difficulty in restoring aṇṇautthiya to the etymon √tṝ. The 
term has already been the subject of several philological discussions,46 where the main 
issue centred around the question whether the Jain texts that Sanskritized the term into 
anyayūthika are, from a strict linguistic and philological point of view, correct or those 
that Sanskritized it with anyatīrthika.47   
Let us first assume that Sanskrit anyatīrthika is phonologically related to 
Ardhamāgadhī aṇṇautthiya. The fact that the intervocalic –t- of the then hypothetical 
base form aṇṇa-*tutthiya would have dropped, has, to use Leumann’s terms on this 
matter, “nichts auf sich.”48 Indeed, the elision of the simple intervocalic –t- is for 
Ardhamāgadhī a relatively constant phonetic law, amongst the otherwise still many 
uncertain trends.49 The main difficulty for restoring the second segment of the 
compound aṇṇautthiya (i.e. °utthiya) to √tṝ lays in the presence of the vowel –u- instead 
of the phonologically anticipated –a- or –i- for the sonantal ṛ in √tṝ and its derivatives. 50 
The development of ṛ into –u- in Middle Indic vernaculars is, according to Hermann 
Berger, to be expected when (1) –u- occurs in the following syllable (e.g. ṛtu ‘season’> 
utu) or (2) when it precedes labial consonants (e.g. bṛhaspati ‘lord’> Mg. buhaspadi).51 
Neither of these two conditions are fulfilled here to satisfactorily explain the –u- of 
°utthiya. In his introduction to Das Ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick, von Hinüber cites “Pkt. 
 
                                                     
46 Cf. Folkert 1993: 298, n. 22. See also Deleu 1977 ‘Lord Mahāvīra and the Anyatīrthikas.’ 
47 Also the Pāia-Sadda-Mahaṇṇavo (PSM) Prakrit-Hindi Dictionary gives the two Sanskrit possibilities of °tīrthika 
and °yūthika for Prākrit °utthiya. See PSM 46 अÖण, sv. 
48 Das Aupapâtika Sûtra, Leumann (ed.), 1966 (1883): 95. 
49 von Hinüber 2001 (1985): 99 §75. 
50 The normal development of the Sanskrit vowel ṛ in Middle Indic forms is –a-. Cf. Ibid., 126 § 122 where von 
Hinüber cites as example “Skt. kṛta > P kata, Amg kaḍa, M kaa; Skt. hṛdaya > P hadaya.” In the vicinity of a palatal   
-ṛ- can also develop into –i-. For our specific case in the derivative tīrthika (< √tṛ) ṛ occurs near the palatal 
vowel–i- of the suffix ika-. Another concrete example is the development of the Sanskrit word gṛhin into Pāli 
gihin and AMg gihiṇ. Ibid. 
51 Cf. Tedesco 1956 who critically reviews Berger’s Zwei Probleme der mittelindischen Lautlehre. For a clear 
summary of Berger’s theory of ṛ see 498-499. Tedesco notes though the general pattern of Berger’s theory of 
the development of ṛ “seems natural and satisfactory […]  there are many words which do not fit in.” Ibid., 499.  
For the development of ṛ into a, i, or u see already Pischel 1999 (1981²): 60-68 §47- 59.  
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–utthiya” as a paradigmatic example to illustrate the fact that certain Middle Indic forms 
do not immediately find a correspondence in Vedic or Sanskrit.52 A *(t)ūrthika form 
which would easily explain the AMg. °utthiya is indeed not found attested in Vedic 
Sanskrit lexicons. Though it would go against Berger’s stipulated phonetic conditions 
under which ṛ may be expected to develop into u (cf. above), it is not unreasonable to 
suggest that parallel to the widely attested Ardhamāgadhī form tittha also a doublet 
form *tuttha or *tūtha (< Vedic Skt. *tūrtha) would have developed from √tṝ. This 
especially sounds reasonable when we consider the fact that the pronunciation of the 
sonant ṛ was not univocal in the Prākrit languages and could variably be pronounced 
“with a tinge of a+[C], i+[C] and u+[C].”53 This phenomenon caused ṛ to “vacillate […] in 
the same words not only in different dialects, but even within the same dialect.”54 In the 
light of this phenomenon it is not unlikely that in the derivatives of √tṝ, the sonant ṛ 
knew analogous to the īr- also an ūr- development. Also Leumann subscribes to this 
possibility. While favouring a phonological relation between aṇṇautthiya and anyatīrthika 
(and thus not with anyayūthika), he sees this relation underpinned by the general 
observation that “Das Prâkṛt hat hier und da den ursprünglichen r-Vocal zu ûr 
entwickelt, wo das skr. îr zeigt,” citing juṇṇa ‘old’ (< *jûrṇa) = jîrṇa as supporting 
example.55  
Further corroborating our hypothesis from a historical-philological perspective is the 
fact that already in Vedic Sanskrit the –i- and –u- vowels occur alongside (next to, it may 
be noted, the original vowel –a-) in the conjugation and verbal noun derivatives of √tṝ.56 
Some examples:  tūrtáḥ is found attested in Vedic Sanskrit as verbal adjective of √tṝ side 
by side tīrṇáḥ.57 Apart from the expected causative tārayati also the causative form 
tūrvati recurs in Vedic texts.58 √tṝ when conjugated in the present class III,59 gives for the 
third singular indicative present titarti, a form which is clearly based on the 
reduplicated present stem titar, whereas the third singular in the potential mood is not 
 
                                                     
52 von Hinüber 2001 (1985): 42 §10. 
53 Cf. Pischel 1999 (1981²): 60 §47, op. cit. 
54 Ibid., §48, op. cit. 
55 Das Aupapâtika Sûtra, Leumann (ed.), 1966 (1883): 95, op. cit. 
56 The interchange of  i/u in derivatives of √tṝ in the Ṛgveda has already been observed by von Hinüber. In the 
presence of Khowār thūrt and avatūvya he considers the possibility that u-forms of tṝ originally occurred in 
North-West India. In the light of various i/u (<īr, ūr< *ṝ) interchange in Pāli and Prākrits he finds “eine 
Zuordnung der –i- und –u- Formen zu verschiedenen Sprachebenen wohl wahrscheinlicher.” Cf. von Hinüber 
2001 (1985): 42 §10, op cit. 
57 CESD I: 480, sv tárati. 
58 CESD I: 480, sv tárati.  
59 √tṝ can be found conjugated in the present classes I, III and V. 
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based on the stem titar but on tutur, giving tuturyāt.60 In the Ṛgveda the u-vowel appears 
in numerous verbal-compounds based on √tṝ such as ap-túr, viśva- túr, āji- túr, pṛtsu- túr, 
niṣ-ṭúr etc.61 The interchange between the –i- and the –u- vowel (again, it should be 
stressed, next to the original –a- such as in tarati) in the conjugation of √tṝ is in fact so 
striking that an independent verbal present stem with u may readily be suspected. It is 
therefore not surprising to see that Hermann Grassmann listed for √tṝ next to the 
present stems tára and tirá also a present stem turá.62 Of the verbal noun derivatives 
(Vedic) Sanskrit tara, tīrtha, tīra and tur (tūr) may be quoted to illustrate also here the 
interchange of the a, i (ī), u (ū) in √tṝ’s  vocalism.63  Therefore, the floating pronunciation 
of the vowel ṛ noted above for the Prākrit languages was most probably already present 
in Vedic Sanskrit. This would certainly explain the lively vocalism of the etymon √tṝ in 
its conjugation and derivatives. On the pronunciation of ṛ in Vedic Sanskrit, Louis Renou 
may be quoted here:64 
[…] il s’agit d’un phonème composite, ayant pour centre un r consonne, de part et 
d’autre deux voyelles ultra-brèves non précisées […]; la pronunciation actuelle est 
re chez les YVedin […] . La graphie ri dans certains mss, les variations ṛ/a, ṛ/i, ṛ/ar, 
plus souvent ṛ/ri […] ou ṛ/ru […] d’un texte à l’autre (y compris dans les 
etymologies du Nir.), font apparaître un flottement assez sérieux […] . 
Both facts that in Vedic Sanskrit the vowel -u- appears in many of the conjugated and 
derived forms of √tṝ and that the appearance of –u- in these forms generally cannot be 
subsumed under the conventional phonetic laws for ṛ/ṝ > u/ū, but that it is most 
probably due to ṛ’s ‘floating pronunciation,’ support the possibility that alongside tīrtha 
a doublet *tūrtha developed. And it is this doublet *tūrtha that must have laid at the basis 
of Ardhamāgadhī °uttihiya. This hypothesis further founds support by the fact that 
Sanskrit tīrtha (or, perhaps better *tūrtha) gives Aśokan tuṭha as it is testified by the 
compound tuṭhāyatanāni occurring in the Delhi-Toprā inscription.65  Corresponding to 
 
                                                     
60 For the form tuturyāt see e.g. RV 6, 63,2; 5.15,3 and 77,4; 8. 16,2. Also tuturyām in RV 5.45, 11 and tuturvāṇi 
1.168,1. For a complete alphabetical word index of the Ṛgveda, see Swami Vishweshvaranand & Swami 
Nityanand 1908. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Grassmann 1976⁵ (1873), Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda: 525 & 540 ‘tar, tir, tur’ and tur, sv.  Grassmann considers of 
the three possible root vocals of √tṝ , a as the original vocal, i as a result of a shift of accent (from tára to tirá) 
and the u as “meist durch Einfluss eines auf r folgenden y entstanden.” Ibid., op cit.  
63 Grassmann 1976⁵ (1873): 529, sv tára; 537, sv tīrthá; 541, sv túr. It is true that the substantive túr may be 
considered as already a second degree verbal noun derivative of √tṝ  through intermediary of verb ‘túr’ which 
developed in seclusion of tar ‘going across’ a more specific connotation of ‘going across swiftly’, hence also ‘to 
vanquish’. But túr remains nevertheless related to √tṝ. 
64 Renou 1952: 11-12. 
65 Turner translates tuṭhāyatanāni with ‘abodes of suitable recipients’, cf. CDIAL 337: 5903, sv *tūrtha- . 
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tīrtha/*tūrtha is also Prākrit (Māhāraṣtrī) tūha (‘ford’) which can be found attested in e.g. 
Hemachandra’s Prākṛt-Vyākaraṇa66 and Bhadrabāhu’s Bṛhat-Kalpa-Niryukti.67 This all 
strongly suggest that Ardhamāgadhī aṇṇautthiya is, in accordance with anyatīrthika, an 
adjective of appurtenance formed on tīrtha’s doublet *tūrtha (AMg. 
*tuttha/*tūtha/tūha/*tūṭha). The preferred Sanskritization of aṇṇautthiya, from a 
philological point of view, should therefore be anyatīrthika (in the absence of an attested 
*anyatūrthika) since this term, unlike anyayūthiya, recognizes aṇṇauttihiya’s relation to 
√tṝ. The Sanskritization anyayūthiya gives merely a semantic equivalent.68 The 
component ‘yūtha’ of anyayūthiya which carries the meanings of ‘a herd, flock, troop, 
etc’69 shows how the Jain authors interpreted the ‘tittha,’ or more correctly, the *tuttha, 
*tūtha’-component of aṇṇautthiya as bearing reference on their ascetic community.  
To finalize this philological exploration of titthiya et al the formality remains to make the 
relation between tīrtha (tittha) and the etymon √tṝ explicit. This relation may already 
have become apparent in our discussion of aṇṇautthiya and it therefore suffices to state 
that tīrtha is a primary derivative of the root √tṝ formed by the attachment of the suffix 
tha-.70 The suffix tha- forms “almost without exception action-nouns (though some have 
assumed a concrete value).”71 That tīrtha should in a first instance indeed be considered 
as an action-noun which quickly developed into a noun with concrete denotations will 
be seen in the upcoming chapter where the semantic unit of √tṝ and its derivatives will 
be argued by means of concrete textual examples. 
 
                                                     
66 See PSM 442, sv तूह. 
67 Bhadrabāhu Bṛhat-Kalpa-Niryukti and Sanghadāsa Bṛhat-Kalpa-Bhāṣya, Bollée 1998 : 2388, 2395, 4860, 4866-8. This 
Niryukit dates between 300 and 500 AD.  
tūha is further also found attested in the Māhārāṣṭṛī Prākrit,  cf. Pischel 1999 (1981²): 68 §58. 
68 For further reflections on the īr/ūr alternation of √tṝ and on the possibility of a doublet *tūrtha see a.o. CDIAL  
*tūrtha-,  Whitney 1913⁴ (1896): 271 §756; 274 §766. Renou 1952: 29 §26 where an intermediate form *tṛṇo- is 
suggested for √tṝ’s vowel alternation. Wackernagel, Jakob & Debrunner, Albert, 1957² (1896) see Prākrit tūha- 
as a development of *tṝtha (p. 27 §24), contrary to Pischel who advocates the *tūrtha base form for Prākrit tūha. 
Cf. Pischel 1999 (1981²): 68 §58 where he further equally posits a Sanskrit form *anyatūrthika for AMg. 
aṇṇaütthiẏa. 
On Aśokan tuṭhāyatanāni see Hettiaratchi (1945: 579) who pleads for reading the term as an equivalent to Pāli 
titthāyatanāni and as having developed from *tuṭṭhāyatanāni. He further suggests the following line of 
development for Māhārāṣtrī tūha: *tūrtha > * tuttha > * tūtha > tūha.  
For derivatives based on √tṝ see CDIAL 5695 *tára-, 5702 *tárati, 5793 tārá-, 5794 tāraka-, 5795 tāraṇa-, 5821 tirátē, 
5823 tirás, 5845 tīrṇa-, 5846 tīrthá, 5847 *tīrthādahana-, 5903 *tūrtha-, 5909 *tṛta-. 
An additional literature list on (the development of) √tṝ can be consulted in von Hinüber 2001 (1985): 42 §10. 
69 MW 856 yūtha, sv. 
70 Cf. Renou 1952: 160 §209. 
71 Whitney 1913⁴ (1896): 436 §1162.  
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What ‘To Cross Over,’ ‘Doctrine,’ and ‘Adherent of An(other) Ascetic 
Community’ have in Common 
That the Pāli terms tittha, titthakara, aññatitthiya and titthiya, just as their corresponding 
Ardhamāgadhī and Sanskrit terms, share an etymological affinity is now clear. In the 
previous part ‘Etymological Explorations of titthiya et al’ it has been demonstrated how 
these terms are reducible to the etymon √tṝ. This etymological affinity does not, 
however, immediately or transparently shine through the divergent denotations these 
cognates carry. For where lies the semantic affinity between, for instance, ‘to cross over’ 
(√tṝ), ‘doctrine’ (tittha) and ‘adherent/head of a different ascetic community’ (añña-
titthiya)? And how are the meanings of ‘fording place,’ ‘(head of a) community of 
ascetics,’ and ‘doctrine,’ which are all associated with the term tittha, interrelated?72  
Despite those various divergent meanings, this chapter argues for a semantic unity of 
titthiya and its cognates. This chapter will delineate how those divergent meanings are 
the outcome of the application of √tṝ and its derivatives in figurative settings expressive 
of the soteriological aim of liberation (mokkha). As it will be shown, it is in these 
figurative settings that the development of the Pāli term titthiya needs to be understood, 
as well as the early Buddhist bhikkhus’ initial positive association with the term titthiya. 
More specifically, both the development of the term titthiya and the early Buddhist 
bhikkhus’ initial positive association with it, are intertwined with the fact, as we will see, 
that life was soteriologically conceived as cyclic. It is well known that the cyclic 
conception of life is not unique to early Buddhist bhikkhus, but that it equally lies at the 
basis of the philosophical speculations and ascetic stipulations of early Jain bhikkhus.73 In 
other words, the metaphorical application of √tṝ and its derivatives in the ‘language of 
liberation’ is common to both early Buddhists and Jains.74  
In what follows, the connection will be elucidated between the basic soteriological 
viewpoint of life as cyclic and this shared metaphorical use among early Buddhists and 
 
                                                     
72 See p.175 and p.207. See also Balcerowicz 1997 where he argues for using the term ‘tīrtha’ (instead of the 
more commonly employed term ‘dharma’) when looking for a semantic equivalent of the western concept of 
‘religion.’  
73 This was most certainly also true for other early Indian ascetic communities. In fact, the conception of life as 
cyclic was one of the several “cultural features of Greater Magadha,” cp. Bronkhorst 2007: 69 ff.  
74 This expression ‘language of liberation’ has been inspired by a similarly entitled chapter of Katherine 
Blackstone’s Women in the Footsteps of the Buddha. This book and particularly its chapter ‘Language of 
Liberation’ offers an examination of the metaphors and symbols used in the Therīgāthā to express the quest 
and achievement of liberation by bhikkhunīs. Comparing it with those in the Theragāthā, she unveiled 
important differences between the two companion texts regarding their metaphor use and their story 
settings. These differences might be indicative that the Therīgāthā has indeed, as the text itself claims, been 
compiled by female authors, see Blackstone 1998. 
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Jains of √tṝ and its derivatives. Several early Jain and Buddhist textual fragments will be 
quoted to, in a first instance, show the application of √tṝ and its derivatives in literal 
settings, and subsequently in figurative settings too, hereby both showing the semantic 
unity of the various cognates and offering a ground for understanding the early 
Buddhists’ positive association with the term titthiya. 
The Applications of √tṝ in Literal versus Metaphorical Language 
In early Buddhist and Jain texts numerous conjugated forms of the root √tṝ can be found 
that carry the literal meaning of ‘to cross over.’ These forms occur in clear unambiguous 
literal contexts, that is, the forms are used in such a way and occur in only such type of 
phrases that do not permit additional interpretation to what has been expressed on the 
literal level. Though that which can physically ‘be crossed over’ may both be firm 
ground or water (such as a river), the verb is most frequently used in the context of 
water.  
A first example of √tṝ expressing the crossing of a physical space on firm ground may 
be drawn from the Mahāvagga. In the sixth chapter of the Mahāvagga a succession of 
actions is given of a householder who wishes to approach the Buddha, who at that 
moment is staying in his dwelling place (vihāra). So we read at Vin I 248: 
[H]aving approached quietly, having entered the verandah [ālinda] (but) without 
crossing [ataramāno] it, having coughed, [the householder] tap on the door bolt. 
(tr. I.B. Horner BD IV 342, emphasis added)75 
This negated present participle (a-taramāno) is a rare example of a literal application of 
√tṝ to express the crossing of something else than water. Conspicuously more frequent 
is the use of the verb in contexts of water. This is in part seen by the fact that the 
Padabhājaniya to pārājika II explains nāvā (‘boat’) with ‘yāya tarati’ or ‘that by which one 
crosses.’76  
In general, the recurrent setting of √tṝ is the wading through a (mostly specific) river 
by an animal or a person in order to reach the shore on the opposite side. The wading 
through is usually mentioned because the river literally lies in the way of the village or 
city that is to be travelled to. Occasionally, it might explicitly be stated that the crossing 
of the river takes place at a ford (tittha). Vin I 191 mentions the crossing of the river 
Aciravatī by cows. At Vin III 63 we can read en passant how a Buddhist bhikkhu crosses a 
river and a little further, at Vin III 67, we hear of a bhikkhu who, living in a certain 
village, needs to cross a river to visit a fellow bhikkhu who lives in the city of Kosambī. 
 
                                                     
75 Vin I 248: … appasaddo upasaṃkamitvā ataramāno ālindaṃ pavisitvā ukkāsitvā aggaḷaṃ ākoṭesi. 
76 Vin III 49 (tr. BD I 60): nāva nāma yāya tarati. 
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The crossing of a river seems to have been permitted both by wading/swimming77 and 
by boat as Vin I 109 respectively mentions a supposed incident of bhikkhu Kassapa 
wetting his garb due to being caught by a strong current of the river he was crossing, 
and pācittiya XXVIII prohibits bhikkhus to embark in a boat with bhikkhunīs unless if it is 
to cross over to the other bank (and thus not for leisure trips). In all Vinaya passages 
just referred to, the Pāli term nadī is used for river and a conjugated form of √tṝ to 
express the crossing of it.78 Also at Vin I 230 ‘nadī’ and a form of √tṝ, though with the 
addition of the preverbium ud°- which most probably stresses the fact that the crossing 
is here done by wading through (and thus not by using a boat),79 is used when two 
ministers of Magadha, standing in awe of Gotama the Buddha, thought:  
… yen’ ajja samaṇo Gotamo dvārena nikkhamissati taṃ Gotamadvāraṃ nāma bhavissati, 
yena titthena Gaṅgaṃ nadiṃ uttarissati taṃ Gotamatitthaṃ nāma bhavissatīti. (Vin I 
230) 
 
                                                     
77 It may be noted here that the present day Hindi word for swimming, तैनार्, is also etymologically related to 
√tṝ.  
78 In order of quotation see: Vin I 190-191 (BD IV 254): tena kho pana samayena chabbaggiyā bhikkhū Aciravatiyā 
nadiyā gāvīnaṃ tarantīnaṃ visāṇesu pi gaṇhanti. (emphasis added) 
Vin III 63 (BD I 106): tena kho pana samayena aññatarassa bhikkhuno nadiṃ tarantassa rajakānaṃ hatthato muttaṃ 
sāṭakaṃ pāde laggaṃ hoti. (emphasis added) 
Vin III 67 (BD I 113): atha kho tassa bhikkhuno gāmakā Kosambiṃ gacchantassa antarā magge nadiṃ tarantassa 
sūkarikānaṃ hatthato muttā medavaṭṭi pāde laggā hoti. (emphasis added) 
Vin I 109 (BD IV 142): tena kho pana samayena āyasmā Mahākassapo Andhakavindā Rājagahaṃ uposathaṃ 
āgacchanto antarā magge nadiṃ taranto manaṃ vuḷho ahosi, cīvarāni ’ssa allāni. (emphasis added) 
Vin III 63 (BD I 106): tena kho pana samayena aññatarassa bhikkhuno nadiṃ tarantassa rajakānaṃ hatthato muttaṃ 
sāṭakaṃ pāde laggaṃ hoti. (emphasis added) 
Vin III 67 (BD I 113): atha kho tassa bhikkhuno gāmakā Kosambiṃ gacchantassa antarā magge nadiṃ tarantassa 
sūkarikānaṃ hatthato muttā medavaṭṭi pāde laggā hoti. (emphasis added) 
Vin I 109 (BD IV 142): tena kho pana samayena āyasmā Mahākassapo Andhakavindā Rājagahaṃ uposathaṃ 
āgacchanto antarā magge nadiṃ taranto manaṃ vuḷho ahosi, cīvarāni ’ssa allāni. (emphasis added) 
Vin IV 65-66 (BD II 292-293), i.e. Pācittiya XXVIII: yo pana bhikkhu bhikkuniyā saddhiṃ saṃvidhāya ekaṃ nāvaṃ 
abhirūheyya uddhaṃgāminiṃ vā adhogāminiṃ vā aññatra tiriyaṃtaraṇāya, pācittiyan ti. (emphasis added) Cf. also 
Vin IV (saṃghadisesā III) where nuns are prohibited to cross the river alone. 
79 As preverbium ud° according to the PTS’ PED carries the ‘Original meaning “out in an upward direction”, out 
of, forth …[and] hence develop[ed] 2 clearly defined meanings, viz. (1) out, out of, away from [and] (2) up 
(high) or high up, upwards, on to [… ].’ (cf. PED 132 ud-, sv) it is possible that ud° in connection with the root 
√tṝ and when √tṝ has as specific direct object a stretch of water, it expresses the meaning ‘through’ water, with 
the image of ‘upward direction’ fulfilled by the vertical figure of the wading person. uttarati nadiṃ would then 
mean ‘he crosses through the river,’ stressing the fact that the crossing is accomplished through (vertical) 
wading and not through using a (horizontal) ferry or any other floating devices. This hypothesis seems to find 
support in the fact that a little further the Vinaya passage in question suggests that the ud°√tṝ (or the wading 
through) was not possible due to too high levels of the river and that a raft or a floating device was needed 
instead. 
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or, in Horner’s translation: 
By whichever gate the recluse Gotama goes out to-day, that shall be called 
Gotama’s Gate; by whichever ford [titthena] he crosses [ut-tarissati] that shall be 
called Gotama’s Ford [Gotama-titthaṃ]. (I.B. Horner BD IV 314) 
A literal application of √tṝ in the Jain Ᾱgama may be quoted from the Kappa Sutta, a text 
traditionally categorized under the group of Cheyasuttas (Skt. Chedasūtras, 
‘Degradation Manuals’) and which third part deals with the conduct of Jain ascetics 
during the rainy season, hence also its name Pajjosavaṇā Kappa (Skt. Paryuṣaṇā Kalpa).80 
In the edition of Walther Schubring Kappa sutta IV 27 reads: 
no kappai nigganthāṇa vā nigganthīṇa vā imāo pañca mahā-naīo uddiṭṭhāo gaṇiyāo 
vañjiyāo anto māsassa dukkhutto vā tikkhutto vā uttarittae vā saṃtarittae vā, taṃ-jahā: 
Gaṅgā Jauṇā Saraū Kosiyā Mahī. aha puṇa evaṃ jāṇejjā: Eravaī Kuṇālāe – jattha cakkiyā 
egaṃ pāyaṃ jale kiccā egaṃ pāyaṃ thale kiccā, evaṃ se kappai anto māsassa dukkhutto 
vā tikkhutto vā uttarittae vā saṃtarittae vā. jattha no evaṃ cakkiyā, evaṃ se no kappai 
anto māsassa dukkhutto vā tikkhutto vā uttarittae vā saṃtarittae vā. 
Which may be translated as: 
Nigganthas and nigganthīs are not allowed to either wade through [uttarittae] or 
ferry across [saṃtarittae] twice or thrice within one month the following five, 
fixed, enumerated and named large rivers: the Gangā, the Yamunā, the Sarayū, the 
Kośikā and the Mahī. If, however, they see at places like the Ajiravatī in Kuṇālā – 
where it is possible to wade through [uttarittae] or cross [saṃtarittae] by putting 
one foot in the water and the other on the ground, then one may wade through or 
cross the river twice or thrice within a month, otherwise not. (tr. partly following 
Burgess 1910: 265)81 
From these literal applications of √tṝ the following facts may be underscored: √tṝ in its 
primary denotation (i.e. in its literal application) necessarily entails that its agent 
crosses a place by moving from one (specific) point to another (specific) point. Further, 
 
                                                     
80 The Kappa Sutta is traditionally ascribed to Bhadrabāhu. While its third part (which is the oldest part of the 
Sutta) deals with the conduct of Jain ascetics during the rainy season, the first part gives biographies of the 
Jina, and the second lists several gaṇas and their branches. Though ascribed to Bhadrabāhu, some sections are 
much later than Bhadrabāhu, dating from the first century AD. Cf. Winternitz 1999 (1983, revised edition): 444 
ff. and Deo 1956: 33 ff. 
81 Burgess’ translation of the Jain Kappa Sutta is an Enlgish translation of Schubring’s German translation The 
Kappa Sutta has been translated into German by Walther Schubring at the turn of the 19th century (xxx). This 
translation has been republished in the 1970’s by Klaus Bruhn in his Walther Schubring Kleine Schriften, cf. 
Schubring 1977. Schubring’s German translation has further been translated into English in 1910 by May S. 
Burgess, see Burgess 1910. 
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the notion of this crossing implies that the two locations from which one moves from 
and to are separated by an area that normally invites someone to move in a direction 
that is perpendicular to the crossing direction. In other words, √tṝ entails a spatial 
tension with the area that is to be crossed and hence appears to demand a certain 
(physical) effort of its agent. 
In concrete terms, when √tṝ is used, for instance, in the context of a river it is 
immediately understood that √tṝ’s agent is moving from a certain point of the hither 
bank to a point that is located on the opposite shore. Both banks from which the agent 
moves from and to, do not, therefore, need to be explicitly mentioned, they are 
implicitly understood in the action itself. The space between the two banks is filled up 
with the river which normally invites a moving that is either upstream or downstream, 
or, in other words, a moving which direction is perpendicular to the line between the 
two opposite shores. Further, the direction of the crossing stands in tension with the 
natural course of the river, and finally the crossing of the river requires more effort 
than following its natural course. 
When we keep these facts of √tṝ in mind, it is not difficult to see (in the specific 
context of rivers, that is) that a little shift of emphasis from the act of crossing to the 
actual aspect of reaching the opposite shore combined with the facts that the crossing 
of the river and the reaching of the shore entails respectively a certain tension and 
effort, √tṝ perfectly lends itself to carry next to its literal denotation of “crossing over” 
the meanings “to reach something,” “to overcome something,” or even “to vanquish.” 
Indeed, in Vedic Sanskrit texts several examples may be found of √tṝ wherein the aspect 
of reaching (the other shore) has been emphasized at the cost of loosing the crossing 
aspect.82 Also in Buddhist and Jain texts √tṝ can be seen applied in the meaning of 
“reaching something,” or “overcoming something.” An example from the Jain Āyāraṅga 
Sutta. AS I 16.18-19 (in the edition of Schubring) reads “saccassa āṇāe uvaṭṭhie mehāvī 
māraṃ tarai,” meaning: “recognize [only] the truth! (equipped with the knowledge of the 
truth) the prudent one overcomes death.”83 
In Buddhist and Jain texts the implication that the crossing over might also involve a 
reaching of something (i.e. succeeding), especially becomes relevant when the river that 
is crossed becomes metaphorically associated with the pitfalls of worldly life or a 
wrongly advocated ascetic life. This point will soon be explored in greater detail. 
The reason why metaphorical expressions are, generally speaking, a widespread feature 
of language, lies in the fact that they are crucial tools to translate abstract notions to 
everyday experience. Metaphors bring down, so to say, abstract ideas and realities to 
 
                                                     
82 For textual references see Grassmann 1976⁵ (1873), Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda: 525 & 540 ‘tar, tir, tur’ and tur, sv. 
83 Pure Life, Schubring, 2004 (1926): 98.  
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tangible levels where the activity of comprehension takes place. Seen from the 
perspective of what is to be expressed, metaphors open up the conventional boundaries 
of a word’s denotation and enable a larger, complex interplay of meanings, implications 
and sometimes visual conceptions too, that would not have been found or been possible 
on the literal level. Soteriological concepts very often, if not always, are abstract notions 
that are in need of metaphorical language to, on a basic level, become expressible and, 
in a second instance, become understandable. The complex concept regarding the 
functioning of ‘karma,’ for instance, is one such idea that needs metaphorical language 
to be conveyed and grasped. In an interesting and recent article “Checking the Heavenly 
‘Bank Account of karma’,” Jens Schlieter traces, among other things, the different 
metaphors used to express the functioning of karma in both early Buddhist texts and 
western scholarship. While the latter extensively seems to draw its imagery from the 
financial world, and more specifically, its banking account system, early Buddhist texts 
find their source for explaining karma in the agricultural environment, creating its 
imagery from seeds, their ripening, fruit and (the uncertainty of the quality of) the 
harvest.84 
Apart from karma many other soteriological notions are best understood when 
expressed in or illustrated via metaphorical language. Among these are the 
interconnected soteriological notions of life as cyclic; and of the possibility to put an 
end to this saṃsāra of life and death, provided that one exerts oneself on the ascetic 
path laid out by his or her teacher. One particular set of metaphors developed in both 
early Buddhist and Jain texts to help expressing these soteriological notions, appears to 
have been provided by the imagery of ‘the crossing of a river.’ With the river representing 
ignorance or (types of) deeds obstructing liberation, a wrong view or, even saṃsāra 
itself; with the two shores of the river representing the binary concept of (the to be 
rejected) household or worldly life and the (more desirable) ascetic life; with the 
teachings of respectively the Buddha and the Jina representing the raft to cross the 
river; or with the Buddha and the Jina themselves being the raft- or bridge-makers; and 
with the notion that crossing entails an effort, the imagery to attain liberation 
expressed by √tṝ and its derivatives is complete. Let us illustrate this metaphorical use 
of √tṝ and its derivatives with a few examples.   
We may start by returning to the last quoted Vinaya passage above. At Vin I 230 we 
could read how two ministers wanted to name the gate (dvāra) by which the Buddha 
would depart, the Gotama-gate and the ford (tittha) where he would cross (uttarissati) 
the river Gaṅgā, the Gotama-ford. The application of tittha and uttarissati were, as I have 
pointed out, in a literal sense. The passage soon continues, however, in a symbolic tone 
 
                                                     
84 Cf. Schlieter 2013. 
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wherein √tṝ and its derivatives are no longer used in a simple literal sense but start to be 
metaphorically applied. The Vinaya passage continues thus: 
atha kho bhagavā yena dvārena nikkhami taṃ Gotamadvāraṃ nāma ahosi. atha kho 
bhagavā yena Gaṅgā nadī ten’ upasaṃkami. tena kho pana samayena Gaṅgā nadī pūrā 
hoti samatitthikā kākapeyyā. manussā aññe nāvaṃ pariyesanti aññe uḷumpaṃ pariyesanti 
aññe kullaṃ bandhanti orā pāraṃ gantukāmā. addasa kho bhagavā te manusse aññe 
nāvaṃ pariyesante aññe uḷumpaṃ pariyesante aññe kullaṃ bandhante orā pāraṃ 
gantukāme, divāna seyyathāpi nāma balavā puriso sammiñjitaṃ vā bāhaṃ pasāreyya 
pasāritaṃ vā bāhaṃ sammiñjeyya, evam eva Gaṅgāya nadiyā orimatīre antarahito 
pārimatīre paccuṭṭhāsi saddhiṃ bhikkhusaṃghena. atha kho bhagavā etam atthaṃ 
viditvā tāyaṃ velāyaṃ imaṃ udānaṃ udānesi: 
 
ye taranti aṇṇavaṃ saraṃ setuṃ katvāna vissajja pallalāni, 
kullaṃ hi jano bandhati, tiṇṇā medhāvino janā ’ti. (MV VI 28.11-13, Vin I 230, emphasis 
added) 
Which may be rendered into English: 
Accordingly the gate [dvāra] by which the Bhagavat departed came to be called 
Gotama’s Gate. Then the Bhagavat approached the river Gaṅgā. Now at that time 
the river Gaṅgā was full, having the same level as her banks [samatitthikā], (so 
that) a crow could drink (from it) [kākapeyyā]. Since they were desirous of going 
from the hither to the further [bank], some people searched for a boat [nāva], 
some searched for a float [uḷumpa], others put together a raft [kulla]. 
The Bhagavat saw these people, of whom some were searching for a boat, some 
were searching for a float, others were putting together a raft since they were 
desirous of going from the hither to the further [bank]. Seeing them, as a strong 
man might stretch out his bent arm or might bend back his outstretched arm, 
even so did he, vanishing from the hither bank [orimatīre] of the river Gaṅgā, 
reappear on the further bank [pārimatīre] together with the bhikkhu saṅgha. Then 
the Bhagavat, having understood this matter, at that time uttered this solemn 
utterance: 
 
“Those cross [taranti] the deeps, the rivers, making a bridge, spanning the swamps. 
See! People tie their rafts – but crossed over [tiṇṇa] are the wise.” (trsl. partly 
following I.B. Horner, BD IV 314) 
With the river, in the quoted Vinaya passage, presented as unfordable the question of 
crossing it turns into a question of how to cross it and who can succeed in it. The fact 
that the passage presents the riverbank crowded with people, who are hopping around, 
building all sorts of floating devices to cross, suggests that the reaching of the other side 
is difficult but highly desired too. The symbolic tone of the passage becomes very 
distinct when the Buddha is said to miraculously disappear for a moment to reappear 
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the next moment on the other bank (pārima-tīra). The passage thus metaphorically 
equates the Buddha with the functioning raft needed to successfully cross the river. 
That the bhikkhu saṅgha is said to appear together with the Buddha on the other bank 
(and not the ‘common’ people) alludes to the idea, ‘Buddhist’ that is, that the other side 
can only be reached by those who are following the Buddha and his teachings.85 
Another example of this metaphorical application of √tṝ and its derivatives in 
Buddhist texts, may be provided by the Jātaka tale entitled ‘Good Group of Five’ 
recorded at Mahāvastu III 353 of the Northern Buddhists, the Mahāsāṃghika-
Lokottaravādins. In true Jātaka fashion the story tells of a previous birth of the Buddha 
where he, as Bodhisattva, saved the life of five merchants who, in a subsequent birth, 
became the Buddha’s first disciples.  
The gist of the story presents the Buddha as self-sacrificing himself so that his dead 
body may literally become the raft that will help the five merchants, who were 
shipwrecked, to successfully cross (avatīrṇa) the great ocean (mahāsamudra) in order to 
reach dry land (sthala), this is, the ocean’s shore (samudra-tīra). In this Jātaka tale, √tṝ is 
metaphorically applied to express not a mere crossing, but a crossing over that entails a 
succeeding, a reaching of, and even an overcoming of false views (dṛṣṭi). To see how √tṝ 
is metaphorically applied in this Jātaka it suffices to have a look at its application in the 
story’s prologue: 
िभक्ष ूभगवÛतमाहÛसुः|| भगवता पंच भद्रवगीर्या अÛयतीिथर्कसंिĮता दाǽणेन Ǻिçटओघेन 
वुéयमाना ततो Ǻिçटगितषु िविनवतर्िय×वा भयभैरवातो संसारसागरातो उद्धिर×वा क्षेमèथले 
िशवे शमे अभये िनवार्णे प्रितçठािपताः || भगानाह || न िभक्षवः एतरिहमेव पंचका भद्रविगर्का 
मया संसारसागरातो तािरता अÛयदािप मया एते महासमुद्रातो भग्नयानपात्रा अलेन अत्राणा 
अशरणा अपरायणाः कृÍछ्रप्राÜता åयसनमागता आ×मपिर×यागं कृ×वा महासमुद्रातो 
èविèतना प्रितçठािपताः ||86 ( Le Mahâvastu, Senart 1977 (1897) Vol III: 353.14-20) 
 
 
                                                     
85 Horner in her translation of this Vinaya passage notes that tiṇṇa is a technical term. It is, she writes 
‘frequent in the Suttas, meaning “crossed over” the four-fold flood of sense-pleasures, becoming, false view 
and ignorance, or over some other undesirable state, and so “crossed over” Māra’s stream, a river of death.” 
Horner, BD IV 314, fn. 8. 
86 bhikṣū bhagavantamāhansuḥ || bhagavatā paṃca bhadravargīyā anyatīrthikasaṃśritā dāruṇena dṛṣṭioghena 
vuhyamānā tato dṛṣṭigatiṣu vinivartiyitvā bhayabhairavāto saṃsārasāgarāto udddharitvā kṣemasthale śive same abhaye 
nirvāṇe pratiṣṭhāpitāḥ || bhagānāha || na bhikṣavaḥ etarahimeva paṃcakā bhadravargikā mayā saṃsārasāgarāto tāritā 
anyadāpi mayā ete mahāsamudrāto bhagnayānapātrā alena atrāṇā aśaraṇā aparāyaṇāḥ kṛcchraprāptā vyasanamāgatā 
ātmaparityāgaṃ kṛtvā mahāsamudrāto svastinā pratiṣṭhāpitāḥ// 
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The monks said to the Exalted One, “This good group of five monks were once 
adherents of another sect [anyatīrthika], carried away by the strong current of 
heresy [dṛṣṭioghena]. But then the Exalted One turned them away from these paths 
of false belief [dṛṣṭigatiṣu], raised them up out of fear and dismay, out of the ocean 
of recurrent birth [saṃsārasāgarāto], and established them on the firm ground 
[kṣemasthale] of peace, happiness, calm, fearlessness and nirvana.” The Exalted 
One replied, “Monks, that was not the only time that the good group of five were 
led by me across [tāritā] the ocean of recurrent birth. There was another occasion, 
also, when I, through sacrifice of my own self [ātmaparityāgaṃ], saved them from 
the great ocean [mahāsamudrāto] when their vessel [yānapātrā] had been wrecked 
and they were without shelter, protection, refuge or succour but fallen into dire 
straits and adversity, and established them in prosperity.” (The Mahāvastu, J. Jones 
1952 Vol III: 350)  
What is to be crossed here, or better, what needs to be overcome is not a simple river 
(nadī) but the strong current of false views (dṛṣṭi-ogha) and herewith linked the ocean of 
recurrent birth (saṃsārasāgara). With the Buddha being the raft to help them cross, the 
metaphorical application of √tṝ is complete. 
Also within early Jain texts, a similar metaphorical application of √tṝ can be 
encountered. The Dasaveyāliya Sutta (Skt. Daśavaikālika Sūtra, DS),87 equates vinaya or 
correct discipline (as promulgated by the Jina, that is) to be the means to attain mokkha, 
this is, to cross over saṃsāra. This is beautifully illustrated at DS 9.2.1-3 that states how a 
Jain bhikkhu failing to apply himself properly to vinaya (AMg. viṇaa) will be endlessly 
carried away in saṃsāra ‘like a piece of wood in a stream (soya)’: 
मूलाओ खÛध-Üपभवो दमुèस, 
 खÛधाओ पÍछा समुवेिÛत साहा ǀ 
साहा-Üपसाहा िवǽहिÛत प×ता, 
 
                                                     
87 The Sutta may be considered as an early concise manual to lead the Jain ascetic life. It belongs to the group 
of Mūlasūtras and is traditionally attributed to Sejjaṃbhava who is said to have written the Sutta in the year 
98 after Mahāvīra’s death. The text contains a reference to the Jain patriarch Govinda Vācaka who lived in the 
third century A.D Cf. Deo 1956: 24. 
The Sutta has been edited and translated by respectively Leumann and Schubring. Cf. The Dasaveyāliya Sutta, 
Ernst Leumann (ed.) & Walther Schubring (tr.), Ahmedabad: The Managers of Sheth Anandji Kalianji, 1932. 
(Has been republished in Walther Schubring Kleine Schriften of Klaus Bruhn, Glasenapp-Stiftung Band 13, 
1977). Leumann also edited the niryukti on the text, cf. Daṡavaikālika-sūtra und –niryukti, nach dem 
Erzählungsgehalt undersucht und herausgegeben von Ernst Leumann (ed.), 1892. A user friendly edition and 
translation of the Sutta has also been provided by Lalwani. Cf. Daśavaikālika Sūtra (Dasaveyalia Sutta), Kastur 
Chand Lalwani (ed. & tr.), Delhi, Varanasi, Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973.  
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 तओ से पुÜफं च फलं रसो य ǁ१ǁ 
एवं धàमèस िवणओ मूलं , परमो से मोक्खो ǀ 
जेण िकि×तं सुयं सग्घं िनèसेसं चािभगÍछई ǁ२ǁ 
जे य चÖड ेिमए थदे्ध दåुवाई िनयडी सढे ǀ 
वुÑझई से अिवणीयÜपा कटं्ठ सोय-गयं जहा ǁ३ǁ  
(DS 9.2.1-3, ed. Leumann 1932: 177-178)88 
 
From the root comes the trunk of the tree, from the trunk shoot up the branches, 
from the branches and boughs spring up the leaves, from them the blossom, the 
fruit and [its] sap. In the same manner discipline (viṇaa) is the root of Dharma; by 
it [the monk will] obtain a glorious reputation [and] complete [knowledge of] 
tradition. [Dharma’s] final [fruit is] Salvation (mokkha). But [a monk] without 
discipline (aviṇīyappā), [who is] rough, [of a] limited [intellect], full of conceit, 
harsh in his words, vulgar, and uncouth, [will] be carried away [in the Saṃsāra] 
like a piece of wood in the stream (soya). (DS 9.2.1-3, tr. Schubring 1932: 111) 
Contrary to the Jain bhikkhu who neglects vinaya, the bhikkhu who does apply himself 
properly to vinaya and who does follow his guru’s instructions, that bhikkhu crosses 
(tarati) the flood (oha) that is difficult to cross (duruttara) and ‘reaches the highest 
abode’:   
िनƧेस-व×ती पुण जे गुǾणं 
 सुय×थ-धàमा िवणयिàम कोिवया ǀ 
तिर×तु ते ओहिमणं दǽु×तरं 
 खिव×तु कàमं गइमु×तमं गय ǁ (DS 9.2.23, ed. Leumann 1932: 180)89 
 
 
                                                     
88 mūlāo khandha-ppabhavo dumassa, 
 khandhāo pacchā samuventi sāhā. 
sāha-ppasāhā viruhanti pattā, 
 tao se pupphaṃ ca phalaṃ raso ya. (1) 
evaṃ dhammassa viṇao mūlaṃ, paramo se mokkho, 
jeṇa kittiṃ suyaṃ sagghaṃ nissesaṃ cābhigacchaī. (2) 
je ya caṇḍe mie thaddhe duvvāī niyaḍī saḍhe, 
vuñjhaī se aviṇīyappā kaṭṭhaṃ soya-gayaṃ jahā. (3) (DS 9.2.1-3, ed. Leumann 1932: 177-178) 
89 niddesa-vattī puṇa je gurūṇaṃ 
 suyattha-dhammā viṇayammi koviyā, 
tarittu te ohamiṇaṃ duruttaraṃ 
 khavittu kammaṃ gaïmuttamaṃ gaya. (DS 9.2.23, ed. Leumann 1932: 180) 
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But they who are obedient to the directions of the Guru, [who] know the Dharma 
and its meaning, are experienced in discipline, cross (tarittu) that dangerous flood 
[of Saṃsāra,] (oham duruttaraṃ) annihilate [their] Karman and reach the highest 
abode. (DS 9.2.23, tr. Schubring 1932: 112) 
A final and paradigmatic application of √tṝ in ‘the language of liberation’ may be 
provided by the Jain Uttarajjhayaṇa Sutta (Skt. Uttarādhyana Sūtra),90 lecture 23, suttas 
63-73, being a part of the famous dialogue between Kesi (Pārśva’s disciple) and Gotama 
(Mahāvīra’s disciple): 
कुÜपवयणपासÖडी सåवे उàमग्गपिट्ठया ǀ 
सàमग्गं तु िजणक्खायं एस मग्गे िह उ×तमे ǁ ६३ 
साहु गोयम पÛना त ेिछÛनो मे संसओ इमो ǀ 
अÛनो िव संसओ मÑझं तं मे कहसु गोयमा ǁ ६४ 
महाउदगवेगेण वुÑझमाणाण पािणणं ǀ 
सरणं गई पइट्ठा य दीवं कं मÛनसी मुणी ǁ ६५ 
अि×थ एगो महादीवो वािरमÑझ ेमहालओ ǀ 
महाउदगवेगèस गई त×थ न िवÏजई ǁ ६६ 
दीवे य इइ के वु×ते केसी गोयममÞबवी ǀ 
केिसमेवं बुवंतं तु गोयमो इणमÞबवी ǁ ६७ 
जरामरणवेगेणं वुÑझमाणाण पािणणं ǀ 
धàमो दीवो पइट्ठा य गई सरणमु×तमं ǁ ६८ 
साहु गोयम पÛना त ेिछÛनो मे संसओ इमो ǀ 
अÛनो िव संसओ मÑझं तं मे कहसु गोयमा ǁ ६९ 
अणवंिस महोहंिस नावा िवपिरधावई ǀ 
जंिस गोयममाǾढो कहं पारं गिमèसिस ǁ ७० 
जा उ सèसािवणी नावा न सा पारèस गािमणी ǀ 
 
                                                     
90 The Uttarādhyana Sūtra is the first Sūtra of the group of four Mūlasūtras. “The work, consisting 36 sections, 
is a compilation of various texts, which belong to various periods.” Cf. Winternitz 1999 (1983, revised edition): 
448. It contains many poems, parables and ballads. Some sections also deal with dogmatics and ascetic duties. 
A complete edition of the Sūtra has been provided by Charpentier. Cf. The Uttarādhyayanasūtra, Charpentier 
(ed.), 1922. The first chapter of the Uttarādhyana Sūtra has also been individually edited and translated by 
Norman. See Uttarajjhayaṇa-sutta, Norman, 1994. On the relative dating of the text, see Winternitz 1999 (1983, 
revised edition): 448. 
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जा िनरèसािवणी नावा सा उ पारèस गािमणी ǁ ७१ 
नावा य इइ का वु×ता केसी गोयममÞबवी ǀ 
केिसमेवं बुवंतं तु गोयमो इणमÞबवी ǁ ७२ 
सरीरमाहु नाव ि×त जीवे वुÍचइ नािवओ ǀ 
संसारो अणवो वु×तो जं तरिÛत महेिसणो ǁ ७३  
(UD 23.63-73, ed. Charpentier 1922: 175-176 )91 
“The heterodox [kuppavayaṇa] and the heretics [pāsaṇḍī] have all chosen a wrong 
path [ummagga]; the right path [sammagga] is that taught by the Ginas; it is the 
most excellent path.” (63) 
‘Well, Gautama, [you possess wisdom, you have destroyed my doubt; but I have 
another doubt which you must explain to me, Gautama]. (64) 
‘Is there a shelter, a refuge, a firm ground for the beings carried away by the great 
flood [vega] of water [mahāudaga]? Do you know the island, O Gautama?’ (65) 
“There is a large, great island in the midst of water, which is not inundated by the 
great flood of water.” (66) 
Kêsi said to Gautama, ‘What do you call this island?’ To these words of Kêsi 
Gautama made the following reply: (67) 
“The flood [vega] is age and death, which carry away living beings; Law [dhamma] 
is the island, the firm ground, the refuge, the most excellent shelter.” (68) 
 
                                                     
91 kuppavayaṇapāsaṇḍī savve ummaggapaṭṭhiyā, 
sammaggaṃ tu jiṇakkhāyaṃ esa magge hi uttame. (63) 
sāhu goyama pannā te chinno me saṃsao imo, 
anno vi saṃsao mañjhaṃ taṃ me kahasu goyamā. (64 ) 
mahāudagavegeṇa vuñjamāṇa pāṇiṇaṃ, 
saraṇaṃ gaī païṭṭhā dīvaṃ kaṃ mannasī muṇī. (65) 
atthi ego mahādīvo vārimañjhe mahālao, 
mahāudagavegassa gaī tattha na vijjaī. (66) 
dīve ya iï ke vutte kesī goyamamabbavī, 
kesimevaṃ buvaṃtaṃ tu goyamo iṇamabbavī. (67) 
jarāmaraṇavegeṇaṃ vuñjhamāṇa pāṇiṇaṃ, 
dhammo dīvo païṭṭhā ya gaī saraṇamuttaṃ. (68) 
sāhu goyama pannā te chinno me saṃsao imo, 
anno vi saṃsao mañjhaṃ taṃ me kahasu goyamā. (69) 
aṇavaṃsi mahohaṃsi nāvā viparidhāvaī, 
jaṃsi goyamamārūḍho kahaṃ pāraṃ gamissasi. (70) 
jā u sassāviṇī nāvā na sā pārassa gāmiṇī, 
jā nirassāviṇī nāvā sā u pārassa gāmiṇī. (71) 
nāvā ya iï kā vuttā kesī goyamamabbavī, 
kesimevaṃ buvaṃtaṃ tu goyamo iṇamabbavī. (72) 
sarīramāhu nāva tti jīve vuccaï nāvio, 
saṃsāro aṇavo vutto jaṃ taranti mahesiṇo.  (73) (UD 23.63-73, ed. Charpentier 122: 175-756, emphasis added) 
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‘Well, Gautama, [you possess wisdom, you have destroyed my doubt; but I have 
another doubt which you must explain to me, Gautama]. (69) 
‘On the ocean with its many currents there drifts a boat; how will you, Gautama, 
on board of it reach the opposite shore?’ (70) 
“A boat that leaks will not reach the opposite shore; but a boat that does not leak, 
will reach it.” (71) 
Kêsi said to Gautama, ‘What do you call this boat?’ To these words of Kêsi Gautama 
made the following reply: (72) 
“The body is the boat, life is the sailor, and the Circle of Births [saṃsāra] is the 
ocean which is crossed [taranti] by the great sages [mahesiṇo].” (73)  
(UD 23.63-73, tr. Jacobi 2004 [1985] SBE 45: 126-127) 
When we consider the metaphorical application of √tṝ in this Uttarajjhayaṇa passage 
together with its application in the other quoted Jain and Buddhist textual fragments, it 
may become clear how titthiya and its cognates may be viewed to constitute a semantic 
unity, despite their divergent meanings. What do the various denotations have in 
common? What the denotations ‘to cross over’ (√tṝ), ‘doctrine’, ‘(head of a) community 
of ascetics’, ‘fording place’ (all meanings that, as we have seen, are associated with the 
term tittha), and ‘adherent/head of a different ascetic community’ (añña-titthiya) have in 
common, is that they all developed within the metaphorical language of liberation. All 
denotations developed within the symbolic setting expressive of the difficult but much 
desired goal of liberation (mokkha).  
From the above quoted early Buddhist and Jain textual fragments it has become clear 
that both samaṇa communities translated the abstract soteriological idea of attaining 
liberation by means of drawing on the imagery of successfully crossing a river by boat. 
Within this metaphorical setting, the river, as we have seen, came to represent saṃsāra, 
this is, the endless cycle of life and death. Its treacherous strong currents (ogha, vega) 
preventing one to successfully ‘cross’ saṃsāra, has by both communities been 
metaphorically linked with the wrong ascetic path (ummagga) of so-called heretics. The 
failure to cross was further also seen presented as the outcome of not applying vinaya 
correctly, or as the result of neglecting the instructions of one’s teacher. Conversely, the 
means to successfully cross the river lies in following ‘the right path’ (sammagga). 
Finally, within this imagery, the bank (tittha) that is to be reached is represented as the 
safe, dry, firm ground, or, as in our fragment of the Uttarajjhayaṇa Sutta, as the island 
that prevents one from being swept away by the current of saṃsāra. When we consider 
the fact that within the respective traditions the raft to successfully cross over, or 
sometimes even the firm ground itself, is linked with the Buddha, the Jina, and their 
teachings, it becomes clear how ‘tittha’ came to carry the –interrelated – denotations of 
‘fording place,’ ‘doctrine’ and ‘(head of a) community of ascetics.’  
In conclusion, when remembering both how the term titthiya, being an adjective of 
appurtenance, literally means ‘belonging to a/the tittha,’ and the fact that its 
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development should be understood within this metaphorical setting, we now are able to 
understand how early Buddhist bhikkhus could initially positively associate themselves 
with the notions represented by the term. 
The semantic shift of ‘titthiya’ in Buddhist texts may then point to a (gradual) 
dissociation from and a simultaneous change of the notions represented by it. Be as it 
may, the semantic shift reflects a shift in the Buddhist community’s self-perception vis-
à-vis its others, wherein (the concern for) internal coherence amongst its members 
seems to prevail above the community’s participation in the larger samaṇa landscape. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
Departing from the truism that the development of the early Indian Buddhist 
community evolved in intense dialogue with its wider ascetic landscape, I examined 
how and how much of this dialogue can still be traced in the early Buddhist ascetic text, 
the Pāli Vinaya. Recognizing that ascetic others constituted an important dynamic and 
dialectic force within the development of the early Buddhist community, I investigated 
how the Pāli Vinaya acknowledged, integrated, and dealt with the early Buddhist 
bhikkhu’s ascetic others. In other words, this dissertation focussed on the role ascetic 
others, and in particular the Jain other, exerted on the early Buddhist community’s 
development, and assessed how and how much of their dynamic and dialectic 
contribution can be identified within the Pāli Vinaya. 
The question of how to identify the dialogic influence of ascetic others within the Pāli 
Vinaya, translated itself into the question of how to approach and read a normative 
source. We discussed how the Pāli Vinaya presents itself as a historically complex 
document. Due to its long textual development; its prescriptive nature; and its 
provenance within a ‘Buddhist’ traditional sphere (i.e. it was composed, transmitted and 
redacted by ‘Buddhist’ bhikkhus for ‘Buddhist’ bhikkhus), the Pāli Vinaya cannot be 
considered as a faithful blueprint of the historical development of the early Buddhist 
ascetic community. The manner how the narratives within the Pāli Vinaya revert to 
stock phrases; use a repetitive structure; and place the executive role for every legal 
decision with the Buddha himself created, as we have seen, a strong traditional story 
regarding the origin and development of the Buddhist ascetic saṅgha. It is evident that 
within such a traditional story the dynamic role of ascetic others is bound to either be 
flattened out, misrepresented or simply left out. Throughout this dissertation I explored 
possibilities to break through this normative, traditional account of the Pāli Vinaya to 
bring to the foreground the dialogic influence of the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s ascetic 
others. 
Situating my research within the contemporary scholarly discourse on anti-essentialism 
(cp. Section I ‘Scholarly Frameworks, Past and Present’), I considered it vital to apply to 
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the Pāli Vinaya only such readings and to raise only such questions that would do full 
justice to the very concept of dialogue.   
We have seen how within nineteenth century scholarly language the question of 
historical origins and development, because of being informed by the idea of “the purity 
of the historical prior,” effected homogenized products of knowledge. Similarities and 
differences between the various early Indian ascetic traditions were mapped out and 
relegated to the interpretative scheme of who copied who; who was prior; who may we 
consider to be the original source, thus attempting to define the ‘original’ Buddh‘ism’, 
‘original’ ‘Jain‘ism’ and ‘original’ Brahman‘ism’. Rejecting the very idea of an original, or 
essential Buddhism, Jainism, or Brahmanism,  I studied the early Buddhist community in 
relation to its various ascetic others in order to assess not the degree of so-called 
positive influence these ascetic others had on the Buddhist ascetic community’s 
development, but in order to assess the manner in which these ascetic others stirred the 
Buddhist ascetic community to dialectically define and redefine itself in terms of 
similarity and difference.  
To identify in the Pāli Vinaya and bring out the dialogic influence of the early Buddhist 
bhikkhu’s ascetic others, I applied, in a first instance, Nattier’s ‘principle of irrelevance’ 
and ‘principle of counterargument,’ while investigating the contact opportunities 
between the early Buddhist bhikkhus and his ascetic others. For the question of dialogue 
begs the simple but important question of contact. How easily could Buddhist bhikkhus 
come into contact, whether direct or indirect, with their ascetic others and how did this 
contact affected their self-perception and ascetic organization? The contact 
opportunities I drew from the Pāli Vinaya were supplemented with examples from the 
Jain Āyāraṅga Sutta. My principal aim was not to provide an exhaustive typology of 
contact opportunities, but to gain insights into the socio-geographical proximity of the 
early Buddhist bhikkhu ascetic others. Where was the ascetic other located? In other 
words, how easily could the Buddhist bhikkhu enter into dialogue with his ascetic other?  
We have seen how nearly any daily and basic activity (wandering for alms, sleeping, 
eating, bathing) of the early Buddhist bhikkhu could give rise to contact. In this 
discussion the paramount role of householders in bringing about contact opportunities 
also became evident. The fact that (some) householders would donate alms-food 
whether at their houses, or during public festal events, or at the place of residency itself 
of a samaṇa, irrespective of the latter’s specific ascetic affiliation, effected many direct 
and indirect contact opportunities. Also their establishment of public facilities, such as 
public rest-houses or travel lodges were conducive in bringing the Buddhist bhikkhu into 
direct and indirect contact with his ascetic others. The discussion of the various contact 
opportunities, whether arising from the activity (e.g. alms-begging) or place of being  
(e.g. public rest-house) of the Buddhist bhikkhu, made us better appreciate the reason 
why ascetic practices pertaining to garb, begging bowl and diet were so often the 
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subject of intra- and inter communal debates. In the absence of a material boundary 
separating the Buddhist bhikkhu from his ascetic others, the remaining locale to place 
identity rested with the bhikkhu’s body itself and the (visible) ascetic practices he could 
exerted with that body.  
We further noted how with the establishment of more sophisticated vihāra 
complexes, contact opportunities became both more regulated and, most probably, less 
frequent too. Exclusive and materially sophisticated vihāra complexes started to provide 
Buddhist bhikkhus with a new and important source of (distinctive) identity. With the 
establishment of materially more sophisticated vihāra complexes, the distinction 
between a Buddhist bhikkhu and his ascetic other became, in part, provided and 
supported by the material boundaries of the vihāra complex itself.   
In the third section ‘Processes of othering,’ I further examined the dialogic role of the 
early Buddhist bhikkhu’s ascetic other by reverting to Jonathan Smith’s theory of 
‘proximate other.’ With Smith’s theory we have seen how a community requires a 
theory of the other when experiencing “otherness” to be “TOO-MUCH-LIKE-US” or when it 
claims to “BE-US.” “It is here,” as Jonathan Smith remarked, “that the real urgency of 
theories of the ‘other’ emerges, called forth not so much by a requirement to place 
difference, but rather by an effort to situate ourselves.”1 In a similar context, Green 
noted how the terminology a community develops to refer to its so-called other are 
“primarily clues to its self-understanding.”2 These insightful reflections have proven to 
be very helpful in identifying processes of othering within the Pāli Vinaya.  
Considering the early Buddhist bhikkhus’ ascetic others to be in Smith’s 
understanding of the term ‘proximate,’ we examined both (1) when, how and why the 
Pāli Vinaya referred to these others, and (2) the terminology it developed to refer to 
them. When we keep Jonathan Smith’s and Green’s theories in mind, the value of 
examining the Pāli Vinaya’s references to the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s ascetic others and 
their supposed practices, lies in the fact that one can go beyond the (mere) question of 
whether the reference is historically faithful or not. This is, when searching for the 
dialectic and dynamic role of the ascetic others, one does not (per se) need to establish 
whether a particular reference to a supposed practice; utterance; soteriological idea 
(etc.) of a so-called proximate, ascetic other is historically correct (whether it has a 
factual correspondence), one can, instead, focus on the reflexive aspect of the reference: 
what does the reference in question say about the preoccupations of the early Buddhist 
bhikkhus themselves? In this manner, we were able to establish how the early Buddhist 
bhikkhus thought about the importance of the ascetic garb; the value of the ascetic 
 
                                                     
1 Smith 2004 (1992): 245. 
2 Green 1985: 49. 
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practice of nakedness, and of the importance of a begging bowl in direct relation to its 
proximate, ascetic other, whether real or imagined.  
Further, having examined the various denominations the Pāli Vinaya developed for 
referring to the early Buddhist bhikkhu ascetic other, we were able to establish that 
though having a knowledge of the manner how contemporaneous ascetic communities 
denominated themselves, the monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya preferred to resort to the 
more neutral and generic denomination (añña)titthiya. We explained this preference to 
be in line with their general concern to create the very tradition they claimed to hold. 
In the final section, I addressed the dialogic role of the early Buddhist bhikkhu’s 
ascetic other by means of a philological examination of ‘titthiya’ and kindred terms. 
Through this examination we were able to identify a semantic shift in the application of 
the term titthiya. Whereas early Buddhist bhikkhus could initially positively associate 
themselves, and could also by outsiders positively be associated with, the term titthiya, 
they nevertheless (gradually) lost their self-identification with the term. Instead 
‘titthiya’ became exclusively used to generically refer to their real or imagined ascetic 
others, and this usually in contexts betraying a negative perception of these others. We 
argued that this semantic shift went hand in hand with a shift in the manner how the 
early Buddhist ascetic community perceived and related to its ascetic other. If it initially 
might have related to its ascetic others in terms of sameness, the early Buddhist ascetic 
community gradually, having become well-established and self-conscious of its 
difference, started to more and more relate to its ascetic others in terms of difference. 
Keeping in honour our statement at the beginning of this dissertation on “the 
importance of an on-going methodological reflection,” and recalling how a PhD is “not 
an endpoint, but just a jumping board to other [yet, unwritten] chapters,”3 I end my 
dialogue with the Pāli Vinaya, for now, here. 
 
 
                                                     
3 Cf. p. vii. 
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